THE CAUSES OF TYRANNY AS A GUIDE TO POLITICAL REFORM: 
ST. THOMAS MORE’S *HISTORY OF KING RICHARD III OF ENGLAND*

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Part One of this dissertation establishes a basis for interpreting More’s *History of King Richard III*. Chapter One inquires into its genre, concluding it is a “rhetorical history” like the histories composed by Thucydides, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus, a genre similar to drama which aims to reveal fundamental moral and political truths by following classical rhetorical principles. Chapter Two investigates the relationship between the nine textually significant extant versions of this work, and concludes that they derive from a series of revised drafts. The English versions are shown to be preliminary drafts, with the Paris manuscript being the Latin version based on the latest draft. Chapter Three analyzes the changes between drafts and finds that More carefully revised his work and paid particular attention to concepts important in political philosophy.

The four chapters of Part Two interpret the work's political teaching. Chapter Four introduces the major theme—the causes of tyranny in the England depicted—by contrasting tyranny with a good political order, “republic.” This chapter defines tyranny, distinguishes the tyrant Richard from the merely bad king Edward, notes the relationship between tyranny and faction, and describes the attributes of a republic and its members, “citizens.” It also discusses aligning public and private interests and avoiding conflicts of interest as principles of political reform. Chapter Five inquires into institutional causes of tyranny, discussing sanctuary and the dangers of imprudent rational critique, the strengths
and weaknesses of England's criminal, civil, and constitutional law, and the weaknesses of hereditary kingship. Chapter Six inquires into moral causes, concentrating on individual failures of the virtue *fides*, including persons who are too trusting and those who are not trustworthy, discusses when it is appropriate to trust, and notes the importance of trustworthiness in political teaching. Chapter Seven inquires into non-human causes—Divine Providence, fate, and fortune—and concludes that despite the limits these place on human power, a significant arena for choice and action remains. Humans have free will, and should choose to work for the real, but limited possibility of political reform.

The Appendix includes a new literal translation of *Richard III* from Latin.
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Approved by the Examining Committee:

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To my mother and father
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Part One: Establishing a Basis for Interpretation

The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze Thomas More’s political philosophy as presented in *The History of Richard III*, and Part Two provides that analysis. However, because confusion about two fundamental questions concerning this work characterizes the present state of Morean scholarship, Part One addresses both of them in order to demonstrate that the interpretive approach adopted in Part Two is justified by the evidence. These two questions concern (1) the *History’s* genre and (2) which of the extant texts ought to be taken as authoritative, and they must be answered before any very specific analysis can be attempted, since, with regard to the first, different kinds of works are intended to be read in different ways and for different purposes, and, regarding the second, the various texts of More’s *Richard III*, while telling the same story, nevertheless differ very substantially.

In order to understand how and why the current misunderstandings concerning the genre and text of *Richard III* came about, it is necessary to briefly recount how this work has come down to us. Certain choices made by More and his posthumous publishers have given rise to a great deal of confusion which has tended to mask the full philosophical vigor of the *History* throughout most of the five centuries since he first wrote it. In retrospect, the single largest contributing factor to both the prevalent misunderstandings and the general neglect of this text by subsequent scholars was More’s decision neither to publish it while he was alive, nor to leave clear instructions about how to handle his manuscripts after his death. The negative effect of this authorial choice was in this particular case uniquely compounded because, as Chapter Two will describe in
detail, at least three significantly different manuscripts of *Richard III* each gave rise to different published versions of More’s *History* in the thirty years following his death; and one of these versions was in Latin, leading to the rare example of a major literary work coming down to us not only with substantive textual variants, but also in two different languages. The first version of More’s *History* to be published was printed in 1543 by Richard Grafton, and this version set two important precedents which were to have an unfortunately prejudicial effect on how readers understood More’s work over the next 400 years: its language and its mode of presentation. First, Grafton based his book on an English manuscript, and published in that language for a popular audience. More’s Latin manuscript was subsequently almost completely ignored. Although it must have been copied at least a few times, only two editions based on it were published before 1963: in More’s *Complete Latin Works* published at Louvain in 1565 (reprinted 1566) and in an almost identical collection published at Frankfurt in 1689. As a result, the impact of any Latin version was minimal. Furthermore, as Chapter Two will show, although these Latin editions were superior to all of the English versions in several ways, the best Latin version of *Richard III* is found in a manuscript that was not published until 1986.

The second precedent Grafton set was to incorporate More’s work into a larger history of England (in this first instance, Grafton’s continuation of John Harding’s *Chronicle*), rather than publishing More’s work on its own. Grafton’s second edition of that continuation (published later the same year) marked the second time *Richard III* appeared in print. This was followed by the inclusion of More’s *History* in two editions of Edward Hall’s *Union of the Two Noble Houses of Lancaster and York*, another chronicle, in 1548 and 1550. Then in 1557, More’s nephew William Rastell published
his massive *English Works of Sir Thomas More*, which included a different and superior English version of *Richard III*. Importantly, Rastell claimed to have printed from an autograph manuscript, and criticized the four previously published versions as erroneous. Rastell notably treated More’s *History* as an independent work, but in this he was almost alone. Between 1557, when Rastell’s version was published, and 1821, when Rastell’s version was first reprinted verbatim (in an edition intended for scholars), More’s *Richard III* was published in English twenty-six additional times; but only two of those were not parts of larger chronicle histories, and both of those two drew their text from Hall’s 1550 version, rather than from Rastell’s. Since Hall’s version included substantial portions of text that were not actually More’s, and which were designed for use in a chronicle, even these stand-alone versions tended to reinforce the long-settled impression of virtually all readers that More’s *Richard III* was a chronicle of events like other similar chronicles, better written, indeed, but nevertheless a work whose purpose was to recount events of the past. Although some of the English editions published after Rastell’s version followed the wording of his text even while incorporating it into a history of England, many others continued to follow Hall’s or Grafton’s text, and several went as far as to add their own interpolations, comments, corrections, and speculations without acknowledging that the text they were presenting was not really More’s as he wrote it. Furthermore, almost all of these versions split More’s work into two or three parts: at

1 Thus altogether *Richard III* was published 31 times in English and twice in Latin before 1821. For comparison, More’s *Utopia* was published 24 times in Latin and 20 times in English translation (as well as 8 times in French, 4 times in German, 3 times in Italian, 6 times in Dutch, and twice in Spanish) before 1821 (Frank & Majie Padberg Sullivan, no page numbers). For the first 125 years after More’s death, *Richard III* was published almost as often as *Utopia*, and far more often in England. By 1651, *Richard III* had been published 25 times in English and once in Latin. By that year *Utopia* had been published 18 times in Latin (never in England), 5 times in English, 4 times in Dutch, 3 times in French, twice in German, once in Italian, and once in Spanish.

2 The 1641 edition and its reprint in 1651.

3 See Chapter Two of this dissertation, pp. 38-46.
least a “History of Edward V” covering the time before Richard is crowned and a
“History of Richard III” for that small part of More’s English manuscript which occurs
after his coronation, and sometimes also with the account of Edward IV’s deathbed
oration further split apart and attached to a chronicle of that king’s reign. Such division
masked the work’s thematic and dramatic unity.

As a result of such treatment, virtually everyone who read More’s Richard III in
the 400 years following its first publication read it and judged it solely as a factual
account. For more than a century, it was nearly universally treated as an accurate one,
and successfully used by the Tudor monarchs to lend credence to their efforts to vilify the
man from whom Henry Tudor had usurped the British throne. In 1646, George Buck
became the first to publicly question whether Richard III was really as evil as he is
portrayed in More’s account, and the tide began to turn. After Horace Walpole’s Historic
Doubts on the Life and Reign of Richard III in 1768, most scholars came to conclude that
More’s account was erroneous at best, and heavily biased at worst. Over the next 140
years, increasing doubts about the historical accuracy of the work, combined with More’s
towering reputation for integrity even to the point of death, gave traction among scholars
to the rumor that The History of Richard III was not More’s work at all, but Cardinal

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4 See Rubio, 276-370 for a comprehensive list of published versions of Richard III that contains
descriptions of which earlier version each edition was based upon, and how the text was altered in each
case.

5 Rubio, 2-3. Rubio was not, however, as he claimed, “the first to question this assumption.” As will be
noted in Chapter One, A.F. Pollard, L.F. Dean, A.R. Myers and C.S. Lewis all read Richard III as
something other than a chronicle history some years earlier than Rubio, although none of their analyses
were as extensive or systematic as Rubio’s. There was also one prominent exception before the twentieth
century: Dr. Samuel Johnson, who certainly appreciated Richard III’s literary value, apart from any
historical concerns. In his essay “The History of the English Language,” prefaced to his famous
Dictionary, he wrote “[T]he works of Sir Thomas More ... were considered as models of pure and elegant
style” (27), and Dr. Johnson devotes more space to quoting from More’s Richard III than from any other
work (32-35).

6 Rubio, 190-198.
Morton’s. They apparently reasoned along these lines: the work contains false
statements; More would never lie; therefore, the work must not be More’s.

Thus, at the turn of the 20th century, standard reference works such as the
Cambridge History of English Literature and the Dictionary of National Biography were
reporting that More was not the author of this work. The scholarly debate of that time,
such as it was, revolved almost entirely over the issues of authorship and factual
accuracy. After R.W. Chambers conclusively demonstrated More’s authorship in 1928
(showing, in fact, that there should never have been any question on the point, since the
evidence was so lopsided in More’s favor), the question of historicity persisted for

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7 This unsubstantiated rumor was first reported by John Harrington in 1596: “Lastly the best, and the best
written part of all our chronicles, in all mens opinions, is that of Richard the Third, written as I have heard
by Moorton, but as most suppose, by that worthy and uncorrupt magistrate, Sir Thomas More, sometime
Lorde Chancellor of England ...” (46).
8 See Grace 1977, 11.
9 Chambers 1928, 406. For an example of the confusion about authorship before Chambers wrote his
article, see Krapp, 82, 83 n. 58, 312.
10 Despite the evidence that Chambers presents, as late as 1940 W. Gordon Zeevald still argued against him:
“In spite of the care with which [Chambers] has formulated his argument, his evidence still leaves the
authorship open to question. More did not acknowledge the history as his work, and it was attributed to
him by no one else during his lifetime. Furthermore, internal evidence of date ... is illusory and misleading
in setting a forward date, except as applied to the particular manuscript or edition in hand. Whatever
reverence William Rastell might have held for a work of Thomas More would not necessarily prevent the
addition of such personal reminiscences as would enrich the manuscript draft in More’s own hand. But
even assuming that Rastell’s edition was indeed a word for word printing of More’s manuscript, it cannot
be assumed that the More autograph was not a copy of an earlier work. ... [N]one of the evidence prevents
accepting Buc's statement at its face value, namely, that More inherited a Latin history of Richard from
Morton, his early patron” (Zeevald 1940, 955). The evidence for More’s authorship has only become
stronger since that time, however. For example, now that More’s complete works are available in print,
very strong stylistic, verbal, and thematic parallels between More’s other writings and all the Latin and
English versions of Richard III are quite noticeable. Cf. Edward’s words (444.5-6) with More’s Epigram
243 and Richard’s words (480.10-12) with Epigram 121, for example.

The numbers in parentheses in the previous sentence refer to lines 5-6 on page 444 and lines 10-12
on page 480, respectively, of The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 15, ed. Daniel Kinney, (New
Haven: Yale U.P., 1986). Subsequent citations of Richard III in this dissertation will be parenthetical, by
page and line number, in this style. All such citations without a prefix are from this volume. Although the
line numbers cited are the Latin text, rather than Kinney's translation (found on facing pages in that
volume), quotations are generally given in English. These are always my own translations, unless
otherwise noted. A full English translation of the version of More’s Richard III which I consider best (as
explained in Chapter Two) appears as an appendix to this dissertation. Sometimes my translations of
particular lines or words given in the body or notes of this dissertation do not exactly match the translation
in the Appendix, since more than one English translation is often appropriate for the same Latin word, and
sometimes my argument requires an emphasis on different shades of meaning.
several decades longer, while being gradually eclipsed by a related topic of debate that has continued until the present day: Richard III’s genre.

Taking this contemporary debate as a starting point, Chapter One of this dissertation first investigates the accumulated evidence related to genre, and concludes that Richard III is best classified as a “rhetorical history,”11 the same genre as the famous histories by Herodotus, Thucydides, Sallust, Suetonius, Plutarch, Livy, and Tacitus, as well as other works written during the Renaissance in emulation of such classical Greek and Roman exemplars. Only after understanding what it means to be a rhetorical history can one know how and to what end More’s History should be read. This genre is shown to be characterized by, among other things, its distinctive rhetorical style, its philosophical nature, and its moral and political educational goals, and Part Two of this dissertation interprets the work in light of this understanding.

The discussion of genre is applicable to all of the extant versions of More’s Richard III. None of them differ so widely as to constitute an entirely different kind of work. However, they differ from each other enough to complicate a serious student’s task. Interpreting a philosophically and rhetorically precise text often requires analyzing particular phrasing, sometimes even which individual words are used or repeated, and the various versions of Richard III, as was noted, sometimes differ by much more than just wording. Therefore, Chapter Two carefully compares all ten of the extant versions and shows that they represent a series of drafts, rather than merely examples of variants creeping into the work as a result of textual transmission. Based on the available evidence, an order of these drafts is proposed which indicates that the most recently discovered Latin version of Richard III is in fact the most advanced extant draft. Thus

the interpretation found in Part Two is based on that version, and a new literal and consistent translation of that version into English appears as an appendix to this dissertation.

Chapter Three utilizes the order of drafts established in Chapter Two in an analysis of More’s composition process, which sheds light on the themes More emphasizes in this work. The nature of his revisions helps to show that More intended for the *History* to deal with many of the most important questions of political philosophy, including those of the best regime, the possibility of political reform, and the relationship between God and man. Part Two then goes on to investigate various aspects of these and related questions.
Chapter One: Ascertaining the Work’s Genre

To what genre does Richard III belong? This is one of the most vexing questions scholars continue to grapple with, and it is certainly the single most debated question about the work over the last hundred years. At first, this debate might seem surprising, because the question seems to answer itself. The title indicates a “history.” However, there is strong evidence that More's idea of a history is not the same as the one commonly held today, leading many scholars, beginning with Pollard, to ask “in what sense, if any, More regarded himself as writing history.” This chapter will show that it would be misleading and possibly confusing to approach Richard III in the same way as a modern history monograph because of how history is understood now; will argue that the work is rather a “rhetorical history”; and will explain how a rhetorical history should be read, in light of its intended purpose.

Generally, historians of our time stress neutrality and factual accuracy. A good history, in the prevailing modern view, is one that accurately describes events of the past without disclosing the bias of the historian, without making a judgment about the events described, and without adding things that did not happen or leaving out things that did happen. The object, in this view, is to provide objective historical facts to a reader. More’s History does not meet these standards.

For one thing, the Narrator makes numerous moral judgments, and in particular, no reader comes away with a positive view of Richard himself, leading Krapp to

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12 “Two literary questions haunt readers of the History of Richard III: to what genre does it belong, and why was it never finished?” (J.P. Jones, 57).
comment, “It seems to have been written less in the spirit of the disinterested seeker after truth than in that of the political pamphleteer, intent on strengthening the cause of Richard’s vanquishers.”

And although More’s work was not intended as Tudor propaganda, Tudor officials noticed the work’s clearly negative picture of Richard, and successfully adopted (or rather adapted) it as such.

Additionally, other aspects of the work mark it as significantly different than modern history, leading most scholars since 1935 to argue that literary, rather than historical concerns were dominant in its composition. Richard Sylvester, for example, argues that “More's History of King Richard III is just as surely literature as it is history,” while Hanham goes farther, concluding that “it is more profitable to regard it as literature than as a work of scholarship embodying the results of historical research.”

Pollard similarly says, “[More’s] history is literary art, and not historical science,” and F. Smith Fussner echoes him. A. R. Myers, among others, recognizes that “it is questionable whether More regarded himself as writing history; his story is much more like a drama, unfolded in magnificent prose, for which fidelity to historical fact is scarcely relevant.” The work’s similarity to drama and its lack of fidelity to historical fact have both been widely recognized, and both indicate that classifying the work among

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14 Krapp, 416.
15 Carver, 33; A.R. Myers, 515; Reese, 47; Hanham 1975B, 37; Donno, 418; Gransden, 445; Rudnytsky, 165; Schmidt, 189.
16 That Richard III is not inherently pro-Tudor can be seen from the fact that these officials felt the need to significantly edit the work and carefully package it with other royally approved chronicles in order to make the point they wished, as Chapter Two will discuss in more detail.
18 Hanham 1975A, 155.
19 Pollard 1933, 320.
20 Fussner, 230.
21 Myers, 515.
modern histories would be a mistake.

Looking at the big picture first, the whole design of the work shows considerable concern for symmetry, symbolism, and drama, but very little for chronology. Daniel Kinney notes that Richard III displays an “artistic pattern,” 22 that “the drama of Richard's usurpation forms a self-contained whole,” 23 and in particular that “the conclusion of the Latin [version] as we have it produces a considerable impression of dramatic completeness.” 24 In addition, the sequence of narration in this work often strays from historical chronology, which separates Richard III from both the typical histories of our time and from the other English chronicles with which it was packaged by Grafton, Hall, and most of its later publishers. The beginning is particularly mixed. 25 Richard III opens with a statement of King Edward IV's death (314.1), goes on to describe his funeral (316.1-5), then backs up to paint a picture of his life, from his youth (316.27) through his very last summer (318.23), then mentions his death again (320.1), then, after a digression on the titular Richard, reverses again to give Edward's last speech and its circumstances (329.24 ff). Later, after recounting the beheading of Hastings (412.17-9), the History tells of the day before his death and some important events that happened the morning before he was killed (414.1-420.8). Similarly, the account of Richard's actions after the execution of Hastings is interrupted by a biography of Shore's wife which stretches from

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22 CW 15, cli, n. 1.
23 CW 15, cli, n. 3 (continued from p. cl).
24 CW 15, clii, n. 2. There is in fact more than one Latin version, but most scholars lump all the versions in each language together and therefore speak of only two versions. Chapter Two discusses the question in more detail. The analysis in this chapter is applicable to all the versions, except where otherwise noted.
25 The different opening sequence found in some texts of Richard III, as well as the reason this alternate sequence is more chronological, is discussed in Chapter Two. The argument of this dissertation (for reasons given in Chapter Two) will rely on a version that opens as described in this paragraph. The versions with the alternate opening sequence nevertheless share with the other versions the flashbacks described here.
her birth to her seventies (424.23-430-14), and another sizable portion of the work is a 
flashback concerning Edward IV's marriage (436.7-448.16).26 This is all very effective 
narrative, but only makes an accounting of particular dates more confusing. A clear 
account of historical events does not appear to be the main goal.

In addition to its chronology, much of the detail of Richard III indicates a literary, 
rather than historical, focus. As Logan notes, “Richard's thoughts and secret 
conversations, and the speeches he puts into the mouths of the usurper and other major 
characters are clearly ... to a large extent rhetorical inventions.”27 The death-bed oration 
of Edward IV, for example, is nothing close to a stenographic record, or even an attempt 
at accuracy based on interviewing witnesses. Instead, it amounts to “an elaborate 
rearrangement and paraphrase of a death-bed oration in Sallust (Bellum Iugurthinum 9.4-
11.1).”28 Since speeches and dialogue are such a large proportion of Richard III,29 more 
of the work is imagination than fact.

Next, aside from dialogue, some of the information in More's History of Richard 
III is verifiably inaccurate, while much that is accurate is unimportant. For example, 
almost all the evidence indicates that Hastings and his enemies in the Queen's family 
were not killed on the same day, as stated in the History (430.15-8). Rather than be

26 Hanham astutely observes, “The difficulty is partly that, viewed as a piece of straightforward historical 
writing, the History is curiously uneven, and the author’s purpose seems unsure. The long debate about the 
privilege of sanctuary overbalances the narrative ...; the widely praised description of Mistress Shore has so 
little to do with the matter in hand that it looks like self-indulgence on the part of the writer; and the 
superstitious elements in the work are strange indeed from a man like More, who elsewhere attacks 
superstition in the strongest terms” (1975A, 153). Once the genre of this work is understood, however, 
these elements all make sense. See Chapters Five, Six, and Seven of this dissertation, where all three of 
these elements are discussed.
27 Logan 2005, xxxi. Cf. Pollard 1977, 429; Chambers 1938, 117; Carver, 36; Reese, 46; Hanham 1975A, 
181.
28 CW 15, cl.
29 Logan has calculated that “fictional oration: speeches, direct or reported, … constitute 40 percent of the 
English version … and more than half of the Latin one” (2005, xxxiii).
strictly accurate, however, “More seems to link the two executions for purely dramatic reasons.”30 Sylvester notes, “On the whole, [More] seems not to have been greatly concerned about the accuracy or inaccuracy of individual details—names, dates, and places.”31 In some spots, More makes “blunders,” yet in others, he gets “a large number of minor details … correct.”32 A modern historian would be interested in getting all the facts right, and more concerned about major details than minor ones, but, “[f]or More, … the importance of the facts themselves is conditioned by the symbolic value which they can be made to assume in his narrative.”33

In fact, as more and more contemporary records have come to light, it has become increasingly clear that the charges of inaccuracy first leveled by Buck and Walpole are justified. Already by 1900, “[t]hat More’s account contains not only many inaccuracies, but also seemingly wilful misstatements of fact, ha[d] been abundantly proved.”34 George Logan is therefore correct when he characterizes Richard III as “semi-fictional historiography” that “does not meet the critical standards of modern historical writing,”35 but, as Hanham notes, that does not mean that it is a “travesty of historical method,” as some have claimed.36 It was not meant to provide the kind of information that the historical writing of contemporary America provides. Richard III is not a failed history, but rather an “artistic triumph”37 of literature.

One of the History’s factual inaccuracies has received a great deal of attention

30 CW 15, 621.
31 CW 2, lxix.
32 CW 2, lxxix.
33 CW 2, lxxvii. See also Hanham 1975A, 160.
34 Churchill, 119. Pollard lists many such factual errors (1977, 427), as does Grace (1977, 12).
35 Logan 2005, xv-xvi.
36 See Hanham 1975A, 152.
37 CW 2, lxxx.
Mock Chapter One 13

from scholars because it is so prominently placed, and so obvious, so much so that
Sylvester refers to it as an “egregious blunder.” The very opening lines of the History
increase the age of King Edward IV at his death by about 13 years. Although some have
argued that More forgot Edward's real age or made a “mistake,” it seems unlikely that if
More was in doubt about Edward’s age he would report it with a false accuracy down to
the very day (314.4). Instead, this opening passage should be read as a statement of
literary intent. More shows that historical accuracy is not his aim by intentionally giving
an obviously wrong age, an error “so flagrant” that it would therefore attract the
attention of anyone even somewhat familiar with the events described, but in such a way
as to also be symbolic and meaningful. By giving Edward's age to the day, the Latin

38 CW 2, lxxix. Almost all scholars who mention this inaccuracy are struck by it, and most are at a loss to
explain it. Pollard calls it an “astonishing statement” (1977, 426), “illogical” (1977, 427), and an
“extraordinary assertion” (1933, 320); Rubio calls it “most striking” (51, n. 21); Yost calls it “an egregious
error” (24); Anderson says, “More’s first sentence exhibits a notorious lack of factual accuracy” (80). See
also Ackroyd, 160; Grace 1977, 12.
39 CW 15, cxlv, n. 1.
40 CW 2, lxxix. Daniel Kinney uses the same word to describe this “misreckoning” (CW 15, 607), as does
Jeremy Potter (113).
41 Andreas Höfele comments thus on this inaccuracy: “Blunder indeed! How strange that More
should have got something so easily ascertainable so blatantly wrong! But then, did he? The egregiousness
of the mistake occurring at the very outset of the narrative has led critics to suspect that it might have been
deliberate, or indeed that it couldn’t have been anything but deliberate” (193).
Anderson is one commentator who agrees that it was deliberate. She investigates the meaning of
the opening lines of the History more than any other scholar, and argues that More gives, not a historically
accurate, but rather an “idealized portrait of King Edward” at the beginning of the History (81), and
Edward’s inaccurate age is part of More’s message to readers: “[The inaccurate age] is conspicuous; it not
only reveals but also briefly exposes the fact of More’s idealization of Edward. But More’s purpose in
idealizing Edward is neither to satirize the King nor to deceive the reader. More frees himself from strict
accuracy ... from an unimaginative assessment of truth. He takes fictional license with fact and most
notably with biographical data ... Yet More also alerts us to what he is doing” (82). “[More’s] error
regarding Edward’s age at death in virtually the first words of the first sentence of the Richard is not
accidental. It is an error stated in loving detail and with unqualified assurance, where uncertainty or
conflicting information as to his age, which was likely to have been available to More, would have called
for a different approach” (83).
Wegemer also agrees that “the opening sentence ... contains ‘errors’ so glaring as to make any
reader knowledgeable of the period stop short. This sentence, however, from a literary point of view,
serves the same function as More’s title of Utopia: both serve to warn the attentive reader of the literary
game at play. In this opening sentence of Richard III, for example, More claims that King Edward lived
versions are able to list every number between 2 and 7, inclusive, with no repetitions, in this order: 4, 5, 3, 7, 6, 2 (and 20; 315.3-5).\textsuperscript{42} One English version even manages to fit in all the numbers less than 10, with no repetitions, by mentioning the length of his reign to the day and recording the date of his death, resulting in this order: 4, 5, 3, 7, 6, 2 (and 20), 1, 8, 9.\textsuperscript{43} These opening lines show the reader what to expect from the work: not history, but literature.\textsuperscript{44} Like Edward's age, \textit{Richard III} as a whole will not be factually accurate in every detail, but it will be rational, orderly, precise, and complete; and to see this order, those details need to be carefully noted.

Although all but a few recent scholars agree that More's \textit{Richard III} is not a fifty-three years; actually he lived only forty—a fact that More tells us later in the same work. ... These errors draw attention to the cause of the war following Edward's death. If Edward had lived to be fifty-three, his children would have been old enough to rule; given that he in fact died thirteen years earlier because of his own wanton living, Edward seems doubly responsible for the civil discord that followed. More could not have made these errors inadvertently. In fact, More simply imitates his classical ancestors in using a standard literary device to warn careful readers that he does not intend to write either a chronological account of Richard's life or a mere listing of known dates and events. He intends to tell the truth, not of the historical accidents of time and place, but of Richard's 'essence'—i.e., his nature as a tyrant. ... In short, More's \textit{History of King Richard III} does not claim historical accuracy as understood today" (1996, 218, n.9).

Rubio similarly reads this as an "obvious error" (231, n. 6) and also concludes that it was intentional (197-198, 200, 216), as does Yost (24, 40). They interpret it as a signal to the reader of an unreliable narrator. However, as far as I could tell, no previous commentator has noted the numerical pattern which More included as part of that message.

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. Dante, \textit{Inferno}, 33.67-75, where the numbers 1-6 are used in a similar way.

\textsuperscript{43} For purposes of clarity, I have adopted a somewhat cumbersome method of citing lines from \textit{Richard III} in CW 2. First, in order to avoid any confusion with citations from CW 15, all citations from Sylvester's volume will bear their prefix. Next, because pages 2-82 of this volume are doubled, with one page of each number in both Latin and English, the page number will be followed by a letter, either "a" for the left-handed pages in English, or "b" for the right-handed pages in Latin. Last will come the line number(s). Thus, these opening lines in English are found at CW 2, 3a.1-4. Subsequent citations of lines from either the Latin or English text of \textit{Richard III} in CW 2 will be parenthetical.

\textsuperscript{44} "Alluding to the manner of a history so conspicuously and employing fact so licentiously in the opening sentence of the \textit{Richard}, More indicates the historical nature of his work and limits its claim to literal, exact historicity. His opening signals that he treats historical fact but that he treats it very much as subject rather than as inviolable object. He primarily masters its essential truth, whether ideal or otherwise, rather than primarily recording its data" (Anderson, 84).
historical work in the modern sense, there seems at first to be no agreement on what it actually is. It has been described as a biography, an example of literary portraiture, a drama, a morality play, the first historical novel, an epideictic, a satire, and an historical work in the modern sense, there seems at first to be no agreement on what it actually is. It has been described as a biography, an example of literary portraiture, a drama, a morality play, the first historical novel, an epideictic, a satire, and an

Despite the evidence, some few commentators continue to place a great deal of emphasis on the word “history,” which is indeed not only found in the title, but is also used by the Narrator to describe the work (328.6; CW 2, 9a.20). Pollard notes that Utopia is in fact referred to in one of its prefatory letters using the same word, so the word cannot mean a factual work (1977, 426), but Anderson responds that “More’s letter refers not to his own narrative as ‘history’ but to the imaginary Hythloday’s Utopian tale, making the reference doubly ironic because it is twice removed from historical fact” (76-7). However, one could certainly accept More’s work as ironic without accepting it as historically accurate. Furthermore, to associate the word “history” (whether in English or Latin) in the sixteenth century with the modern conception of “historical fact” is an anachronism. As Reiter points out, “in the sixteenth century, the word ‘history’ was used quite loosely. Legendary chronicles, polemical treatises, even tragic dramas were called, on their title pages, ‘history’” (6). The genre of Richard III cannot be determined by the modern meaning of a single word.

A few others continue to insist that Richard III is largely historically accurate; they argue that to claim that “because the History is undeniably a work of literature, its historical accuracy is therefore suspect... is to create a false dichotomy” (Anderegg, 41; cf. Höfele, 192). To some extent, this interpretation is not controversial. Everyone admits that some of the facts in Richard III are historically accurate, that Richard was a real king, and that some of the other characters were also real people. Zeevald, however, insists that “detail after detail of that remarkable portrait is historically grounded” (1963, 67). As noted above, however, many details are not, and many large portions of the work, especially the speeches, are probably not historically grounded at all. D.F. Rowan, while researching Shore’s wife, says, “The most important historical document is Sir Thomas More’s Life of Richard III. Later historians have discovered a number of proclamations, records and letters which generally confirm the outlines of the story as told by More” (448). Again, it would be a mistake to jump from a confirmed general outline to accepting More’s description of Mistress Shore as accurate in every detail. Given More’s exaggerations in his descriptions of Kings Edward and Richard, it would not be surprising to find the same in the case of Shore’s wife, if other contemporary descriptions were ever to be found. Hallet, too, insists that “More’s work, in spite of its enormous literary merits, remains primarily a history. There is every reason to believe that More regarded it as such” (22). Hallet goes on to acknowledge that “it is a known fact that More himself made errors and at other times willfully altered facts so they would better serve his agenda.” However, “[More’s] defense would probably be to ask pardon for his errors but at the same time to defend any conscious alterations as having been made in the interest of highlighting the significance of events, even though it occasionally became necessary to disregard minor facts. Always, the greater truth was being served. More... grounds the actions in specific times and places, both which can be checked for accuracy. When he says that it was on Friday, the thirteenth of June, 1483, in the Tower of London, that Richard of Gloucester arrested Lord Hastings for treason and that Richard had Hastings beheaded on the same day, one can take it as a fact” (22-3). More also says, however, that the Queen’s kinsmen were also beheaded that day, which is not a fact. Hallet is anxious to differentiate More from Shakespeare—“More was engaged in writing history, while Shakespeare was writing drama” (90)—but there are more appropriate ways than to continue to insist that More was a historian in the modern sense.

46 Krapp, 316; Stauffer, 37; Carver, 31; Reiter, 6. Chambers, in contrast, explicitly rules out biography (1932, xlvi). 47 Anderson, 7. 48 Pollard 1977, 426; Myers, 515; Kincaid, 223-42; Hanham 1975A, 174; Ross, xxvi. 49 Kincaid, 231. 50 J.P. Jones, 49; Yost, 7-8.
“inverted panegyric.” Many commentators have placed the work in more than one category, or have noted the work’s mixed nature. This situation has been unhelpful, since, as Grace notes, “a view of the History as literature neither disqualifies it as history nor gives any precise guide to its interpretation.” Readers need to know what kind of literature it is. Perhaps because so many genres have been proposed, a few scholars have even gone so far as to assert that this work does not have a genre, or at least not one we can determine. However, a closer look at how various commentators describe Richard III while they are discussing its genre shows that despite the different categories used by different scholars, and the disagreements some of them think they have with each other, most of them actually are describing the same kind of work using different names.

The characteristics which many scholars see in More’s History include its dramatic presentation, its aim to educate its readers in moral and political truths, the influence of classical authors—especially Tacitus, Sallust, Suetonius,
Thucydides, and Livy—its adherence to classical rhetorical principles, and its philosophical nature. Several scholars have moved the debate considerably forward by showing that such characteristics are in fact typical of several similar works composed during the Renaissance by other humanists, and have therefore classified More’s Richard III as a “humanist history.” This classification is accurate and helpful; however, since
(as all these scholars correctly note) humanist histories were written in emulation of classical histories, they really constitute members of a larger genre together with those ancient works, which this dissertation, following Logan, calls "rhetorical history." Logan’s description of rhetorical history from a modern perspective is very helpful:

In shaping the materials he obtained from a variety of sources into a coherent narrative, More applied the historiographical precepts and techniques revived by previous humanist historians from the ancient Greeks and Romans. The key fact about the classical tradition of historiography is that in it narrative history was normally regarded as a branch of rhetoric. Rhetoric is the art of verbal persuasion; its aims, according to an influential Ciceronian dictum, are to teach, delight and move. When the genre is history, the teachings are moral and political, and we are moved to put them into practice primarily because they are embodied in vivid instances: as Thucydides—the father of classical political history—was reported to have said, ‘history is philosophy teaching by examples.’

The natural modern assumption is that these instructive examples would need to be true. ... In practice, however, the examples were often not entirely true, or not true at all. It was almost inevitable that this would be the case. First, the highest degree of eloquence—which history was thought to demand (Orator 11.37)—was not necessarily compatible with the exhaustive recital of ‘the whole truth.’ Second, if the purpose of history was to teach moral and political lessons, which for the most part meant deploying examples to illustrate familiar philosophical precepts, what

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only English historical work that is written according to the classical rules (my translation)]” (Fueter, 163; cf. Gransden, 443). Moreover, as Chapters Two and Three will show, in the end More decided to move his work, too, into Latin, the language of the majority of the works of its type. Scholars who study the Renaissance more broadly thus have a better perspective than English literature specialists.

In the end, those who recognize More’s History as a “humanist history” do not really have different views about More’s purpose or the work’s genre; they merely describe it using the word “history” in a highly technical sense, rather than as “literature” or one its subsets such as “drama.” Hanham, however, thinks that More’s genius was such that he built upon the classics so well and so uniquely that “[w]hat he in fact produced ... was a new and highly individual genre, from which we can now see the Shakespearian history play struggling to break out” (1975A, 160).

Logan recognizes that Pollard et al. were not so far off base: Richard III is not a drama, but “it clearly is ... a member of a genre—rhetorical history—that has much in common with drama” (2011, 185). E.g., Cicero, Orator 11.37, De oratore 2.12.50-4, 15.62-4. On the importance of rhetoric in humanism, see [The Cambridge Companion to Thomas More, ed. George Logan. Cambridge UP, 2011], 47-8.

Ascribed to Thucydides by the Greek rhetorician and historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ars rhetorica 11.2)
difference did it make if the examples were strictly true, so long as they vividly conveyed the precepts? Indeed, it was often better, in this conception of history, not to use real examples (or, at least, to modify them), for, as Sir Philip Sidney notes in arguing the inferiority of history to poetry, history (that is, when it is veracious), ‘being captived to the truth of a foolish world, is many times a terror from well-doing, and an encouragement to unbridled wickedness’—an observation he confirms by a recital of many historical examples of virtue punished and vice rewarded.72

That rhetorical historians had learned well both this lesson and the one about the ineloquence of historical detail is apparent in some kinds of materials they characteristically include, as well as in some they characteristically leave out. ... [T]hese historians normally decline to enter into detailed discussions of evidentiary questions, or to quote (or, for that matter, to consult) the unglamorous documents, private and public, that often constitute the most valuable historical evidence. On the other hand, their pages are full of rhetorical set pieces—especially orations, character portraits, and accounts of battles—that frequently have only tenuous connections with known historical facts and are, indeed, often stereotyped in both form and substance.

The elastic relation to fact in rhetorical historiography is especially conspicuous in its orations. These are usually remarks supposed to have been made by key actors in the events being narrated, speaking at crucial junctures in them. But what these individuals actually said on these occasions (if they spoke at all) was normally not known, or known only in outline. Accordingly, it was standard practice for the historian simply to invent the speeches. They were intended as—and frequently were—dazzling displays of rhetorical prowess, and they usually also served important thematic purposes, conveying the writer’s sense of the significance of the events being narrated and often his understanding of their causes, which in this tradition of historiography were sought primarily in the character and ambitions of powerful individuals. (None of these strictures should be taken to mean that there was not, in the best rhetorical histories—as, in modern times, in the best historical novels—profound exploration of historical events and their causes and consequences, as well as beautiful writing: this is, after all, a historiographical tradition that includes, to cite only three of the most distinguished examples, Thucydides, Tacitus, and Plutarch. In hands of genius, rhetorical historiography drew lessons—often nuanced and profound—from events rather than imposing text-book lessons on them, and managed, through the stylization, and even the

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stereotyping, that this way of writing history allowed, to display the constants of human affairs.) (Logan 2011, 175-7; emphasis in original)

In this passage, Logan explains in detail what C.S. Lewis recognized 60 years ago: More’s *Richard III* is a “classical sort of history—history as a grave and lofty Kind, the prose sister of epic, rhetorical in expression and moral in purpose.”73 Therefore, the *History*’s departures from historical fact do not indicate that More did not care about the truth, but rather are evidence of his conviction, shared by others who write in this genre, that it is legitimate to use a fictionalized story to teach moral and political truths: “The truth which the humanists sought must not be equated with any kind of objective accuracy. ... The concern was rather for the formulation of an *ars historica* whose precepts, drawn from classical sources, would aid the writer in effectively persuading his reader to emulate virtuous actions of the past. The truth, then, of humanist history is a moral truth—truth which would serve as moral guidance for the reader.”74

73 Lewis, 389.
74 Harris, 103. Cf. Hanham: “More did not hesitate to alter or embroider the historical record in furtherance of his literary purpose” (1975A, 166). For More, “history is not fact but fictitious Truth” (1975A, 170). Or, as Nancy Streever puts it, “in the Humanist concept of usage, truth is social veracity, a truth which is opposed to lie, rather than to objective wrongness as in mathematics or logic” (180).

Reese has a similar understanding of the primacy of moral truth, although he misunderstands More’s particular moral and political goal, equating it instead with mere propaganda: “[D]ispassionate concern for truth, was not, however, characteristic of the general run of Renaissance historians; or, rather, most of them pursued truth of a somewhat different kind. If, for instance, someone had told Sir Thomas More that his *History of Richard III* was untrue, meaning that it was founded on evidence and assumptions that had not been verified, he would have been not so much shocked as uninterested. He would have claimed that his portrait of Richard was essentially true; and if imagination had touched up some of the details, was not the proper exercise of the imagination a form of truth? Historical truth, that is to say, was to be tested by the historian's fidelity to the object he had set himself; which in More's case was to justify the Tudor usurpation by showing what a bad king Richard had been.” (10). In More’s understanding, truth was not in fact to be disregarded in order for a message of political propaganda to have its effect; rather part of the political message of *Richard III* is to beware of propaganda. See Chapter Six, Section II of this dissertation. Furthermore, Chapter Two will discuss how More’s *History*, while indeed used as pro-Tudor propaganda, was not in fact written for that purpose, but rather was edited to that end.

Gransden has a more correct understanding: “*Richard III* is a piece of apologetic, not an objective history. But unlike most renaissance histories in this category, it is not an apologia for a particular ruler: it
More and his fellow humanists accepted the established rules of classical rhetoric as guides so that those truths could be taught most effectively, and More did an expert job of applying those classical rules to his own material. Thus, “the invention of

is not a work of propaganda written in the Tudor interest. ... Rather Richard III is an apologia for an idea. More sought to demonstrate by means of an exemplum the nature of tyranny and its evil results” (445). For the humanists, “eloquence, and therefore rhetoric, is an essential, not accidental, part of history” (Struver, 63).

“In the case of humanist histories, the key to meaning lies in an understanding of the ‘rules’ which governed their composition. History was a literary genre. Rhetoric provided the rules for its composition. ... [Cicero] implies that the orator should be not only technically, but morally, qualified to perform the task. For his is the responsibility, far more than for the poet or philosopher, to ‘shed light upon reality’ and bring ‘guidance to human existence.’ ... To represent the greatness of a country or city and thereby sustain it; or to record the sublimity from which it has fallen; or to instruct in public morality and affairs, history was required. ... The underlying conception of truth here is one of moral worth. ... [E]fficacy rather than ‘objectivity’ will measure the worth of a humanist history” (Grasse 1977, 14). “[T]he Humanists are convinced that the use of rhetorically instead of logically oriented discourse leads one to reality through illusion.” (Struver, 77).

As Harris notes, “What distinguishes More's historical narrative from the chronicle genre are his additions which are necessary to heighten the persuasive power of the story and his elimination of extraneous material which distracts the reader from the lessons More wished to point out. Character sketches done in the classical manner, speeches patterned on the ancients' rules for oratory, figures of speech, digressions, scenes constructed with a dramatist's art, dialog, and summaries of past events which are required to understand the narrative are all added to More's story for the purpose of persuasion through eloquence” (55). Rhetoric is the way “form and content” are “harmonized in such a way that truth and knowledge were not simply presented to the intellect, but also made to work upon the will. ... The bare truth could not convince or instruct; it must be transformed by means of eloquentia.”” (105, quoting Hanna Gray, "History and Rhetoric in Quattrocento Humanism," Diss., Harvard University, 1956, p. 2.) “Because More felt the need to persuade and believed in the powers of rhetoric to help him do so, it was important to his history that it be told eloquently” (Harris, 174; see also 121). Cf. Yoran, 523-5.

For example, “The whole portrait of Edward carefully adher[es] to the classical rhetoricians' requirements for an effective panegyric, for the praise of Edward begins with a description of external circumstances, then pauses to include a brief delineation of Edward's character, goes on to a physical description, and finally returns to the lengthy discussion of his character which the Ad Herennium particularly recommends for the concluding portion of a portrait” (Harris, 129). Harris also demonstrates in convincing detail that the character portraits of Richard and of Shore’s wife are similarly constructed in accord with classical principles (129-132), that Edward’s deathbed oration and Buckingham’s speech are both textbook examples of classical “deliberative” orations (132-3), and that Richard’s speech on getting the boy out of sanctuary is an excellent example of periphrasis, or “copiousness” (140-2).

The skill with which More applies classical principles in Richard III was recognized in the 16th century. Roger Ascham, in a letter written in 1553, lays out several criteria which are “to be looked for at his hand that would well and advisedly write an history.” These include “to write nothing false,” “to be bold to say any truth,” “to mark diligently the causes, counsels, acts, and issues in all great attempts; and in causes, what is just or unjust; in counsels, what is proposed wisely or rashly; in acts, what is done courageously or faintly; and of every issue, to note some general lesson of wisdom and wariness, for like matters in time to come. ... Diligence also must be used in keeping truly the order of time; and describing lively, both the site of places and nature of persons, not only for the outward shape of the body, but also for the inward disposition of mind. ... The style must be always plain and open, yet sometime higher and lower, as matters do rise and fall: for if proper and natural words, in well-joined sentences, do lively express the
speeches in humanist histories is seen as following the classical precedent associated first with Thucydides. Erasmus affirms the practice as ‘admirable.’... Invented speeches, the exploration of motivation, and the creation of an ‘illusion’, far from detracting from a humanist history, were essential to it.” In the same way, “[More] would follow, not deny, Horace’s antique dictate to write in such a way that he would give instructions and enjoyment simultaneously.” The moral lesson would be learned more readily from an enjoyable story.

Finally, it is appropriate when reading More’s work to look for political teachings: “Amongst the most important [implications] for establishing its meaning are those which point to its political significance. ... [A]n insistence on the History as history should indicate the appropriateness of a political reading ... The political nature of Renaissance histories was assumed.” These teachings will be philosophical in nature, since “[humanists] believed that history was useful because concrete examples could be drawn from it to illustrate the precepts of moral philosophy.” More’s History is thus a literary work of political philosophy.

Richard III therefore has a much different purpose than modern histories. A good modern scholar who writes a history of King Richard III aims to present the truth about

77 Grace 1977, 15.
78 A. F. Kinney, 115.
81 Curtright 2012, 12; cf. Lehman, 134.
what happened during that man's life. Thomas More's *History of Richard III, King of England*, aims to present the truth about what happens in human life. The accuracy of dates, or the exact content of conversations, or the precise order of events as they happened is not as important as the accuracy of the depiction of the human condition.82 Readers certainly should not dismiss *Richard III* on account of its factual inaccuracies, since “what finally matters about the *History* is not its inaccuracies but its profound accuracies: its unsurpassed analysis and indictment of the machinations of unscrupulous, self-serving politicians in any time or place, at their everyday worst.”83 In the end, “The truth about *Richard III*, as More saw it, was not so much a matter of the facts of his reign; rather, it resided in the timeless correspondence between events of the past and the immediate situations in which men found themselves involved.”84 Misstatements about what particular events occurred at a particular time and place do not preclude the possibility that *Richard III* can impart important truths that are applicable to all times and places.85 More’s *History* “appl[ies] ancient paradigms in the attempt to elicit or confirm timeless lessons from observations of the present.”86 As Hanham puts it, “[I]n terms of the more humdrum Truth of the modern historian, [More’s] *Richard III* is as far from the actual world of the 1480s as *Utopia* was from the England of 1516. As far, and also as close.”87 In particular, “More ... offers many shrewd observations on the process of

82 And More depicts that condition very skillfully: “[W]ith historians like More, ... one finds human character analyzed with a realization of its subtleties and shades of meaning such as the historians of the medieval school never remotely approached” (Krapp, 453). See also Gransden, 447.
83 Logan 2005, xl.
84 CW 2, ciii-civ.
85 Several ways that More progressively moved his *History* towards a more general audience and more universal concerns will be discussed in Chapter Three.
86 Logan 2011, 168.
87 Hanham 1979, 76.
Richard’s usurpation—lessons, of general applicability, on how a tyranny was established and how it might have been forestalled."\textsuperscript{88} And so, “In the long debate that continues about \textit{Richard III}, one must keep foremost in mind what More makes clear within its pages: he writes so that future generations can learn the lessons of tyranny as fully as story form (‘\textit{historia}’) will allow.”\textsuperscript{89} Therefore, Part Two of this dissertation will carefully analyze More’s \textit{History} as a literary work of philosophy which intends to impart moral and political teachings concerning universal and timeless truths about tyranny.

\textsuperscript{88} Logan 2011, 182.
\textsuperscript{89} Wegemer 1996, 34.
Chapter Two: Determining an Authoritative Text

This chapter aims to establish an authoritative text of More’s Richard III. It will discuss the major differences between the various extant texts, and show that, given the available evidence, the best hypothesis for explaining the relationship between the various versions is to interpret them as representatives of several stages in More’s composition process. A careful comparison shows that one of the Latin versions, the Paris manuscript (upon which CW 15 is largely based), is the one derived from the most advanced draft of a work that was never quite finished. Since it is the most dramatically and philosophically complete version, it should be considered most authoritative for purposes of interpretation.

The History of Richard III has the most complicated textual history of any of More’s works, as well as the most disparate extant texts. There are nine textually significant versions of Richard III which have survived and are known to scholars: five in English, and four in Latin. The following sigla will be used throughout this dissertation for these texts. 1543A, 1543B, 1548, 1550, & 1557 (for the English versions), and

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90 Hanham (2007, 84; 2008, 1) and Sylvester (CW 2, xlii) also propose that there was series of drafts, but their reasoning and postulated order are quite different than those proposed in this chapter. Their arguments and evidence will be considered at length below.

91 CW 2, xxvii.

92 CW 2, xvii-xviii; CW 15, cliv.

93 The sigla used by Sylvester and those used by Daniel Kinney to refer to the texts of More's Richard III are not only somewhat different, but mutually exclusive, because each uses “H” to refer to a different version. I have adopted Kinney's (CW 15, cxlvi, cliv), except that I differentiate between the earlier and later printings of the two earliest published versions, and thus the sigla employed in this dissertation are derived as follows: All of the published texts will be referred to by their respective years of publication. The two earliest versions, included by Richard Grafton in his Continuation of John Harding's Chronicle and both published the same year, are henceforth 1543A (STC 12766.7 & Sylvester's Ha2; see note 94 below) and 1543B (STC 12767 & Sylvester's Ha1). 1543 will be used when a reference applies to both editions. The two versions which Grafton subsequently published from Edward Hall's manuscript as part of Hall's
1565, A, H, & P (for the Latin versions). To these may be added a fifth Latin text (making ten texts altogether): the version which Rastell consulted when he translated portions of it and inserted the translations into 1557. Daniel Kinney and Sylvester agree: if Rastell's translation is accurate (and there is no reason to doubt him), then the Latin text he had was different than any Latin text extant today.95 This reconstructed text (the manuscript Rastell translated from has not survived) will be cited as 1557L.96

Union of the Two Noble Houses of Lancaster and York (CW 2, xxi) are cited as 1548 (STC2 12721) and 1550 (STC2 12723). The version in William Rastell's The workes of Sir Thomas More Knigght ... wrytten by him in the Englysh tonge (STC2 18076) is cited as 1557, and the Latin version published at Louvain in Thomae Mori Angli ... Omnia ... Latina Opera as 1565. Although Gibson & Patrick list four versions of the Louvain book—Nos. 75a, 75b, 76a, & 76b (with the latter two printed in 1566)—all four collate identically except for the title pages (104-107; CW 2, xvii, n.2), and thus constitute only one version of Richard III. The three Latin manuscripts are referred to as: P for the most recently discovered Paris manuscript (MS fr. 4996 (Ancien fonds) in the Bibliotheque Nationale), upon which CW 15 is largely based; A for MS Arundel 43 in the College of Arms in London; and H for MS Harley 902 in the British Library. Analysis of the handwriting of all three of these manuscripts dates them to approximately 1500-1550 (CW 2, xviii; CW 15, cxxiv). I have ignored MS Tanner 302 because of its late date and evidence that it is “simply a copy” of 1565 (CW 2, liv, cf. xviii). Thus, while Sylvester also records “nine versions” (CW 2, xix), our lists are not the same.

94 Alison Hanham reports that her “discovery in 1972 of a corrected reissue of Grafton’s first edition showed that Sylvester, with others, had confused the order of what he called H1 and H2” (Hanham 2007, 80, n. 89). Logan agrees with her that the “first printing of Hardyng” is STC2 12766.7 (Logan 2005, 119). That 1543A was published first “is evident both because it contains numerous mistranslations from Vergil’s Latin which are corrected in [STC2 12767], and because the Houghton Library of Harvard contains a so-far-unrecorded variant of [STC2 12766.7] in which two new folios have replaced the original ff. cvii-cviii (sigs. Oo ii and Oo iii). In other copies these contain an egregious mistranslation which described Edward Stafford, 3rd Duke of Buckingham, executed for treason in 1521, as eldest son of Henry VII. It is likely that this political blunder in the first issue caused Grafton’s imprisonment in April-May 1543” (Hanham 1975A, 202, n. 3; see note 154 below). Hanham shows no awareness of Rubio’s work, but Rubio in fact independently concluded that Sylvester's order was reversed at least a year before Hanham did (Rubio, 98-100). Rubio based his conclusion on the fact that, except for the reign of Henry VIII, which was drastically shortened in 1543B, all the other narratives “are expanded versions of their equivalents” in 1543A (101), and that the shortened account of Henry VIII's reign is clearly an abridgment of the longer version; the longer version does not make sense as an expansion of the shorter (106). Rubio also notes the shorter version's more precise use of noble titles (112-114), the more accurate translation of Vergil mentioned by Hanham (118-121; see note 156 below), and some additions by Grafton which “provide[] fuller and more historically accurate information on events described” (123).

Sylvester noticed one aspect of 1543A (his H2) in particular which made him think it was the later and better version: it “is consistent in changing the 'his' genitive ... to the more normal 's' form” (CW 2, xx). If, however, Grafton's manuscript came from an earlier draft of Richard III than the one 1557 was printed from, as this chapter will argue, then restoring the more archaic genitive may well reflect Grafton's greater faithfulness to his manuscript in his second printing. See notes 157 & 210 below.

95 CW 15, cxxvii-cxxl; CW 2, xlvii.

96 This sigla also comes from Daniel Kinney (CW 15, cxxv).
It is not necessary to consider each of the ten versions at the same length, because some of them are merely textual variants of others. The two versions published by Richard Grafton based on the papers of Edward Hall, for example (1548 & 1550), are almost certainly two printings from the same manuscript,\(^{97}\) while both versions Grafton published in 1543 as part of his continuation of Harding's *Chronicle* also “preserve approximately the same text.”\(^{98}\) However, the widespread practice of classifying all the extant texts of *Richard III* as variants of only two versions, one in each language, while treating the resulting English and Latin reconstructions as separately composed works, is also unwarranted and misleading.\(^{99}\) The English 1543 differs almost as much from 1557 as 1557 differs from *A*, a Latin version. There are in fact three main groupings or families of texts,\(^{100}\) as explained below, but the best way to account for all the texts available today is to see them not as two or three separate versions, each with a few variant texts with differences accumulated through scribal transmission, but rather as three groups of related texts, all of which are part of one continuous and progressive series of drafts. This chapter will argue that the various versions of *Richard III* were neither independently conceived nor simultaneously written; they instead represent

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\(^{97}\) CW 2, xxii.

\(^{98}\) CW 2, xx. The spelling and grammar differences are much more extensive between these two texts (see notes 157 and 210 below), but there are no substantive differences. Rubio concludes “both editions [1543A & B] were set from the same manuscript copy” (58).

\(^{99}\) This approach seems to have originated with A. W. Reed. After examining the evidence available to him, he summarizes his conclusions thus: “that More was the author of both the English and the Latin versions of *Richard III*; that neither is merely a translation of the other; that the two are not separated by a long interval” (194). Reed's opinion is almost universally accepted by later scholars. For example, Sylvester speaks of “two versions,” (CW 2, lvi), Daniel Kinney of “two somewhat divergent authorial versions of the history in English and Latin (CW 15, cli), and Hanham divides her article into two parts based on the same assumption (Hanham 2007, 62, 73). This chapter will show that evidence not available in 1931 suggests that Reed's conclusions are no longer valid.

\(^{100}\) It seems odd that Sylvester recognizes that there are “three main branches of our textual 'tree'” (CW 2, l), yet persists in grouping both English branches together and opposing them to the Latin versions when he considers the order of their composition.
different stages in the composition process of one work.

**Section I: The Three Textual Groups**

Because the evidence indicates a series of drafts, part of the goal of this chapter is to establish the compositional order of the texts, which is not clear-cut with regard to *Richard III* because there is no text with any explicit authorial approval. The *History* was not published during More's lifetime, and an examination of the changes, additions, and omissions from text to text raises suspicions that some variants result from the author's own revisions while others stem from the errors of scribes and printers, as well as intentional alterations by editors. Although a detailed examination of differences in word choice and spelling, as well as small omissions and additions of clauses and single lines here and there is indeed required for any textual reconstruction, and such minor evidence will be considered in this chapter, such small changes are difficult to trace accurately. Is a word changed because the author changed his mind, or because the printer bungled his type? Is a line omitted by the author as superfluous, or by the scribe through haplography? Sometimes plausible arguments can be made, and sometimes only guesses. Often, different scholars have come to different conclusions about the relationship between the various texts and textual families of More's *History* because they are confused by conflicting evidence when they pay too much attention to minor details.

If the variations between texts indeed do result from a mixture of authorized and unauthorized alterations, then small changes are not always good guides to the order of composition. Even those instances where a word, phrase, or line is clearly more apt in

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101 For example, from “simplification, modernization, [and] vulgarization” (CW 2, xxiii).
one version than in another are not conclusive. The improvements which come from revision by the author will be most evident only in the last draft, but if, for example, the text which represents that final draft to us has been copied many times, the mistakes of copyists will be compounded there, and thus a better reading in some instances could come from a text which represents an earlier draft but was copied fewer times. It is not enough to locate a better reading if one cannot clearly assign responsibility for a worse one somewhere else. Therefore, this chapter will begin by looking at changes that are too large and complex to be merely transmission errors, and will attempt to assign responsibility for them.

Three major textual families of *Richard III* are evident from such major differences, which will become clear by examining the English versions first. Among these, it has been noted that *1543A* and *1543B* are very closely related to each other, as *1548* is to *1550*. While these two pairs occasionally differ from each other in wording, all four of these versions also “share an overwhelming number of readings with each other” when compared to *1557*, the fifth English version; but, even more importantly, these four earliest published texts also share four major structural characteristics which are not found in any of the other versions, and which therefore mark them as members of the first textual group (“Group One”). First, as noted in Chapter One, they present More's *History* as part of a collection of chronicles of England, rather than as a stand-alone work. Second, and relatedly, they divide More's work into two parts,

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102 CW 2, xxiii. This is true to such an extent that W.A.G. Doyle-Davidson wrote, “Hardyng and Halle may be regarded as a single version” (43; cf. 222). Rubio concurs (2).
corresponding to the reigns of King Edward V and of part of that of King Richard III. 103

Third, they all contain, as the beginning of the portion of the narrative designated as
covering Richard's reign, a six page account of the pomp of Richard's coronation not
found in any other versions. Fourth, they share an opening organizational structure (the
“Form One” beginning). 104

Sylvester has conveniently separated the Form One beginning into eight parts
designed to facilitate comparison with 1557. 105 Part I: an introductory paragraph. Part II:
a description of Richard, Duke of York, and his sons, culminating in his third son, the
titular Richard (CW 2, 6a.13-9a.7). Part III: a six line transition. Part IV: Edward IV’s
deathbed oration (CW 2, 10a.10-13a.31). Part V: a description of Edward, his children,
and his kingdom (CW 2, 3a.1-6a.8). Part VI: a section containing two consecutive but
not directly related stories: first the story of the prescient servant, and then the description
of Richard's plan for sowing discord (CW 2, 9a.7-10a.9). Part VII: the account of how
the Duke of Buckingham became a conspirator with Richard to make the latter king (CW
2, 88.1-89.2; which will be referred to as the “conspiracy backstory”). Part VIII: a four
line transition. After this, the narrative continues in the same way as the other versions

103 All four of these texts seamlessly continue the narrative from the likely ending point of More's History
through the rest of Richard's reign. They do so in different ways, however. See note 109 below.
104 It should be noted that the two pairs differ in regard to one major structural feature: 1548 & 1550 insert
about three and one-half pages of material following the equivalent of CW 2, 87.21 which is not found in
any other versions, and which has been universally accepted as an interpolation by an editor, largely
because a marginal gloss at the beginning of the interpolation indicates that More's authorship ends at that
point (see notes 109 & 208 below). This material appears immediately before the heading “The II Yere.” It
describes first, the responses to the murder of the two princes by Richard himself, the people at large, and
their mother; second, the details of the pageantry that attended Richard's visit to York; third, Richard's
decision to turn from his former ways and serve the public good; and fourth, how the wheel of fortune now
began to turn downward for Richard, beginning with the death of his son. 1543 does not divide Richard's
reign into separate years, and thus lacks the heading as well as this preceding material.
105 CW 2, xxv-xxvi. Rubio separates the entire History into 42 “Narrative Units” and 6 interpolations; the
beginning consists of 14 such units in his scheme (14-26).
from the point of Edward V setting out from Wales (CW 2, 13a.31). All of the Latin versions and *1557* share the following alternate order (the “Form Two” beginning): Parts V, II, VI, and IV, in that order, before continuing in the same way as Form One from the departure of Edward V. Parts I, III, and VIII do not appear in these other texts. Part VII, the conspiracy backstory, appears in *1557* in the same form as in the other English versions, but rather than anywhere close to the beginning, instead almost at the end (CW 2, 87.21-89.4), while the Latin versions\(^{106}\) give a significantly different conspiracy backstory and place it in the middle, just after the sanctuary scene (396.21-400.18).

In addition to the different placement of the conspiracy backstory, the three Latin texts which preserve it (*1557*, *1565*, and *P*)\(^{107}\) also differ from *1557* in their ending. While these Latin texts end with Richard's coronation,\(^{108}\) *1557*, like the other English versions, goes on significantly farther, to recount the murder of the two princes, and ends with part of a conversation between Buckingham and Bishop Morton.\(^{109}\) Since it differs

\(^{106}\) Except *H*, which breaks off very early, at the equivalent of 344.5.

\(^{107}\) Sadly, *A* is also incomplete. It can attest only in part to the conspiracy backstory, because of a gap, and ends in mid-sentence at the equivalent of 474.15. While *1557*\(^{L}\) is even more fragmentary than *A*, consisting only of three short sections of the work (CW 2, 39a.7-24; 42a.24-44a.18; 81a.11-82a.12), the second of these is the conspiracy backstory and the third is the ending found in *1565* and *P*. While Rastell does not explicitly tell his readers that his Latin version ended with the section he translated, it is reasonable to conclude that it did, as will become clear.

\(^{108}\) This is a brief reference to Richard's coronation, not at all similar in style or detail to the six-page account found in Group One. *1557* mentions Richard's coronation slightly later, and then only in passing (CW 2, 83.7).

\(^{109}\) Since More's *Richard III* is only one part of a longer chronicle in Group One, it is difficult to know precisely where More's authorship ends. Rubio goes as far as to say that “the Halle conclusion to the Richard III story, in fact, is so carefully aligned with the Halle text of *Richard III*, and the style of the conclusion so consciously modeled on More's style, that, were it not for the Rastell text, it would be impossible to determine precisely where More's work ended and where Halle's began” (67).

In *1543*, Grafton does not name More as the author of that portion of the chronicle, and there are eight lines between the ending words of *1557* and the point where the text begins to be a translation of Polydore Vergil's *Anglica Historia*. These may well be Grafton's own work. In *1548* and *1550*, a marginal gloss states that More's authorship ends at the equivalent of CW 2, 87.21, but lines equivalent to the remainder of *1557* appear a few pages later, after the interpolation described in note 104 above, and then the conversation between Morton and Buckingham goes on for several pages after that before Hall, too,
structurally from both Group One and the Latin versions, 1557 must be counted in its own group (Group Two), while all the Latin texts form Group Three, as a result of their similar structure.\textsuperscript{110}

Section II: Editorial Interference in Group One

Because the Form One beginning has inspired extensive debate,\textsuperscript{111} it will constitute the starting point for analyzing the relationship between the texts. While no scholars have questioned the authorship of the Form Two beginning (probably because Rastell’s claim to have printed from a holograph manuscript is universally accepted), scholarly opinion is split on whether Form One is More's work or not. Two prominent scholars say it is More's. Sylvester concludes that it is “a reasonable probability that the [Form One beginning] goes back to an original draft of the History which More composed before making the fair copy eventually printed by Rastell.”\textsuperscript{112} Hanham, however, thinks “Sylvester was ... right to credit More with 1543’s rearrangement of the opening paragraphs—but in a later revision of the History, not, as he thought, one made before 1557.”\textsuperscript{113} Their disagreement suggests that even if the Form One beginning is accepted as More's, the evidence that fact would provide relating to the overall order of the drafts is either inconclusive or contradictory. However, the preponderance of the evidence points against the Form One beginning being More's, and that evidence also best explains

\textsuperscript{110} Because A and H are clearly much closer to P than to any English version in the parts of the History they preserve (as discussed below), I include them in the third group despite their lack of the distinctive shorter ending.

\textsuperscript{111} Rubio says the Form One beginning gives rise to “[t]he most vexing questions posed by the [Group One] texts” 75.

\textsuperscript{112} CW 2, xxviii.

\textsuperscript{113} Hanham 2007, 82.
the other structural characteristics of Group One.

First, consider how limited are the arguments by the proponents for More's authorship. Sylvester admits, “It would not have been impossible for Grafton, editing his manuscript copy of the *History*, to have undertaken such a radical rearrangement of the order of events in its narrative; yet it does appear, in view of the characterization of his editorial work given above, that he would have been extremely unlikely to have effected it. One looks in vain for a motive that might have led him to engage in such a major redaction.”¹¹⁴ Hanham quotes him and then supports his point by describing the complexities of such an undertaking:

It involved not only the composition of necessary connecting passages, and moving the account of how Buckingham’s servant had delivered messages to Gloucester straight after the death of Edward IV, but also supplying the reminder that the reader had already learnt these details at the point where, in Rastell, More had recounted them. ... [I]n point of fact, the opening of Rastell would have suited Grafton’s overall scheme much better, and saved Grafton from having to write a sentence to open his new chapter on the reign of Edward V. Moreover, it seems unlikely that Grafton would go to so much trouble to recast More’s work in this place when he cheerfully preserved the very similar descriptions of Edward IV and Richard III given by [Polydore] Vergil and More, respectively. (Hanham 2008, 208-9)

Thus neither of them can point to any positive evidence of More's involvement, but only to a lack of evidence of a motive for Grafton. Doyle-Davidson, too, who thinks that Grafton was indeed responsible, nevertheless agrees that it is “difficult to understand ... the rearrangement of the opening pages ... with no gain in coherence. The change could hardly have been accidental, yet the intention is not at all clear.”¹¹⁵ Other scholars have

¹¹⁴ CW 2, xxvi.
¹¹⁵ Doyle-Davidson, 44. He elsewhere notes that it “is rather a problem, there being no apparent reason for
demonstrated, however, first, that Grafton probably was not the man who rearranged things, and second, that a plausible motive can be found, regardless of which editor did it.

Both Daniel Kinney and David Womersley, building on Rastell's complaint that the previously published English texts were “corrupte,”¹¹⁶ explain the Form One beginning as the work of an editor. Kinney believes that it is “quite unlikely” that the Form One beginning is More's work, and notes, “Even granted that the verbal differences between 1543 ... and 1548 ... strictly rule out the possibility that both texts are directly derived from the same manuscript, it is still perfectly possible that both are derived indirectly from one manuscript ... in which some reader tampered extensively with More's organization and phrasing.”¹¹⁷ This could have been some unknown party years before, but, since Kinney recognizes that the Form One beginning matches the chronicle presentation style better than Form Two, proposes that motive for its editor, while noting that such editorial liberties are in fact in character for Hall:

Hall was perfectly capable of 'improving' on More's text, as the many bizarre verbal flourishes found only in 1548 [and 1550] very amply establish. It may be that Hall introduced various changes into [his source] before the copy text ... of 1543 was copied and then made further changes in preparing the copy ... from which 1548 was derived. Neither Grafton nor Hall seems to have felt any qualms about 'editing' More's history away from the incomplete state in which they must have found it ... Hall had very good reason to rearrange More's text, since in Hall's scheme it forms a transitional 'history of Edward V,' while in More's standard versions the drama of Richard's usurpation forms a self-contained whole. As another large-scale compiler, Richard Grafton may well have been similarly tempted to rearrange More's text. (CW 15, cl, n. 3)

¹¹⁶ in his introductory comment on the work in 1557. See CW 2, 2a.5.
¹¹⁷ CW 15, cl, n. 1; see CW 2, xxi for conclusive evidence that when Grafton published 1548 & 1550, he did not correct Hall's manuscript by comparing it to 1543.
Kinney does not explain why or how Form One would be superior for a transitional history in a larger chronicle, and therefore Hanham dismisses the argument, but, as discussed below, evidence gathered by Gerald Rubio shows that Kinney's conclusion is correct. Kinney also does not discuss any farther which publisher, Hall or Grafton, actually created Form One, although once again evidence from Rubio suggests that Kinney's initial inclination towards Hall was correct. Whichever of them prepared the rearrangement, however, must have shared it with the other, since it is not reasonable to assume that two men independently chose to rearrange More's work in exactly the same way. For his part, Grafton denies responsibility. When he published 1548 and 1550, he explicitly stated that he made no changes to Hall's manuscript, and Sylvester generally accepts Grafton's claim. Grafton never mentions the source of the manuscript of Richard III he used in 1543.

The evidence shows that someone, however, made certain changes to both Hall's source-text and Grafton's. To begin with, Womersley is very convincing in the main thrust of his argument: namely, that all four of the versions Grafton published show signs that someone edited "More's text in obedience to the dictates of [the editor’s own] religious and political beliefs." First, Womersley shows that this editor altered the source-text's wording to better conform to Protestant ideology concerning such matters as

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118 Hanham 2008, 209.
119 CW 2, xxi; see also n. 2 & 4 on that page.
120 Womersley, 289. Womersley assumes that the person responsible was Grafton himself (274, 289, etc.), but other than Grafton's known Protestant sympathies, Womersley presents nothing to suggest Grafton in particular. Womersley's strong evidence regarding his analysis of the way the text was edited should be separated from his weak evidence pointing toward the identity of the editor. See the following note, as well as Rubio's evidence presented below.
sacraments, grace, and relics. Womersley also notes the editor's political bias. He completed the story of Richard III's reign beyond what More wrote by drawing from Polydore Vergil's *Anglica historia*, but in doing so “intensified Polydore Vergil's providentialism.” He also tried to make Richard look even worse than he does in 1557: “In the [Group One] texts, Richard became a more simply devilish villain.” The editor shows “the desire to accentuate and purge of ambiguity the portrait of Richard's wickedness.” And Womersley proposes that this “desire manifest in the [Group One] texts to unmask Richard once and for all, and beyond any shadow of doubt, as a diabolical tyrant explains the greatest divergence between these texts and 1557; that is to say, the thorough remodelling and reordering of the first fifteen paragraphs of the narrative.” He cites strong evidence in the introductory paragraph found only in Group One, “which includes this unambiguous statement of the theme of the history ... :

'For his [Edward V's] vncle Richard duke of Gloucester, within thre monethes depriued hym not onely of his croune and regalitee, but also vnnaturally bereft hym of his naturall life: & for the declaracion by what craftie engine he firste attempted his vngracious purpose, &

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122 Womersley, 275. Womersley's evidence assembled by comparing Vergil's original with what appears in Group One appears on p. 275 and several following pages.

123 Womersley, 285.

124 Womersley, 287.

125 Womersley, 287.
by what false coulourable & vntrue allegacions he set furth openly
his pretensed enterprise, and finally by what shamefull cruell and
detestable act he perfourmed the same: Ye muste firste considre of
whom he and his brother dessended, their natures condicions and in-
clinacions, and then you shall easely perceiue, that there could not
bee a more crueller tiraunt apointed to acheue a more abominable
enterprise.' (Womersley, 288; see the full paragraph in CW 2,
xxv.)

As Womersley notes, in this statement, “nuance and implicitness [are] sacrificed to clarity
and a simplified vigour. ... [The editor] cleansed this text of its complexities, and made it
instead an ideologically more coherent history of the diabolical prelude to the
providential accession of the Tudors. As the devilishness of Richard was heightened, so
the corollary became more inescapable that the accession of the Tudors was an act of
God.”

The Form One beginning may thus be understood as reflecting both the

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126 Churchill provides additional evidence that the changes to make Richard seem more evil were Hall's
rather than Grafton's. 1548 and 1550, based on Hall's manuscript, include, in addition to the introductory
paragraph mentioned by Womersley (which appears at the beginning of “The Pitifull Life of Kyng Edward
the V”), a paragraph to introduce “The Tragical Doynges of Kyng Richard the Thirde” not found in
1543.

Churchill quotes from that paragraph:

“Hall shows his own feeling by saying of Richard, ‘Lothe I am to remembre, but more I abhore to
write the miserable tragedy of this infortunete prince, which by fraude entered, by tryannye proceded, and
by sodayn deathde ended his infortunete life: But yf I should not delcare the flagicious factes of the euyll
princes, aswell as I haue done the notable actes of verteous kinges, I shoulde neither animate, nor incourage
rulers of royalmes, Countreyes and Seigniories to folowe the steppes of their profitable progenitors, for to
attayne to the type of honour and worldly fame: neither yet aduertise princes being proane to vice and
wickednes, to aduoyde and expell all synne and mischief, for dread of obloquy, and worldly shame: ...
Wherfore I will procede in his actes after my accustomed vsage’ (p. 374.)

This animus Hall reveals very clearly in his continuation, by the additions he makes to Vergil’s
account. His original is constantly embelished to bring out more strikingly the cruel nature and
wickedness of Richard” (Churchill, 203).

Rubio is correct: “The evidence suggests (but cannot prove) that Edward Halle either introduced,
or approved the earlier introduction of, all the differences in content between the Rastell text and both the
Hardyng and Halle texts of Richard III” (71). However, in the end, which editor was responsible is not
particularly important: “Whether we attribute responsibility for the differences in content between the
Rastell and Grafton texts of Richard III to Edward Halle (and so reconcile Grafton's statements in the
prefaces to the Hardyng Continuation and to the Halle Union with the demonstrable fact that his texts have
been edited), or whether we name Grafton editor and dismiss his protestations to the contrary howsoever
we choose, there can be no question but that the differences are the result of conscious editing and thus
totally without authorial authority” (Rubio, 75). See also notes 144, 150 & 151 below. For those interested
in More's draft, these editorial changes should be disregarded.

127 Womersley, 288.
Protestant and the pro-Tudor bias of its editor.

Gerald Rubio provides even stronger evidence to support both Daniel Kinney's claim that Form One is more appropriate for a chronicle and Womersley's argument that Form One is the result of such bias; and Rubio shows that the two are related. He in fact demonstrates that all four of the major structural features unique to Group One are the result of Tudor governmental interference—most likely orders from the Privy Council—and that these changes were introduced so that the chronicles published by Grafton would present as clear evidence as possible for the Tudor dynasty's support by Divine Providence. His dissertation “is, to a large extent, a search for just such a motive” for the Form One beginning as Sylvester and Doyle-Davidson did not find, and thus is particularly helpful on this point. Rubio concludes that “while the Grafton texts [his term for Group One] may indeed reflect an 'early-draft' of the narrative, the most important difference between the English versions of the work—the arrangement of the opening sequences—cannot be attributed to More; [that] sequence is explicable only as an editorial change introduced to make the narrative More wrote suitable for publication in the Hardyng Continuation and in the Halle Union.” Rubio further concludes “that Henry VIII's government took a very active interest in both editions,” and “that the unique aspects of [Group One] reflect the political climate of the early 1540's.”

The strength of Rubio's argument and the uniqueness of his perspective result

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128 Rubio, 8. Rubio's dissertation, which was never published, was apparently unknown to all those who have published articles and books about the history and relationship of the texts of More's Richard III, as I have never found Rubio referenced anywhere. This was an unfortunate occurrence, since Rubio marshals more extensive evidence relating to, and demonstrates a better understanding of, the English texts of More's History than any other scholar.
129 Rubio, 12.
130 Rubio, 12.
from the breadth of his consideration. He carefully examines all of the English texts of *Richard III*, but not in isolation, as it appears most other scholars have done. He looks at the whole volume each of those five texts were published in, and makes careful note of how each editor treated the other texts in that volume, and then draws appropriate conclusions. Judging from how the rest of *1557* was edited, for example, Rubio concludes that “except for three clearly-marked passages [i.e., *1557L*], the Rastell text is a totally unedited and verbatim transcription of More's original manuscript of the narrative,” with only two small exceptions: the title and the marginal notes. Thus *1557* should be accepted as an authentic reproduction of one of More's drafts. However the evidence “by no means preclude[s] the possibility that the autograph manuscript Rastell possessed was not the only English version of the narrative written by More; since we have evidence of the existence of three alternate Latin versions of *Richard III*—[A], [1565], and [1557L]—all of which are to some extent authoritative, it is possible that More also composed alternative versions of the English text.” Nevertheless, when Rubio examines the Group One texts and makes a similar comparison, he finds that “the differences in content between [1557] and [Group One] cannot possibly be attributed to More.” “[T]he Grafton version [Group One] of *Richard III*, for example, is both preceded and followed by demonstrably edited texts of portions of Polydore Vergil’s *Anglica Historia* in translation, and the final narrative (written by a yet unidentified

131 Rubio, 31.
132 Judged not to be More's because “[t]hroughout the Englysh Workes, Rastell explicitly tells us every time More assigned a title to one of the works included,” and he does not say so in this case (Rubio, 43).
133 Rubio, 46-7.
134 *P* was discovered 15 years after Rubio wrote.
135 Rubio, 53.
136 Rubio, 54.
chronicler) has been edited differently for the two editions of the Hardyng Continuation [i.e., differently in 1543A & 1543B]. ... [T]he Grafton versions of these texts stand in precisely the same relationship to their authors' originals—so far as content is concerned—as do the Grafton texts of Richard III to More's original as preserved in the Rastell text.”

Thus the Form One beginning, as well as the other unique content of Group One likely stems from the actions of the volumes' editor(s), rather than from More.

Rubio shows that everything about the Group One texts makes sense if one postulates an editor whose goal was to convince the readers of both Harding's and Hall's chronicles that the Tudor monarchs were providentially ordained. First, More's work was intentionally packaged with chronicle accounts of other kings' reigns so that readers would view it as part of the explanation of a larger providential plan which culminated in Henry Tudor and continued with his descendants. In the case of 1543, Rubio shows that readers were specifically directed to read the work as a condemnation of Richard III and as an exposé of his tyranny in two ways. First, Grafton's metrical preface includes three stanzas (28-30) that “did not form part of Grafton's original ..., but ... were either added to it—or substituted for other stanzas—while the Hardyng Chronicle volume of the publication was in the hands of the printers.” In these stanzas, Richard III gets four lines, while other kings get only one. And “the stanzas merely list the names of the monarchs who preceded and followed Richard on the throne, but they impose an interpretation on the story of Richard's career, telling us that he was "plaged ... / With a

137 Rubio, 65.
138 Rubio, 140; see also 149-154.
139 Rubio, 148.
shamefull death, as Goddes vengeaunce" for his murder of the true king, Edward V.”\textsuperscript{140}

“In context, because his relationship both to Edward IV (the king Richard succeeded in fact) and to Edward V (the uncrowned king he replaced) is unacknowledged, the lines [in stanza 29 of the metrical preface] imply that Richard had no hereditary or other right to the throne; they also imply that the accession of Henry VII was the result of divine intervention in human history brought about by Richard's murder of Edward V.”\textsuperscript{141}

Second, this direction of how to view Richard is reiterated when the reader gets to the reign of Edward V by the Form One introductory paragraph,\textsuperscript{142} as noted above. “Richard III, then, was presented to the Renaissance reading public as an explanation of the providential view of history because of the way in which Grafton's metrical preface directs us to read it, and because all prefatory materials to the Chronicle and to the Continuation discourage our noticing any differences between the Hardyng version of Richard III and the narratives in the publication which are explicitly providentially oriented.”\textsuperscript{143}

While 1548 & 1550 do not contain Grafton's preface, they do add a paragraph to introduce Richard's reign, as noted above, which directs the reader in a similar fashion,\textsuperscript{144} and Hall's entire work is specifically designed to support the Tudor government: “the central theme of the Union is illustration of the relationships between historical events and the larger, providentially directed, pattern of English history from the deposition of

\textsuperscript{140} Rubio, 155-6.
\textsuperscript{141} Rubio, 163.
\textsuperscript{142} Rubio, 163.
\textsuperscript{143} Rubio, 171.
\textsuperscript{144} As Rubio notes, this paragraph “explicitly applies to Richard III Grafton's thesis (expressed in his metrical preface to the Hardyng Chronicle) that chronicle narratives present readers with examples of conduct to emulate or shun; it also echoes the summary of Richard's career which introduces the Grafton versions of the entire narrative” (185). See note 126 above.
Richard II through the reconciliation of the conflict between the houses of York and Lancaster during the reign of Henry VIII.⁴⁴⁵

And the whole of Form One contributes to this editorial goal in its presentation of Richard: “The Grafton opening sequence, with its new introductory paragraph, focuses attention immediately on Richard and summarizes his actions against the young king; the sequence, on the one hand, alters the initial context in which More places his character and, on the other hand, encourages readers to neglect one of the narrative's central concerns: the relationship between Richard and the forces which ought to have opposed him.”¹⁴⁶ By deemphasizing the role of faction and other contributory causes to Richard's rise, Form One places more of the blame on Richard himself.¹⁴⁷

The rest of the Form One arrangement is specifically designed to fit in with the introductory paragraph: “In More's arrangement ... (as seen in the Rastell text), one episode leads inevitably into the next and no justification for his sequence is required; the arrangement in the Grafton texts, by contrast, amplifies and supports the introductory paragraph, but without the paragraph to tell readers what was being illustrated by the sequence, all would be mystified by the inclusion of these materials under a reign entitled 'Kyng Edward the fifth.'”¹⁴⁸ Part of Form One's arrangement is required to fit More's work into a series of chronicles: to “explain why events which took place long before Edward V's reign began are described where they are in the Grafton texts of Richard

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¹⁴⁵ Rubio, 59.
¹⁴⁶ Rubio, 176-7.
¹⁴⁷ Rubio, 177-8.
¹⁴⁸ Rubio, 81.
III. As Chapter One noted, the beginning of More's narrative moves around in time quite a bit, and while these flashbacks—and flash-forwards—are ... essential to the Grafton versions of the narrative, ... since they often duplicate descriptions of the same events in accounts of the reigns in which they took place, the editor (or editors) of the Hardyng Continuation and Halle Union apparently felt forced to defend the repetitions by rearranging those portions of Richard III which describe events prior to the death of Edward IV ... into patterns which aligned them with the alternative versions of the same descriptions by making them appear to be necessary recapitulations or amplifications of earlier passages. ... More's development of the opening portions of Richard III would not have suited the chronicles into which the narrative was inserted by Grafton, but ... the Grafton rearrangement of More's initial narrative units does transform the narrative into a suitable companion piece to the other historical narratives in both the Hardyng Continuation and the Halle Union. Since More obviously did not design his Richard III for inclusion in publications which did not appear until twenty or more years after he wrote the piece, we can only conclude that his narrative was transformed by its editors. (Rubio, 82)

Therefore, with Rubio, “we must conclude that the manuscript copy from which the Grafton texts of Richard III were printed presented the opening portions of the narrative in precisely the same sequence as they appear in [Groups Two and Three], and that the revised sequence—along with the Grafton introductory paragraph and transitions—was introduced when the manuscript was edited for publication in the Hardyng Continuation.”

Rubio shows that the other major differences in Group One also arise from the

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149 Rubio, 81.
150 Rubio, 84. Rubio goes on to note that “while the publisher Richard Grafton would have had no motive for revising the narrative in this way, Edward Halle had ample reason for revising Richard III into a narrative which aligned itself structurally and stylistically with the other narratives he had composed for his Union. And this is hardly a task Halle would have shirked: as noted, he found it necessary to rewrite completely all his sources except Richard III to make them support the central thesis of the Union; Richard III, by contrast, was transformed into a suitable vehicle for Halle's ideas by comparatively minor revisions of More's treatment of his materials” (85).
same editorial intent. Dividing the account between the reign of Edward V and of Richard III emphasizes that Richard was Edward V’s subject at first. It makes him a traitor. Richard’s coronation scene is thus interpolated both to provide a clear transition between the two reigns and to “help transform the narrative into a work more typical of Renaissance chronicle narrative,” since coronation scenes were typical for such works, but More did not provide one.

Furthermore, Rubio shows that this pro-Tudor slant likely was not simply that of the editor himself, but resulted from governmental intervention. Tudor officials took an active interest in the publication of Grafton’s volume as a whole in 1543, and their actions show that they specifically approved of the version of Richard III published therein. They evidently had granted Grafton a license to continue Harding’s Chronicle by using an edited version of More’s Richard III for the portion of time it covered, and using an English translation of Polydore Vergil’s work for the rest. When Grafton’s first edition was released, the translation of Vergil was found to be so poor, and in one respect so disrespectful to King Henry VIII, that Grafton was imprisoned. He apparently had made the translation mistakes inadvertently, however, and showed a willingness to

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151 Rubio, 179.
Interestingly, the same commentators who ascribe the Form One beginning to More nevertheless agree that the six page description of the pomp of Richard’s coronation ceremony (appearing after CW 2, 81a.11), is an editorial interpolation (Hanham 2007, 79; 2008, 208), even though the textual evidence is identical in both cases. Every text with the Form One beginning—and only those—including the coronation scene.
152 Rubio, 187.
153 A limited license such as this is probably the reason that the account of the reign of Henry VIII which was not drawn from Vergil was deleted in 1543B. Grafton had permission to publish Vergil and More only (Rubio, 134-6).
154 Rubio, 73-4, 115; CW 2, 273 & n.4. Hanham has identified the most offensive mistranslation: “Grafton ... got himself imprisoned in 1543 for carelessly printing the nonsensical statement that Edward, Duke of Buckingham, executed in 1521, was the eldest son of Henry VII” (2007, 80).
155 Rubio, 133.
cooperate. After he was released, his second edition corrected the offensive passage and improved the translation of Vergil in several other respects. The second edition, however, makes no substantive changes to the portion derived from More's work, although it does seem to cleave rather more closely to its source-text. After Grafton thus fulfilled their wishes, he was appointed “royal-printer” by the Privy Council in 1545. From this evidence, Rubio concludes that “the original edition was revised and reissued as the second by government order.” These clear indications of governmental

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156 “The most reasonable explanation for the revisions introduced into the second edition of the Continuation through retranslation of Vergil's original is that Grafton was licensed to publish a translation of the Anglica Historia— with the Grafton version of Richard III substituted for Vergil's account of the same period— but that the translation as published in the first edition of the Continuation altered Vergil's narratives in some ways which were found objectionable; Grafton was then ordered to align his translation more closely with its Latin original for the second edition of the Continuation, as well, of course, as to introduce the other revisions already described into the work. It is, however, also possible—but much less likely—that the editor of the second edition revised the translation published in the first edition because he himself found it unsatisfactory” (Rubio, 122).

157 For example, by preserving archaic genitive forms which are modernized in the first edition (see note 94 above and note 210 below). When the 1543B version of Richard III was published, it did not need to be changed beyond being more faithful to its manuscript, because it was not a translation. Similar exceptional treatment is apparent in the case of the two versions printed from Hall's manuscript: “To develop his thesis, Halle has taken facts and descriptions of events from earlier historians and chroniclers, but— except in the case of Richard III— he has totally rewritten and reinterpreted his sources” (Rubio, 59). “Halle's treatment of all his other sources for the Union demonstrates that, had the Hardyng text of More's Richard III not suited him in all respects, he would have rewritten it—or redited it extensively—for inclusion in the Union” (Rubio, 73). Thus the text of Richard III had probably already received governmental approval in its edited form.

158 Rubio, 137.

159 Rubio, 107. He also observes, “If the government found the first edition objectionable, it is only reasonable to assume that it wished the edition suppressed as effectively as possible: since copies of the first edition were already abroad and since (we surmise) there was a continuing demand for the work, the second edition was probably issued as a substitute for the first. This is why, I believe, the title page and colophon of the second edition carry precisely the same dates as those of the first edition— when, as shown, it is clear that the two editions could not have been published simultaneously—and why the second edition does not attempt to attract customers by in some way advertising itself as superior to the first. Governmental objection to the first edition is also the only reasonable explanation for the fact that the work was edited so extensively between editions in the ways already illustrated: it is unlikely that a publisher bringing out a second edition of a work because his stock of the first edition was exhausted would have his texts and titles revised unless he was in some way pressured to do so” (116-7). “All the facts at our disposal suggest (but do not prove) that the Privy Council, rather than Richard Grafton or the editor he employed, was ultimately responsible both for the substitution of Richard III for Vergil's account of the same period in the first edition of the Hardyng Continuation and for the fact that this first edition version of Richard III was in no way edited or altered for inclusion in the second edition of the Continuation” (Rubio,
involvement, combined with their apparent approval of the Form One beginning make it “probable” that all the major structural features of Group One result from “the political climate of the early 1540’s.” Governmental interest in Richard III did not end with that decade, however, but rather continued throughout the Tudor dynasty. As long as a Tudor was on the throne, every chronicle published in England used an edited version of More's text for that part of Richard's reign. Even though the normal custom was for an editor of a new chronicle to rewrite the narratives in his own style, Richard III was never rewritten during this period. Why? “The most reasonable explanation is that the Tudor chroniclers had no choice but to reprint More's narrative (or a summary of it) if their publications were to deal with Richard's reign at all. The government's motives for enforcing such a policy are obvious; as [E.M.] Tillyard shows, More's Richard III as incorporated into the Tudor chronicles functions as the cornerstone of the "Tudor myth," for Henry VII and his successors had a very tenuous legal claim to the throne of England.”

In the end, then, these structural features of Group One reveal that it is a group of texts derived from a substantially edited source, one designed to reflect well on the Tudor government, but not one authored by More. Thus they do not provide conclusive evidence of where in More's compositional order their underlying source-text(s) fall.

Therefore, despite the limitations of such an approach, which have been noted, that order

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132. Rubio, 177.
160 “In all [the later Tudor chronicles] we find the Hardyng and Halle interpolations [such as the coronation scene] ... all present the narrative as a prelude to—or explanation of—Richard's defeat at Bosworth by continuing the story as did Halle; all, by one means or another, insist that we interpret the events described by More's narrator precisely as Grafton directed in the 1540's” (Rubio, 192).
163 Rubio, 183. Rubio thus answers Donno's question (406).
can only be determined by a consideration of smaller differences that set apart the Group One texts from 1557.

Some of these minor changes, too, should be set aside as the work of the pro-Tudor editor. For example, where 1557 refers to Richard's “abominable dede” and Group One replaces “dede” with “murther and execrable tiranny” (CW 2, 87.21) it is easy to see the same hand at work that wrote the Form One introductory paragraph, insisting on Richard's tyranny and casting him in an even more negative light. The same goal explains the insertion of the word “tyrannously” at CW 2, 49a.22, and of “vnnatural” at CW 2, 10a.3. The editor's intention is also the best explanation for why Group One describes Richard's murder of Henry VI as a fact, while 1557 reports it as a rumor (CW 2, 8.15-19 & note), and for the similar situation where the Group One texts restate what in 1557 is a warning that you should not believe everything you hear into an assertion that “ye shall vnderstand for a truth” the story that follows (CW 2, 9a.7 & note).

Another class of differences between Groups One and Two can also probably be assigned to the editor, rather than More. These are the small changes that make Group One more historically accurate: “Blanks left by More in his unfinished manuscript ... had been filled up ..., several unnamed persons identified, names, places, and dates, added, Christian names supplied and in two cases corrected.”

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164 Womersley, 286.
165 Womersley, 285.
166 Doyle-Davidson, 44. Cf. CW 2, xxiv; Rubio, 64, 69-71.
Section III: Relative Compositional Order of Groups One & Two

Although the differences that remain are inconclusive, a few of them are suggestive that 1557 stems from a slightly later draft. First, there are two places in the Form One beginning that mention the date of Edward's death, since the new introductory paragraph states it, while More's account also had that information at its own beginning, which is found later in the Form One rearrangement. Neither of those places, however, includes Edward's age, which, as mentioned in Chapter One, provides the necessary numbers to complete the series 1-9 in 1557. There is no reason More would have developed this number symbolism only to discard it in a later version, while if Group One comes first, there is a good explanation for why Edward's age, rather than some other part of the information, was falsified to make the symbolism work. Group One already refers to the ninth day of April, the one month, the eight days, and the two (and twenty) years.

Hanham's attempt to prove that 1543 is a later draft than 1557 illustrates the dangers posed by reliance on minor details. We commentators do not share More's judgment. Is “would not I weene belue” (CW 2, 92.6) really “greatly clarifi[ed]” as “would not once beleue me” (Hanham 2007, 79, n. 81)? In Hanham's own words, these sorts of thing are “highly disputable” (Ibid., 80). Even where 1543 has an arguably better reading than 1557 (as at CW 2, 87.7-8 & 4a.22-5), it is virtually impossible to tell whether the lines were added by More from 1557 to 1543, or dropped by mistake going the other way. In the former, for example, the reading in 1557—“And the mischief that he tooke, within lesse then thre yeares of the mischiefe that he dyd”—seems to lack a verb that is found in 1543, which continues “in thre monethes be not comparabale.” Although it is possible that More wrote an incomplete sentence and corrected it later, it is perhaps even more likely that he wrote the sentence correctly at first, but a scribe omitted it by haplography before 1557 was printed, if the manuscript line divisions were something like this:

| mischief that he tooke, within lesse then / |
| thre yeares of the mischiefe that he dyd in/ |
| thre monethes be not comparabale,/ |
| And yet all the mane time, spente in |

Since the line divisions in 1557 as printed exactly match those given here for the three lines it includes, this may also have been the mistake of a typesetter (The vvorkes of Sir Thomas More Knight ... , folio 69). For an illustration of how a passage that Hanham cites to support her view (Hanham 2007, 81-2) can be reasonably seen as progressing from 1543 through 1550 to 1557, see the discussion of the knight passage below.

The symbolism is clearer, of course, if “two and twentye” is spelled out, as in 1557 (CW 2, 3a.3), rather
(CW 2, 3.1ff.), and that Edward was the Fourth could not be altered without enormous complications. It would make sense, therefore, if the five, three, seven, and six were added later.

Additionally, several small changes suggest that 1543's source-text was actually somewhat earlier than Hall's, and that both in turn were somewhat earlier than 1557. Perhaps 1543’s “an eloquente” was changed first to “an eloquente and well spoken” in 1548/50, and then to 1557’s “a very well spoken” (CW 2, 18a.22-3). Maybe 1543's “crye” becomes 1548's “crye out as lowde as they could” and then 1557's “crye owte as lowde as their throtes would gyue” (CW 2, 76a.19). Similarly, More may have added the simile of the owl (CW 2, 68a.28-9) to his draft before it was copied into what became Hall's manuscript. The most convincing of the minor differences, however, given its length and complexity, is the account of the knight sent to bring Hastings to his fateful meeting, in which there seems to be a clear progression. In 1543, the knight is simply described as “sturryng that morning very earely” and later “forasmuche as the lord Hastings was not redy, he taried a while for him and hasted him away,” while 1548 & 1550 say the knight “was one of the priueyest of the lord protectours counsail and doyng” and he was “of truthe sent by the lorde protectour to hast hym thitherward.” In 1557 the

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169 Since all four Group One texts include the structural components which have been discussed, and which were introduced into More's text before either Grafton's or Hall's versions were published, it seems that either Hall corrected the wording of his manuscript from one of More's later drafts sometime between 1543 and his death in 1547, while maintaining the government-ordered Form One beginning, or that a manuscript which had the Form One beginning had been copied many times already, and that the manuscripts used by Grafton and Hall were somewhat different copies of such a manuscript, with Hall's being generally the more accurate.

For somewhat different reasons, given her different theory about the order of the texts, Hanham also thinks it to be “more likely ... that Hall had acquired a third, slightly different, draft of the History” (2007, 81, n. 93).
altered lines of Hall's text are combined and further extended: “of trouth sent by the protector to hast him thitherward, wyth whom he was of secret confederacy in that purpose, a meane man at that time, and now of gret auctorite” (CW 2, 51a.2-5).

Therefore, Group One is best understood as consisting of extensively edited texts based on earlier drafts than 1557, but not drafts that differed from Rastell's copy very much.

Section IV: Relative Compositional Order of Groups Two & Three

The next step, then, is to consider the other major structural form that is evident from the extant texts of Richard III. What can the shorter ending and alternate placement of the conspiracy backstory in Group Three reveal about whether those texts are earlier or later drafts than 1557?

First, it appears that the two unique structural features of Group Three are related. It was necessary to move the conspiracy backstory when the ending was changed, since Group Three ends before the point at which the conspiracy backstory is placed in Group Two. Since there are good reasons for changing the ending, which are explained below, but not for moving the conspiracy backstory, it is likely that the former caused the

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170 Rubio agrees that “the verbal differences between the Grafton and Rastell texts of the work suggest that the Grafton texts do perhaps reflect an early draft of the narrative” (79; cf. 87, 91-2), but his final position is agnostic: “The vast majority [of the variants between Groups One and Two] could reflect either authorial revision or scribal corruptions. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine which of the alternatives is more likely in any given case. Any phrase in the Grafton texts which appears awkward when compared with its equivalent in the Rastell text could be interpreted as hasty writing on More’s part or as faulty transcription by a scribe; any modification of emphasis between texts could as easily have been introduced into the Grafton texts by a careless scribe or by an opinionated editor as easily as into the Rastell text by More when polishing the narrative. I have collated selected passages between texts in an attempt to find patterns on which one might base judgments, but no patterns have emerged. All one can say is that there is no reason to believe that many of the variants do not reflect More’s early draft of the English version of Richard III; at the same time, however, there is no proof whatsoever that any of the variants did originate with More in an early draft, or that the Grafton texts are based on any such early draft in the first place” (92).

171 CW 2, li, n. 1.
latter.\footnote{Fox agrees (1983, 105).} Therefore, it is probable that $1557^L$ ended with Rastell's final translation, since he also translated the relocated backstory; and thus there is even more reason to group all the Latin texts together.\footnote{Daniel Kinney is even more certain, stating unequivocally, “$1557^L$, 1565, and $P$ all conclude with the same reference to Richard's coronation” (CW 15, clii, n. 2).} An examination of the reasons why the ending was moved up will result in the conclusion that Group Three is a more developed story than Group Two.

It seems that Group Two was originally intended to be even longer, covering Richard's whole reign. When $1557$ recounts “what wretched end ensueth such dispiteous crueltie,” (CW 2, 86.24), it reads: “King Richarde himselfe as ye shal herafter here, slain in the fiede (emphasis added),” where the Group One texts read simply “was” in place of the italicized words.\footnote{CW 2, 87.4-5. The contrast between Group One and Two is particularly striking here, since the chronicles within which Richard III is embedded in Group One both in fact do go on to describe Richard's death. It is more likely, then, that More himself added this reference to Richard's death to $1557$.} There is no such extension of $1557$, and perhaps More eventually decided that if he could not find a proper way to move forward to the conclusion of Richard's life, he needed to move backward to the conclusion of Richard's plan. As the longer ending stands, there is a definite feeling of incompletion.\footnote{Heath, 18. Heath also holds that the Latin versions came after the English, and therefore thinks “the material now found in the last section of the English version may be looked upon as a collection of episodes which did not find a place in the finished Latin version” (19).} It is awkward to begin the tale of Richard's overthrow without ending it, and to introduce Morton's place in the new conspiracy against Richard without tracing its effects. Daniel Kinney points out the contrast: “[T]his ragged ending,” as he calls the longer one, “seems to be inconsistent with the artistic pattern of the rest of the work as we have it,”\footnote{CW 15, cli, n.1.} while the shorter ending “produces a considerable impression of dramatic completeness.”\footnote{CW 15, clii, note 2. Kinney here shares Doyle-Davidson's view (Doyle-Davidson, 42).}
the more immediate level, even the conversation between Morton and Buckingham seems unfinished, which is perhaps why both Grafton and Hall continue it from other sources in their chronicles. The plot of the History in all the texts moves forward along with Richard's plan to seize the crown. The opening wish of Edward that his son would reign over a land of peace and prosperity (334.29-336.1) gives way, bit by bit, to Richard's opening plan to sow faction and discord (328.6-23) in order to gain power for himself. Eventually, even the preparations for Edward V's coronation are turned towards Richard's purpose (484.24-5). The end of any possibility to avoid tyranny is thus a most fitting ending for the History.

On the moral level, the horror at what Richard has done is strengthened by ending with his successful coronation. If the History continued to Richard's death, a reader would see an evil king get his just desserts, and in fact even during his brief reign being plagued by the spirit of faction he did so much to stir up. This would tend to mitigate any indignation in a reader's heart. The shorter ending of Group Three presents a tyrant at the moment of his greatest glory and most desired victory. Evil has triumphed. It is a more effective reminder that evil, even short-lived evil, is terrible. Furthermore, as Part Two of this dissertation will show, by adopting this ending, the whole work can focus on what went wrong, and how or whether the evil could be prevented, which would be more difficult if there were a just ending.

Also, as Chapter One noted, Richard III is a work of political philosophy. In the

178 Although it would seem obvious that Richard is the protagonist, Hanham argues that the longer ending is complete, and that the History is meant to come “full circle” around Buckingham, from his conspiracy with Richard to his conspiracy against him (Hanham 2008, 216). Even she, however, admits that the longer ending “lacks the dramatic force” of the shorter (Ibid., 215).
longer ending of the earlier drafts, the most memorable event, and therefore the one that will tend to characterize Richard in the mind of the reader, is without question the murder of the princes. This is obviously tragic, but it is also personal in a way that the work as a whole is not. As even the Group One and Two texts have Edward IV saying, the death of his sons is a lesser evil than the turmoil of factional strife that leads to the deaths of many men (CW 2, 13a.12-7). Rather than portray the bloodthirsty man who slays innocent children, a more universal political lesson can be taught by showing the man of unbridled ambition who tears apart a realm and does grievous harm to a whole society. The shorter ending better aligns with the themes already present in the rest of the work. Thomas More thus improved his History from Group Two to Group Three by reducing its chronological scope, sharpening its focus, and editing with a view towards thematic continuity; the altered ending is the most noticeable result of this process.\textsuperscript{179}

**Section V: Linguistic Priority**

The foregoing analysis of the History's structure thus places all the Latin versions after all the English ones. Since the question of linguistic priority and whether Richard III was translated from one language into the other at some point in the composition process has been a point of confusion and contention among scholars,\textsuperscript{180} this chapter next turns to the considerable evidence in addition to the structural components described already which demonstrates that the History was in fact written in English first, and that those parts of the work which appear in both languages were translated from English to Latin, rather than vice versa. This is almost a unique view. To date, there has been very

\textsuperscript{179} See Chapter Three for more examples of changes between the drafts and their significance.
\textsuperscript{180} Hanham 1975A, 152.
little opposition to the opinion first put forward by A. W. Reed in 1931: that “neither [language] is merely a translation of the other.”\textsuperscript{181} The two main misleading pieces of evidence that have confused matters so far and prevented any other view from taking hold are related first, to More's frequent use of doublets, and, next, to the relative textual authority of \textit{1565} compared to the other Latin texts. In both cases, new evidence suggests that commentators should reevaluate all the evidence.

Reed's conclusion is based to a large extent on the presence of doublets in both languages. On the one hand, he writes, “[i]t is a fair assumption that when a single Latin word is represented by a pair of words in English, it is the Latin which is the original,”\textsuperscript{182} and there are many of these. “On the other hand, Latin doublets abound in \textit{Richard III}.”\textsuperscript{183} Perhaps Reed's assumption is unwarranted, however. Sylvester's full collation of all the English versions, unavailable to Reed, reveals that if one compares Group One with Group Two, both written in English, one can find dozens of instances where two (or more) words in the former are represented by one word in the latter, as well as many examples of one word in the former represented by two words in the latter.\textsuperscript{184} If someone were to make a literal translation of \textit{1557} into Latin and lay it beside \textit{1543}, it would look very much like laying \textit{1557} next to \textit{A}, as far as doublets go.\textsuperscript{185} Furthermore, Sylvester

\textsuperscript{181} Reed, 194. Chambers agrees (1928, 415). Hanham also concurs that there can be no “certainty about linguistic priority,” although she is fairly sure that \textit{1565}, in Latin, was the earliest of all the surviving versions (Hanham 2007, 83).

Sylvester argues that \textit{Richard III} was “written simultaneously in two languages, with neither version a ‘translation’ of the other” (CW 2, lviii, n. 5). Many hold this view of simultaneous composition, with different intended audiences. See Kendall, 24; Levy, 70; Rubio, 80; Mudan, 110; Wegemer 2011B, 40.

\textsuperscript{182} Reed, 191.

\textsuperscript{183} Reed, 192.

\textsuperscript{184} See notes 289-293 in Chapter Three.

\textsuperscript{185} Rubio notes the doublets provided by interlinear variants in \textit{A} are “of the same type as many of those
Mock Chapter Two 55

shows that there is no linguistic favoritism found by comparing doublets in 1557 and 1565. Single Latin words rendered by English doublets and single English words rendered by Latin doublets occur approximately equally often and without any pattern. These doublets by themselves should not be taken to indicate any priority of composition, but rather simply to indicate a work in progress. As some instances of hesitation in the face of synonyms are resolved in the author's mind, others arise. Furthermore, the invaluable discovery of the Valencia manuscript (V hereafter), More's holograph of De Tristitia Christi, proves that doublets in More's work do not necessarily indicate any translation at all. V was written entirely in Latin while More was imprisoned in the Tower of London awaiting execution, and has revisions on almost every page. Clarence Miller describes what V reveals about More's composition process as follows: “More did not hesitate, as the revisions show, to heap up synonyms or multiply details in certain passages. The revisions also show, however, that he did not do so indiscriminately. For he very often substituted one word for another when the use of a doublet would have saved him the trouble of choosing between them.” Substitution and multiplication of synonyms from one draft to another are simply part of More's style, and their frequency in both English and Latin should not suggest that the translation process went both ways, which differentiate the Grafton texts from the Rastell text” (89).

186 CW 2, lvii. Cf. Doyle-Davidson, 52; Logan 2011, 173.
187 This manuscript is reproduced in Part I of The Complete Works of St. Thomas More, vol. 14 (in two parts), ed. Clarence H. Miller, (New Haven: Yale U.P., 1976). Henceforth, this volume will be cited as CW 14. All page references with Roman numerals are in Part I. Pages numbered 693 and above are in Part II.
188 The authenticity of this document is beyond dispute: “No one but the author could have written it because the writer revised during the very process of composition ... It is doubtful that any scribe could have reproduced the complex cancellations and revisions; it is all but certain that none ever would have done so. The physical makeup of the manuscript rules out the faintest possibility that it is the work of some incredibly clever modern forger. The Valencia holograph authenticates itself” (CW 14, 695).
189 CW 14, 759.
or that the versions in both languages influenced each other.

After removing the evidence of doublets, there is not much left to support the argument for simultaneous and independent composition. The only other substantial evidence Reed cites is a sudden change he perceives in the English style starting from the point where Group Three stops and continuing on through the longer ending. The change is not obvious, however, and objective judgment in such a matter is very difficult. As Hanham notes, “Throughout the work More's style changes with requirements of subject, so that the change in style is not [a] conclusive argument that this second part was added later.” Even if such a variation in style could be proven, there are other possible explanations for it, aside from assuming that the first part of 1557 was influenced by a Latin version more than the ending was. Perhaps a change in tone is warranted by the change in situation. Describing Richard's confident exercise of power as king might require a different style than when he was constrained by circumstances to hide his true desires. Perhaps the section after the coronation was edited either more or less than the part before, or had been composed at a different time. As with doublets, this evidence is not reliable enough to make a determination.

Sylvester mentions another method that has been used to determine linguistic priority which “entailed the selection of a passage from Rastell's edition and its counterpart from the 1565 Latin. The critic would then argue, depending on his choice of passages, either that the English idiom had been influenced by the Latin or that the Latin had been affected by the English. In either case the version responsible for the influence

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190 Reed, 189. Doyle-Davidson seconds him on this point (52), and Hanham, too, agrees, although she calls the change “slight” (Hanham 1975A, 152).
191 Hanham 1975A, 185.
was assumed to have been composed before its parallel text in the other language."192 Sylvester points out two weaknesses to this approach. First, it requires a lot of skill to employ, and because of the era and More's practice, his work in each language shows a lot of influence from the other even when he is not translating. This makes any determination tentative. Second, “[i]f the right passages are selected, two conflicting chains of evidence can be assembled; the one alternative will demonstrate the priority of certain passages in the Latin, the other will assign an equivalent priority to the passages in the English.”193 These contradictions, together with the contradictory doublets, lead Sylvester to support Reed's conclusion and argue for “simultaneous composition.”194 These contradictions are mostly removed, however, if one compares 1557 with the Latin manuscripts instead of with 1565.

The early commentators recognized this, but since they lacked P, the most complete Latin manuscript, they were somewhat misled. Doyle-Davidson notes that A contains many “passages—whole sentences or only single metaphors and phrases—which would hardly occur to a person writing originally in Latin, passages more natural to English ways of thinking ... They can be understood only as literal translations from an English original, rejected on revision. It is not at all that these are unsuitable in Latin, for they translate well and vigorously, but just that on the Continent, for example, they would be recognized at once as foreign.”195 Sylvester agrees that if A is considered authoritative, the evidence indicates a translation from English to Latin, rather than vice versa.

192 CW 2, liv.
193 CW 2, lv.
194 CW 2, lviii.
versa: “Yet if the readings of [A] are placed against those of the 1565 Latin, and if both Latin texts, in a series of passages, are compared with the 1557 English, then it is evident that, at least in these passages, the English version must have been written first.”

Doyle-Davidson indicates that these readings were “rejected on revision” because they do not appear in 1565, and he assumed that 1565 was the final version. If, as this chapter will argue below, many of the revisions unique to 1565 do not have authorial backing, these literal translations from English actually represent the History's final form.

Sylvester qualifies his statement by saying “at least in these passages” because A is so incomplete. There are many passages it does not contain; but P is almost complete, and in almost all instances, P closely follows the phrasing of A, as does, for that matter, H, for its short length. As Kinney's collation shows, the differences between these three texts are “numerous but basically minor adjustments.” All these manuscripts show the same literal rendering into Latin of English idioms. There are no similar counter-examples in any English text of an obviously literal translation of any Latin idiom into English.

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196 CW 2, lv. Cf. Hanham 1975A, 200: “it is evident that the Anglicized constructions and idioms in [A] were occasioned by ... a process of literal translation.”
197 CW 15, cxxxiv.
198 Elizabeth McCutcheon remarks, “What impresses me is how ‘English,’ that is how vernacular and even colloquial, many of More’s English litotes are” (McCutcheon 2001, 107-8). Although McCutcheon accepts Sylvester's assertion that the two languages were employed simultaneously (Ibid. 107), her evidence suggests otherwise. See her full comparison of litotes in 1557, 1565, and P (Ibid. 92-106). Many of the Latin litotes are explainable as literal translations from English, but none of the English ones seem to derive from Latin.
199 Doyle-Davidson's assertion that “[a]gainst typically English idioms that indicate an English original can be set words and phrases that demand a previously existing Latin, without which they could not have occurred, or in fact, even be understood” (52) is unsupported. The examples to which he refers the reader (on p. 191 of the same work) show that More's English is sometimes archaic, and can be better understood by reference to the Latin, but none of them “demand a previously existing Latin.” The phrase “found by the way tarying” is obscure to a modern English speaker, but it is not a literal translation of “moras nectente,” nor is the latter a Latin idiom. Similarly, a modern reader would not immediately interpret “prowesse” as a synonym of moral virtue, but that meaning was current at More's time, and it in no way requires the Latin “probitas” to make sense.

Before the theory of simultaneous composition was proposed, Churchill asserted that “it is beyond
but Kinney’s claim for one passage deserves specific attention.

Kinney, despite the fact that he had access to both $P$ and $V$, agrees with Reed, and sees “cross-pollination in either direction between extant versions in each language.” To support the English-to-Latin part of his theory, he provides a very strong piece of evidence which has not been mentioned yet: At 340.2, all the Latin manuscripts leave a gap for a word, and $P$ even writes the English word “avauncement” in the margin. It is obvious that More had not yet settled on a translation for this word, but intended to translate it at some point. Thus for this “one single passage, there is incontrovertible evidence that More wrote first in English and then translated into Latin.” To support his Latin-to-English claim, Kinney points to Edward’s deathbed oration, which Chapter One noted is based on a similar speech in Sallust’s *Bellum Iugurthinum*, saying, “it seems likely that More’s Latin provided an intermediate source for his English.” However, any Latin influence on the English phrasing of this speech could just as easily be traced to the original translation (in thought or in writing) from Sallust, without supposing any intermediary. When More later translated the whole work into Latin, it would be natural for him to remember his source and choose verbal forms which recall their original even better than the English version does. That passage does not really support any claim for the existence of a Latin version of *Richard III* while an English version was still being revised. It merely suggests that More read Sallust’s Latin before he wrote *Richard III*

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200 CW 15, cl, n. 1.
201 Logan 2011, 172.
even in English.

Another piece of evidence supporting English priority of composition is that the Latin versions almost always contain more detailed descriptions. Generally speaking, as Doyle-Davidson notes, later drafts are longer and fancier, and thus based on this evidence, he would place the English first: “For in rewriting a composition, either in the same or another tongue, it is natural if not inevitable to expand and elaborate now and then. ... The probability is all against the cutting down of an original more elaborate Latin, first on the score of natural procedure, and secondly because there would be a distinct loss in the shortening: the Latin version is an improvement—and therefore later. And the fact must be stressed that ... expansions of this kind are very numerous and occur throughout the History.”

Also, as Fox observes, even 1565, which does not have as many expansions as the Latin manuscripts, nevertheless “contains so much substantive material not found in the English History (witness the need Rastell felt to translate portions from it) that it appears not to have been prior to the final English version; rather it is more likely that More revised and augmented [A].”

All this internal evidence for the order of the groups is supported by Thomas Stapleton's brief reference to Richard III in his biography of Thomas More published in 1588. Although Chambers thinks that Stapleton misread 1565's heading, which refers to previously published English versions, Stapleton says, “He [More] wrote out [descripsit] [Richard III] in English much earlier and more fully and more elegantly.”

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202 Doyle-Davidson, 49-50.
203 Fox 1983, 105.
204 Chambers 1931, 34.
205 The italics and translation are mine. Stapleton's Latin reads, Anglice illam multo ante & plenius &
Mock Chapter Two 61

Stapleton does not say where he got his information, and he is not always right in what he claims, but he had access to the manuscript collection of John Harris, More's secretary, and may have judged Richard III from the manuscripts themselves. All the evidence considered together thus places Group Three later than 1557 in the drafting process and therefore indicates that there is none of the “cross-pollination” Kinney hypothesizes from any Latin version back to the English ones. Group One is thus probably earlier than 1557, while all the Latin versions come last.

Section VI: Compositional Order of All Texts

The next step is to attempt to arrange the texts within the groups in order from earliest to most advanced draft, starting with those within Group One. Since both 1543A and 1543B were printed from the same manuscript, Grafton's own, while 1548 and 1550 were both printed by Grafton from another manuscript he inherited from Hall, the first step in this process is to compare these two pairs of texts. The most obvious differences between the pairs are three additions in the Hall texts which are found nowhere else, none of which appear to be More's work. The only consistent variation between 1543 and 1548/50, that glosses are found in the latter which are not in the former, is likely also

elegantius descriptus (Churchill 1931, 34, n. 1). Stapleton may be referring to the longer ending with plenius.

206 CW 2, xlviii-xlxi.
207 CW 15, cl, n. 1.
208 The only differences of more than one sentence between the 1543 texts and the later printed pair are the parenthetical description of Burdet following CW 2, 70a.15 and the two major additions noted above: the paragraph that introduces the reign of Richard III, following CW 2, 81a.10 (see note 126 above), and the three-and-a-half page transition between the first and second year of the reign of King Richard which follows CW 2, 87.21 (see note 104 above). The first of these (even if it is More's work, which seems doubtful), since it is irrelevant to the narrative, is not helpful in comparing the texts. The second is written in the first person, apparently by Hall, since the writer declares that he must include Richard's reign in the chronicle, “as I haue done the notable actes of verteous kinges” (Hall, 374). The third, longest addition follows immediately upon a marginal gloss that indicates that More's authorship ends at that point. Even though there is no corresponding gloss to show where the text begins to be More's again (see note 109 above), it is extremely unlikely that these three and a half pages are More's. See Rubio, 60.
Hall's doing. As noted above, the remaining meager evidence, while not conclusive, indicates that Grafton's manuscript was derived from a slightly earlier draft than Hall's.209 Between the two texts printed from that earliest manuscript, 1543B is almost certainly more accurate, as shown by its better preservation of archaic genitives, among other details.210 Thus, 1543B is the more meticulous rendering of the earliest manuscript, while 1548 and 1550 are printing a very slightly revised second draft.211

Passing over Group Two, which has only one member, it is time to consider in which order the drafts behind the Latin texts were made. There has been no scholarly consensus on which text begins this series. Kinney argues that 1557L is the earliest text in Group Three, while Sylvester thinks this is A, and Hanham votes for 1565.212 Previous attempts to establish compositional priority of the Latin texts have been mostly one-sided, so in order to demonstrate just how difficult it is to sort out errors from revisions, this section will next examine some of the strongest evidence in each case.

Sylvester did not know of P, and so some of his arguments no longer apply.

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209 See note 169 above.
210 Of all the Group One texts, 1543A alone modernizes genitives at CW 2, 7a.30, 8a.15-20, 8a.26-7, 11a.6, 13a.15, 14a.28, 15a.20, 15a.31, 45a.5, 59a.33, 60a.2, 61a.19, 64a.10, 64a.34, 71a.15, 72a.5, 72a.30, 79a.11, 79a.13, 79a.17, 79a.31, & 80a.11. In contrast, 1543B alone does not modernize genitives at 9a.29, 13a.22, 31a.23, & 34a.9. There is a similar occurrence at CW 2, 44a.16, where 1543B alone has an archaic verb form. It is easy to see how modernization could occur as a result of the activity of copyists or printers, but it is very difficult to envision Grafton or anyone else systematically introducing more archaic forms into their text. Besides this, Chapter Three will show that synonymous doublets are characteristic of More's revision process, and 1543B (along with 1548 & 1550) prints both words at CW 2, 50a.22, while 1543A selects only one. All in all, it appears that Grafton's first printing involved heavier editing with a view towards greater clarity for the reader, while his second printing exemplifies greater fidelity to his manuscript, even if sometimes at the expense of sense (e.g. CW 2, 63a.8, 75a.26). This slavish fidelity was likely his way of being sure not to offend the Tudor officials who had jailed him for departing from his sources in 1543A. See notes 94, 154, & 157 above.
211 Since 1548 and 1550 “differ only slightly from each other,” it is difficult to assign priority to either one, but since 1548 contains slightly fewer misprints (CW 2, xxii), it may be taken as the best representative of that stage of the revision process. Of course, the best reconstruction of both stages of revision which lie behind the Group One texts would only be available through a complete, detailed comparison of all the texts.
212 CW 15, cxxxvii; CW 2 li.; Hanham 2007, 74, 83.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that he has some good reasons for placing \( A \) earliest which apply just as well to \( P \). For example, there are some blank spaces for words in both \( A \) and \( P \) which match those in 1557, but are not found in 1565, and these could be taken to indicate that \( P \) and \( A \) are not far removed from Group Two.\(^{213}\) There are also corresponding lacunae of seven or eight lines in \( A \) and \( P \), which are completed not only in 1565 but also in 1557 and Group One, which might be interpreted, as Sylvester, Hanham, and Rubio do, to mean that \( A \) and \( P \) are actually even more primitive drafts than 1557.\(^{214}\) Furthermore, as noted above, there is considerably more similarity between the syntax and phrasing of 1557 and that of \( P \) and \( A \) than there is between 1557 and 1565. Sylvester sees that, often, \( A \)’s “idiom is markedly dependent upon an English version of the History,”\(^{215}\) and a “literal correspondence with the English ... is so often characteristic of \([A]\).”\(^{216}\) After a close comparison, he concludes, “The passages in the Latin which follow the English most closely occur in \([A]\), not in the later revised text \([1565]\).”\(^{217}\) Sylvester can produce dozens of examples where \( A \) is closer to the English than 1565,\(^{218}\) but only a handful where 1565 is closer to the English than \( A \).\(^{219}\) He also places \( A \) earlier than 1557\(^L\), noting that one clause in \( A \) is omitted in both 1557\(^L\) and 1565, but in two other places, 1557\(^L\) follows \( A \) more closely than it follows 1565. Therefore he concludes that

\(^{213}\) CW 2, xxxvi.  
\(^{214}\) CW 2, xxxvi; Hanham 2007, 65, 74, 78; Rubio, 80.  
\(^{215}\) CW 2, xiii.  
\(^{216}\) CW 2, xxxvii.  
\(^{217}\) CW 2, lxi-lxii.  
\(^{218}\) See commentary to 3.1, 3.9, 4.1-3, 4.3-5, 5.3, 5.7, 5.9, 5.12-4, 5.19, 6.1, 6.7-8, 6.10, 6.22-3, 7.7-8, 8.1-2, 12.24, 13.1, 13.2, 13.14, 13.24-5, 14.16-7, 15.6, 15.16, 16.1, 16.15, 16.18, 18.12-3, 18.13, 19.5, 21.13, 22.11, 26.23, 27.9-10, 28.20, 29.1, 29.9, 30.26, 31.11-3, 33.7, 33.11, 35.21-3, 36.18, 36.32, 45.1, 45.15, 46.12, 48.31, 49.31, 50.7, 51.30-52.1, 52.14-6, 52.16-22, 55.2-3, 55.4-7, 55.9-12, 55.16, 56.8-10, 57.27-8, 57.30-58.1, 59.5-6, 59.23-4, 59.28, 60.12-3, 65.1-2, 65.6-8, 65.8-12, 66.33, 68.6, 68.10-1, 68.25-6, 69.15, 69.27-8, 70.14-5, 71.2, 73.26-8, 76.19-21, and 77.5 in CW 2.  
1557L “occupied an intermediate position between” those two other versions.\textsuperscript{220}

Hanham and Daniel Kinney both place 1565 before A, rather than after.\textsuperscript{221} Part of their argument is based on new evidence. Access to P allows both of them to gain a new perspective on the omissions in A and 1565. First, it is apparent by any comparison of P and A that the two texts are very similar to each other, as well as to H. By looking at P, therefore, one can see that some of the omissions in A are unique to that text, and thus due to its corrupt condition and the shortcomings of its scribe,\textsuperscript{222} and not to any inherent roughness that might mark it as the earliest stage in the drafting process. The better quality of P also clarifies that there are many clauses present in both P and A which are not found in 1565. This leads Hanham to her conclusion: “1565 frequently offers a very different wording from that in [A] and [P]. It also lacks some of the expansions and witty asides in those two. On those grounds alone logic dictates that 1565 was the earlier text.”\textsuperscript{223} Two such omissions that Hanham points to are the jest of the schoolmaster (422.20-6) and the ironic comment on Richard's motive for putting Shore's wife to penance (424.8-10). It is true that these comments are not essential to the plot, but neither do they detract from it. On the contrary, besides their obvious entertainment value, they help the reader gain insight on Richard's character, and they contribute to an

\textsuperscript{220} CW 2, xlvii. Sylvester's hypothesis for the textual order of the Latin versions is thus A, 1557L, 1565. He mistakenly considers H to be merely a copy of the first several pages of A (CW 2, xl).
\textsuperscript{221} Hanham argues against “Kinney's insistence that [1565] was later” than P (Hanham 2007, 64), but in fact, she and Kinney conceive of the same order for the three longest Latin texts: 1565, then A, then P. The real disagreement between the two is whether or not 1565 is a “corrupt text” (Hanham 2007, 68). That part of the argument is considered below.
\textsuperscript{222} A is missing several pages in the middle and again at the end (CW 2, xxxvi), was copied during at least two different sessions (CW 2, xxxvii), and shows signs that it was copied from another manuscript by a scribe who did not know Latin (CW 2, xxxix, n. 4). P and H show no such signs, yet share virtually all readings with A, where A is not corrupt.
\textsuperscript{223} Hanham 2007, 64.
important theme of the *History* by strengthening the contrast between truth and appearances which culminates in the metaphor of politics as tragedy near the end of the work (482.15). Hanham is right: “It is very hard ... to envisage a reviser deliberately omitting [such passages] that occur in [A] but not *1565*. It is more logical to suppose that they had not yet occurred to More when the draft of *1565* was made.”224 It is worth mentioning that both of these passages also appear (in slightly different form) in all the English versions (CW 2, 54a.9-13, 24-6). Thus, much of the same evidence used to show that *1565* is an earlier draft than *P* also can be used to postulate that it is in fact the first draft of all, as Hanham suggests,225 and that therefore the Latin versions did not all come after the English ones. Any explanation of *Richard III*’s textual relationships needs to account for the considerable evidence of smaller, but significant omissions which seem to indicate that *1565* is the earliest text of all without losing sight of the structural evidence which places *1565* in the most advanced group.

To support his contention that *1565* is earlier than *A* or *P*, Kinney points out ten “extended omissions which are not improvements [that] are common to *1565* and *1557*.226 Besides these, in the two passages which introduce Catesby (404.9-14) and which give the biography of Hastings (420.1-8), “*1565* actually says nothing new but does stay rather closer to More's English than does the comparable passage in *P* and *A*.227 These points support his argument, but Kinney also needs to answer Sylvester's objections concerning those many more places where *1565* is farther from the English

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224 Hanham 2007, 67.
225 Hanham 2007, 83.
226 320.8, 412.7-8, 412.12-4, 414.3-5, 426.17-428.11, 428.19-21, 462.2-3, 472.14, 480.17-8, & 480.22 (CW 15, cxlix, n. 2.)
227 CW 15, cxlvii, n. 1.
than $P$ or $A$.\textsuperscript{228} Kinney does this by asserting that the editors of 1565 garbled the text while trying to improve it.\textsuperscript{229} He claims that “More himself probably had nothing to do with the radical alterations introduced in the source-text of 1565.”\textsuperscript{230} Those places where 1565 is farthest from the English thus do indicate the most revision, but by the editors in their attempt to improve the grammar, phrasing, or word choice of their manuscript, rather than by the author.\textsuperscript{231}

To further cement its early place, Kinney also provides evidence connecting 1565 with 1557\textsuperscript{L}. First, Kinney draws an opposite conclusion from the same clause that Sylvester noticed was in $A$, but not in 1557\textsuperscript{L} or 1565. This clause is also in $P$ (400.8-10), and Kinney believes it indicates that 1565 was based on an earlier draft than any of the manuscripts. In the Group Three version of the conspiracy backstory, the Duke of Buckingham is promised not only lands in Hereford, but more “treasure and royal furnishings” (400.8). The clause in question admits that this report of an additional reward may or may not be accurate: it is true, “unless [the Protector] reproached him with a false [story] [when] there was discord [between them] afterwards, as if [the Duke] was ungrateful for such great benefits of his” (400.8-10). As Kinney says, “There is nothing thematically or stylistically objectionable about this qualification; there is certainly no

\textsuperscript{228} Hanham does not do this, because she rejects the structural grouping proposed here and instead holds that 1557 was completed after at least some of the Latin texts (2007, 74, 78), and that what is here called Group One was actually more advanced than 1557 (2007, 82).
\textsuperscript{229} CW 15, cxliii.
\textsuperscript{230} CW 15, cxxxvi.
\textsuperscript{231} Hanham opposes Kinney's conception of 1565 as a “corrupt text” because she sees evidence that it is “an early draft” (2007, 68). The rest of this section will show that 1565 is in fact both an earlier draft than $A$ or $P$, and that it was edited in some places to produce a smoother and less distinctively Anglicized Latin reading.
reason why both Rastell and the editors of 1565 should deliberately omit it.”

Thus, 1557L and 1565 must both be either earlier than P and A, in which case the clause is an authorial improvement as Kinney suggests, or both later than P and A as Sylvester suggests, in which case More omitted the clause as superfluous, or a scribe dropped it by mistake. Kinney argues that P and 1565 cannot be earlier than 1557L, because both of the former have lost an infinitive through haplography at 484.16-8 (CW 2, 82b.3-5) which the latter preserves. Furthermore, Kinney cites the passage which describes the lords assembled to work out the details of the coronation (400.15-21; CW 2, 44a.15-8) to show that 1557L contained a continuity error regarding the identity of the Chancellor. Although the Archbishop of York was deprived of that office because he gave the seal to the queen (CW 2, 25a.34; 358.26-7), this later scene still has him in his position. Since 1557 contains a similar error, where the Archbishop of York remains among Richard's attendants and is the prelate sent to discuss the release of the younger prince from sanctuary (CW 2, 27a.24, 28a.9), Kinney argues that these passages in 1557 and 1557L were both written under the same assumption—namely that the Archbishop remained in his office—and therefore they indicate affinity between 1557L and 1557. This is a good point, but it cannot be conclusive, since an editor could easily have corrected this historical inaccuracy, as indeed must have happened in the Group One texts, if they

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232 CW 15, cxl.
233 CW 2, xlvi.
234 CW 15, cxxxix-cxl. The situation is complicated by the fact that 1565, unlike P, has a complete sentence here, and so is not as obviously missing a few words. Kinney suggests that 1565 has been amended by an editor to try and make sense of the passage, and since even as it stands it lacks the same word as P when compared to 1557L (something that Rastell would translate as “he saluted”), Kinney is probably right.
235 CW 15, cxxxvii-cxxxviii; see CW 15, cxxxviii, n. 1.
indeed preceded Groups Two and Three in More's composition process. The weight of all of Kinney's evidence makes it likely that he is correct, however, and an additional piece can be produced in his favor.

When determining the place of \textit{1557}\textsuperscript{L} in the drafting process, a question that Sylvester raises is worth considering: “[O]ne wonders why Rastell, particularly in view of his duplication of [the conspiracy backstory], chose just these three passages to translate from his Latin manuscript. It might be expected that, once he had adopted the practice, he would also have given us an English rendering of other passages in the Latin, for example the details of Edward's wooing (pp. 60-1) or the account of Middleton's motive in striking the Earl of Derby (49/5f.), which are either much fuller than their English equivalents or are omitted entirely.”

Why indeed? Sylvester's query arises from a false assumption. There is no reason to think that \textit{1557}\textsuperscript{L} resembled \textit{1565} or any of the surviving Latin manuscripts in their fuller detail of certain events, and there are reasons to think otherwise. First, Rastell gives every impression of conscientiousness. The first of the three passages he translates is brief and unnecessary to the plot, although it does strengthen the Queen's case for keeping her son in sanctuary, and adds to the discussion about English law and precedent. Thus, it is helpful without being crucial, plausibly added in a later draft, but not indicative that Rastell's selections are based on a

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{236} Hanham in fact uses this correction in Group One to support her contention that those texts came after \textit{1557} (2007, 82). Alternatively, these errors could conceivably be Rastell’s. He may have mistakenly thought that he was actually correcting the text. No other version in either language has these continuity errors, and the only indisputable common characteristic of both \textit{1557} and \textit{1557}\textsuperscript{L} is that Rastell printed both. However, his general editorial approach would suggest he did not correct anything. See note 238 below.
\item \textsuperscript{237} CW 2, xxxi-xxxii. Pollard (1933, 323) and Rubio (32) raise the same question.
\item \textsuperscript{238} W. E. Campbell calls Rastell a “scrupulously careful disciple” (ix), while R. W. Chambers agrees that \textit{1557} displays “scrupulous editing” (1931, 32), and notes, “Few books in the English language have been edited with greater care” than \textit{1557} (1931, 9).
\item \textsuperscript{239} See the brief discussion of law in Chapter Three of this dissertation, and the longer one in Chapter Five.
\end{itemize}
concern that readers might be confused without his translated passages. The first passage also goes as far as to give the Latin alternate beginning of the transition sentence which closes it, followed by the full sentence as it stands in English (CW 2, 39a.24-5).

Furthermore, Rastell's second translated passage does indeed confuse the reader, by giving the conspiracy backstory in a different version from that provided later, resulting in partial duplication and partial contradiction.240 Given that Rastell exhibits such attention to detail and such disregard for clarity and consistency in order to be faithful to both of his copy-texts, combined with the knowledge that $1557^L$ differed from both $1565$ and $P$ in some respects,241 the simplest explanation for why he does not include any other passages which depart from his English version is that there were no more such passages in his manuscript. It had probably not been edited much beyond Group Two, but rather was virtually a translation of $1557$, with only those three major additions, including the shorter ending.242 Thus, Kinney is correct, and $1557^L$ should be seen as the earliest Latin version of the texts which have reached us.

240 Although Sylvester asserts, “The two accounts do not contradict each other” (CW 2, 210), that is true only in the most technical sense. The Group Three version of the conspiracy backstory includes not only the portion which Group One places near the beginning, but also the account of the unraveling, as found in Group Two. These two latter accounts describe quite different versions of the same events. $1557^L$ admits that there is more than one rumor about what happened (CW 2, 42a.28-31). Then it gives the report from those “which knewe better” (CW 2, 43a.2) and reads, “Than it was agreed ... that the protectour shold graunt him the quiet possession of the Erledome of Hertford” (CW 2, 44a.1-4). In contrast, $1557$ admits there is more than one rumor, then reports “the duke ... required of the protector the duke of Herfordes landes ... [but] he reiected ye dukes request w't many spiteful & minatory wordes” (CW 2, 89.8-14). Only afterwards does it say that “many right wise men, think it unlyke” that the scene occurred as described (CW 2, 90.2-3). The Group Three account thus gives details about what the wise think did happen, while the Group Two account gives similar details about a scene that the wise think did not happen. Even if they are ultimately not in opposition, Rastell probably would not introduce the former passage in order to clarify the story.

241 Besides those cases mentioned above, Sylvester notes two instances where $1557^L$ differed from $1565$: CW 2, 39a.23/b18 and 43a.18/b14 (CW 2, xlv, note 3). The former agrees with $P$ (390.10), and thus may perhaps be explained as a printer's error in $1565$, but the latter is different from both (398.12-3). Sylvester is certainly correct to conclude that $1557^L$ “did not contain a text which could be said to correspond either with that of [A] or with that of [1565]” (CW 2, xlvii).

242 Rubio, 41.
Since 1565 has been shown to follow \textit{1557L} immediately in the progression because of their shared omission, there remain only three texts to place relative to them and to each other. \textit{P, A,} and \textit{H} usually do not differ from each other in the places they differ from 1565, and in fact if variants that result merely from spelling conventions and single-word substitutions for synonyms are disregarded, there is nearly universal agreement among all three. There are a few changes that can give a tentative order, though. Kinney argues that, since \textit{A} includes one redundant clause that is also found in 1565 \textit{(cf. CW 2, 13b.16 & 104.20)}, but not in \textit{P} or \textit{H} (336.6), and both \textit{A} and 1565 omit another clause that \textit{P} and \textit{H} have (468.17), \textit{A}'s source was probably a slightly earlier draft than \textit{P}'s.\footnote{CW 15, cxli. See also note 283 below.} Two scribal errors that have crept into the latter texts also seem to place 1565 and \textit{A} earlier than \textit{P} and \textit{H}: at 324.11, where “gnaviter” (in \textit{A} \& 1565) becomes “graviter” (in \textit{P} \& \textit{H}) and at 376.4, where the correct “\textit{est / est}” in 1565 and \textit{A} is reduced to “\textit{est}” in \textit{P}. Similarly, several minor, but superior readings in \textit{H},\footnote{CW 15, cxlii, n. 3.} along with one substitution that seems to be part of More's editorial process of thematic concentration,\footnote{\textit{H} reads “prudentior” where 1565, \textit{P,} and \textit{A} have “sapientior.” Prudence is a theme of \textit{Richard III,} and the word is used often, to refer to several different characters. Cf. 316.22, 362.27, 368.1, 372.13, 372.16, 382.1, 392.6, 392.7, 392.8, 394.4, 394.5, 394.25, 402.15, 464.20, 466.27, 484.15-6. Variations of “\textit{sapiens}” occur only four other times, all of which are closely associated with Richard himself: Twice he is described as wise (468.7, 466.19), once compared to a wise man (466.23), and once he warns his listeners that they will not be thought wise if they leave the younger prince in sanctuary (360.26). Since the line in question concerns not Richard, but Henry VI, the change in \textit{H} is thematically consistent.} make it likely that it stems from a slightly later draft than \textit{P}. Kinney is therefore correct in his ordering of the Latin texts: 1557\textit{L}, 1565, \textit{A, P,} then \textit{H}.

\textbf{Section VII: Contradictory Evidence from Omissions}

Accepting Kinney's ordering of Group Three requires returning to the subject of...
omissions. What about the omissions and lack thereof that misled Sylvester? Recall that perhaps the best evidence Sylvester presents for his ordering is that there are no unfilled spaces in 1565, but there are several word-sized blanks in both 1557 and A, and several empty lines in the latter. In one way, the discovery of P strengthens Sylvester's argument, since P has empty spaces and lines not only in many places that A does, but even one more after A leaves off. 246 To make matters even more confusing, although one of the blanks in A and P corresponds to one in 1557 (344.12), and the one near the end in P matches the location of one in 1557 (484.22), the several blank lines near the beginning of A, P, and H 247 (the three most advanced drafts according to the reasoning presented above) are identically filled in every other text, including those of Group One. It is important that any theory of the order of these texts be able to explain why these late texts lack so many lines present everywhere else.

There is a plausible explanation for how the blanks were handled in 1565. In the four cases where there are small gaps in P, Kinney thinks the editors altered the surrounding words and added in some guesses of their own to fill the sense, although they usually failed to capture a meaning similar to the English texts. 248 Doyle-Davidson similarly thinks it “very probable” that the Louvain editors smoothed things out when the grammar or syntax in their manuscript was rough, 249 and Hanham states, “The editors of Louvain also eliminated blanks that awaited authorial addition, sometimes to the

246 CW 15, cixv-cxlvii.
247 Although H omits the same lines as A and P, it does not leave as large a space. Kinney reports an “eight-line gap” in P, a “seven-line gap” in A, and “almost no gap” in H (CW 15, 314.20, n.).
248 CW 15, cxi.
detriment of the sense."⁴²⁵⁰ Sylvester came to the same conclusion by comparing 1565 with 1557. In all six places where Rastell left gaps, 1565 either omits the whole sentence (as at CW 2, 22a.27/b24), or fills the gap with an apparently editorial interpolation.⁴²⁵¹ Where A and P have several blank lines, and the gap was therefore too large to completely ignore, Kinney suggests that the editors copied the information from 1557, translating extremely literally.⁴²⁵²

Here again, looking to CW 14 is useful. That volume contains evidence that supports Kinney's theory of how the compilers of 1565 handled their manuscript of Richard III, by shedding light on both their editorial practices in general and in particular how they handled authorial gaps in their source texts. Although with the discovery of V in More's own hand a critical edition of that work is obviously not needed, Miller nevertheless presents a textual stemma for four of the early texts of De Tristitia Christi, including 1565, precisely because “1565 contain[s] other works for which we possess no autograph,” such as Richard III.⁴²⁵³ Miller's thorough investigation and comparison reveals that 1565 is not an especially accurate text: “1565 contains, besides many careless errors, a fairly large number of deliberate (and often unwarranted) changes in the text.”⁴²⁵⁴ These changes include “a few corrections [and] several omissions and editorial 'improvements' ... made by the editor and typesetters of 1565.”⁴²⁵⁵ They changed the text so much that 1565 is approximately as different from what More actually wrote as a

⁴²⁵¹ CW 2, xxxiii, n. 2.
⁴²⁵² CW 15, cxiv.
⁴²⁵³ CW 14, 724.
⁴²⁵⁴ CW 14, 737.
⁴²⁵⁵ CW 14, 735.
manuscript whose “scribe ... was very careless and seems not to have understood Latin.”\footnote{CW 14, 730. See also CW 14, 736: “With the possible exception of O, 1565 is further from the text of V than any other surviving version.”} Certainly 1565 corrected some real mistakes, like a Bible quote that More accidentally extends past the part he comments on,\footnote{CW 14, 159.6-7.} and a non-standard declension of the biblical name “Ioas,”\footnote{CW 14, 395-401.} but elsewhere, by “correcting” a scriptural passage to the Vulgate reading, they significantly altered More's meaning, since he had purposely changed the wording to fit better into his narrative.\footnote{CW 14, 727.} Earlier, this chapter noted that the phrasings of some passages of Richard III in 1565 are farther from the English of Groups One and Two than the same passages in A, despite evidence that A is a later revision.

Analyzing what happened between V and 1565 for De Tristitia Christi makes it almost certain that this apparent anomaly results from an editor's dissatisfaction with More's Latin. Looking only at variants unique to 1565, Miller finds that “[i]t introduces many careless, unintentional errors ... But more damaging than these is the deliberate editorial revision to which the text has been subjected ... A finicky concern for elegant Latinity in 1565 sometimes sacrifices More's meaning for the sake of 'correctness'.\footnote{CW 14, 736. Miller gives several examples (CW 14, 736-7), but some clearly editorial changes Miller does not point out are also significant. The Louvain editor disagreed with More's emphasis in some places, and thus, at CW 14, 89.1, for example, softens atrociter (“savagely, fiercely”)—a word which Chapter Four will show has a special association with evil for More—to acriter (“sharply”), when describing Christ's sufferings. Similarly, at one place the editor deleted haud paulo (“by no means a little”) before “less sin” (CW 14, 309.3) and at another (CW 14, 341.3), he softened haudquaquam (“by no means whatsoever”) to haud (“by no means”)} What V shows undoubtedly did happen to De Tristitia Christi very probably happened to Richard III as well. In both cases, the editor of 1565 faced a Latin text which had never before been published, and in both cases he altered the text he read in his manuscript wherever
he felt the Latin was too rustic. Thus in those passages in *Richard III* where the wording of *A* and *P* is close to that of 1557 while 1565 presents better Latin, the latter ought to be disregarded for critical purposes. At those points, 1565 prints something more elegant than what More actually wrote.

The way that the 1565 editor handled what was not in his manuscript at all helps just as much as how he handled what was not to his liking in understanding what happened in the case of *Richard III*. Just as gaps appear in 1557, *A*, and *P*, More left four blank spaces of varying size in his autograph of *De Tristitia Christi* (all related to quotations from the Bible), but none are preserved in 1565. Two instances relate to 2 Cor 7:10. More apparently did not remember the exact wording, nor which of the New Testament epistles contained this verse. First, More left a gap long enough for several words in the middle of a line, where he evidently intended to add the first half of the verse,261 and then began a new sentence near the end of the line. Here, 1565 adds a period before the gap, even though the sentence is incomplete, and then begins a new paragraph (CW 14, 263.10), although the gap was certainly intended to be filled, not to mark a transition.262 This is very similar to what Kinney thinks happened in *Richard III* at 344.12.263 On the next page of *V*, More left another gap, for the name of the epistle's author, before paraphrasing the second half of the verse.264 Again, 1565 simply removes the gap without comment (CW 14, 265.7). The editors of 1565 fill the third gap, the longest, with a biblical prophecy taken from “the last part of the verse (Matt. 26:31)

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261 CW 14, 1026, n. 263.9.
262 CW 14, 736, n. 1. More clearly marks his paragraphs with appropriate symbols, as is evident, for example, near the bottom of page 264, just before *proximum*.
263 CW 15, cxlvi.
264 CW 14, 1027, n. 265.6.
quoted by More just before the blank space." In this case, they made an obvious choice, which is probably correct. In the last instance, though, they insert two words of their own imagining, neither suggested by anything in More's manuscript, nor in fact completing the quotation according to the Vulgate. Judging from what happened to $V$, Kinney's theory is even more plausible. The longest gap in $A$ and $P$, relating to Edward's daughters, was likely filled from the most obvious source, 1557, while any gaps small enough to ignore without too much loss of sense were simply omitted, and the grammar of those sentences changed to avoid jarring the reader.

Kinney does not explain, though, why these lines were left blank in the first place. If 1557 (or Group One for that matter) indeed comes earlier, why would it include the information needed to fill eight lines that are left blank in a later version? If More could not remember the names or details about Edward's daughters when he made the later versions, why did he not turn back to his own English manuscript instead of leaving it to be done thirty years after his death in Louvain? Also, even accepting that the Louvain compilers edited their manuscript of Richard III in a similar way to how they edited their manuscript of De Tristitia Christi cannot explain all the irregularities found. Would an editor have removed text, instead of simply smoothing what was there and adding lines that were obviously lacking? As Kinney notes, a considerable number of the places where $A$ and $P$ are closer to 1557 than 1565 is involve omissions, not merely changes in phrasing. Clauses and whole lines that are found in both Group Two and other Group Three texts are not in 1565.

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265 CW 14, 736, n. 2.
266 CW 14, 736 & n. 2.
267 CW 15, cxlix, n. 2; cxl, n. 1; cl-cli.
Turning again to More's holograph for help, one finds that only once does 1565 omit an entire clause from V, possibly only because it was overlooked (since it was interlined after the main text was written), but possibly because the editor censored it because he “was troubled by More's assertion that Christ still appears to some persons miraculously.”268 Apparently thinking along these lines, Kinney has identified three omissions in 1565 which he judges “to be cases of straightforward censorship,”269 but Kinney also notes eleven other passages of at least one clause in length which are found in 1557, A, and P, but not in 1565.270 Why were they left out, if 1565 really comes after 1557? On the other hand, as Sylvester noticed, it is significant that “for those portions of the text which are preserved in both [A] and 1565, no additions occur in the latter.”271 If A and P came later than 1565, what happened? Did More delete a large amount of helpful information that was present in his English versions when he wrote the manuscript that the 1565 editors found, only to add it back in later so a scribe could draw up A and P? Perhaps it is because this seems so impossible that Hanham insists that the English versions came after 1565, despite the structural evidence to the contrary. Rubio, too, insists, “The only possible explanation for this gap [the seven lines near the beginning] is that More, when composing [A], did not have at his disposal the facts about these two of Edward's seven children; he did, however, have the information about them

268 CW 14, 737.
269 CW 15, cxl, n. 1. The three are: 424.8-10, 428.22-3, & 434.4-6. As shown below, at least two of these can be plausibly explained in other ways.
270 These are: 316.9, 366.19, 392.15, 418.12-3, 418.25, 422.20-6, 428.29-430.2, 430.24-5, 468.17, 478.3-6, & 482.20-4. This list derives from making the comparison Kinney recommends between the lists he compiled of “extended omissions which are not improvements ... common to 1565 and 1557” (CW 15, cxlix, n. 2) and all “extended omissions in 1565” (CW 15, cxl, n. 1), and then adding in the jest of the schoolmaster, which he discusses in the main body of the text (CW 15, cxli).
271 CW 2, xliii, n. 2.
available later when he prepared the texts which eventually descended to Grafton, Rastell, and the Louvain editors.²⁷²

However, there is a plausible, although necessarily somewhat conjectural way to resolve these disagreements between Sylvester, Kinney, Hanham, and Rubio. It has been shown above that More probably wrote the English versions of Groups One and Two before translating the final English draft, discarding its ending and adding a new one along with a revised version of the conspiracy backstory to form 1557Ł. If it makes sense that 1557Ł contained no more information than 1557, except for the three selections Rastell printed, that does not preclude the possibility that it may elsewhere have contained even less. If 1557Ł omitted not only the information from those several lines near the beginning, but also everything else that is more fully given in P, but does not appear in 1565, Rastell would still have been preserving the maximum amount of More's History by making the choices he did.

Since we see whole lines blank in some texts, perhaps 1557Ł and whatever subsequent draft(s) gave rise to 1565 had even more,²⁷³ not because More forgot anything, or decided to omit so many descriptive asides, but because these drafts were preliminary versions made before the author completed his translation. As noted above, one blank in P is especially suggestive of this. In the margin, the scribe wrote

²⁷² Rubio, 80.
²⁷³ Even if they did not preserve the blanks, they may have had omissions. Even P, which has many blanks, does not preserve all the blanks which must have been in its source. See note 283 below.

One of those places where P lacks a word, but does not preserve a blank space actually presented considerable difficulty to Kinney, and he did not catch his mistake until after CW 15 was already printed, and thus it was corrected only in the errata found in Volume One of the Complete Works. At 484.23, he “misread P at first because this word [eiusdem] is both heavily and ambiguously abbreviated ... and because P lacks the space before ‘mensis’ that we can restore on the basis of Rastell’s close rendering of this bit of Latin in 1557 Ł” (CW 1, 446; correction for p. 631 of CW 15).
“avauncement,” which is the word which appears in the equivalent sentence in 1557 (CW 2, 15a.8), but no Latin word had yet been chosen to take its place. Since it is likely that the 1565 editors had a blank in their manuscript at that word, as well as where A and P have other blanks, then still more blanks can be postulated where 1565 omits clauses found both before it in 1557 and in P afterwards.274 These would be filled up after the passage in question was fully translated.

In several cases, it is easy to see why an omitted passage would take more time to translate than the surrounding text. The marginal notation in P mentioned above shows that More took his time to be careful about the proper translation of even one word. An extremely complex sentence like the one omitted from Richard's acceptance speech in 1565 but found in P275 would obviously require more work to get exactly right. In other cases, stylistic considerations delayed the translation more than vocabulary or grammar. The instances mentioned above that Hanham brings up in her attempt to show that 1565 is an earlier draft than P are only two out of several such omissions that demonstrate substantial wordplay and wit, and thus would take more time to translate properly. The schoolmaster’s jest in 1557 relies on a pun that is not reproducible in Latin (CW 2, 54a.12). Its replacement in A and P (422.25-6) required More first to search for a suitable classical alternative that would convey the same message and then to translate the transitional sentences that lead up to the joke.276 The ironic comment that Richard

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274 Hanham has a similar idea: “Did the editors in Louvain here remove from their draft the blank betraying that in the very earliest stages of Latin composition More had suffered this writer’s (or rather translator’s) block? (Hanham 2007, 72-3).

275 “He was able to cede his right not at all reluctantly because he had seen that it always brings more gall than honey to him who intended to rule in such a manner [that] it ought not to be permitted for someone [to rule] who did not want [to rule] in that manner” (478.3-6; cf. CW 2, 78a.34-79a.2).

276 The passage introducing the new joke, from Terence's Andria (line 476), contains perhaps the strongest
made Shore's wife do penance “as a goodly continent prince clene & faultes of himself, sent oute of heauen into this vicious world for the amendement of mens maners” (CW 2, 54a.24-6), ends with triple alliteration, perhaps for emphasis. When he eventually translated this clause into Latin, More transferred the alliteration to the beginning while working in an allusion to the Aeneid: “pius purusque princeps” (424.8-9). Similar stylistic concerns explain others passages found in 1557 and P, but not in 1565. For example, the passage extending the stage-play metaphor (482.20-4; CW 2, 81a.6-10) includes another pun that cannot translate into Latin, on the word “scaffolds,” and the description of the queen's intelligence (CW 2, 28a32-29a.3) relies on a double meaning for the phrase “shrewde witte,” indicating both that it is the wit of a clever woman, and also that of an irritating woman, a shrew. The insult cannot translate directly, but the Latin eventually used in P manages to preserve a more subtle jibe against her sex when Buckingham says she has a degree of “intellect” which is “undoubtably not contemptible for a woman” (366.19). So, too, the description of Friar Penker (434.4-6; CW 2, 59a.6-7) preserves the alliteration from English (“frere forced for”) to Latin (“frater pefrictissimae frontis”), and adds a new pun besides (“disputandum sputa”). This poetry all takes time.

Further evidence comes from the proverbs which are frequently quoted in Richard III. Brenda Hosington has identified 51 proverbs in the portion of the English texts

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277 The use of “pius princeps” clearly alludes to the Aeneid, since this “is the most frequent epithet Virgil used to describe his Roman hero, Aeneas” (Wegemer 2011B, 59, n. 90).
shared by the Latin texts. Of these, “fifteen proverbs are absent from [1565] although the
text surrounding them is not; five were absent because the whole passages surrounding
them were too. However, the remaining thirty-one [in 1565] were extremely close to the
English, both lexically and syntactically. In [A], this rises to forty-one ... Of these 31
Latin equivalents, only three are close to classical proverbs of the sort found in the
*Adagia*. Some proverbs cannot be translated well or easily into Latin, so these were
dropped completely in 1565, but they appear later in A as literal translations from the
English.

Some of the other omissions unique to 1565 appear to result from thematic
concerns. As Chapter Three and especially Chapter Five explain in more detail, the role
of fortune, providence, fate, and related superhuman forces play in determining the
future, and the possibility of foresight or prophecy for knowing that future are two related
themes that run through *Richard III*. In accordance with development of these themes, to
the description of Hastings in 1565 (CW 2, 52b.13-21), (which is itself a considerable
expansion of 1557; CW 2, 52a.16-22), is added “He had too little foresight” in A (CW 2,
226). Similarly, one of the possible reasons given why Shore's wife took no money for
interceding with the King changes from 1557's “or for y' wanton women and welthy be
not alway couetouse” (CW 2, 56a.23-4) to P's “or whether a girl frollicking in her present
[good] fortune was neither anxious about the future nor continually gaping at riches”
(428.29-430.2). It would require more time than usual to alter these passages in

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278 Hosington, 23-4. As with the other evidence, the treatment of proverbs points towards editorial
alterations in 1565.
279 It is also possible that, as in the similar cases above, More was striving to preserve the alliteration of
“wanton women and welthy,” but was ultimately unable to arrive at a satisfactory Latin equivalent.
accordance with the emerging thematic development that is discussed in Chapter Three.

Perhaps something similar is what delayed the translation of the largest gap in A and P, the lines about two daughters of Edward IV: Bridget and Anne (314.13-7).

Certainly, translating them directly from 1557 would not be particularly time-consuming, and there is nothing complex about the passage as it stands in 1565. However, More may have intended to add some material here related to the power of fate or fortune over their

Of the fourteen extended omissions that Kinney notes, including the ones he calls censorship, seven remain to be explained. The evidence is not as clear with any of them, but some have suggestive details that indicate similar concerns with wordplay, while others may be the result of overzealous editing. All the translations in this note are mine.

The description of Richard's reign (CW 2, 4a.1-3, 4b.1 & 316.9-11) moves from speaking of “the crueltie, mischiefe, and trouble of the tempestious worlde that folowed,” in 1557 to “The hateful principate of the following parricide” in 1565, to “the cruelty of the following period [or storm; tempestatis], the inhuman and hateful principate of a parricide” in P. Here, 1565's version is not simply an omission. It translates the English triplet “crueltie, mischiefe, and trouble” with invisus, and adds that Richard was a murderer. In P, More found a way to bring back the allusion to a stormy time and make a pun, and restores “cruelty” while turning one clause into two.

The omission of one clause near the end of the sanctuary scene (CW 2, 40a.29-30, 40b.27 & 392.15) which indicates that companions, too, were not ready to flee with the younger brother, involves one word in 1565 taking the place of three in P. Since 1565 adds an “esser” that is only understood in P, the other words may have been accidentally omitted when the grammar was clarified.

At 418.25, the reference to two hours is omitted in 1565. Sylvester comments on this passage that “The text of [A] ... reflects a clumsy attempt to render the En.” (CW 2, 225). If the Latin is clumsy here, maybe the two hours were edited out when the Louvain redactors corrected the grammar.

The English proverb “for sinnne it wer to belie y e deuil” (CW 2, 56a.14-5), is omitted in 1565, but literally translated in A and P (428.22-3). Perhaps More attempted to find a similar Latin proverb, but settled on translation later when he was unable to do so.

Perhaps the clause which tells us that Radcliff charged Grey and Woodville with treason before the crowd (430.24-5) was omitted in 1565 because More was considering a way to pun on “scafold” again (CW 2, 57a.27). As it is, P does not suggest the stage metaphor at all, while 1557 at least hints at it.

One clause is a very special case. There is no equivalent in 1565 or even in the later A for 1557’s “the people whom he hoped y’ the Mayer had framed before” (CW 2, 75a.1-2), but P (468.17) provides both alliteration “prefectum preformasse populum” and a play on words, since the prefect, literally the man “pre-made” is the one who was to “pre-form” the people. Since there is no evident wordplay in the English, however, it is difficult to say why a literal translation did not appear in 1565 while More was musing over the best possible alliteration, and especially why, out of all the skillful wordplay required by so many other such passages, this one was the last to be put into Latin.

Finally, I see no reasonable explanation at all for the omission at 418.12-3. Still, since so many of these major omissions suggest an extended effort by More to bring word-play of various sorts from English into Latin, the best explanation is that the manuscript from which 1565 was set was written after the English version of 1557 was already written, and after the decision in favor of the major structural changes which mark Group Three had been made, but before several of the most artistically challenging translations had been completed. If 1565 had been written prior to 1557, as Hanham holds, it should have many more omitted clauses that have nothing to do with translation difficulties.
lives, or some comment about the lack of such power. The description of Edward himself (314.5) as well as those of the other three daughters (314.17, 20; CW 2, 159), all reference fate or fortune. Although this is only speculation, if the argument presented here is correct, it is unlikely that these lines were to remain unchanged from 1557, as they are presented in 1565.280

Recognizing 1565 as an incomplete translation not only can explain the order of Group Three, it also helps to avoid some difficulties associated with placing Group One. Kinney assumes that Group One cannot be “an authentically primitive text of More's history in English” because “1543 and 1548 share the same omissions as 1557 with the Latin of 1565, and like 1557 they concur with the reading of the extant Latin manuscripts at a number of other points where 1565 has omissions.” To Kinney, therefore, “it seems that the copy-text of 1543 and 1548, like the copy-text of 1557, was affected by a good deal of textual cross-pollination with the advanced stages of More's Latin. ... [I]t seems highly unlikely that More would have retained an alternative and even more primitive organization in one form of his English while revising its contents along with a more advanced form of his Latin.”281 If 1565 results from printing an incompletely translated draft, there is no reason to assume a revision of the contents of either Group One or 1565 in order to avoid being forced into Hanham's implausible defense of Group One's inferior organization.282

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280 Kinney offers the alternative explanation that these blank lines very near the beginning were intended to prevent the publication of the manuscript until the rest of the blanks could be filled and the drafting process completed (CW 15, cxliv, n. 2).
281 CW 15, cli.
282 The order of composition argued for in this chapter can answer some of Hanham's own questions. She seems surprised, for example, that “in places the extant English versions go back to a draft composed at a time before More had been struck by some of the ideas that he expressed in one or all of the Latin versions”
There is no question that 1565 seems very odd: it omits a great deal found in Groups One and Two, as if it were the earliest draft of all, and yet presents the superior organization of Group Three; it differs so much in syntax from the English versions, as if it were the last Latin draft, and yet shares certain characteristics with 1557 as if it were one of the earliest Latin drafts. The best explanation for all these features is that 1565 is based on a very early Latin manuscript, incompletely translated from English, full of gaps where words and sentences were later to be filled in, which was then edited in several places for grammar and idiom by whoever printed it in Louvain in order to present a smoother text. Places where whole sentences or clauses were omitted, or gaps which were filled with the editors' own translations from 1557 would not leave the grammatical traces in the text that Kinney points out around single omitted words. More could have supplied many such translations in subsequent drafts before A, P, and H were copied.283

(2007, 73) and that “the English texts do not have the depiction of Richard as consummate actor that appears in 1565 (Ibid., 75). Similarly, it strikes her as odd that “all the extant Latin versions have this addition about the queen’s nocturnal insinuations against Hastings. The extant English versions do not” (Ibid., 78). These all make sense when all the English texts are placed before all the Latin ones. At least one clause seems to have been translated only after the draft from which A derives had been written: “so much he had hoped that the mayor had formed the people beforehand” (468.17), is omitted in both 1565 & A, but has an English equivalent at CW 2, 75a.1-2 (See note 279 above). Since it is very conceivable that additional translations either did occur or were intended to occur after P was copied from its source, the most valuable parts of 1557 from a textual standpoint are the clauses and sentences which do not appear in any Latin version. Despite the fact that several subsequent drafts omitted them, More may well have meant to eventually include translations of them in the final draft. However, as Chapter Three will discuss, the longest such passages found in 1557 but not in P are repetitions, and so it is likely that they were purposely pared from the later draft. P may well contain all, or nearly all, the passages that More ever intended to translate from English.

It is not reasonable to assume that any remaining passages in P where information is omitted when compared with 1557 are due to authorial intent, rather than incomplete translation. P does not have blanks in three places where A does, and where a word indeed seems to be missing (344.11, 344.20, 466.8). In his critical edition in CW 15, Kinney fills the first, leaves a gap for the second, and ignores the third. Interestingly, 1565 fills this last gap with “publico,” which would change the sense from being “to Richard's advantage” to being “for the good of his country” (CW 2, 253). Was More trying to decide between “publico” and “re publico?” (Cf. note 308 in Chapter Three on CW 2, 74b.12.) Or between Richard's own good and the common good? Both are intriguing, and both would fit with the political considerations found in the rest of the work, as Chapter Four will show.
In conclusion, although editorial interference with More's texts muddies the waters where the Group One texts and 1565 are concerned, the evidence suggests the following textual history of *Richard III* as the most probable: Around 1513, More began to write the *History* in English. He worked on it on and off for at least five years, but either did not circulate any manuscripts during this time, or suppressed any mention of the work by his friends.²⁸⁴ At least three manuscripts, all very similar to one another, were written out in English. More revised his work during the time these manuscripts were produced, but only in minor ways. One of those manuscripts, from which 1557 was later printed, was then subsequently partially translated into Latin, and the resulting Latin manuscript (from whence came 1557¹) was further edited to have a different, shorter ending, a relocated conspiracy backstory, and a third minor addition when compared to its English source. These two manuscripts were filed together in such a way that they both came to William Rastell after More's death. At some later point, More translated some more of 1557 into Latin and then subsequently made further revisions of his *History* in that language in another manuscript, in which he nevertheless left many gaps, large and small, awaiting future translations. A copy of his manuscript made at this stage eventually found its way to Louvain, and 1565 was subsequently printed from it.

Meanwhile, More continued to translate additional passages from English to Latin and to make other revisions. Copies made of his manuscript during this part of the composition process eventually gave rise to *A*, *P*, and *H*. By 1538, a copy of some version of More's

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²⁸⁴ Rubio thinks Erasmus would otherwise probably have mentioned More's *Richard III* in his famous letter to Ulrich von Hutten which describes More and his works in detail (84). Erasmus's omission is not conclusive, however. Although this letter is dated to 1519, when More was probably working on *Richard III*, Erasmus does not mention some of More's other works which had certainly circulated in manuscript by that time, such as his English poems.
work which had been circulating among men who knew him was publicly acknowledged.\textsuperscript{285} Around that time, Hall (or perhaps another editor), reorganized, corrected, and otherwise edited an early English manuscript of More's \textit{History} in accordance with the wishes of the Privy Council. While still at work on his own \textit{Union}, Hall gave a copy of this edited manuscript, which had obtained governmental approval, to Grafton, from which Grafton printed 1543. During the next four years, Hall made further edits to his copy of the manuscript,\textsuperscript{286} possibly also obtaining another, later draft of More's English version during that time. When Hall died in 1547, he left to Grafton a fair copy of his most recently edited manuscript, from which Grafton printed 1548 and 1550.

The complete order of composition presented in this chapter (omitting inferior variants printed from the same manuscript) is therefore: 1543\textit{B}, 1548, 1557, 1557\textit{L}, 1565, \textit{A}, \textit{P}, \textit{H}. The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that, of all the extant texts, \textit{P} is the best single guide available to \textit{Richard III} as More intended it to be read, since it is nearly complete, has no significant omissions beyond the description of the two daughters, and was copied from a draft more advanced than any other version except \textit{H}. Although this chapter does not accept all of Kinney's arguments, especially regarding the English texts, his final conclusion is correct: “\textit{P} is not only the least garbled transcript of More's Latin history; it also provides, along with [\textit{H}] the most final known form of a text

\textsuperscript{285} CW 2, xxvii.
\textsuperscript{286} See Rubio, 72.
which we know More never finished completely.\textsuperscript{287} Part Two will therefore base its analysis on a text almost completely derived from P.\textsuperscript{288}

\textsuperscript{287} CW 15, cxxxv-cxxxvi.

\textsuperscript{288} Since $P$ is not perfect, Part Two of this dissertation will be based on the translation found in the Appendix, which relies mostly on $P$, but sometimes accepts the superiority of another reading. I have tentatively filled $P$’s blanks and revised some passages to account for scribal omissions and similar errors, as Daniel Kinney has done in his critical edition. I also consistently treat $H$ as more authoritative than $P$, including those six places where $H$ records only one reading, but $P$ has superscript variants. Kinney has sometimes corrected $P$ from $H$, but not with regard to any variant. Kinney sees the choices that $H$ makes in those six places as “scribal selection between variants,” and does not follow them because he thinks “$H$ does not necessarily exclude the same variants that More himself would have excluded” (CW 15, cxliii). This would be reasonable if $H$ never gave variants, but at 316.27, $H$ has two possibilities listed, in the same manner that the variants in the earlier texts are given in many times. Why would a scribe who was willing to select between variants refuse to select there? It is more likely that the draft he copied only had one such doublet left in it. Whenever a passage is referenced where my reading of the texts differs from that given in CW 15, it will be noted, and a justification will be given.
Chapter Three:  
Aspects of More’s Revision Process

Now that the argument for the order in which the various drafts were written has been set out, this final chapter of Part One will look at More's editorial process and some of the stylistic, dramatic, and thematic changes which are evident from one group of texts to another. This investigation will reinforce the conclusions reached in Chapter Two concerning the ordering of the three groups of texts, demonstrate just how much revision P has already undergone, justifying further inquiry into an admittedly incomplete work, and will shed light on More's typical revision process, his compositional goals, and the evolution of his literary focus.

Section I: Attention to Detail

More’s editorial process is especially marked by concern for detail. One of the easiest ways to see this is in his practice of preserving doublets or sometimes even triplets of nearly synonymous words in the same draft, and sometimes between drafts. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this aspect of More’s procedure is evident at all stages: as the drafts progress, some words are settled, and some other words are called into question. Over time, the whole work becomes more precise.

A comparison of Groups One and Two demonstrates this process in between the drafts which gave rise to each group. In about fifty cases, a doublet in 1543 is reduced to a single word or phrase in 1557. Sometimes, the line makes sense even with the doublet, but there is often a sense of redundancy, suggesting that the original doublet was present in the manuscript to preserve choices for the author, and that a final decision was to be
made at a later time. The vast majority of these are simply one or the other of the doublet chosen and printed. For example, “warre and battail” in 1543 becomes simply “battayle” in 1557 (CW 2, 3a.24), and “a veri blemish & highe disparagement” becomes “a veri blemish” (CW 2, 62a.27). In a handful of cases, a single third synonym is printed such as when “reason and policye” is reduced to “wysedome” (CW 2, 4a.14), or one set of options is replaced by another, such as “beautee and liniamentes of nature” with “bodye and prowesse” (CW 2, 7a.18-9). In nineteen cases, 1557 prints a doublet or triplet where 1543 has only one word or phrase, as when it prints “Innes and lodgynges” for the earlier “lodgynges” (CW 2, 17a.24). One of these strongly indicates that Rastell's manuscript either had interlinear variants or multiple options written together on the same line, because “diseased vexed” does not make sense together, but either word could replace the “deceased” of 1543 (CW 2, 35a.6).

The Latin manuscripts of Group Three provide even stronger evidence that More employed such simultaneous alternatives while writing his drafts. Both A and P present a large number of interlinear variant readings. Even H, short as it is, has one (316.27). An analysis of these variants from manuscript to manuscript within Group Three shows the

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289 The are 45 others doublets reduced to singles: CW 2, 4a.15-6, 4a.17, 4a.18, 5a.21, 6a.5, 6a.7, 6a.8, 6a.22, 7a.1, 9a.26, 10a.11, 12a.4, 13a.12, 13a.17, 13a.24, 14a.31, 15a.21, 26a.9, 27a.7, 30a.15, 30a.23, 31a.27, 31a.30, 34a.20, 37a.16, 50a.22, 54a.7, 54a.13, 62a.24, 69a.29, 71a.7, 71a.11, 73a.6, 73a.14-5, 74a.7, 76a.33, 78a.21, 79a.35, 79a.12, 80a.1, 80a.16 (twice), 84a.13, 84a.28, 89a.2, & 90a.9. At CW 2, 52a.19-20 a triplet is reduced to a doublet, and at 28a.17-8, a triplet is reduced to a single word, while at 42a.12 a doublet is eliminated completely. CW 2, 18a.22-3 & 20a.2 may be examined for doublets which apparently underwent revision between 1543 and 1548, and then again before 1557.

290 There are six others: CW 2, 4a.15, 5a.3, 14a.12, 37a.11, 56a.28, & 59.39.

291 Once, a quadruplet is eventually reduced to a doublet, in the process perhaps incorporating a scribal error (CW 2, 82a.15). Once, an option is chosen for half a phrase, and a new option created for the other half (CW 2, 58a.8). Once, part of a triplet is carried over into a new doublet, when “borowe, pill and extort” becomes “pil and spoyle” (CW 2, 8a.6).

292 The others are at CW 2, 16a.12, 17a, 22-3, 20a.15, 20a.16, 21a.15, 22a.11, 24a.2, 32a.8, 35a.6, 39a.4-5, 46a.31-2, 47a.23, 56a.27, 60a.8, 68a.34, 79a.4, 80a.20, & 81a.9.

293 CW 2, xliii. See also Logan 2005, 120-1, n. to p. 37 (1) & n. to p. 40 (3).
same kind of development as noted with regards to the English texts. A, based on an earlier draft, has 73 places where the scribe recorded variants. One of these (340.15) does not appear in P, perhaps indicating that it was settled by that time, but all the others remain under consideration, while a great many more are added. P has 204 variant sites, and some of these record two variants besides the main reading. 294 Many of these are comparable to the doublets found in the English versions, with the variants listing synonyms or near synonyms. For example, veritos & suspicantes (328.20), inimicitias & simulates (330.12), sentiebat & intelligebat (404.3), amaretur & foveretur (430.3), tutela & curatone (442.12), and reliquis & ceteris (474.9). Another common group of variants consist of the same verb, but with different tense, number, or mood, such as decussum est & decutitur (412.19) and vocabatur & vocatus est (480.25). Frequently, the reading listed as an interlinear variant in P is the same as the reading printed in 1565, 295 while just as frequently, 1565 matches the main reading. 296 If 1565 is indeed derived from an earlier draft, as Chapter Two argues, then the editors may well have faced the same variant readings in their manuscript which are present in P, and chose the one they

294 CW 15, cxxxv, n. 1. Although P has variants throughout, they are considerably more numerous beginning on p. 394.
295 e.g. 316.13, 328.20, 334.27, 344.12, 366.28-368.1, 380.10, 400.4, 400.18, 402.17, 404.3, 410.21 (twice), 414.16, 414.21, 416.2, 418.4, 420.21, 422.6, 422.7 (twice), 422.15, 424.3, 424.24, 426.3, 426.14, 432.12-3, 432.13, 436.17-8, 440.4, 440.25, 442.12, 444.3, 444.5, 444.16, 444.26, 446.3, 446.9, 446.20, 448.8, 448.22-3, 450.16, 452.19, 454.1, 454.17, 454.24, 456.19, 458.10-11, 460.7, 462.10, 462.19-21, 466.19, 466.21, 468.13, 472.23, 474.2, 474.9, 476.12, 480.12, 482.26-7.
296 e.g. 316.27, 330.12, 334.19, 366.28, 394.5, 404.5, 408.10, 408.12, 408.17, 408.20, 416.8, 416.10, 416.18, 416.19, 416.22, 418.12, 418.17, 420.10, 424.6, 424.23, 428.28, 430.3, 432.8, 432.12, 432.20, 432.24-5, 434.17, 436.4, 436.5, 436.14, 440.2, 440.23, 444.9, 446.25, 448.9, 448.12, 450.15, 450.22, 452.4, 452.18, 454.22-23, 456.11, 458.2, 458.5, 458.11, 458.15, 458.16, 458.25, 460.13, 462.4, 462.12, 462.15, 464.11, 464.15, 464.16, 466.4 (twice), 466.13, 470.13, 474.7, 474.7-8, 474.10, 474.12, 474.15 (twice), 474.16, 474.21, 476.1-2, 480.13, 480.21, 482.7, 482.20.

Hanham supposes that the main readings in a particular manuscript are usually the latest, with some earlier possibilities preserved above the line (2007, 64). There really is not enough evidence to say. If that is the case, however, then the 1565 editors chose the main reading about as often as the variant reading in their manuscript.
preferred.\textsuperscript{297} It is also likely that earlier manuscripts had variants that were not included in the later drafts, since 1565 often prints a nearly synonymous word or phrase that is nevertheless not found in \textit{P}.\textsuperscript{298} A few instances are especially suggestive of this, where \textit{A} preserves the reading of 1565, but \textit{P} does not, even as a variant.\textsuperscript{299} Similar instances occur where earlier texts have readings that appear to be variants of the reading in \textit{P}, but \textit{P} records no options.\textsuperscript{300} Progress was being made, and even more progress is apparent in the manuscript that appears to be based on the most advanced draft, \textit{H}. At 316.27, the main reading in \textit{P} is present as a variant in \textit{H}, while a new option has become the main reading. Meanwhile, decisions seem to have been made at 328.20, 328.21, 330.12, 334.19, and 334.27, where \textit{P} has variants, but \textit{H} does not.\textsuperscript{301} Thus, all the indications are that More continually referenced alternate readings throughout his drafting process until he made a final decision in a particular instance, both while working in English earlier, before he settled on the version he decided to translate, and then again after he switched to Latin. In the same way, as Chapter Two noted, when More made his initial translation from English to Latin, it appears that sometimes he translated an English doublet with one Latin word, and sometimes one English word with a Latin doublet.\textsuperscript{302} This concern

\textsuperscript{297} In at least one instance, they probably printed both together, where 1565 reads “\textit{lugubri et miserabili}” (CW 2, 60b.28), and \textit{P} has a main reading “\textit{miserabili}” and “\textit{lugubri}” as an interlinear variant (436.22).

\textsuperscript{298} e.g. 328.21, 330.9, 330.19, 366.24-5, 398.12-3, 400.6, 402.1, 402.11, 412.2, 412.2-3, 412.16, 414.1-2, 416.10, 416.17 (twice), 424.13, 426.6, 426.8-9, 430.18, 432.22, 440.26, 442.16, 444.6, 444.10, 446.5-6, 448.8 (twice), 464.11, 474.2, 474.7, 480.5, 480.15, 480.25.

\textsuperscript{299} e.g., 450.21.

\textsuperscript{300} e.g. 330.9, 394.16, 396.5, 396.9, 396.18, 402.25, 410.8-9, 426.6, 426.8-9, 440.26, 456.6-7, 458.11, 474.15, 476.26. Of course, these could have simply been changed in the course of revision, even if no variants were in the earlier manuscript. 350.3 and 416.17 change from 1565 to \textit{A} to \textit{P}, but variants are never recorded.

\textsuperscript{301} \textit{H} does not always select the main reading of \textit{P}. 334.19 and 334.27 both select \textit{P}’s variant. Since many choices regarding wording seem to have been finalized there, it is a loss to us More scholars that \textit{H}’s scribe did not copy his entire source.

\textsuperscript{302} See CW 2, lvii for some examples.
for the right choice, even when dealing with synonyms, demonstrates that More was concerned about precise meanings at every stage, and that sometimes when interpreting *Richard III*, it is worth paying particular attention to the choice of specific words at specific places.

Another noteworthy aspect of *Richard III*s revision is the removal of redundant passages between Groups Two and Three. Buckingham replaces Edward V's servants with others twice in *1557* (CW 2, 19a.30-20a.1 & 45a.4-5), but only once in Group Three (350.1-2), and two accounts of why Hastings waited until the king was dead to sleep with Shore's wife (CW 2, 48a.21-2 & 55a.21-3) give way for one (426.11-3). Similarly, two subsequent reiterations of the assertion that Edward was actually married to Elizabeth Lucy—in the plan for the content of Dr. Shaw's sermon (CW 2, 66a.15-23) and as part of Buckingham's speech (CW 2, 73a.15-7)—are omitted in the later version, as they both simply repeat information that has been given before (CW 2, 59a.11, 18-25, 64a.24-9). During Shaw's sermon itself, *1557* repeats several lines when Richard enters (CW 2, 68a.15-21), while Group Three merely gives one line and then summarizes the rest with “and what follows” (454.3-4). Finally, the longest passage (besides the ending) found in *1557* but not in later drafts gives the content of the proclamation issued after the execution of Hastings (CW 2, 53a.14-29). The allegations in the proclamation are either already familiar to the reader from Richard's words before Hastings's arrest (CW 2, 48a.6-24) and from the story Richard invents for the prominent men of London (CW 2, 52a.31-53a.7), or are very similar to those given immediately afterward (CW 2, 53a.31-2). Thus the later versions more concisely speak of the “edict ... from which ... almost the
same things were proclaimed” (422.4).\(^{303}\) This elimination of repetitive passages makes the History less confusing, more engaging, and more striking. The result is a story that moves more quickly, has a clearer plot, and which avoids placing too much emphasis on relatively unimportant aspects of the account.

Section II: Dramatic Progression

Other alterations demonstrate More's attention to the action of each scene. There is a notable tendency toward more detailed description, greater flair, and more dramatic exposition in the more advanced drafts. For example, where Group One has “He slewe king Henry,” 1557 adds, “with his owne handes” (CW 2, 8a13-4), while Group Three says that Henry “was cruelly stabbed and slaughtered by [Richard] with a dagger thrust under his ribs” (324.22-3). Along the same lines, Group One describes how, when Richard's partisans displayed the weapons that the Queen's partisans had supposedly used in their treachery, “muche part of the common people were therewith verye well satisfyed,” while 1557 adds, “and said it wer almoise to hange them” (CW 2, 24a.14-5), and Group Three elaborates that the story “satisfied the simple and rough people so marvelously that from the sight of the arms it was just as if treason was certain and proven, and everywhere they proclaimed health for the Dukes and hanging for the

\(^{303}\) Since there are no other long passages from 1557 which have not been translated in \(P\) besides these repetitions and the account of two of Edward's daughters near the beginning, it appears that there is probably not much more that More wished to carry over from 1557. There are, indeed, many other phrases and clauses which do not show up in \(P\), but the vast majority of them are of such small significance that they could easily have been eliminated as part of the editing process. The longest passage that is in 1557 and which seems to be missing from \(P\) is the Cardinal's summary of Richard's argument that the boy in sanctuary needs a playmate (CW 2, 34a.25-30). \(P\) gives Richard's argument itself (362.1-12), as well as the Queen's later response (388.5-12), but in \(P\) as we have it, she never actually hears the points she responds to, since she was not present at Richard's speech. More may have eliminated this passage as a repetition similar to the others mentioned here, since, although it creates a continuity error in the storyline, for the reader it is indeed no more than a restatement of what already has been read. However, many other of the Cardinal's almost exact restatements of previous arguments still appear in \(P\). See note 410 in Chapter Six.
captives” (358.11-4). Inserting a reference (as here, to the dukes) for greater contrast, adding a comment on human behavior, and increasing specificity (as here, from most of the common people to “simple and ignorant people”), are all typical of the last stage of More's editorial process.

These kinds of changes are present at all stages, but especially evident between Groups Two and Three. For example, where the former has merely “mischief” (CW 2, 12a.25), the latter has “slaughter and blood” (334.17); in Buckingham's speech against Edward, 1557 notes that whenever the King looked at a girl, he “would importunely pursue hys appetete, and haue her” (CW 2, 72a.10-1), while the latter say he would “immediately pursue, solicit, and rape” her (462.15); and in 1557, Buckingham complains about the sanctuaries being full “of them whome wylfull vnthriftynesse hathe broughte to nought” (CW 2, 30a.26-7), while Group Three specifies “dice, luxury, and lust” as the reasons for their moral decline (370.18). Comparing the two descriptions of how the Queen receives the message about what happened at Stony Stratford is a good way to see how Group Three often elaborates the narrative to intensify the dramatic effect. 1557 includes all the necessary facts, but nothing more: “But anone the tidinges of this mater came hastely to ye quene ... in the sorest wise, yt the king her sonne was taken, her brother, her sonne and her other frendes arested, & sent no man wist whither, to be done w' god wot what” (CW 2, 20a.17-21). Group Three includes more emotion and gives a better idea of what is at stake:

[A] frightened messenger came to the Queen at Westminster Abbey, announcing all the sad and vicious deeds: that the Prince had been captured by his uncle and abducted by force contrary to his will; that her brother Woodville and Richard Gray, and then other friends of
hers were apprehended and sent away, with it uncertain as to where and uncertain in what way they would be treated; that the whole of things was changed; and that everything, having been overturned, was ruined. Accordingly, the time should be seized by her, and she should take counsel for herself and the remnants of her fortunes while it was possible, lest her enemies, who were running quickly, should intercept those remnants. (350.16-9)

The description of Shore's wife similarly is much more poignant in the later version. 1557 has “Proper she was & faire” (CW 2, 55a.23), but Group Three reads “This was [a woman] with white skin, and with an extraordinary appearance to her whole face; but especially marvelous were the enticements in her eyes. As for the rest of her body, there was nothing you would want to change, unless perhaps one might wish her taller. For she was more pretty than tall, which itself is especially pleasing to almost every very tall man” (426.14-8).\textsuperscript{304} Such elaboration helps keep the reader's attention and gives the work a more realistic feel. It also sheds greater light on the motivations of the characters; as in these instances for example, to know what fears prompted the Queen to take sanctuary and to understand why Mistress Shore had such access to prominent men.

These typical human motivations, dispositions, and other aspects of the human mind constitute another developing characteristic of the work. As Sylvester recognizes, in Richard III, “How men feel is just as important as what they do; motives as well as

\textsuperscript{304} Examples of more vivid language serving to increase contrast or heighten suspense are extremely common in Group Three. The following passages are only a selection among many which do not appear at all in 1557: “the child rushes toward dominion over the very body of his parent” (394.16-7), “the nobles meanwhile rejoiced in his great cheerfulness, as much [as] they had not seen in him before by mere chance, and they simultaneously praised his humanity and his benevolence” (406.24-6), “murder was imminent” (408.16), “and then for open slaughter” (410.4), “an adverse rumor, to which maternal piety would impart authority and weight” (446.16), “from so much wealth to not only poverty but even to nakedness” (458.17-8), “more necessarily than honorably” (462.4), “all appropriate arts for governing a dominion besides coincided by divine providence in this one man in such a way that he alone could appear born for the kingship” (466.11-3), “[he] called for silence again” (472.17).
actions must be analyzed."\textsuperscript{305} Once again there are significant developments from 1557 to Group Three. Very often, there are additions which concern the reasons the characters act as they do, or did, or might. Even in the earlier versions, the Narrator doubts that King Edward IV knew about the murder of Henry VI (CW 2, 8a.20-1), but only in Group Three is there the additional reason that “he probably considered [Henry] to be more to his advantage alive and in his own hand” (324.23-5). Only there do we see Richard's reason for remaining silent before he accuses Shore's wife and then Hastings of treason: He wanted to “ke[ep] in suspense the terrified minds of those waiting” (408.5).

Motivations are given for all kinds of actions in all parts of the work: the Queen gives up her younger son because “hope sometimes glitters meanwhile among ruined affairs” (392.18-9); Middleton is willing to kill the Earl of Derby because of a land dispute (410.26-412.3); Richard presses the charge of prostitution against Shore's wife “lest they [be forced to] confess she had been harassed through injustice” (424.4-5); Penker and Shaw have to think up some legitimate reason that Richard could replace his nephew as king, “lest such an impious plan, shamelessly expounded, be immediately booed off the stage” (434.15-6); Edward's mother publicly objects to his marriage “not now in the same manner [as before], from the lowliness of her daughter-in-law, as from anger inflamed by the spurning of her counsel” (446.6-7); and the Recorder repeats the Duke's speech only because he “fear[ed] harm to himself if he refused” (470.12-3). All these descriptions, though they are usually not very long, help to shed light on the events in Richard III, to show why the characters do or do not oppose Richard, what it might have taken for them to have opposed him more vigorously, and ultimately how and why he succeeded in his

\textsuperscript{305} CW 2, xciv.
quest for the crown. These explanations help to constantly raise a question: Given the human motivations depicted, what kind of political reforms are possible?

Other additions deal not only with individuals' motivations, but human behavior more generally. The following examples are all statements put into the mouth of the Narrator only in Group Three: Concerning all men, he says that when they have wealth and health, “nearly all men” will turn to vice (319.1-3), and putting things in the wrong place is what “usually happens in such a great tumult” (352.25). Similarly, sometimes groups of people fight each other because they are “carried away by hatred or by favor” (354.21-2) and “[opportunity] usually impels even sluggish and quiet men to crime” (328.8-9). Sometimes, though, only a certain class of person is described. In an example discussed already, being “more pretty than tall ... is especially pleasing to almost every very tall man” (426.16-8), and in any crowd there will always be some schoolboys and apprentices willing to follow others' lead, even though they have “no concern” about what actually is going on (472.11-4).

Section II: Thematic Progression

All the changes discussed so far in this chapter, from discernment in word choice, to more pizzazz and less repetition, to more precise descriptions of human motivations, all help Richard III convey its philosophical and political message. They serve auxiliary roles for several prominent and parallel thematic progressions. Patterns that emerge from revision to revision show that, from its inception until the last changes evident in P and H, Richard III is ever more characterized by a universally applicable depiction of the possibilities and limits of politics. The History inquires into the relationship between
human institutions and tyranny to show how much a proposed political reform could accomplish. It also investigates how tightly politics is constrained by the power of fortune, asks to what extent human actions are bound by fate or destiny, or can be foreknown through prophecy, and depicts the limits of human nature, all to show how much cannot be accomplished. These aspects of Richard III are the main focus of chapters in Part Two, but for now, as an introduction, this section will show how some modifications made between the earlier texts and the later ones emphasize these themes.

First, Richard III becomes continuously more universal. Information about peculiarly British places, persons, money, and law are either removed, if not necessary for the plot, altered so as to be more widely understood, or clearly explained. An example of removal is the description near the end of the work of how various people meet before going together to offer Richard the crown. Group One notes that they meet together “at Paules” and then go “unto Baynardes castell where the protector lay,” but Group Two drops the meeting place (CW 2, 77a.10), and Group Three drops the name of the Protector's house, noting only that he “was lodging there in London” (474.4). Similarly, Potter's home address (CW 2, 9a.10) is not important, so is dropped from Group Three. There is also no need for the specific amount (in a possibly unfamiliar currency) that Shore's wife is fined (CW 2, 54a.17), and an audience of a different time or place might only be confused by a reference to the “north partes” of England, which is not crucial anyway (CW 2, 74a.6).³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ Sylvester realizes that 1565 (and thus by extension, all of Group Three) “is patently designed for an international audience” (CW 2, xxxiii.), but universalization can bridge gaps of both space and time. More's revisions also made his History more intelligible to men of later centuries. More's universalization of his text led, as Chapter Two mentioned, to the prevailing view of our own day, when Richard III is
Meanwhile, some details are kept, but clarified, such as the location from which Edward V sets out to London. Group One, assuming an audience with local knowledge, tells readers he was “at Ludlow;” 1557 adds that Ludlow is “in wales” (CW 2, 14a.2), and Group Three further explains why a British crown prince is there: “For that [place] is the proper domain for the first-born sons of kings, successively, while their parents are still living” (336.26-7). Group Three also adds descriptions of the location of Westminster Palace (316.1-3) and Northampton (344.6-8), explains that London is “the royal city” (336.24-5), refers to the Guildhall (CW 2, 69a.2) as “a forum in London, a place both elegant and spacious enough for a great crowd” (454.16-8), and to Westminster Hall (CW 2, 81a.12-3) as “the [other] forum (not that of London, but a larger and more majestic one which is near the palace adjoining Westminster abbey” (482.25-7). The office of Recorder in London is called “the mouth of the citie” in the earlier groups (CW 2, 75a.21), but P explains further: “The Londoners address as “Recorder” a man there who is the assistant of the mayor, learned in the laws of his country, so that he would not err through inexperience in returning judgments” (470.7-9). In the same way, only Group Three tells its readers that the office of Chamberlain “is extremely honorable among the English” (342.1-2), while elsewhere dropping 1557’s reference to specific British offices (CW 2, 70a.22) and referring to them instead as “all the honorable offices among you” (458.12-3).

In perhaps the most telling sign of the move towards a broader audience than that of his own time and place, in Group Three More switches from his native English to widely thought to be two different works with two different intended audiences, one British and one international. This view seems to have originated with Chambers (1938, 115-6). In contrast, this dissertation argues that More changed his intended audience as part of his revision process of a single work.
Latin, a language both accessible to all educated men of his own time and one with substantial ties to a long tradition of literature and philosophy. The Latin language enables *Richard III* to make allusions and references to great works of the past and to take its place in the conversation of Western Civilization with every expectation that it would be accessible in the future. With these steps, More refashions a story of one king of England which would be helpful for his fellow countrymen into an exploration of universal philosophical and political questions which could be useful to men of all times and places.

The second aspect of the work's thematic progression is the move towards greater emphasis and more precision in the use of words which represent crucial ideas in political philosophy. Political questions are central to the *History* even in its earliest form, but in each successive draft important political terms become better defined, including four which will play a key role in Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation: faction, law, and the nature of a republic and its citizens. The difficulties of parties, or factions, is apparent even from the early texts, but Group Three adds “factious” (320.19) to the initial description of Edward and Richard's father, Richard, Duke of York, and introduces four other uses of this word which are not found in Groups One or Two (338.9-10, 348.10-2, 352.20, 356.1-3), along with new references to “internal sedition” (336.7) and “discord” (346.17), which demonstrate the increasing importance of this idea.

The next topic, law, is equally prominent, or more so, and there are several signs of its refinement over time. As with other aspects of the *History*, law is universalized while it is emphasized. Thus, Buckingham says the succession has been settled
“accordinge to the comon law of this lande” in the earlier groups (CW 2, 73a.33-74a.1), but in Group Three it is simply “by a formally proposed law” (464.26). So, too, some details of interest only to lawyers, such as that “[the Queen] and all her chyldren and compaignie” did their paperwork and “were regestred for sanctuary persons” (CW 2, 21a.3) or that an alternative to knight's-service is socage (CW 2, 38a.30), are present in Group One but omitted in later drafts, while some references to law as a principle are added, as when Group Three has Richard saying that “the whole force of” “all laws” “depends on [the people]” (480.11). One early change seems to highlight the rule of law. In the discussion of justifiable homicide, Group One notes that in such cases, a pardon “is graunted,” which becomes “the law graunteth” in 1557 (CW 2, 30.a.22).

The concepts of republic and citizen are closely connected, and the later revisions of Richard III use these terms with great force in discussing political freedom. In a monarchy such as England in the day of Thomas More, the terms 'realm' and 'subject' were commonly employed; but More realized that these words tend to make the government seem like the king's possession, and the people seem like his servants. By substituting new words, the possibility and perhaps even desirability of a free country with free citizens becomes much more prominent in the later drafts. There are three places where the inhabitants of England are called “subiectes” in Group One (CW 2, 5a.1, 62a.16, and 92.8) which are omitted in Group Two, and there are no such references at all in Group Three.307 Similarly, Group One calls those who greet Edward V when he enters

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307 When the word appears in Daniel Kinney's translation, it is never in the Latin. At 480.7, “invitos” is substantive, and thus should be “the unwilling” or at most “unwilling persons.” At 476.19, the Latin has “populis,” the people. At 320.2, “apud suos” means simply “his own.” The only occurrence in 1557 is in the mouth of Edward's mother (CW 2, 62a.9). And, as Wegemer points out (2011B, 46), this is in fact the
London “commoners,” but 1557 and P both call them “citizens” (CW 2, 24a.19; 358.16, 18). The same thing happens later in the work between Groups Two and Three (CW 2, 77a.8; 474.3). Elsewhere, Sir Thomas Cook goes from “worshipful neibour” (CW 2, 70a.21) to “citizen” (458.12), the “cite” itself (CW 2, 58a.19) comes to be identified with its “citizens” (432.18), and in four other cases (354.23, 462.6, 472.11, and 472.16), “citizen” is added new in Group Three. The term for the state changes along with the term for its population. In some instances where earlier texts have “realm,” Group Three uses “republic” (CW 2, 41a.17 & 394.7; CW 2, 79a.7 & 478.12). In another case, “good purposes and necessari” (CW 2, 19a.16) become “the interests of both the king and the republic” (348.13). In other places, Group Three adds phrases or passages that use the term (342.26-7, 476.10, 480.20). It should be clear from these comparisons of the use of political terms that by the time it reaches P, Richard III is a carefully nuanced work which takes the possibility of political freedom seriously.

The last major category of thematic revisions deals with explaining powers which are beyond human control, such as God, chance, fate, or fortune. Generally speaking, the prominence of God (and especially of a recognizably Christian God) in Richard III is lessened in later drafts, while the presence of fortune and fate becomes more pronounced,
although the change is slight before Group Three. From Group One to Group Two, fortune rises to equal billing when a reference to God's grace is changed to “fortune and grace” (CW 2, 3a.7-8), and a parenthetical remark is inserted which indicates that the fickleness of fortune lasts for all of our lives (CW 2, 3a.15-6). In a later scene, the connection between fortune and prophecy is emphasized by moving from speaking of an “euil token obserued as a goying toward mischief” to a “rite & custome, obserued as a token often times notably foregoing some great misfortune” (CW 2, 50a.30-2). Similarly, references to God are removed three times (CW 2, 7a.30, 52a.13, 58a.3), and the only mention of the name of Jesus in any version of *Richard III* is eliminated between Group One and Group Two, softened to “our lord” (CW 2, 49a.24), before even this is stricken from Group Three (cf. 413.20-1). On the other hand, six new references to God (CW 2, 20a.21, 28a.2-6, 28a.13, 47a.8, 86.19, & 91.15-8) and one to His grace (CW 2, 63a.7) are introduced in 1557. Between 1557 and P, however, the trend is clear. God's name is never added, and references to Him are mostly removed. In the vast majority of cases, the lines are either reworked entirely, or Group Three refers generically to “those above [superi]” where prior versions use “God.” Along the same lines, Retha

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309 Three references to Jesus under the title of Christ remain near the beginning, even as late as P: 314.6, 332.24, & 334.5.
310 Out of 67 references to God in the part of the *History* shared by 1557 and P, 54 are omitted in the latter: CW 2, 6a.6, 11a.16, 12a.16, 13a.4, 10, 11, 13, 20a.21, 27a.17, 31, 28a.9, 28a.13, 23, 29a.1, 21, 30a.20, 31a.5, 19,23, 32a.29, 36a.24, 37a.6, 38a.1, 5, 8, 13, 39a.14, 21, 27, 40a.3, 42a.1 (cf. 394.24 “diis”), 42a.9, 10, 47a.8, 50a.24, 52a.13, 53a.6, 54a.2, 57a.26, 64a.10, 64a.16, 22, 29, 65a.11, 66a.29, 67a.14, 68a.6, 69a.14, 71a.15, 72a.30, 74a.19, 78a.21, 79a.11 (cf. 478.17 “divina providentia”), 80a.11, 15. Most of these are omitted in the transition from Group Two to Group Three, but it appears to have been a continuing process. “God” at CW 2, 50a.24 is still “deus” in 1565 (CW 2, 50b.22), but becomes “superi” in A and P (416.5-6). In the same way “god” at CW 2, 42a.1, is still “Deo” in 1565 (CW 2, 42b.1), but “diis” in P (394.24). In at least one case, 1565 adds a passage to 1557 which includes a reference to God (CW 2, 49b.26), and it is dropped only later, in A and P (414.2).
311 Hanham also uses this literal translation (2008, 200), while Kinney's translation in CW 15 often uses the English terms “heaven” or “the saints,” but there is no Christian connotation to the word.
Warnicke has found that “a careful comparison indicates much of the Christian and
demonic imagery that can be found in the vernacular history was avoided in the Latin
text.” For example, “superstition [superstitio] was substituted for witchcraft [cf. CW
2, 50a.13 & 414.21], divine guidance [divino] for holy spirit [cf. CW 2, 68a.3 & 452.18],
and embrace (complexibus) for kiss when the original intention seems to have been to
parody Judas's kiss of betrayal [cf. CW 2, 8a.9 & 324.15]. The Latin text has other
changes: only the marriage sacrament, not all sacraments, was mentioned [cf. CW 2,
12a.15 & 334.4-5] and some demonic references, such as serpent [cf. CW 2, 12a.22 &
334.14] and devilish [cf. CW 2, 37a.31 & 386.18] were dropped.” Not only religious,
but also superstitious symbols found in 1557 are omitted from Group Three, including
that it was Richard's left shoulder that was higher, and his left arm that was shrunken, and
that the betrayal of Hastings and the execution of Richard's other enemies happened on
Friday the 13th.

Occasionally, the new emphasis results from a direct substitution, when fate or
fortune takes God's place. For instance, “thoughe Godde dydde hys pleasure” (CW 2,
13a.13) is replaced by “If the common lot [sors] of men should bring about that [loss]”
(336.2-3), and in one place where Buckingham says the crowd should “thank god” (CW
2, 74a.19), the later versions say they should “rejoic[e] in [their] fortune [fortunae] and ...
giv[e] thanks to those above [superis]” (466.24-5). Other indications that fate and

313 This last change in fact replaces a Biblical allusion with a classical one. There are close verbal parallels
between this passage and one in Tacitus (Annales, 14.56; see Ronnick, 63-5). As Wegemer notes, “More
refines the Latin version to demand more judgment and greater attentiveness—as well as more comparison
with classical predecessors—than the English version” (2011A, 121, n. 6).
fortune are receiving more attention include the opening line—which in the earlier groups tells us that Edward “dyed” (CW 2, 3.3), but in the later versions that he “conceded to the fates” (314.5)—an added statement that “the fates” have the power of life and death (438.5), another that depicts the variability of fortune in the life of Shore's wife in much greater detail (430.8-14), and a third that lists several possible sources for prophecies or “preceding signs of an unavoidable fate,” including a demon, chance, fortune, and some innate power of the human body (414.3-7). Chapter Seven will show how important these changes are through its investigation of the History's final argument regarding the impact that all such non-human powers have on human moral and political freedom.

Part One has shown that More's Richard III is a rhetorical history, and thus should be approached as a work of literature that imparts political teachings, that, of the several versions of this work, the critical reconstruction of P available in CW 15 is the best available text to follow in this dissertation’s subsequent investigation, that the evident progress of More's technical and stylistic emendations show that this draft has received enough careful attention to be worthy of serious study, and that thematic trends from the earlier drafts until P show that More intended Richard III to confront timeless questions of universal human significance and philosophic importance, especially concerning the causes of tyranny and the possibilities and limits of politics. Part Two will follow Richard III's exploration of these questions.
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Part Two:
Interpreting the Work’s Political Teaching

As Chapter One has shown, Thomas More's *Richard III* is a literary work of political philosophy. In accordance with the rhetorical intention inherent in this kind of work, Part Two will closely analyze the text determined in Chapter Two while building on the political themes noted in Chapter Three. The following chapters will show that *Richard III* presents for a reader’s consideration a set of philosophically coherent political teachings, including descriptions of the key characteristics of good and bad political orders.

In particular, this work investigates the nature and causes of tyranny. Classical political philosophy employs the terms “tyrant” and “tyranny” to describe a ruler of the worst sort and the political order suffering under him,\(^316\) and Thomas More was undoubtedly both aware of this tradition and interested in contributing to it, as not only *Richard III*, but also the *Declaration* on tyrannicide he wrote in response to Lucian\(^317\) and a few of his intriguing Latin poems\(^318\) indicate. The way *Richard III* is organized suggests that this work is intended not so much to show what tyranny is as to show how

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\(^316\) See, e.g. Plato's *Republic* 576e and Aristotle's *Politics* 1267a13-5, 1293b29-31, & 1295a1-24.

\(^317\) The *Declaration by Thomas More Responding to the Lucianic One* was first published in 1506 as part of a collection which consisted mostly of translations of Lucian’s works done by More and Erasmus. Erasmus translated twenty-eight of Lucian’s dialogues. More translated three. Both men independently translated Lucian’s *Declaration on behalf of a Tyrannicide*, and then, at More’s suggestion, each wrote a response. More’s *Declaration* is his only original composition in the collection. See *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. 3, part 1, ed. Craig R. Thompson, (New Haven: Yale UP, 1974), xxviii-xxxix, lv-lvi. Henceforth, this volume will be cited as CW 3.1.

\(^318\) More’s Latin poems are collected in *The Complete Works of St. Thomas More*, vol. 3, part 2, ed. Clarence H. Miller et al. (New Haven: Yale UP, 1984). Five of them mention a tyrant (⁸s 25, 80, 109, 110, & 114 in that volume). The titles of the latter four clearly show More’s thoughtful participation in the classical tradition: “Death Alone is a Tyrannicide,” “The Difference Between a Tyrant and a Prince,” “To Be Anxious is the Life of a Tyrant,” “The Tyrant in Sleep is No Different from a Commoner” (my translations). Almost all of More’s Latin poetry was written between 1500 and 1520, but none of the poems about tyrants has been precisely dated. They were first published in 1518 (Ibid., 10-11).
tyranny comes about. Its plot draws attention to its titular protagonist and his quest for
the crown. There is no account of anything he did after he attained his goal. Rather, the
structure of the work draws attention to how he came to power in the first place. The
story opens, not with the beginning of Richard's reign, but with the death of King Edward
IV, which provides the opportunity Richard needs to put his plan into action; and it closes
with Richard's successful coronation, not his death. Richard III thus traces the progress
of a tyrant's plan from conception to fruition, and in so doing it provides an excellent
account of how defects in the social and political order within which he schemes
contribute to his success. Among the first questions a thoughtful reader of this work will
ask is: What went wrong with the political order depicted in this work? Why and how
did this society become a tyranny? What can be done to prevent such a thing? The main
focus of this dissertation is on answering these questions. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven
will examine the contributory causes of Richard’s tyranny under three main groupings:
defects in political institutions, failures of individuals, and non-human causes. As a
preliminary, however, Chapter Four will first establish the problem more precisely. It
will analyze how tyranny is presented in this work and consider how an alternative vision
of a good political order can be gleaned from it.
Chapter Four:
Bad & Good Political Orders

Section I: Attributes of a Tyranny

Although virtually all scholars who have examined the political issues of this work agree that one of the main themes—if not the primary theme—is tyranny, the text itself, in the most advanced draft, hardly mentions the topic directly. This is not to deny that tyranny is in fact depicted here; this dissertation, too, sees tyranny as an important aspect of this work. Rather than merely assert that this work is about tyranny, however, this first section is intended to provide a definition of tyranny based on the text itself in two ways: by seeing how the term is applied to the political order ruled by the titular Richard, and by examining the contrast between how Richard and the other kings mentioned in this work use their power.

Like many of the words already mentioned in Chapter Three, tyranny is an important political term which undergoes a noteworthy change in usage from earlier drafts to later ones. The term is employed significantly less frequently in the last draft, but its meaning becomes more precise as a result.

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319 R.W. Chambers, for example, asserts that “Richard III is as much an onslaught on tyranny as are some of More’s epigrams” (1938, 116); C. Ross says, “It is perhaps best seen as a treatise against tyranny” (xxvii); M.S. Harris says More had “a particular purpose in mind, the showing forth of the evils of tyranny” (61). In the same vein, many articles dealing with Richard III proclaim their stance from their titles: “Thomas More and Tyranny” by D. Fenlon (Journal Of Ecclesiastical History 32, no. 4 (1981): 453-476) and “More on Tyranny: The History of Richard III” by George Logan (in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas More, ed. George Logan, (Cambridge UP, 2011), 168-90) are two typical examples of how More’s Richard III is very often accepted as a work primarily about tyranny.

320 See Rubio, 47. A considerable part of the reason that commentators have recognized tyranny as a prominent theme is that most of them are reading one of the earlier drafts. Very few analyses of this work are based on any Latin version, and even fewer on P.
Because they are so strongly affected by editorial interference on this point, the references to tyranny which appear solely in Group One texts should be disregarded here.\textsuperscript{321} But 1557 retains from Group One two of the Narrator's explicit references to Richard as a tyrant (CW 2, 90.6 & 91.6), as well as his statement that Richard's murder of the princes is an example of “tiranny” (CW 2, 86.17). In Group Three, however, with its shorter ending, all those references are dropped, and the word “tyrant” appears only once: In a passage which uses very similar wording in all three groups, the Queen recalls that “no tyrant so far has been found who was so impious that he has not feared to violate” sanctuary (386.18). Now although this implies that Richard is even worse than previous tyrants by her standards, because he states earlier that he is willing to be the “author of [the boy] being removed from the abbey by a royal edict” (364.7), neither Richard nor any of those prior rulers are actually mentioned by name. The only direct reference to a specific person’s tyranny in Group Three is a new one: The Narrator explains, “[T]he Protector very frequently used” the services of Sir Richard Radcliff “in tyrannical crimes of this kind” (430.19-20). In the last draft, this is the only explicit statement by any character that Richard is indeed tyrannical; but importantly, he in fact “frequently” acts that way.

The trend in the drafts suggests that the identity of the tyrant is never in question, but the precise nature of tyranny may be. In all the texts, the titular Richard is the only person ever named as a tyrant by any character. Furthermore, the only character who

\textsuperscript{321} The Group One texts, of course, emphasize tyranny more than the other texts, and from the very start. Their first paragraph insists that “there could not bee a more crueler tiraunt” than Richard (CW 2, xxv), but, as Chapter Two explained, this paragraph and the references to tyranny at CW 2, 49a.22 & 87.21 were probably inserted by an editor under government instructions as part of the Tudor policy of blackening Richard’s reputation. This blunt sentiment should not be ascribed to More.
ever specifically identifies anyone as a tyrant in any version is the Narrator, but, in
addition, the Queen’s reference to breaking sanctuary as being beyond the pale even for
tyrans is always maintained in every draft from beginning to end. Counterintuitively, the
removal of the other references to Richard as tyrant and the reduction to a single instance
of the word “tyranny” actually help to clarify the meaning of the word. The references to
tyreiny in Group Two indeed give some idea of what tyranny is, but none of them are as
helpful as the single instance in Group Three. All the references in the earlier text
involve betrayal: of the young princes (CW 2, 86.17), Buckingham (CW 2, 90.6), and
Morton (CW 2, 91.6). Beyond that, however, their diversity, combined with a lack of
supporting detail, muddies the waters. The betrayal of Buckingham is merely potential,
since it has not happened at that point in the narrative, and in fact is not described in the
History. The princes and Morton are all tyrannically “taken,” and those arrests by
Richard’s henchmen are described in the work. However, the two boys are “taken” in
different ways, and Morton in yet another. Although there are certainly some common
characteristics to all these takings, the varying circumstances make it less clear which of
those attributes are tyrannical. Group Three avoids that problem by drawing attention to
one incident in particular, which is described in careful detail. This chapter will turn next
to defining tyranny as used by the Narrator in that one instance in the final draft: “[T]he
Protector very frequently used” the services of Sir Richard Radcliff “in tyrannical crimes
of this kind” (430.19-20). What “kind” of a bad action is this? What characterizes the
“crimes” Richard “frequently” commits?
The only one of the Protector's crimes that the Narrator says Radcliff oversaw personally is the execution of Woodville and Grey in Pontefract, but that of Hastings is mentioned in the same sentence. Therefore it is grammatically possible that all three are “tyrannical crimes of this kind,” and it is certain that the Narrator closely links all of them (430.15-20). The punishments inflicted on these three men share three characteristics which may help to indicate why the Narrator singles them out as examples of tyranny. They are characterized by savagery, they are unjust, and they are done under the color of political authority. While the Narrator uses the term “tyranny” only once, these three attributes indeed are “frequently” found in his descriptions of Richard's other actions. Additionally, other characters besides the Narrator comment on Richard's actions in ways which reinforce the Narrator's characterization. Therefore, each of these three attributes will be considered in turn, and it will be shown that not only are these three aspects of tyranny pervasive in the History’s descriptions of Richard’s crimes, but that all three parts of this definition are also consistent with the definition of tyranny provided by the Attorney who delivers More’s Declamation.

The first, and perhaps most horrible, attribute of tyranny is its savagery. The Narrator draws attention to the viciousness of tyranny by frequently using words that show that the Protector's actions are more like those of a beast or a monster than a man. The most important of these words is *atrox* (vicious, savage, harsh, or barbaric).

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322 Radcliff had also assisted in planning the capture of Woodville and Grey earlier (344.19-20)
323 These tyrannical executions of the Queen's relatives and of Hastings are heavily emphasized in Richard III. There are at least nine other references to the imprisonment and subsequent execution of the Queen's relatives (342.4-5, 346.21-3, 350.12-5, 350.19-20, 352.9-12, 384.5, 398.2, 408.21-3, & 418.19-20) and five more to the execution of Hastings (412.16, 412.19, 416.18, 416.25-6, & 420.9). Clearly, the reader is not intended to forget.
324 Baumann shows that “[t]he concept of a tyrant as a wild animal” is found in classical texts as well as “in
It is consistently and almost exclusively used to describe Richard's tyrannical actions. For example, the execution of Hastings is called “more vicious [atrocior] than would admit of these witty jests” (422.21-2); when Woodville and his men are confined in Northampton, it is a “vicious deed [rem atrocem]” (346.7-8); and the way “Woodville and Richard Gray, [and] then other friends of [the Queen's] were apprehended” (350.19-20) is both “sad and vicious [atrocial]” (350.18). Along with atrox, other similar words are also used for the same effect: “when [the chancellor] had heard that the Prince had been turned back and his blood-relations had been captured, he was astounded, struck by the inhumanity of the deed [immanitate rei] and by its viciousness [atrocitate]” (352.9-12). Richard's arrogance is “immanis [inhuman, monstrous, savage, barbaric]” (324.14), his face is “torvus [wild, fierce, grim, gloomy, savage]” (322.22, 408.1), and his reign, “the inhuman [immanis] and hateful principate of a parricide” is characterized by “cruelty” (316.10). Buckingham unwittingly joins the Narrator in this assessment

More's portrayal” in Richard III (120).

Logan has noted that Richard needed certain qualities besides savagery, such as intelligence, courage, and military leadership skill, in order to rise to the kingship (2007, 26), but these qualities are not distinctively tyrannical. Nor is what follows primarily intended to describe a tyrant, or, following Plato, to see what constitutes “a tyrannical soul” (cf. Republic 571a-580a), but rather to describe tyranny: that is, to show what is so bad about this political condition. The question of whether Richard was fated to become a tyrant because of some innate quality of his nature will be considered in Chapter Seven, but a full analysis of what Richard III has to say about a tyrannical soul is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Richard is the only person in the History whose actions are described as atrox, except for when he accuses the Queen in an instance which is obviously not vicious, since she is merely keeping one brother with her in sanctuary while the other is in Richard’s custody: at the behest of Richard, “the Cardinal explained that it seemed to be a vicious [atrocem] thing to the nobles that the only brother of the King was separated from him by her” (378.5-7). The crime of treason is also called vicious twice (408.9, 458.1-2). The first of these is connected to another of Richard's obviously false (410.2-9) accusations of the Queen (408.14). Thus, in this work, only the actions of a tyrant are called vicious by other characters, and only a woman who poses an obstacle to his power is called vicious by the tyrant. The term is also used a few times negatively, describing what is not vicious, as discussed below. (The discussion in this chapter cites every use of atrox in the work which I was able to locate.)

I follow A and P here for a portion of the sentence (immanitate rei et atrocitate), rather than Daniel Kinney's unexplained adoption of 1565 (immani tantae rei atrocitate).

Three of the four mentions of crudelitas (cruelty) refer to Richard (316.10, 324.15-6, 324.22), while the
when, before he learns of Richard's plan to kill his own nephews and usurp the throne, he speaks of “someone with such inhuman savagery [immani feritate] that he would strive to harm an innocent boy” (368.11). The Narrator has already twice mentioned to the reader that Richard does indeed plan not only to injure them, but to kill them (320.12-4, 328.9-10).

The Attorney in More’s *Declamation* speaks in the same way about tyranny, even using some of the same words. He says “a tyrant [is] savage [ferum] and violent by nature” (CW 3.1, 100.18), and that to resemble “the brutes which live by prey ... is characteristic of tyrants” (CW 3.1, 100.20-21). The tyrant is “cruel [crudelis] by nature” (CW 3.1, 120.24) and even “most cruel” (CW 3.1, 98.33 & 106.31), and his face is “trux [wild, harsh, savage, fierce]” (CW 3.1, 104.8). The Attorney also uses such words while raising hypothetical objections to arguments that he expects his opponent would be understood by the audience to support. Although the Attorney ultimately rejects his opponent’s characterization of the tyrant’s son as also being a tyrant, two instances nevertheless may be cited: His opponent, as part of his attempt to claim that the son was a tyrant, argues that the son “did savage [atroces] injustices to the citizens” (CW 3.1, 100.28), and in a similar hypothetical case, the Attorney links a “ferocious [ferocem] disposition” with “tyrannical habits” (CW 3.1, 102.2-3). The Attorney’s conclusion states his own contrary position clearly, but the Attorney’s argument is nevertheless consistent with his opponent’s objection in its association of brutality with tyranny:

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328 All quotations from More’s *Declamation* are my own translation, and line numbers cited are therefore those of the Latin text, rather than the editor’s facing English.
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Furthermore, if that youth ever accomplished anything vicious \[atrocius\], he always said his father commanded him to do so, and I indeed do not doubt that he could have commanded it. For although the son was, in that disposition of his, such that he appeared (if he would have reached such an age) to be going to equal his parent in depravities and atrocities \[flagitiis ac sceleribus\] at some time, nevertheless in that youth of his, compared with that parent’s cruelty and savagery \[crudelitate ac saevitia\] ... he was still an untrained soldier, hardly even a recruit, and he did not do anything big unless he was ordered and instructed by his father. (CW 3.1, 102.17-23)

Thus the Narrator’s emphasis on this key attribute of tyranny in \textit{Richard III} appears to be part of More’s understanding of tyranny generally speaking, and not something peculiar to Richard.

Furthermore, in order to stress the tyrant's brutality, the only two mentions of truly human behavior (\textit{humanitas}) in the \textit{History} describe how Richard is not humane. In both instances, he pretends to be humane, while his true character is completely opposite his appearance. In the first case, Woodville was “so charmed by the humanity \[humanitate\]” of Richard and Buckingham “that he went to bed filled with the best hope, cheerful, and secure in his mind. But those [men] ... had contrived in their mind something far different than [what] they had displayed by their face” (344.15-9). In the second, the nobles in council “praised [Richard’s] humanity \[humanitatem\] and kindness,” but when he “returned ... it was amazing how totally he was changed” (406.26-8). A tyrant may try to appear humane, but in fact he breaks “all ties of human \[humanae\] society” (320.11-2). Tyranny is thus consistently characterized as vicious, brutal, and inhuman.

The second key attribute of the tyrannical executions is their criminality. Rubio has noticed that “[i]n More's narrative ... the illegality of all of Richard's actions is
emphasized.” The Narrator tells us that Woodville, Grey, and Vaughan did not
deserve their punishment, as they were innocent (384.5, 430.26), “with no other guilt than
that they were either too closely related to the Queen or too faithful to the Prince” (432.1-3), but they were killed anyway. Similarly, the execution of Hastings is a “crime
[facinore]” (420.10), and the Narrator characterizes the allegations against him as “an elaborately false fabrication” (422.17-8). In fact, this is typical. The Narrator describes
every punishment the Protector inflicts or intends to inflict as undeserved by the recipient, and therefore as unjust or criminal. When Richard “decided, against justice and right [jus et fas], to take the lives of his own nephews” (320.12-4), the Narrator calls it a “crime [scelus]” (320.18), and when “the house of Shore's wife was invaded” by Richard's men and “she was dragged out and thrown into prison, with her goods plundered ... and conveyed to the Protector as if it were a fine,” the Narrator notes that “she had been harassed through injustice” (424.1-5). It is in fact part of Richard's approach that he makes no distinction between guilt and innocence. “[H]is reasoning was that friends and enemies were equal compared with his own advantages,” and therefore he “never abstain[ed] from anyone's death whose life appeared to obstruct his plans” (324.18-20). He punishes others not for what they did, but because of the power he wants.

One particularly important way that Richard disregards law is by ignoring due process. As regards the “tyrannical” executions, the Queen's relatives die “unconvicted,
unheard, and indeed not even indicted” (430.26-432.1), while Hastings is killed within minutes of being charged with treason, with hardly enough time to make a confession (412.11-2), let alone to testify to a jury. The Queen's conception of tyranny appears to agree with the Narrator's on this point. Aware that a mark of tyranny is disregard of law, she notes the peculiar strength of the laws relating to sanctuary. She claims sanctuary for her son under “English laws” (388.20) and “precedents” (388.28), precedents which not even a “tyrant so far” (386.18) has ignored. Richard's willingness to disregard even that law marks him as extreme even among tyrants. Sanctuary and English due process will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Five. Here it is enough to note that the Narrator is well aware that English law requires things like an indictment, some evidence, and a conviction before punishment is administered, but the tyrant ignores the law.

Disregard for law marks the tyrant of the Declamation, too: “[H]e trampled on human laws, scorned [those] of the gods, [and] disregarded life” (CW 3.1, 100.19-20). The Attorney calls him a “robber” (CW 3.1, 122.15), and indeed dismisses all talk of the tyrant’s son inheriting his position precisely because of the tyrant’s disregard of law: “Why mention laws in a tyranny? ... [S]uccession is by legal right. Or if the son of a pirate filled the place of his dead father, would anyone say [he was] the heir? A tyrant always dies intestate, since the laws, which alone are able to make a will valid, are held captive by him” (CW 3.1, 104.19-22). The tyrant's standard is his own advantage, not any law. He is a criminal who has attained the authority to punish crime, and thus punishments are perverted from their intended purpose of promoting justice to becoming means of injustice.
Thus the third key attribute is that in order for an action to be tyrannical, rather than merely criminal, the perpetrator must be exercising supreme political power. In *Richard III*, Welsh criminals commit injustices such as “robberies and murder,” and are even described as bestial, like the tyrant, being “brutalized *effarari* in their almost wild *silvestrem* conduct” (336.28-338.1), but they are not tyrants because they have no political position. In a similar case, Radcliff carries out the specifically “tyrannical” act, but he is a servant or tool of the tyrant, rather than a tyrant in his own right. In the *Declamation*, the Attorney uses the same distinction to show that the son is not himself a tyrant:

> For if [the son] did injustices occasionally, what else did that show than that he was his parent’s henchman? Among whom, how few there are who would not commit robbery, violate nuptials, pillage homes, despoil temples, slaughter those in the way, and butcher those who are best! But since there is one man whose power and shadow they rely on as they commit such atrocities *sclerata*—otherwise they themselves as robbers, murderers, thieves, and adulterers would indeed be given punishments for their deeds, either by him or by the public laws—then that one prince of atrocities *sclerum princeps* alone, under whose name they all hide with impunity, is a tyrant (CW 3.1, 102.7-15).

Thus doing something illegal and even brutal is not tyrannical if it is done against or despite political authority. Tyranny is rather an exercise of political authority which is both brutal and criminal.

Given this definition of tyranny, the question arises about which kings in this work are tyrants. Richard III is of course the paradigmatic example, but there are four other British monarchs named in the *History*: Henry VI, Edward IV, Henry VII, and Henry VIII. Are any of them tyrants? Are all of them? The latter two are mentioned...
only in passing while describing Edward IV's daughters Elizabeth (314.10-1) and Catherine (314.19), and thus there is not enough information about whether or how they may have ruled tyrannically. And although Henry VI also is mentioned only briefly, since the Narrator describes him as “more innocent than prudent” (320.21), he probably was not criminal enough or vicious enough to be a tyrant; but to someone who reads all the way to the end of this History, Edward IV might well seem to qualify.

The Narrator's contrast between Edward and Richard near the beginning of the work is not as stark as appears at first glance.332 There is much evidence that Edward

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332 There has been significant debate over this aspect of Richard III. Some commentators have seen the initial portrait of Edward as ideal, as a description of a perfect king: “Richard III is a study of tyranny. But it is something else as well. In its opening phase it is an account of good government and how it may be lost. It provides us, in its portrait of ... Edward IV, with our one clear insight into what More understood by good government. It is a brief insight, but a sufficient one” (Fenlon, 455); “For More, Edward IV is a good and noble king” (Condren, 8); “At the beginning of this history, Edward is a good king” (Hall, 94); “The early depiction of Edward corresponds with More’s epigrams on the good king” (Curtright 2012, 47; see also pp. 46, 50, 52-53).

These scholars seem to place less importance on what is said about Edward, and more on how it is said. In one way, this section of the History is a testament to More's rhetorical skills, since so many have come away from it thinking that Edward is a good king. In another way, it speaks to the danger of not looking past the surface in a rhetorical history.

Others have realized that “though it is sometimes held that Edward is portrayed as an idealized ruler, in contrast to the diabolical Richard, upon closer examination this view proves to be untenable” (Rudnytsky, 155; cf. Yoran, 519; Mudan, 111-112). Hanham seems to see what is going on: “More gives two ironically opposed accounts of the reign of Edward IV: one, ostensibly his own, a most unrealistic view of the supposedly ideal condition in which Edward left the country at this death, and the second, put into Buckingham’s mouth, an attack on Edward which is equally exaggerated” (1975A, 159-160). Like Hanham, I interpret the Narrator's description as highly ironic, verging on a parody of court rhetoric, but I think the ironic manner of the presentation, and the facts admitted by the Narrator, show that he means precisely that these conditions were only “supposedly ideal.” As the discussion below shows, the Narrator and Buckingham agree on many important aspects of Edward’s character and reign. The Narrator does not hide the truth, but he does put the best spin on the facts that he can. Read in the right spirit, the fact that this is the best the Narrator can do with the facts of Edward’s reign is very (darkly) comic. Consider just a few of the “good” things said about Edward. First, he was not “hostile” “while there was peace” (314.5-6). When was there peace? Only during the last year of his reign, since “[h]e had taken possession of Berwick by arms one year before his death” (318.17-18), explaining in part why he was never as well liked as at the end of his life (316.17-18). And “that very esteem and longing for him was increased by the cruelty of the following period, the inhuman and hateful principate of a parricide” (316.8-11). So, how much was he really esteemed for what he did? He is only missed in contrast to Richard. That is not particularly high praise. Second, “all the malevolence from the deposing of King Henry VI—which long had blazed among [Henry's] favorers—finally was put to sleep, subsided, and was extinguished” (316.10-13). But Edward himself caused that malevolence by deposing the reigning king! And why was that malevolence
acts in ways very similar to Richard's. A large portion of Buckingham's speech to the people (456.2-464.2) consists of accusations against Edward. Among other things, he says Edward “killed his own full brother” (460.24), “murdered an innocent man” by a “perverse turning of laws” (458.10-1), harmed people through excessive taxes (456.5-17) and fines (456.19), and caused “Thomas Cook ... who both succeeded to all the honorable offices [in London] by proper legal form and managed [them] magnificently ... [to go] from so much wealth to not only poverty but even to nakedness” (458.11-8), all without regard for justice; indeed, “whole households [were] brought to the ultimate crisis, and mostly for no cause, sometimes for a small [one] propped up with theatrically elevated names” (458.22-4). Perhaps most strikingly, just as Richard wishes to depose the young

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extinguished? Because “so many of [Henry’s supporters] ... had died” (316.13-15). This is indeed true, but how they died is important, and is later revealed: Edward killed many of them himself (334.24-26)! So, maybe he was not a good man, but he looked good (316.17, 23-25), at least until he got fat (316.25-27). Finally, if “you could hardly find anything that won for him [such] goodwill, either of more [people] or greater among the people” (318.28-30) than the time during his last summer alive when he sent the meat from some game he had killed into London as a gift (318.23-28), what does this say about his achievements as king? No greater accomplishment is mentioned than a memorable barbecue. If this is the best the Narrator can say, Edward is far from an ideal ruler. Furthermore, even in the initial description of Edward, when many legitimate compliments are also mixed in with these ironic, backhanded ones, the Narrator also bluntly criticizes a serious character defect: “he was completely given over to his appetite and lust immediately from entering the age of maturity and throughout his whole life, to the extent that affairs of government did not call him away” (316.27-318.2). The point is not to show how Edward is ideal, but how he, too, falls short, and to emphasize Richard’s evil by showing how he makes even a king like Edward look good in contrast.

Finally other scholars have gone to the opposite extreme: having seen that Edward is not in fact depicted as good, they think he is therefore no different than Richard, and perhaps even that there is no such thing as good government. Fox goes as far as to say: “The reality underlying Edward’s reign, More shows, is that it is not essentially different in kind from that which Richard will try to erect; the main difference is that Edward gets away with it whereas Richard does not. Edward gives him all his leads, in his ambition, his wilfulness, his dissimulation, his violent affront against natural bonds of kinship, and his ruthless elimination of opponents. ... In exposing the ‘ideal’ condition of Edward’s reign as a contrived illusion, More was seeking to prepare his readers for the real import of the History: a realization that Richard’s reign merely manifests in extreme form circumstances that pertain in all political situations” (1983, 80-81; see also Fox 1989, 120-121). Daniel Kinney similarly holds that “More discreetly exposes both kings very early as brothers in violent self-will” (1985, 136) and that “[w]hen More stresses that Edward and Richard share a heritage of violent self-will he invites us to see them as two sides of one self-promoting mentality” (1985, 138). The remainder of Section I of this chapter is intended to show both that Edward is not ideal, and also that he is not on the same level as the tyrant Richard.
Edward V and take his place, there are reminders throughout the *History* that Edward IV deposed his predecessor, Henry VI (316.11-2, 322.4-5, 436.7, 448.6-7, 458.25-460.1).

Furthermore, in one way, Edward seems even worse than Richard, since Richard never takes anybody's wife, while Edward's “wicked lust ... stole [Mistress Shore] from her husband” (462.6). Thus Wegemer asks a valid question: “The narrator points out that Edward, George, and younger brother Richard were ‘all three… insatiably ambitious, hungry for power’ (*CW* 15, 323). Are all three of them tyrants? Yet More uses the term only for Richard.”333 Not a single action of Edward's is called tyrannical by anyone. Why? What is the difference between these two men?

First, it is important to note that there is no compelling reason to simply accept Buckingham's allegations, and there are some good reasons to question them. First of all, the people who are listening, many of whom presumably lived through Edward's reign, do not find Buckingham's argument convincing. They remain silent instead of acclaiming Richard as king (468.18-9), even after Buckingham gives the whole speech again (470.2), and even after the Recorder reluctantly repeats the speech a third time (470.15). Admittedly, there is no indication as to whether they object only to Richard’s becoming king or also to Buckingham's characterization of Edward, but at least there is doubt. Moreover, it is important to remember that Buckingham is very far from an impartial source. He negotiated an agreement with Richard that allowed him to gain control of an entire county and to make his daughter Queen someday (400.3-7). The evidence provided by the Narrator, who is obviously not in league with Richard, indicates that Buckingham's allegations do not tell the whole story.

333 Wegemer 2012, 150.
Many of the accusations that Buckingham makes against Edward have alternative explanations elsewhere. Buckingham complains that “Shore's wife, a cheap whore, was more influential with the Prince than all the nobles of his kingdom. ... Indeed some of these [men] used the prostitute's patronage in their great affairs, more necessarily than honorably” (460.26-462.4). Earlier, though, the Narrator reports that “this working-girl ... was so far from abusing the favor of the Prince for anyone's evil that in many [ways] it was even for their good” (428.22-4), and she evidently was helping not only some favored group, but everyone, since “she was loved equally by both factions [that] were hostile to each other” (430.3). Buckingham repeats Shaw's claim that Edward's children and Edward himself are illegitimate (464.23-466.8), but earlier the Narrator introduces a long digression in order to show “how false and [how] long refuted and rejected an accusation” those claims are (436.4), and he justifies the digression's length because “it would absolutely not be proper [for the digression] thus to be omitted, lest one be ignorant that the Protector ... could discover nothing that would strike at [Edward's] marriage except a long-past and antiquated false accusation” (448.17-20). In these examples, the Narrator questions Buckingham's veracity to some extent, making the reader wonder to what extent Buckingham can be trusted. But elsewhere the Narrator actually corroborates Buckingham's claims about Edward's oppressive taxes, his responsibility for his brother's death, his bloodshed in civil war (460.8-21), his charges of treason leveled against political opponents (460.1-5), his deposing of Henry, and his sexual immorality (456.3-4, 462.9-21). However, the Narrator's accounts of these same
deeds differ from Buckingham’s in key ways which indicate that readers should not view Edward as a tyrant.

Almost from the beginning, the Narrator acknowledges that Edward levied excessive taxes early in his reign, although, as is typical in this first description of Edward, the Narrator does try to put the best possible spin on it: Edward, he says, had “for a long time utterly left off” assessing them (318.14-6). The civil war is also noted when Edward is introduced, and also downplayed as long past (316.11-3). Edward himself admits very early in the *History* to overseeing executions for political advantage, but with regret that he “procured the honor shown by bent knees by [means of] so many men's heads” (324.24-6). It is not entirely clear whether or not these were tyrannical actions at the time that Edward was doing them, since there are not enough details to make an accurate determination according to the definition established above,334 but Edward was not acting tyrannically in these areas in his last days, at least. There is, however, enough detail on how Edward deposed Henry to provide a stark contrast with how Richard plans to depose Edward V. Richard always intended to kill Edward V. Edward IV actually deposed Henry VI twice, and merely imprisoned him both times, with no intention of anything more. After the Earl of Warwick became angry with Edward IV, Henry “was restored to the kingship from prison” (448.5-6). When Edward returned from exile and deposed Henry again, once more he sent him to prison, and while the Narrator notes that Richard's responsibility for Henry's subsequent death is only a rumor, although a lasting one (324.20), there is “no doubt” the murder was done “without

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334 There is no mention of whether the men who were executed had broken the law, or whether the executions were savagely carried out.
the King [Edward IV] either ordering [it] or being aware [of it]” (324.23). Regarding Richard's plan to depose Edward V, there are conflicting rumors about when he made up his mind to do it—“[w]hether Richard had already seized the kingship within his own mind, or whether he had conceived the plan from the opportunity of his nephews' age”—but “it is certain [that] he decided, [once] the life of the boys was removed, to take control of the kingship as if it were a reward for his crime” (328.6-10). Both Edward and Richard wanted to rule, but only the latter planned to kill his predecessor. Usurping the throne in itself is not enough to cause someone to rank as a tyrant in the Narrator's eyes.

Furthermore, the same terms applied to Richard's tyranny are applied negatively to Edward, both generally and in two of the cases mentioned by Buckingham. First, there are the general statements by the Narrator that Edward “never acted with violence” to get what he wanted (318.6), and that “[t]o the King himself all were obedient, not by force but by their own free will” (318.12-3). Next, in the descriptions of both Edward's wantonness and of the execution of George, Duke of Clarence, the same terminology that revealed Richard's brutality is specifically excluded when Edward's bad actions are considered. The Narrator indicates that to call sexual immorality “vicious [atrociter]” is so ridiculous that “nobody did not laugh” (424.6-8) when Richard tried to do so. It is wrong, but not savage. Buckingham accuses Edward of “rape” (462.15), but there is nothing brutal about what the reader sees of Edward's seductions. The description of how Shore's wife became Edward's mistress shows no violence. Edward offered her a chance to escape from a husband she did not love, and gave her hope of a high social status, of fancy clothes, “of leisure, of luxury, and of pleasures” (426.1-7). The other encounters
between Edward and women for which the Narrator provides details show that Shore's case is typical. Elizabeth Lucy sleeps with him not because of threats, but because “he had displayed so much love” (446.22). When he finally meets a woman who flatly refuses his advances despite the offer of reward, he still does not turn to force or act viciously, but instead decides to marry her (438.12-440.4). It is important to recognize that Edward's sins of the flesh are much less serious than Richard's tyrannical crimes, because even Buckingham, Edward's enemy, publicly states that “no part of [Edward's] morals appeared less bearable” (462.10-1) than his sexual transgressions. As bad as those might have been, there was nothing worse, nothing tyrannical.

The Narrator thus draws a clear distinction between tyranny and other crimes. Seducing women with love and presents may harm families and even society, but it is not tyranny. In these cases, Edward hurts individual men (458.6) and even the realm (440.2-5), not out of hatred, but out of a kind of love for women. In contrast, Richard's motivation is much more selfish even than Edward’s. He acts not out of love for anyone else, but for “his [own] advantages” (324.18-9). In addition, lack of moderation in bodily desires is not in fact as dangerous to society as tyranny. Edward enjoys food (316.25-6, 326.10-11) and women (316.27) too much, but he can still be social. He goes hunting with men and sends home some food with them (318.24-32), and he flirts with women and buys them clothes (426.3, 5). Both gifts are signs of his “love” (318.31, 428.19). Richard never flirts, never loves anyone, and would rather witness a gory execution than eat lunch (412.7-19). In fact, perhaps as a way of drawing attention to Richard’s complete lack of love for others, “More's narrator tells us nothing about Richard which
hints that he had a natural or human side; the narrative, for example, neglects to tell us that Richard was married and that he had a son.\textsuperscript{335} Although both Richard and Edward lack moderation, and thus act on their passions, one passion is much worse than the other. Because of his lack of self-control, Edward would not abstain from embracing a woman he intended to love. Richard did not “abstain from embracing those whom he intended to kill” (324.14-5)\textsuperscript{336}.

Edward also reveals himself to be significantly different than Richard by the manner in which he executes his brother George. It is true that George's guilt is not certain (322.5-14), but his execution nevertheless lacks the signs of tyranny. First, in a passage new to Group Three, “the king withheld the viciousness [$\textit{atrocitatem}$] of the penalty,” substituting drowning in wine for beheading, and he laments the deed once done (322.14-8). Everyone Richard kills is beheaded (350.15, 412.19), and Hastings, killed in Richard's own presence, is beheaded in a particularly tortuous way,\textsuperscript{337} his plea for mercy unanswered (412.15-6). Edward's preferred method of execution carries out

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\item\textsuperscript{335} Rubio, 203-204. Rubio exaggerates slightly. There is in fact one brief mention of Richard’s “only legitimate son,” whom Richard uses as a political pawn to gain Buckingham's support (400.3-5).
\item\textsuperscript{336} Wegemer agrees: “What about Edward IV? The narrator distinguishes him from Richard whose deeds are repeatedly called $\textit{immanis}$, who is compared to a beast of prey marked by extreme hunger, who is said to trample on the laws of God and men, and who does not hesitate to kill those whom he has kissed” (2012, 152). Edward is in fact never called $\textit{immanis}$ nor, on the other hand, $\textit{humanus}$. He is neither ideal nor tyrannical.
\item\textsuperscript{337} Daniel Kinney suspects an error in the manuscript at 412.19, but given Richard's savagery, there is no reason to do so. Both $P$ and $A$ have two variants here, but they are merely the present and perfect tenses of the same verb, $\textit{decutio}$. This in itself would seem to indicate that More had already made a decision on vocabulary, since a scribal error is unlikely to change two different forms of one word into two different forms of another. It is no help to compare \textit{1565} here, because the whole clause is much differently worded: “he innocently endured the sad end of his life” (Sylvester's translation; CW 2, 222). In any case, Kinney prints the present tense option, but adds a note which says that “the sense really calls for $\textit{percutitur}$” (412.19, n.). Kinney expects $\textit{percutitur}$ because it means “to cut through and through,” like any civilized executioner would, but as the manuscripts have it, the process is neither quick nor painless, since Hastings has his head “beaten off” or “dislodged.” The Narrator is consistent in presenting the execution of Hastings as more vicious than others. Later he briefly contrasts the deaths of Woodville and Grey with that of Hastings. The former were “punished by beheading [$\textit{capite plectebantur}$]”. The latter was “dismembered [$\textit{truncatus est}$]” (430.15-8). 
\end{enumerate}
the death penalty “most leniently” (322.15). Richard's method makes the execution as painful as possible.

Even if it were definitely known that Edward killed George out of fear that he might try to take power, even if George were known to be innocent of any crime, that would not be enough, without some evidence of brutality and disregard of law, to classify Edward as a tyrant. As the Attorney puts it in the *Declamation*, “[L]egitimate sovereigns, too, [those] not only governing by laws, but even complying with laws, and milder than tyranny by so great an extent, are nevertheless so conquered by ambition that they do not even spare the lives of intimate friends rather than they should have sharers in their dominion” (CW 3.1, 15-18). Ambition and unwillingness to share power appear to be attributes of many of those in power. They are not specifically tyrannical.

Finally, in George’s case there is a very great difference in process, even if not in certainty of guilt. Richard's executions were done with no due process at all. George was both “charged” and “sentenced [or adjudicated; *adiudicavit*],” in fact by the “full senate” (322.12-4). The proper legal authorities were involved, rather than the king simply acting on his own. Chapter Five will show that the distinction between a bad outcome which results from someone's use of imperfectly functioning political institutions and one which comes from a complete disregard for those institutions is profound. In the former instance, there is a possibility of a miscarriage of justice in any one case. Innocent men are sometimes punished even after receiving due process. In the latter, however, the social conditions which make justice possible for anyone are systematically eliminated. Edward breaks some bonds of marriage and family. Richard
breaks “all ties of human society” (320.11-2). Edward does not completely lack humanity the way Richard does.

Therefore, Edward is often immoral and sometimes unjust, but he is no tyrant. The contrasts of the Narrator’s introduction hold true, even if Edward is not perfect. The Narrator's first description of Edward admits that “that very esteem and longing for him was increased by the cruelty of the following period” (316.8-10). Edward is compared so favorably to Richard, not because Edward was so outstandingly good, but because Edward's misdeeds pale in comparison with Richard's. The tyrant's savagery, his completely selfish aims, his pervasive disregard for justice, and his complete disregard for human bonds put him in a class by himself.

There are larger implications which stem from these similarities and differences between Richard and Edward. The fairly detailed examinations of the character and actions of both Richard and Edward demonstrate More’s concern in this work with politics broadly speaking. Richard III is certainly about the titular tyrant and the nature of tyranny, but it is also concerned with other aspects of good and bad government. On the one hand, the presentation of Edward serves to lower expectations and temper idealism in a potential political reformer. Edward was not an outstandingly good king, but Richard shows that a king can be a lot worse. It is often helpful to be aware that sometimes one’s political goal should not be to get to perfection; sometimes getting to Edward and avoiding Richard is all that should be done.\(^{338}\) On the other hand, by

\(^{338}\) This is apparently Karlin’s point: “Thus, More, a careful reader of The City of God, presents through the dying king St. Augustine’s impossible-to-achieve-on-earth ideal of political friendship, where rulers and citizens act with humility and benevolence for the common good” (78). Karlin seems to be saying that because Edward is shown not to live up to the standards of the rhetoric he uses, and which are used to
pointing out Edward’s significant flaws, this work also provokes thought about the benefits of radical political reform. One might argue that if England’s political system allows a choice merely between a ruler like Edward and one like Richard, then a different system is called for. There is thus a tension between the danger of tyranny and the danger of complacency that haunts this work, because both the tyrant and the reformer overturn the established order. Chapter Five will examine in more detail some of the ways Richard III suggests caution lest, out of zeal to avoid Edward, one in fact introduce Richard.

Richard III’s broader concerns are also evident in other important political concepts treated in the work. In particular, a good political order does not simply consist of having a good ruler. Those who are ruled also contribute to that order, for better or for worse. Part of the reason that such a bad ruler as Richard was able to become king seems to lie in the divisions within the society he eventually succeeded in ruling. Furthermore, the History shows that such divisions are also a problem in themselves, even when they do not lead to tyranny. The next section of this chapter will therefore examine faction.

**Section II: Faction & Characteristics of Partisans**

Before Richard begins his machinations, the young Edward V, as the “king-designate” (314.8, 380.28), is scheduled to succeed his father as king, but he is never describe him, More demonstrates that such perfection is not possible.

One could take this principle even farther and argue that the negative consequences of both Edward and Richard are the result of dissatisfaction with a king who, in retrospect, was really not so bad. As Chapter Five will explain at greater length, the History shows that dissatisfaction with Henry VI led to Parliament’s attempted reform of the kingship by changing the family line in which the kingship would be inherited, so that Richard, Duke of York, rather than the son of Henry VI, would be the next king (320.18-28). Instead of getting the king Parliament wanted, however, this misguided attempt at reform led to the usurpations of first Edward (320.29-322.5) and then Richard (322.19-328.10).
crowned. Why not? The Narrator lists faction\textsuperscript{339} along with Richard's ambition as the two reasons which explain why Edward's sons never reigned (320.6-7), and his descriptions of subsequent events seem to confirm this initial statement. As Wegemer notes, “More’s Historia Richardi shows that the cause of civil war was faction, which in turn was caused by ambitious and ‘noble’ leaders such as Lord Hastings who help Richard come to power even though they are aware of Richard’s cruel and ambitious character.”\textsuperscript{340} The reader of the History sees examples of both the causes of faction and its deleterious effects, in conjunction with, but also even apart from, tyranny. This section of the chapter will look at the distinctive qualities, causes, effects and accompanying motivations and goals of factions, and also compare faction with tyranny.

Faction (or division by party)\textsuperscript{341} is the first negative aspect of England's political order mentioned by the Narrator (316.6), well before tyranny, and even before Richard is introduced (320.7). Faction is introduced into the narrative in the context of war, and faction is shown to often result in battle and bloodshed. The titular Richard is not the first to take advantage of faction for personal gain. His father, Richard, Duke of York, a “factious” man (320.19), similarly “tri[ed] (under the pretext of civil dissension) to anticipate his legitimate time for ruling and to claim the scepter for himself” (320.26-8). The elder Richard's efforts lead to war and his own death along with many others (320.28-9). The younger Richard's plan continues the pattern, as he decides to “exploit

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\textsuperscript{339} For the importance of faction in Richard III, see Wegemer, 2011B, 47 & 2011A, 119-121. He notes that “[t]he Latin version of Richard III has at least eight terms for faction” (2011A, 121), but the most important of these are variants of factio and pars (see note 341 below).

\textsuperscript{340} Wegemer, 2011A, 137.

\textsuperscript{341} It appears to me that throughout Richard III factio and pars are used synonymously, but my translation uses “faction” and “party” to maintain the difference in vocabulary.
the anger and ignorance of one faction for the destruction of the other” (328.16-7), and later yet, “zeal for their parties” produces “armed bands” (354.19-20). Faction, like tyranny, is linked with violence and discord (330.5, 336.4, 342.19, 460.13), while it prevents “peace and concord” (336.8).

Although this connection between faction and war is present throughout the History, most of the rest of what can be learned about the subject is found in the back-to-back musings on faction by Richard and then Edward in 328.8-336.16. These function as a sort of indirect dialogue, with the future tyrant in soliloquy revealing the advantages that faction holds for him, and the ailing king's speech expounding on faction's disadvantages for everyone else. From Richard’s speech, the reader learns that the very first step of his plan for usurpation is to foment faction. Note, however, that Richard does not create this opportunity. The factions are “long-standing” by the time he finds them (328.10-1). He exacerbates the problem, but he does not create it. Later, the Narrator indicates that the Queen's ambition for the advancement of her faction paves the way for the success of Richard's tyrannical ambition, when Richard uses the “situation arranged by the Queen” as a “pretext for ... accomplishing his remaining undertaking” (338.8-11). Without these existing factional tensions, he could not have succeeded: “Richard alone could not have achieved his goal, and More carefully shows us that it is the same motive of ambition, either for advancement in power or material gain, which leads others to help Richard.”

Therefore, one important reason to oppose faction is that by doing so, one may prevent tyranny.

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342 Harris, 118.
There are other important reasons to oppose faction, however, which the immediately following speech presents very dramatically. Edward's deathbed oration (328.24-336.23) both contrasts with and complements Richard's musings. The oration is also concerned largely with faction, but speaks of its elimination or amelioration, rather than its exacerbation. Although Edward does not suspect Richard's plot in particular, he recognizes that factional divisions will be detrimental to the chances for his son to rule successfully (328.29-330.8), and he therefore argues against faction from all directions. It is harmful if either the ruler (330.22) or his advisors (332.6-9) are motivated by factional considerations, and the bad effects will be felt by both the boy himself and the whole kingdom (330.1-2, 332.12, 334.27-8). The benefits, meanwhile, are illusory, since in the long run even the partisans themselves will fall from the king's favor, if he “should recover his senses” (332.14-5). The bonds of humanity and Christianity (332.23-5), family ties of blood and marriage (334.1-5), as well as “the dictate [fās] of either nature or of [human] laws” (334.13) all argue for concord rather than faction, and there are no good reasons for the feelings which lead to faction (332.19-23).343

There is something to be learned from both the similarities and differences between these two views of faction. First, the two men agree that covetousness causes faction. Richard notes that it is especially envy regarding wealth and power that gives rise to faction (328.13-4), while Edward focuses on the latter, speaking of “[p]ride and the desire of surpassing others” (334.14-5) and a “shameful ardor for glory” (334.19) as the causes. According to Edward, wanting “to avenge old injuries” (328.15-6) is just an

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343 Edward thus treats faction as something which can potentially be cured through education. In his view, faction results from misunderstanding one’s actual self-interest.
excuse for fighting with others, since if there were any such injuries, they were “petty” (332.19-20). An example of what Edward describes is found in the dispute between Hastings and the Queen's brother, Lord Rivers. Although in Group Three this passage has been moved away from its original position just before the death-bed oration (cf. CW 2, 11a.4-6), it still illustrates the same point from its new location. The Narrator relates how Hastings and the Queen's family became members of opposite factions, who “had conspicuously engaged in hostility among themselves” (330.12) because of Rivers’s “resenting that [Hastings] was preferred to himself in that office [of captain], which he had hoped for just as if it had been destined and promised [to him]” (418.7-8). Envy for power causes the feud. While agreeing on its causes, Richard and Edward disagree strongly in their hopes for the future. While Richard needs envy (328.13), anger, and ignorance (328.16-7) for his plan to work, Edward asks for love (332.2, 23, 25), truth (332.11), and an end to jealousy of position (334.14-9).

Both Edward and Richard also recognize that a party or faction (in a manner similar to that shown above concerning a tyrant) aims for its own interest rather than the public's. Edward is worried because the goal of party members is the advancement of “partisan endeavors [studiiis]” (330.5): a party member acts “so that each might advance his own faction in the Prince's favor” (330.6-7) or “to ingratiate his own faction with the prince” (332.9-10). A faction thus aims for its own power. Richard agrees that members of factions do not contribute to “anyone's advantage except” their own “immoderate [advancement],” wanting only “their own good” (338.27-340.2). The Narrator shows this partisan motivation in action when he describes how the Queen surrounded her son with
members of her own family (338.3-7) precisely so “she would strengthen the influence of her faction immediately from the tender years of the Prince” (338.8-9). In some respects, however, the tyrant is even more self-serving than the factions. Richard acts only to “conduct his own business” (328.16) and for “his own advantage” (324.12-3; cf. 324.18-9). At least the members of factions act to advance their respective groups, including the other members. A tyrant is so individualistic that he can act only under “the pretext of the parties” (328.15). Even this very corrupted form of human association is beyond him.344

These discussions show that, although it falls short of tyranny, faction is always harmful, partially because it unites only a portion of society, rather than the whole, but even more so because of the kind of unity that faction sustains. Factions unite for destruction of mutual enemies at least as much as for the mutual benefit of their members. Richard plans to ally with “one faction for the destruction of the other” (328.17), and he comments about members of the Queen's faction that “it is uncertain whether they more greedily desire their own good or our evil” (340.2-3). The Narrator tells us that Richard's party was no better: Hastings and Buckingham “did not as much want a mutual benefit for themselves as they desired evil for the Queen's faction” (342.2-3). Thus, the only people Richard can recruit to his party are men who “[had] the most implacable hatred toward those” of the Queen's faction (338.12-3). In the same way, Lord Rivers aims merely to destroy Hastings (418.3-4), not to improve the defense of Calais. The two main factions envy each other; they are not even merely greedy (328.13-

344 If one wished to emphasize the similarities between faction and tyranny, the tyrant could be described as a faction of one man.
4). Both sides have “authority and resources” (328.13), and so their parties are not based on a desire to acquire these things for their members, but on denying them to the other side. Factional alliances are consistently shown to be based on malevolence and hatred, and thus partisan interests are not really the members' common interests, but rather common disinterests. There is no mention in Richard III of a faction united around any positive good. The closest that a faction can come to good is by destroying something bad. In particular, Richard realizes that factions could join in killing him: If they discovered his plan, “a treaty between the disagreeing factions would be ratified in his own blood (328.22-3). Edward's claim that factions lead away from what is useful and true (330.6, 8, 332.11) and towards destruction is thus supported by Richard and the Narrator, too. In Richard III, faction never leads to benefit, even for the faction itself. Edward predicts that “contention” will “blend all [things] with slaughter and blood” (334.17), and that is what has happened before, when his faction fought the Earl of Warwick's and “a great [number of men] in both parties were killed in the slaughter” (448.15). Faction can tear down, but not build up, or even maintain.

Part of the reason both tyranny and faction have a prominent place in Richard III is to show by way of contrast what a good political order looks like. As Harris puts it, “More was also interested in depicting the rise of tyranny in order to teach the men who surround a king how to avoid it.” Moreover, this work also contains helpful

345 Cf. Cicero, For Sestius, 10.24. Daniel Kinney's translation makes it seem as if factions could “make peace,” but forming an alliance to kill is not the same thing. Factions never work for peace in Richard III. Similarly, members of factions are sometimes “enemies” (infensi at 332.6, inimico at 340.17), but they are never “friends,” even of each other, as Kinney has them at 338.12-3. There, they merely are “those favorable [benevolos]” to Richard's party on account of their “hatred [odium]” of the Queen's faction.
346 Harris, 118. L.F. Dean has similarly noted that “from ... ironical evidence we obtain a picture of an ideal king who rules in accordance with the law of God and man, and who safeguards the interests of simple men
descriptions and discussions of positive goods: both of what good members of a political order are like, and of some characteristics of a good political order, which will be discussed in the next two sections of this chapter.

**Section III: Characteristics of Citizens**

From the way that the other characters refer to them and treat them, citizens clearly have a quite different motivation than party members. Furthermore, several insightful comments by the Narrator (who shows sympathy to the efforts of citizens) on one hand, and by Buckingham and Richard (who oppose the citizens' goals) on the other hand, reveal that that very same motivation is the key attribute of the kind of government called a “republic.” As mentioned in Chapter Three, a comparison of the various drafts shows that the terms “citizen” and “republic” were added to Group Three very carefully, and displace the terms “subject” and “realm” where those previously appear.347 Therefore, finding out what these terms mean is important. They are in fact fundamentally opposed to tyranny and faction. The citizen [*civis*] is consistently someone who acts well and properly for the good of the city [*civitas*], as will be shown.

Both the Narrator and Buckingham call citizens “honorable” (358.17, 424.25, 458.13, 468.5, 470.10, 472.15-6), and all persons specifically called citizens by either of them are praised (458.11-4, 462.6-7, 470.9-10). Citizens are shown opposing both

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347 Wegemer notes that “[o]nly five times is the word ‘citizen’ used in [1557] and all five refer to Londoners. There are, however, over fifty references to the ‘people’ of England and only once is an English person called a ‘subject’ and that is said by King Edward IV’s mother in her contemptuous refusal to sanction her son’s degrading the royal blood by a marriage to a supposedly virtuous subject, rather than a wealthy foreigner of ‘sacrosanct blood’. Nowhere else in any of More's literary works is the word ‘subject’ used” (2011B, 46). As Chapter Three has indicated, even this one use of the word “subject” in a literary work has been removed in the latter drafts of the *History*. See note 307 above.
tyranny and faction, but never aiding either. Richard and Buckingham realize that the citizens pose an obstacle to tyranny, and so they enlist the help of Edward Shaw, offering him “boundless rewards ... [if] the citizens would be moved from their opinion” (432.16-8). The effort, however, is unsuccessful, since “the citizens” later maintain “silence” and do not approve of Richard's usurpation (470.5-6). Later, when some people (not called citizens) “who were participants in the plot” do begin to acclaim Richard king, “[t]he astonished citizens turned their necks back” (472.11) to see who could be doing such a thing. The citizens never agree to tyranny, as the Narrator emphasizes: “But the Duke ... was displeased that no honorable citizens appeared in that party [parte]” (472.15-6).

Furthermore, they are not members of a party or faction, here or elsewhere in the History. Earlier, they have actively opposed faction. When the “armed bands” were roaming about, filled with “zeal for their parties” (354.18-20), “[t]hen, lest London suffer some [kind] of sudden calamity, there was an undertaking by the citizens to keep watch” (354.22-4). Citizens unite to prevent destruction, not to cause it. Even for their imperfect king, lacking virtue as he was, Buckingham says that “the citizens ... with great expense and danger to [them]selves, in all his affairs, in prosperity and adversity, ... always offered [Edward] the friendliest minds, extraordinary fidelity, [and] singular effort” (462.23-464.9). Citizens are understood to put the interest of the city and the realm ahead of their own. Citizens not only support government officials, but also serve the public by holding office themselves. This is shown by another of Buckingham's examples, “Thomas Cook, a knight and your citizen ... who both succeeded to all the honorable offices among you by proper legal form and managed [them] magnificently” (458.11-4).
The Narrator, too, points out Fitzwilliam: one of the “citizens” (470.5) who holds the office of recorder of London, “a man there who is the assistant of the mayor, learned in the laws of his country, so that he would not err through ignorance in returning judgments” (470.7-9). These citizens of London are willing and able to rule and to be ruled in turn. Thus, in contrast to a tyrant and to members of factions, citizens act for the public interest, rather than any private one.

**Section IV: Attributes of a Republic**

Wegemer has shown that “self-government by the people—genuine *respublica*—is at the heart of the work.” What does this government, which acts in the public interest, look like? Generally, all the characters in the *History* describe the ends of good government in the same way, although there is considerable debate about the means which should be used, and especially about who should do the governing. The ends of government which are mentioned involve securing important goods from harm, particularly the public’s lives, families, and property. When these goods are safe from armies, there is peace. When they are safe from criminals, there is justice. Thus, achieving peace and justice is the most common way characters in this work describe the purpose of government.

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350 Fenlon has recognized that a good king “respects the lives and property of the citizens, and dies leaving his country at peace. Peace, property and life: these are the goods that government must respect” (455). Note, however, that Fenlon thinks this good king is Edward. Fenlon also importantly recognizes that these types of goods which the government should protect are those which link freedom to responsibility: “True liberty, says More, is grounded in responsibility: children, life and property confer responsibility and with it the freedom to exercise this trust” (457).
The Narrator's first comment about good government importantly notes that two different armies can disturb the peace: foreign and domestic. Near the end of Edward's reign, “his kingdom was most quiet and in a state of flourishing affairs” (318.9). Why? Because “[t]here was neither any war present nor any impending (except that which nobody expected), since every external fear was absent [and] at home the commons were quiet and there was concord procured between the nobles by the King” (318.9-12). A good government protects against both invasion and civil war. The Narrator's statement here also notes that “flourishing affairs” are a result of peace, something Edward also believes. Precisely because “[a]ll things are pacified now” he has “hope that [all things] will be prosperous” (334.29). Prosperity, although never mentioned as a direct end of government, is a by-product of peace.

As noted in Section I, the Narrator also recognizes that there are two types of criminals who commit injustices: those who are beyond the reach of government and those who want to control the government. In his example, the former are found in Wales, the latter in England. Wales, “negligently” governed because of its distance from the king, “began to be brutalized [efferari] in its almost wild conduct, with wicked men attacking in robberies and murder licentiously, and unpunished” (336.27-338.1). This shows that men's property and lives can be threatened when government is absent. Not just any government is an improvement, however. The Welsh are not the only ones who act like wild animals. As mentioned in Section I, Richard and his acts are frequently described using various words which mean “savage” and “vicious,” and the very same word which describes the Welsh is used twice more. First, Buckingham says anyone who
“would strive to harm an innocent boy” has an “inhuman savagery [feritate]” (368.11). It has already been noted that Richard intends to kill innocent boys to become king. Next, the Cardinal says the English will be thought of abroad as “an inhuman and savage [efferum] people” if “there would be danger to a brother even from his brother” (378.11-3). A little later, however, the Queen reminds him that that very danger exists in England, when a brother wants to be king: “we have learned by experience\footnote{periculum; literally “by trial, by experiment.”} how easily the accursed thirst for kingship swallows every affection of blood-relationship: a brother removes a brother and the offspring rushes toward dominion over the very body of his parent” (394.14-7). There are grave dangers to civilized people from both savage, unjust men who are not governed and from savage, unjust men with a thirst to govern.

Edward makes another key point: peace is needed so that any part of society can have safety. During times of “discord” and “internal sedition” one sees the death of “many good and excellent men,” while without “peace and concord,” it is “not safe” for the king and there is “danger” for the nobles (336.4-8). A similar argument is relayed to the Queen by Richard's messengers. She hears that “the whole kingdom would be in arms and tumult from this affair,” and that the resulting “damage” would be “immense” if “concord” was “violated through injustice” (342.22-7). This message shows that both she and Richard agree with Edward on this connection between peace, justice, and protection from damage. She must agree, since the argument convinces her (344.1); and, although Richard presumably would not fall for his own deception, he must think the connection itself is reasonable, or he would not use it as the basis of his argument. In a later statement, Richard again puts forth a view of a good society that he must consider
reasonable as part of another deception: a society where “no danger hindered all good men from living most quietly under the best prince” (422.11-2). The Duke of Buckingham, however, offers the most comprehensive list of goods that the public (whom he is speaking to at the time) “continually desired most greatly” (454.24): “the security of your bodies, the unassailed chastity of your wives and daughters, and your goods [made] certain for you and safe from treachery” (456.3-5).

This positive statement of the three types of good which a good government protects are part of Buckingham's speech pointing out the deficiencies of Edward's government, and the same three areas are evident in the other accusations he makes against Edward. Nobody's property was safe, since the king demanded excessive taxes (456.6-19), assessed unjust fines (456.19-22), and drove Sir Thomas Cook from wealth to poverty for no good reason (458.11-9). Families were not safe, since the king stole Shore's wife from him (462.6) and seduced many other women besides (462.11-8). Finally, “bodies were dragged into danger” (460.6-7), since the king killed his own brother (460.24) and plunged England into civil war (460.8-21).

The Narrator's condemnations of Richard and the men he employs during his protectorate show the same three concerns. Property is not safe, as shown in Mistress Shore's case, when “her goods [were] plundered ... and conveyed to the Protector as if it were a fine for [making] magic potions, which ... was completely baseless” (424.2-4). Richard also endangers families, both by angling to remove the Queen's son from her, claiming that “his mother [is] worse than a stepmother” (362.8-9), and by his attempts to retroactively invalidate Edward's marriage and his accusations of adultery against his
own mother (434.18-24, 466.2-8). The Narrator considers Richard a great danger to persons as well, since he kills Woodville, Grey, Vaughn (350.15), and Hastings (412.18); he may have killed Henry VI (324.22); and he clearly intends “to take the lives of his own nephews” (320.12-3), to kill any members of the other faction that refuse to support him (328.17), and in fact to murder anyone “whose life appeared to obstruct his plans” (324.19). The reader is presented with competing views of which man should be in charge of the government, but all agree on what government should protect: life, property, and family.

The emphasis of the various critiques of rulers in this *History* suggest that it is a work concerned mostly with one specific category of threat. The setting is England, not Wales, and there are no complaints of lack of law enforcement against criminals, but rather of unjust punishments carried out under color of law. Similarly, nobody criticizes either Edward or Richard for failing to prevent England's foreign enemies from invading. The author relegates these other legitimate aspects of political consideration to comments made only in passing.

Thus *Richard III* is not meant to contain a comprehensive literary examination of all political threats to a people, but rather offers a deep look at tyranny, as well as some consideration of faction and related threats to the public from within. The term *res publica* is an important part of this investigation. Characters in the *History* use it to mean a sort of government that works for the public, rather than threatening the public. One way to translate *res publica* is “the public interest.” Thus, what is literally a matter

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352 For example, at 378.17, Daniel Kinney, when faced with a slight variation of the normal compound term, since the first word is in the plural, but not the second (*rebus public[a]e*), translates it as “public
of the public is equivalent to a “matter [re] ... advantageous for the public [in publicum utili]” (454.23-4). The contrast between the private interest of both faction and tyranny and the public interest of the whole society is a very frequent one in Richard III. For example, the Queen decides to forgo a large escort for her son lest she “be alleged to have disordered the republic by a regard for private hatred, [and of] having violated, through injustice, the concord of which her own dying husband had been the author for ratifying” (342.26-344.1). A republic (or public concern) is thus understood to be the opposite of a faction (or private concern), and the former is marked by concord, the latter by discord. Similarly, a little later Richard and Buckingham accuse the Marquis, one of the Queen's family, saying he had “plundered the king's treasury, [and] distributed pay to the soldiers whom he had assembled in a fleet for strengthening the resources of that faction.” The Narrator immediately adds, “In this way they inverted through a false accusation a deed which they were well aware was decided by the Common Council [or possibly “by common deliberation;” communi consilio] and was done very much in the interest of both the King and the republic” (348.9-14). Again, the interest of the republic is a complete inversion of partisan interest. The contrast between public and private interests is also clarified by comparing the terms used in this passage and elsewhere for official repositories of funds. The word “aerarium” is used for “treasury” here, but the term “fiscus” is used later to describe where Elizabeth Grey's property was unjustly remanded by King Edward (436.20). During Roman times, aerarium referred only to the public treasury, while fiscus was used to denote the Emperor's private funds. The
Narrator thus indicates that the public treasury is where funds are drawn from “by the Common Council” and for the common interest. The king’s privy purse is where illegally confiscated wealth ends up. The difference between acting for a private advantage and acting for the public good is thus a key difference between a tyrant and a citizen, and between a factious society and a republic.

Both the definition of “republic” as a kind of society which advances the public interest and the desirability of such a society are accepted by all the characters in the History who speak of it. Richard himself, “lest [he] appear ... insufficient of courage in zealously administering the republic” (480.13), agrees to accept the kingships of both England and France. Then, while speaking to the public, he says, “Indeed I consider merely the administration of them mine, truly the right and profit and ownership of each of them totally yours, not at all doubtfully public” (480.18-20). Based on how he has acted as Protector, Richard probably does not really intend to rule in the way he describes, but even he must speak in this way, since ruling for the public interest is so universally valued.353

Section V: Aligning Public and Private Interests

What obstacles, then, prevent the people of England from forming a true republic? If almost everyone agrees that the public interest should be served, why are there factions? One reason is that at least some conflicts between private interests are almost universal. The main example of faction in Richard III, that between the Queen's family

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353 As Chapter Five will also show, it is common in Richard III for evil characters to describe good political ideas. As Wegemer puts it, “In their effort to win support from the ‘honest citizens’ of London, Buckingham and Richard know they have to address the Londoners as ‘citizens’ and ‘the people,’ and to promise rule by law” (2011A, 137).
and the king's, is said to come from nature: Between “the Queen's faction ... and the 
blood-relations of the King bitter hatred burned (as women not from malice, indeed, but 
from nature almost always hold as enemies whichever [persons] are dear to their 
husbands” (322.8-11). Some sources of faction thus arise from the way humans are, 
apart from any specifically evil intent. Moreover, those who are closest to each other are 
in fact most likely to form factions. King Edward recognizes that this is the case, 
although he does not know exactly why.354 Speaking about family members he says, 
“[B]y I know not what evil fate, we see it to happen such that enmity nowhere is 
exercised more hostilely than amongst those whom the dictate [fas] of either nature or of 
[human] laws ought to deter most powerfully from all hatred” (334.11-4). Whether 
caused by nature, or fate, or both, there is apparently no way men can avoid some 
factional feelings. Additionally, the Narrator says that “in war it was necessary that the 
parties be mutually hostile” (316.5), and Edward says that if his sons see the factions 
fighting around them, they would “undoubtedly be joining factions” (330.21-4) as well. 
Since Edward and the Narrator, the two characters most opposed to faction in the work, 
both see the feelings which give rise to faction, such as enmity, envy, and hatred, as 
natural to at least some extent, and unavoidable at least sometimes, it appears that any 
attempt to improve government will have to work with factions, rather than eliminate 
them.

354 Nor must someone who attempts to reform a political order know the reason why. The cause need not 
be known for the problem to be known. However, the predilection of family members to form factions 
could be explained as the result of laws, rather than fate or nature. Chapter Three will discuss some ways 
in which a system of hereditary kingship produces incentives for family members to oppose each other.
However, if these factional feelings are natural and come about “almost always,” is it still possible to accomplish much that is in the public interest? It seems so. There are examples in the *History* of two ways that private interests and factional passions can be governed without public harm, and the manner in which these two ways are presented is characteristic of the political teaching of the work as a whole. On the one hand, the fact that faction is an ever-present condition which is natural and unavoidable indicates that a perfect political order is unattainable, and that any political reform is inherently limited. On the other hand, the fact that methods of dealing with this problem are seriously considered, and shown to actually work, indicates that some political reform is possible, that certain types of government are better than others, and that working towards the best possible government is a worthwhile endeavor.

The first way of dealing with factional interests is negative, while the second is positive. First, having a private interest in someone's destruction or a private negative feeling is not the same thing as acting on that interest and causing harm. Before someone can act, he must have the opportunity to do so. The Narrator notes that Richard may have “conceived his plan from the opportunity of his nephews' age” (328.7-8), and an important principle follows immediately afterward: “[opportunity] usually impels even sluggish and quiet men to crime” (328.8-9). The corollary of that principle is that without opportunity, not only the peaceful, but even the merely lazy are not likely to commit crime, and given the context, perhaps lack of opportunity can stop others, too, since Richard is neither lazy (432.8-9) nor peaceful (324.2-3). Removing the opportunity to do wrong from persons whose private interests make them especially inclined to do
wrong is an important principle of good government. During the sanctuary debate, the Queen notes how this principle can be put into effect: “the common [publica] law ... admits no one ever as a guardian of [someone] by whose destruction he would gain an inheritance even considerably less than a kingdom” (390.15-8). The public good thus requires laws which avoid conflicts of interest whenever possible.

The second way that the good of the republic can be served while private interests exist is when someone's own interest and the public's are in fact the same. In those cases, the person can act on his private interest while actually helping the public instead of hurting it. One approach using this method is that found in Edward's deathbed oration. He tries to convince the factions that they share in the public interest. True, they are members of a faction, but they also are part of English society. Do they want to live in a ruined kingdom (332.12)? He warns them directly, “[I]f discord should occupy you ... you yourselves [will be] especially exposed to danger” (336.4-7), and ends by saying that they must stop acting factionally for “[their] own safety” (336.15). This is a very reasonable argument. Since everyone actually is a member of the public, that which is in the public interest is in everyone's interest. However, this approach fails (336.23). A strictly rational appeal to human beings, explaining to them why they should act for the public good, is quite limited in its effectiveness. Apparently, members of factions are sometimes either unwilling or unable to set aside their immediate personal interests for their long-term shared interests. However, Edward's argument does point out that it is at least possible to recognize a personal interest in helping the republic. As noted earlier, an
action can be “in the interest of both the King and the public” (348.13), and so it stands to
reason that something can be in the interest of both a citizen and the public as well.

When this remote shared interest is combined with a more immediate private
interest, it can be enough to motivate someone who wants to act in accord with that
interest, while good people who want to help society would be even more strongly
motivated when they saw that their country and themselves could benefit together. Many
characters in Richard III demonstrate this by using the alignment of public and private
interests as part of their attempts to convince someone to act. While the Cardinal is
trying to convince the Queen, he says that by sending out her son “she would be taking
upright counsel [considered] both publicly, for the interests of the kingdom, and
commonly, for [the interests] of her friends, and personally, for her own interests”
(378.17-8); and he later mentions how she once sent off her older boy “for the sake of his
own advantage and [that] of his fatherland” (380.29). After their debate, the Queen also
tries to convince the Cardinal to take even greater precautions for her son's safety by
explaining that if her son dies “it would inflict an eternal wound both on me and on the
republic” (394.7-8). Buckingham understands the principle of alignment of interests the
same way, since he tries to convince the citizens of London to acclaim Richard as king by
appealing to both public and private interests. He tells them it will be “neither more
important than advantageous for the public, nor more advantageous for anyone than for
you” (454.24-5) and that “not only would you have benefited the entire kingdom for the
public, but also you will especially procure advantages separately for yourselves”
(468.11-3). Hoping to appeal to concern for both public and private harm, he also tells
them that under Edward the whole “kingdom was astonishingly oppressed ... nevertheless
you, the citizens of this town, were always especially [oppressed]” (462.22-3). Finally,
as part of his attempt to justify Richard's crowning, he argues that it would be “no more
by his own right than for the public good” (466.17-8), and for the benefit of the crowd,
Buckingham tells Richard that if he accepts the kingship, it would “result in both honor
for him and advantage for the kingdom” (474.16-8). All of these arguments stress that
aligning public and private interests can make things better. On the other hand, when
someone wants to benefit the republic, but thinks he cannot, he might instead choose to
advance a private interest. Buckingham joins with Richard because he “determined that
since the public evil could not be corrected, he would turn [it] as much as possible to his
own good” (400.1-2). Since it is mentioned so often, this principle of interests—that
public and private interests should be aligned, while conflicts of interest should be
avoided—is one of the most prominent lessons on improving society that a reader can
learn from the History.

How, though, can such an alignment be accomplished? Chapter Five will show
that a nation's law as well as the offices and institutions established by that law are
conduits for putting this principle into practice. Just as the common law regarding
inheritances institutes the office of legal guardian (388.18-21), with the limitations
mentioned that prevent conflicts of interest, the law also establishes other offices (like the
kingship) and institutions (such as sanctuary). Chapter Five will therefore examine how
England's legal system aligns and misaligns private and public interests, noting its
strengths, but also its defects, especially in relation to how it failed to prevent the rise of a
tyrant. The examination will begin with sanctuary, since the discussion of that institution also contains important lessons which anyone who wants a better society should learn first, before attempting to reform any laws or institutions in the hope of preventing tyranny and faction, preserving and expanding citizens’ freedom, and achieving the public good.
Chapter Five: Institutional Causes of Tyranny

In the *History*, More presents the poor design of the offices and institutions established by England’s laws as one of the most significant reasons that the nation failed to prevent Richard’s tyranny. As Gerard Wegemer has noted,

To the reader exercising sharp-sighted prudence, *Richard III* reveals dramatically and with penetrating irony how a nation fails in self-government. In doing so, *Richard III* points to clear principles and highly valuable prudential advice about good self-government; it points to the importance of institutions such as London’s often-annually elected ‘senate’ of aldermen, annually elected mayors and sheriffs, professionally trained civil magistrates such as the recorder, and the availability of courts governed by established law. It also points to the odd and imperfect but effective custom of sanctuary, an institution that receives what appears to be disproportionately long attention in his short history. Yet *Richard III* shows how leaders of a people can and must invent such novel and even peculiar protections, cleverly responding to grave threats to the lives of citizens. (2011A, 182)

This chapter will investigate some important institutions, offices, and aspects of the legal system of England as depicted in the *History*, beginning with that “odd,” “imperfect,” “effective,” “peculiar,” and apparently “disproportionately” treated institution, sanctuary. Sanctuary is unquestionably emphasized. The sanctuary scenes occupy the center of the *History*, and constitute the longest and most detailed examination of any of England's institutions in the work.\(^{355}\) It will be shown, however, that such emphasis is not

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\(^{355}\) Because of its prominence, many scholars who have written about *Richard III* recognize that sanctuary is important. While they do not agree on exactly why, most of them concentrate on its sacred character. M.S. Harris thinks that “Richard’s proposal to disregard the sanctuary which had been dedicated to God by St. Peter is intended as another example of Richard’s unnatural acts which, in his desire for sovereignty, break the bonds between God and man” (155). W. M. Gordon holds that “[t]he sanctuary in More’s *History of King Richard III* is a place apart yet central to the action of a story that ruminates upon the sacred as a civilizing agent in human affairs” (1985, 21). John Peters takes this view the farthest: “The relationship between sanctuary and More's Christian world, the lengthy debate about sanctuary in his narrative, and the
disproportionate. The close investigation of this one institution contains important lessons applicable to all institutions, and to all institutional reform. Moreover, important great and perennial questions of political philosophy, such as the tensions between the good and the legal, between reason and tradition, and between the sacred and the secular, are treated under this one exemplar.

**Section I: Sanctuary & Prudent Political Reform**

The section of the *History* dealing with the institution of sanctuary includes Richard's view on the issue and three others, constituting a dialogue of sorts in which each of the four positions represents a different possible conception of political institutions which can inform someone's response to tyranny. Collectively, these various conceptions treat of the strengths and weaknesses of sanctuary, demonstrate the importance of both reason and prudence in institutional critique and reform, reveal which questions are important to ask and to answer about an institution, and ultimately show the reader why and how this institution failed to stop the tyrant immediately at hand. After carefully considering sanctuary, one can more easily understand the other major political failures dramatized in *Richard III*, as well as the manner in which those failures are presented.

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physical and psychological significance of sanctuary are all important to *Richard III*, but sanctuary is most significant in its portrayal of the extremely graphic devastation resulting from its violation. Despite the ominous feeling in the air before Richard takes the prince from sanctuary, only after his departure do destruction and chaos reign throughout the land. Once Richard breaks sanctuary, the realm becomes almost immediately chaotic, both through the doubt cast on the lineal legitimacy of Richard's nephews and through Richard's usurpation and the battles that follow” (36). The present chapter views sanctuary as primarily a political, rather than a religious institution, and thus builds on Travis Curtright's insight that “[i]n the debate over sanctuary, More indicates how English common law, natural law, and the prerogatives of the Church should serve as a defense from aspiring despots” (2012, 56).
Richard begins the debate with a speech in favor of removing his younger nephew from sanctuary (360.13-364.15). Next, the nobles and bishops briefly respond (364.16-366.5). After that, the Duke of Buckingham offers another, longer speech (366.6-376.17), and finally, the Queen and the Cardinal engage in an extended dialogue (378.5-396.4).

Richard's speech both points out some political problems with the younger brother's remaining in sanctuary and offers a solution to these problems. Richard explains that the Queen's action is not strictly private, but has a political effect. Taking sanctuary with her son implies that the nobles have “provide[d] for the Prince either insufficiently faithfully or not wisely enough” (360.26), the first if they know that Richard is bad and made him Protector anyway, the second if they do not know (cf. 392.6-8). He warns that the effects of this implication will be felt both domestically among the commons (360.26) and internationally (362.14). Thus, the first important question arises: What should be done when the use or abuse of an existing institution causes a potentially serious political problem? Richard's answer is to disregard the institution, despite the fact that no other ruler has ever violated sanctuary (364.25-6, 386.17-9). He proposes a royal edict of removal (364.7), which everyone recognizes will involve the use of force (364.18, 376.16, 376.20-2, 378.1). This novel disregard of the institution, which the Queen notes is uniquely extreme, even when compared to past tyrants (386.18), sets the debate in motion, just as Richard's tyrannical actions as a whole inspire reflection on how institutions could be improved to prevent another tyrant's rise in the future.
The immediate response to Richard's speech is two-fold. The nobility acquiesce in full (364.16), approving Richard's simple expediency without any consideration of wider consequences, while the Cardinal and bishops accept Richard's assertion of some potential harm to the realm, but reject his solution of violating sanctuary (364.17-9). The former attitude, one of complete disregard for political institutions, cannot stop tyranny, and in fact directly aids it. This first way of considering institutions is thus quickly dismissed, but, characteristically of the History’s philosophical style, it is at least mentioned. The History is short, and not all aspects of all important questions are equally treated, but usually every important alternative is at least briefly alluded to.

While the response of the prelates shows some initial promise, it, too, proves insufficient. These clerics exemplify a second approach: an unreflective conservatism concerning social institutions. They oppose Richard's plan, but without knowing why they should do so. They simply assert that removing the boy cannot be done because the institution of sanctuary is both “of such ancient age and so sacrosanct” (364.20). They defer to the founders of the institution, although they are not sure whether they were from heaven or earth. They simultaneously claim that sanctuary was “instituted” by “kings and popes” and by “Peter himself, the Prince of the Apostles” (364.21, 23). The bishops are ineffective in stopping Richard because they refuse to violate sanctuary based solely on respect for authority, while the highest authority in England is set on getting the boy out. Also, since they cannot give any good reason why sanctuary should be respected in the present case, their own authority is weak, even among themselves. After the Duke of
Buckingham's “very sophisticated legal argument”\textsuperscript{356} in favor of Richard's edict, most of them change their minds (376.18-21). Faith in both the heavenly and earthly traditions of sanctuary leads them instinctively to the correct decision, but it does not suffice to maintain it against a determined foe. They may have “the appropriate attitude to sacred traditions,”\textsuperscript{357} but they demonstrate that tyranny cannot be successfully opposed without the exercise of reason as well. To successfully defend institutions in the face of such an attack by a person in authority, some of the defenders must be able to respond with effective arguments, rather than merely repeat ancient commands.

In contrast to the bishops, Buckingham is perfectly willing to question authority. Buckingham's speech broadens the argument considerably beyond the case at hand. Richard's speech is forceful, but limited. It contains nothing regarding sanctuary generally speaking. It is simply intended to justify obtaining Edward's younger son. After hearing it, the bishops could still object on principle, even if on principle not well understood. Buckingham questions the principle. His broader approach provokes critical thinking about the whole institution of sanctuary in his listeners and in the reader.\textsuperscript{358}

\textsuperscript{356} Karlin, 76-89, 84.
\textsuperscript{357} Hallet, 189.
\textsuperscript{358} My interpretation here is at odds with those of some other commentators. First, it takes all five viewpoints, including Buckingham's, as important and serious contributions to a dialogue which educates readers about institutions and their possible reform. E.S. Donno, in contrast, holds that “[i]instead of a serious analysis of the [sanctuary] issue, what More offers is a mock-serious one. What he has done, in effect, is to provide Buckingham with an inset declamation, that is, a fictitious legal case (\textit{controversia}), which he handles according to form, by ingenious and sophistical argument” (432). As Chapter One argued, the entire \textit{History} is, of course, fictional, but that does not preclude serious political analysis. The strengths and weaknesses of Buckingham’s argument, including how “ingenious” it is on the one hand, and how “sophistical” on the other, will be discussed below.

In addition, this dissertation rejects as untenable John Peters’s assertion that “in fact [Buckingham] does not try to argue away the right of sanctuary itself but rather its application in this particular instance” (34). Rather, as shown below, Buckingham specifically argues from the universal to the particular. He brings up a large number of examples of abuse of sanctuary that have no direct applicability to the boy in question. Rather, he argues that because sanctuary is such a flawed institution in general, it should also be
Buckingham thus demonstrates the third possible conception of institutions. He takes his own reason, rather than any received tradition, as his source for principles of legal action. His willingness to submit tradition to private judgment is evident from the moment he begins to discuss sanctuary. He declares that he would never have instituted it (368.28-9), and he holds that respect for precedent should be maintained only “to the extent reason would tolerate it” (372.17-8). This is not merely a defiant statement against the authority of St. Peter, because he produces considerable evidence that the institution of sanctuary is far from an unmitigated good. He argues that an accurate understanding of the worth of the institution can only come by “compar[ing] the advantages of sanctuaries with the disadvantages” (370.24-5), and sanctuaries have many of the latter. Men guilty of the most heinous crimes abuse its protection regularly: “[H]ow great a crowd of incorrigibles swarms there ... Moreover, what a hideous and horrid filth of robbers, of assassins, of cutthroats, of murderers, and of inhuman traitors flows together into sanctuary as if into the most pestilent bilge-water hold” (370.16-22). Furthermore, the institution not only prevents justice, it encourages injustice, since “now a wicked youth freely squanders, wastes, and fritters away from no other cause than his trust in these places” (372.-4), and sanctuary also provides a safe place to live off of other people's property (372.4-7). Some murderous thieves even use sanctuary as their base of operations (372.7-13). The bishops appeal to legal precedent and heavenly authority, but Buckingham cites Scripture to show that, in some cases, it would be necessary to violate sanctuary in order to properly follow the law and obey God's command: “Yet, as for the
thieves and robbers who have filled those places, and who once they are tainted by these kind of disgraceful crimes never afterwards come to their senses, it is surely a crime that any sanctuary is available for their protection; and much more so for murderers, whom God ordered to be torn away from the very altars and slaughtered, provided that they purposely assented to the crime” (370.8-12).\textsuperscript{359}

Buckingham argues that blindly following a legal dictate in all circumstances is not a good idea. To support his point, he raises key questions about the purpose of sanctuary. He reasonably presumes that the institution was intended to help society, not to hurt it. These abuses must therefore be unintended effects. If men of a later time can understand why an institution was made in the first place, they can act in accordance with the same principle even while changing the institution for the better or eliminating it, based on their experience. Buckingham's reasoning arrives at two purposes for instituting sanctuary. First, “the true and original use of sanctuaries is that they protect the bodies of those who otherwise would endure evil both great and, principally, deserved” (372.21-3). Sanctuary is only for guilty people (374.9-11, 376.10), and only so they can have a chance to repent (372.11-2). Second, “the use of sanctuaries was born and nourished” (374.1-2) from realizing that sometimes “the danger is from the law itself” (372.28; cf. 376.11). Presumably, any time sanctuary is used for other purposes, it should not be respected. In any case, sanctuary is certainly not seen as something sacred and inviolable, but rather as an imperfect, although perhaps well-intentioned effort to help society. Buckingham argues that since all institutions are meant to accomplish good, to do good by ignoring an institution is really to be faithful to the principle which gave rise

\textsuperscript{359} Buckingham paraphrases Exodus 21:14.
to that institution. Therefore, acts of prerogative are not wrong. The ruler is correct to ignore the law both when he pardons a man when “either necessity armed him or chance pushed him to a homicide” (370.14-6) and when he “drag[s] someone out of sanctuary for his own good and advantage” (376.15-6). Buckingham argues that the letter of the law does not bind as much as its spirit. Reasonable disregard of sanctuary leaves “Divine Peter unoffended” (374.26). Therefore, since it is reasonable to forcibly remove someone from sanctuary “for his own good” (372.19-20), such an act is not really a violation of sanctuary (376.15-7).  

Buckingham’s argument thus makes some good points about how institutions can be analyzed and improved, but it is also weak in some respects, particularly in the way his reasoning is applied to the case in question. Although Buckingham demonstrates to some extent what reason can discover about an institution, his conclusions also show the need for reasoning to be complete before taking action. Hallet is right to describe Buckingham’s speech as “an astonishing display of the misuse of reason.” For example, he seems to open himself up to criticism when he declares that he “would not recommend instituting” sanctuary (368.28-9), but admits that there are some legitimate

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360 Koterski argues that Buckingham characterizes removing someone from sanctuary as “a material complicity to be regretted, not a formal crime that would be sinful” (59). However, Buckingham actually goes much farther. Removing the boy is not something “to be regretted,” but something positively “for his own good” (372.19-20, 376.15), and trying to keep him there is “wicked” (368.18) and “evil” (368.24). Moreover, in the case of criminals, Buckingham says “it is surely a crime that any sanctuary is [available] for their protection” (370.10-11), and later calls it an “evil” that should be “abolished” (372.14). Buckingham’s argument is less like a regrettable complicity, such as the example of delivering mail to an abortion clinic that Koterski gives in his article (57), and more like arguing that killing someone is permitted when defending others. Buckingham argues that it would be right to make an exception, and it would be wrong not to.

361 As Fenlon puts it, Buckingham offers a “plausible, but in reality nefarious, argument against sanctuary” (462). “[Buckingham’s] arguments are persuasive and well reasoned: sanctuary favours criminals. But the queen is not deceived. She looks behind the arguments to the purpose of the arguments, and she sees that what is at stake is human life” (457).

362 Hallet, 189
uses for sanctuary. How would he protect persons in those circumstances? Is it really possible to more narrowly tailor sanctuary? Can sanctuary ever protect anyone without protecting everyone? He shows that it is possible to make reasonable judgments about which persons deserve and which do not deserve sanctuary. But is it reasonable to conclude that persons in difficult circumstances will be judged reasonably? Or who could be trusted with making such a judgment? He also advocates weighing advantages against disadvantages. Is it true that the advantage of punishing a large number of guilty people is worth allowing some innocent people to be punished as well? Buckingham does not seem to even consider such objections.

Buckingham's speech also draws attention to the importance of using prudence in addition to reason in any political reform. As Curtright puts it, “Buckingham’s jurisprudential chicanery mirrors Machiavellian ideas of prudence defined as calculation.” In other words, Buckingham arrives at his conclusions by ignoring the distinction between prudentia and ratio. Prudence does not simply calculate a reasonable result, but considers that many persons act irrationally, and that an important part of the purpose of political institutions is to ameliorate the effect of irrational human actions. According to reason, as Buckingham notes, “injustice should not be introduced to any place at all. ... [There is no] place in which it is right to perpetrate an evil deed” (372.25-28). Prudence, however, attempts to discern what institutions or practices would actually stop people from perpetrating crimes.

As noted in the previous chapter, very often in Richard III, a character working on the side of tyranny speaks the truth without acting on it. In this speech, Buckingham

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363 Curtright 2012, 56.
repeatedly stresses the importance of prudence (368.1, 372.13, 372.16), but does not follow his own counsel. It arguably demonstrates a lack of prudence for him even to point out the flaws in an institution for which he has no better substitute. In addition, at the same time that Buckingham says he would not have founded this institution, he says he would not “want the immunity of sanctuary to be violated” (368.26). He thus recognizes in principle that a flawed institution should sometimes be preserved. This should spur the reader to wonder why. What is it about a legal precedent that could make an institution worth having when reasonable people can see that it is not working exactly as intended? One need only turn back to the response of the bishops for an example of how, in large measure, law gains its effectiveness among unreflective people simply from being old. Longstanding and unwavering precedent leads to the association of the old with the holy (364.20), further reinforcing a law's power, and not only among the clergy. All previous tyrants respected sanctuary out of piety (386.18). Weakening the authority of sanctuary without offering another effective and authoritative solution is merely destructive, rather than reformative. In any case, Buckingham actually shows no respect for precedent at all, and his ridiculous closing words show that it is impossible to have it both ways. He claims that, in the case of a reasonable exception, even if people “do violence [vim fecerint]” to someone while removing him from a sanctuary, they do not “do violence to sanctuary [asylo vim fecisset]” as an institution (376.16-7). In reality, someone cannot simultaneously respect an institution and violently disregard it when it suits him. The effect of Buckingham's speech shows that an imprudent rational critique of an institution is even worse than the unquestioning acceptance of the bishops. The
former can actively advance tyranny, while the latter merely is an inadequate obstacle to it. The clergy might not have been able to stop Richard, but they did oppose his plan. After Buckingham speaks, “all the laymen who were present and truly also most of the clergy assent” to using force (376.18-9).

Buckingham's speech contains both a positive and negative lesson for someone considering political reform. On one hand, Buckingham might be taken as a model of how to find out what is wrong with institutions and how to think about their purpose. These are important steps in any improvement of institutions, and may tend to encourage someone to undertake a much-needed reform. On the other hand, a reader might consider the questions Buckingham does not answer, the contradictions found in his argument, and especially the ultimate consequences of his speech, and hesitate while contemplating what prudent reform really means.

In order to understand the flaws in Buckingham's speech, one must turn to the next contributor to this debate. Buckingham points out many of the failings of sanctuary, and he himself is part of the reason that sanctuary fails to stop Richard's plan, but sanctuary's weakness in the face of tyranny is only fully evident after the Queen and Cardinal have spoken. While the Cardinal does make a few points responding to particular aspects of the Queen's argument, he does not offer his own view of sanctuary during his debate with the Queen. Rather, he presents a synopsis of the views that

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364 In this sense, Karlin is right to liken Buckingham to “a judicious reformer” (81).
365 Karlin says, “No one can deny that a sanctuary law that serves mainly to foster and protect lawbreakers is deserving of serious reform. Like Hythloday’s criticism of the harshness of English penal law in *Utopia*, this criticism has the ring of truth” (82). In Curtright’s judgment, too, “More probably thought the privilege of sanctuary in need of vast reform” (2012, 56).
Richard and Buckingham have already articulated.\textsuperscript{366} The Queen, however, does declare her view of the institution, which, while admitting the weaknesses Buckingham mentions, nevertheless starkly contrasts with his conclusions.

Buckingham raises many of the right questions about problems with institutions, but answers only some. Furthermore, the Queen's argument reveals that even those questions he does answer display inconsistent reasoning, perhaps because Buckingham aims more to obtain the prince than to actually consider the issue carefully. For example, while it is indeed necessary to seek to understand the purpose of an institution in order to improve it, the two purposes that Buckingham discovers, supposedly through reason, are neither consistent with each other, nor can they cover all the cases he himself mentions. The law is not necessarily a danger only to those who deserve punishment, and Buckingham acknowledges that it is good to help debtors beset by the “adverse violence of fortune” (370.1-2)—although only to protect their bodies, not their property (374.18-20)—as well as to protect persons when the throne is in dispute, since it is not certain in such a case who is a traitor and who is not (370.3-8).\textsuperscript{367} The Queen can point to her own experience for a time when an innocent child needed protection when the throne was in dispute (390.1-10), and someone who went bankrupt through misfortune has no need to repent, as Buckingham requires. While Buckingham argues that sanctuary was for the guilty, the Queen asserts that its true purpose is to help the innocent. She would like her relatives, whom she calls “undeserving” of punishment and her sons, who are “innocents” (384.5), both to be protected by sanctuary (382.30-1; 378.24-6). The Queen also notes

\textsuperscript{366} Karlin, 85.

\textsuperscript{367} Karlin notes that this situation is closest to the Queen’s own, but it “immediately disappears from Buckingham’s argument” (81).
that someone who “require[s] the benefit of sanctuary” might need it not in order to repent, but as protection “against the wicked,” and that innocence is not protection enough in itself (386.23-6; cf. 384.2-6, 13-4). She stresses that she “seek[s] the welfare of [her]self and [her] child” (382.14-5) and hopes that her relatives will not die because they did not take sanctuary. As it turns out, despite their “innocence,” they are later killed, “unconvicted, unheard, and indeed not even indicted ... with no other guilt than that they were either too closely related to the Queen or too faithful to the Prince” (430.26-432.3). Buckingham had claimed that in order “that undeserved [evil] might be avoided, there is no reason you would invoke a privilege peculiar to any particular place” (372.23-5). The execution of Woodville and Grey proves him wrong. It is not certain whether they would have lived if they had claimed the privilege of sanctuary, but their example shows that the need to avoid unjust evil, which Buckingham denied was real, actually exists. As the next section will examine at length, the law does not always protect innocent people, and therefore something more is required.

The Queen agrees with Buckingham that sanctuary protects some criminals, and thus does not always serve its purpose. She freely admits that “robbers are safe” there (382.21; cf. 386.22-3), but this fact does not prevent sanctuary from ever serving its purpose. While the institution protects the guilty, that does not stop it from protecting the innocent, too. The Queen's different conception of sanctuary's purpose is also the basis for her disagreement with Buckingham over who can claim sanctuary. The Duke says her son cannot claim it because he “has neither the age by which he could ask for it, nor the malice by which he could need it” (376.9-10), but if the aim is to protect an innocent
person, neither of those reasons applies. The Queen does not concede that her son is unable to claim sanctuary for himself (388.13), but more than that, she insists that she could claim it for him in two different ways. First, even if the boy were simply treated as property, he belongs to her, not to anyone else, and so she says, “[W]hoever would remove him, even willing, from me unwilling, I contend he clearly desecrates this holy sanctuary, unless we should think that where it would be a sacrilege to lead away a horse from me, there it is lawful [fas est] that my son be dragged off” (388.17-8). Second, if the boy is treated as a person, since “English laws entrust him to be guarded by his mother” then “even if my right is not able to guard him and he is not able to ask for his right, nevertheless when his guardianship belongs to me, who would not see I am able to ask for his right in his place?” (388.20-4). The Queen argues that the ultimate purpose of both the law and the privilege are the same: to protect the boy himself, “[u]nless perhaps the law intends only that guardianship of his goods be had with no care had for his body, for the sake of which alone the law takes care that the goods are safe for the ward” (388.24-7).

The Queen's explanation of the legal relationship between a person and his possessions leads to another important point of divergence between the speeches by the two dukes and her own legal position. Buckingham holds that it does not violate sanctuary to remove someone “for his own good and advantage” (376.15-6). The Queen never questions that principle, but she does show that determining what is for someone's own good is not as simple as Buckingham pretends. There is sometimes a difference between one’s goods and one’s good. Richard condemns the Queen for “begrudg[ing] to
... both [her sons] those sweet amusements of mutual companionship” (360.16-7) and
“the pleasure of play” (362.2), and for depriving her younger son in particular of “his
liberty, ... [and] the light and splendor of his most brilliant fortune” (360.18-9). The
Cardinal sums up this part of the dukes' argument by saying that “it would be the greatest
advantage especially” for the two brothers to live together (378.20). The Queen counters
that it would “be a matter of no small advantage to either [of them] if their mother should
protect and raise them both for some years still” (378.24-6), especially for the younger,
sick brother, since there is nobody who “has explored more thoroughly what his body
could bear and requires” than herself (380.9-11). She implies that if the dukes really
were concerned about the good of the brothers, they would pay more attention to health
than play, and to the presence of the parent instead of the sibling. Wealth and recreation
should be for the sake of the life and health of the body, not the other way around.

The Queen's opponents also base their argument on honor. Richard wants to
respect the honor of the nobles (362.12), the king (362.23), and the boy himself (364.9),
while Buckingham agrees that sanctuary is an “unbecoming [indecorum]” place for the
boy (366.27). The Cardinal repeats their concerns that keeping the boy in sanctuary will
result in “infamy” for the nobles and damage the reputation of both his brother and the
nation (378.8-11), and tells her that “it has been judged by the common opinion of all that
it is far more to the Duke's advantage to live with the King, free, in dignity and in
splendor, and for the good and advantage of both, than—to the harm of one, the disgrace
of the other, and certainly to the sorrow of both—to lead a miserable life with you in lairs
and in squalor” (380.21-5). The Queen in this case, too, holds that a good, honor, may
conflict with “the good and advantage” of the boy. Protecting the boy is “so necessary that it would easily merit forgiveness even if it should turn aside a little from honor” (382.10-1). The Queen then proceeds to justify her own action using the same principle that the dukes are claiming will justify theirs. They hold that it does not really violate sanctuary to act for someone's own good, following reason; she insists that “for nobody is it not honorable to leave the Duke especially there, where it is credible that the most accurate reasoning for his welfare will be had” (382.25-7).

Faced with the strength of the Queen's legal and prudential argument, the Cardinal realizes that he cannot win (390.26-7), and tells the Queen “he would not dispute the matter any longer” (392.3). In fact he has not really debated at all, since he never even tries to refute to any of the Queen's legal points. After the Cardinal quits, however, the Queen's reasoning in giving up her son—even though she has won the argument—points to the single greatest flaw in the institution of sanctuary, which Richard exploits to move his plan forward.

The Queen changes her mind, and decides to hand over her son despite everything she has said before (394.9) because she thinks that the institution of sanctuary is too weak to stop Richard, despite the fact that it stopped all previous tyrants. Richard has shown

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368 The Cardinal does not, however, concede. Why would he not admit that the Queen was right? Cousins believes that “his naive faith in Richard places him beyond persuasion by even her eloquence” (84). Another possibility is that the Cardinal himself considered the goal of getting the boy out a good one, and was not open to any other outcome. In any event, he acts either on reasons he cannot or does not wish to articulate, or from motivations aside from reason.

369 The Queen’s apparent change of mind has been one of the most debated aspects of Richard III. Virtually all commentators agree that she is not somehow suddenly convinced by the Cardinal's argument, and therefore wonder at the Queen’s decision. Some see it as simply inexplicable. Barbara Panza insists that “[t]he moment Queen Elizabeth relinquishes custody of her eleven-year-old son, Prince Richard, knowing that by doing so she condemns him to die, defies understanding” (90), partially because “[b]y handing over her son, she also jeopardized her daughters” (99). A.F. Kinney comes to the same conclusion: “The queen
combines the tradition and legality of sanctuary, the place of motherhood, and the logic of Richard having no need for the younger son—ideas and experience—to counter the Protector and the duke with such clarity, force, and wisdom that we are apt to put aside the reasoning of the opposition. ... What follows, then astonishes: In a counterargument with herself, a mini-disputation within the larger one, the queen surrenders both her argument and her son” (120). Hoffman similarly wonders, “Why do this, especially since she has already determined that Buckingham's attack on sanctuary is nothing more than a "goodly glose?" She spotlights the transparent weaknesses of his argument, weaknesses already alluded to by the councillors eager to avoid rumor, and yet it works on her” (107). E.S. Donno avoids an explanation by stating that there are “multiple, even contrary, possibilities” for her action and that it is “[o]n the basis of such conflicting motivations [that] the queen surrenders him” (424).

Most commentators, however, try to account for the Queen’s decision, and these fall into three main camps. In the first camp are those who stress her lack of choice. These hold that the Queen’s decision makes sense, because she couldn’t have done anything else. Alison Hanham says, “The queen finally surrenders him, not because legal argument overcomes her private fear (based on knowledge of Richard), but because she can see no other way out” (1975A, 176). Richard Marius agrees: “In the queen, More gives us a mother driven to desperation by events she cannot control, a powerless creature bent on protecting her own children from the wickedness she alone discerns in the Protector. ... In the end, when she realizes that her cause is hopeless and that she must give up her younger son, she utters a long monologue filled with resigned grief” (106). Some scholars go as far as to read in this debate a lesson in the inevitable capitulation of reason to force. Cousins, for example, says that “More portrays the queen as winning the dispute, in so far as she wins her argument with the cardinal, yet inevitably losing it because there has never been a possibility of her controlling its outcomes. [She is f]orced to confront that fact when the cardinal announces he will abandon discussion” (85). Yoran pushes this argument the farthest: “But as the child's fate was decided beforehand, the ensuing debate between the nobles and the queen clearly becomes superfluous. More underscores this by giving the queen the upper hand in the dialogue with the cardinal and, more explicitly, by inserting an internal monologue to show that, while the queen delivered up her son, she did so only because she was convinced that otherwise he would have [been] taken without her consent (40-1). Although the queen and the cardinal debate the issue for some time and put forward several reasonable arguments, no consideration is truly given to rational arguments and nobody is persuaded. The exchange was a simulation of a dialogue, a theatrical performance of a dialogue” (532). Taken to Yoran’s extreme, this interpretation sees More as hopeless about political reform. Arguments and reason are useless, and the victory of evil is inevitable. No amount of debate or deliberation about institutions can bring about good, since those in power act as they wish, regardless. Chapter Seven will consider this view at greater length, and show that More’s view is that the power of reason is limited, but not irrelevant.

In the second camp are scholars who stress the care with which the Queen made her choice, and how reasonable it was. Karlin thinks “[t]he queen had strong, prudential reasons to capitulate” (86), and Moran agrees: “Only when the frustrated Lord Cardinal prepares to leave and hints that, if she refuses to relinquish her son, then another likely will soon take the boy by force, does she accede, and she only does so after she “stode a good while in a great study” (40). ... But her decision is reasonable when weighed against what would likely follow if he were taken through violent means; here at least is the possibility that the Lord Cardinal will act on his promise to protect the prince” (151). J.P. Jones also thinks that “[t]he cardinal makes it clear that he intends to take the boy by force if she refuses to relinquish him” (57), and adds, “Knowing that her son may be safer if she surrenders him than if he is forced from her, she turns him over to the cardinal in a moving scene that reveals both her maternal emotions and her political acumen” (57). Jeffrey Lehman give a more tentative version of the same basic argument: “Given the way this passage is written, it is difficult to determine just how much weight the queen places on each of the items she considers. Nevertheless, it seems to me that she essentially gives in based upon the good faith of the cardinal and others in his company” (150).

The interpretation offered in this chapter agrees with those of the second camp that the Queen’s choice was indeed real, but simultaneously notes with those of the first camp that there was an element of inevitability. Hallet’s description is the best at bringing out both aspects: “Elizabeth is foiled because she is without power. If she submits, the Archbishop will personally guarantee the boy’s safety. But—and here
the Archbishop throws on the table the deciding card—if she denies their request he will leave her at the mercy of those who will give less surety for the well-being of her son. Elizabeth’s choice is either to give in willingly or submit to having her son taken from her at the command of the Lord Protector, who waits ready at hand in an outer room. Elizabeth, concludes More, ‘stood a good while in a great study’ (History, 46), pondered her choices, realized that she had been taken by surprise and was, therefore, unprepared to convey the boy away from Westminster to safety, and, facing the reality of the situation, she submitted to the inevitable (June 16, 1483), even while doing so revealing her wisdom” (191, cf. 214). In Hallet’s view, her wisdom consisted precisely in knowing what part was inevitable and what part was not. Her immediate choice was to give her son to the Cardinal or not. If she did not, she risked a violent confrontation with Richard’s henchmen.

The third camp consists of those who think the Queen had a choice, but made the wrong one. Much of the debate between the second and third camps concerns the Queen’s character, judgment, ability, and intentions. Readers must ask themselves what the History shows us. Are the claims of her goodness accurate? Is “More’s Elizabeth ... a person who sees through Richard in the way that More says wise folk invariably see through him” (Hallet, 190)? Is she someone “who magnificently defends the rights of the mother, the rule of law, and the sacred nature of the place to which she has fled” (Gordon 1985, 20)? Is this a “depiction of a wise and rhetorically powerful Elizabeth,” as Mudan claims (114)? Does “her sorrowful farewell to the boy tell a sad tale of a woman struggling to defend herself in a world of power and in the end baffled by it” (Hall, 86)? Hallet, especially, sees her as courageous, intelligent, sharply ironic, and inevitably witty” (190), and she demonstrates “her keen abilities to hold her own with wit and agility” (191). Allison Machlis Meyer thinks that “More depicts her as both the strongest impediment to Richard and the most wisely skeptical member of Edward IV’s former court” (158). Hallet also specifically excludes any Machiavellian machinations or selfish ends: “In More, Elizabeth was a strong-willed, intelligent, capable woman who used every means at her disposal to protect her child from abuse, with little regard for her own well-being and no political calculations for bettering her status. More’s Elizabeth is single-mindedly interested in her children’s safety, well aware of what would happen to the child if it came under Richard’s control” (192).

However, many others who read the same work disagree. Donno says that “the queen herself views the younger prince as a political pawn” (441). Fox says, “It is the queen’s own ambition that is responsible for her committing the fatal errors of judgment that ruin her party and deprive her children of life and the succession” (1983, 92). Wegemer holds a similar view: “Her self-interest alienated those who could have protected her sons; her imprudence left these children without the necessary protection; her lack of fortitude led her to give up the protection of sanctuary despite her better knowledge; and her lack of political sophistication left her powerless before lawless forces” (1996, 35). “Although the Queen knows that man’s laws, nature’s laws, and God’s laws are on her side (CW2 38-39), she never takes any steps to invoke those laws to protect her son, her relatives, or her friends” (1996, 213, n.8). Wegemer also specifically accuses the Queen of acting out of political calculation: “It is strange indeed that the queen never even thinks, You will take my sick child from me over my dead body. She never thinks about using her life to protect her son’s. Her extraordinary rhetorical powers seem to be used in a measured and politically calculating way. And her calculation does work in that her daughter will marry Henry VII” (2011A, 134, n.93). Andrea Frank similarly says that “her ungoverned tongue alienates her audience and her political desire prevents her from capably leading or understanding them. The cardinal silences the queen because her speech “waxed euer the lenger the farder of” and because her angry indignation makes her words “sore” and “biting” against Richard, then the Protector (CW 2, 40/8-9,10). ... [S]he is ineffective as a speaker, for she does not suit her arguments to her audience. The cardinal, as yet sympathetic to Richard, “neither beleued, and was also loth to here” her angry accusations, no matter how logical, and he therefore “woulde no lenger dispute the matter” (CW 2, 40/11,12). Despite having right on her side, she lacks the experience, wisdom, and self-control that would enable her to argue effectively. ... She argues truthfully and logically, but her words are acidic and accusatory. The cardinal seems sympathetic until this point and would have to respect a formal legal appeal should she make it, but she alienates him through her lack of diplomacy and therefore gives up her son despite accurately having perceived his danger” (231-232). These scholars think that the Queen had other choices: for example, to challenge Richard in court, or to physically fight him. They
himself to be different. The Narrator records her thoughts at the time she makes her new decision: “Since the Cardinal appeared to her more ready for leaving than some from his escort, and since the Protector himself was present in the palace with a band of henchmen, it began to enter her mind that her son could not be kept openly in sanctuary, and that there was truly no hope of concealing him, ... [since she] was thinking about nothing less than force being brought into the sanctuary; which, she considered, was even now blockaded, nor was there any way out for the boy except to be given into a trap” (392.9-18). Her fears are certainly justified. Richard has indeed put men in boats “blockading the sanctuary” (354.15-6), and the Narrator points out that some of the Cardinal's escort might have been under orders to take her son no matter what she said (376.27-378.2). The Cardinal himself has told her they might “come to tear him away from here even with you unwilling” (386.3-5). From this evidence and her knowledge of Richard's character, the Queen judges that the greatest source of strength for sanctuary will be ineffective against him. The power of the institution against tyranny comes from the “religious fear” of kings (372.17). While this power has always been enough to deter kings in the past, it does not seem to be enough now. One reason for this is that Richard is not like past kings. He is extraordinary in many ways, mostly evil ones. As Buckingham has already noted, “if there was someone with such inhuman savagery that he would zealously strive to harm an innocent boy, with such an impious and profaned mind that neither the fear of those above nor shame before men could restrain him from a disgraceful crime, the name of ’sanctuary’ would be trivial and empty for him” (368.10-
4); and Richard is such a man. He does not care about either human or divine moral standards. He rejects human standards of decency because his “contempt for others [fastus]” is “uncontrollable, unlimited, and inhuman” (324.13-4), and the only time he invokes a divinity is when he promises to kill someone (412.7-10).

Richard may have no shame, but he does nevertheless care about appearances. As Chapter Four noted, Richard tries to seem humane even though he is the complete opposite (344.15-9; 406.26-8). This aspect of Richard's character might lead someone to criticize the Queen's decision. One could argue that the Queen's judgment is mistaken, and that by persisting in her unquestionably justified legal claim she could force Richard to back down rather than to publicly violate sanctuary in order to get her younger son, and thus that the institution could be strong enough to withstand his assault when backed by public opinion. If the Queen knows Richard as well as the Narrator does, however, she knows that Richard is “skilled in dissimulation [versipellis]” (322.24). Like a werewolf, he is a wolf (358.25) who can appear to be a man: “He would put on and wear and zealously guard whatever persona you please—cheerful, severe, grave, lax—just as his own advantage persuaded him to take up or put down” (324.10-3). Richard has already made the Queen appear to be the one working against her son's welfare by questioning her motives. In order to gain public support, the Queen would have to obtain some kind of public hearing to counter his argument with her own. Richard's actions both before and after the sanctuary debate show that the Queen probably was right to think she would never get that chance. The Queen is well aware that Richard did not

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370 See the summary of the opinions of the third camp in note 369 above.
371 The adjective versipellis means “werewolf” when used as a substantive.
hesitate to imprison her relatives on a pretext, despite their innocence (382.28-384.6). Although she does not mention it to the Cardinal, she is also probably aware of how he successfully manipulated public opinion on that occasion, since the story was told “everywhere” (358.14): He and Buckingham showed some weapons to the people and announce that the prisoners had attempted to “slaughter the Dukes and all the nobles through a treacherous plot” (358.7) and despite the implausibility of this “fiction” (358.7-8), “it satisfied simple and rough people, so that from the sight of the arms it was just as if treason was certain and proven, and everywhere they proclaimed health for the Dukes and hanging for the captives” (358.11-4). There is no widespread demand for due process among the public, and therefore she has no reason to expect public support for her own legal claims. The Cardinal acknowledges that her relatives’ “causa [case, legal proceeding, or trial]” has not yet been either “examined [excussa]” or “judicially investigated [cognita]” (384.9-10). The Queen has no reason to believe it ever will be. Even the other nobles on the council at first “were reproaching that deed of the Dukes and interpreting it hatefully, as if private grudges were being used as a pretext for a treacherous plot which had been constructed against the Prince” (356.1-3). They only cease objecting when Hastings promises that they themselves “will judge that legal action by their arbitration or they will settle it,” and offers his own apparent concern for due process, when he admonishes them not to “decide with the suit unexamined [incognita]” (356.7-11). The Queen, however, knows that she cannot trust Hastings, as she tells the Archbishop when he tries to comfort her by invoking him (354.3-5), and since his word is
the only justification anyone ever gives for the denial of due process to her relatives, she reasonably seeks another option.

The Queen's assessment of her son's minimal chances for legal protection is vindicated by Richard's subsequent actions as well. Richard gives Hastings no opportunity to counter the accusations against him (412.5-19), and is content to justify his execution after the fact through an invented story about an assassination attempt given greater weight by appropriate use of rusty suits of armor as props (420.10-21). In the same way, Radcliff orders that Woodville and Grey be “forbidden to respond [to the charge of treason offered as a reason for their execution], lest with their innocence known it would enkindle malevolence for the Protector” (430.25-6). The Queen thus reasonably expects that if she tried to resist, not only would her son be taken, but she herself might immediately be killed and some cover story provided. Her well-known enmity towards her husband's family would make it plausible to charge her with plotting to overthrow the Protector. Therefore, the Queen does the best she can to protect her son under the circumstances.

There is also one more possible reason that “she supposed it preferable that she surrender him willingly, rather than she appear to do so unwillingly” (392.26-7). Appearances are important when sanctuary depends on belief and tradition for its strength. Since the Queen suspects that a tyrant who is willing to ignore sanctuary and his ally, the Duke, who is willing to sweep away traditional respect for institutions, will act on their wishes no matter what she does, she brings truth to the Cardinal's sarcasm and, “in accordance with [her] eminent prudence” (382.1), acts in a way that publicly
preserves as much respect for sanctuary as possible. By sending her son out voluntarily, sanctuary is not in fact violated. She has shown throughout her debate with the Cardinal that she understands as well as anyone how useful sanctuary is to society in those circumstances where a more pious or even merely a more timid man rules. She believes that sanctuary cannot help her son, but it may yet be able to help others, as it helped her in the past (390.4-9). In her speech after she has made her decision, she carefully and specifically states that she does not agree that any reasons whatsoever justify forcefully removing someone from sanctuary, and she does so with words that both emphasize that she is not being forced and which do their best to maintain the traditional religious awe which has been called into question by the Duke: “I do not doubt that I could protect him by the holy reverence of this place if I had not determined to entrust him to you” (394.10-1). She stresses that she, not anyone else, made the determination, and that she has, not doubt, but faith in the holy tradition of sanctuary.

The Queen therefore represents the fourth way of looking at institutions: prudent respect for tradition. Like the bishops, she does not want to see sanctuary violated. Unlike them, however, she can see the reasons to preserve tradition and thus remains unconvinced by Buckingham's speech. The Queen is willing to engage in reasonable debate, but unwilling to let flaws in the institution of sanctuary undermine all the good it could still accomplish. She believes that protecting innocent people is an important social benefit. Thomas More evidently shares the Queen's concern. He is obviously aware of the shortcomings of sanctuary, the power of rational argument to point them out, and the good that critical reasoning can do by looking past what an institution is to why it
exists. After all, he constructs the Duke's speech. More also seems aware, however, of the danger that comes from destroying an imperfect institution and an irrational but effective view of the divine without replacing them with something better. To win the victory against tyranny, the boldness of rational criticism must be accompanied by prudence in one's tactics (cf. 316.22-3). Therefore, the only systematic and overt criticism of an institution in *Richard III* is this one, by an evil character, an ally of the tyrant, regarding sanctuary, an institution which had already been substantially weakened by Richard, and thus would not be harmed much more by further criticism. The benefit of the sanctuary scene to the reader lies both in its usefulness as a paradigm of institutional criticism and in its warning of the dangers of imprudent rational critique and of overconfidence in one's own reasoning. The *History* contains critiques of other social institutions and offices, but all of them are more veiled. Thomas More does not shy away from difficult questions in *Richard III*, but neither does he ask them in a way that might harm society more than help it.

The next section will consider some of these questions as they touch on legal forms and practices, including how they failed, but also how they often function as intended, and their usefulness as models.

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372 It is also important to note that *Richard III* was not published by More, and perhaps his concern not to publicly criticize institutions that were still functioning, however imperfectly, contributed to his decision. If More was considering publishing *Richard III* eventually, the shorter ending of Group Three has another justification, since it maintains Buckingham as an evil character throughout the work, except for the brief hint at 400.8-10. More's simultaneous choice to move into Latin might have been partially motivated by similar concerns. The Latin language would help ensure a more educated audience that could better understand the full lesson: Reason can show a great many problems with existing institutions, but prudence should guide any attempt at reform.
Section II: Strengths & Weaknesses of British Law

Law is an important part of any political order, and it receives a large amount of attention in *Richard III.*[^373] There are several scenes which show the law at work in a formal setting and many explanations of the structure and workings of the English legal system. The reader is shown enough to conclude that English law is good in many ways, but also has some major weaknesses. Some of these weaknesses enable (or at least insufficiently hinder) Richard's progress in his plan to become king and in his tyrannical acts along the way. The descriptions of how England's legal system often succeeds, however, contain statements of legal principles which suggest how English law could be improved and thus how the nation's susceptibility to tyranny could be lessened by wider application of those very principles.[^374]

As the discussion of sanctuary above showed, one great danger of rational criticism is that it could destroy an institution's credibility without revealing anything that would be any better. Since by pointing out such serious failures in the English legal system, *Richard III* could be taken as a critique of the authority of law in general, it is important to recognize that these implicit criticisms of the laws of the author's native

[^373]: Wegemer has noted “the many references to law throughout the *History* ... the references to due process ..., the importance of lawyers ..., and the central role of law” in this work (1996, 213, n.8).
[^374]: Wegemer argues that because “laws ... have arisen from the collective wisdom of tradition, statesmen would not be concerned with achieving the theoretically 'best' form of government. Instead, they care 'as best they can' for whatever form their people have developed” (1996, 68) and that “the best must always be considered in light of the existing traditions and customs of a country” (1996, 69). This section and the next will show that Wegemer’s insight is correct insofar as *Richard III* holds up existing principles within English law, rather than those derived from foreign laws or institutions, for example, as building blocks to a better government. However, Section III will show that the *History* highlights the superiority of an elective and limited executive over absolute hereditary kingship, and thus strongly suggests that statesmen need not limit their reforming efforts to “whatever form their people have developed.” Rather, a statesman can see that sometimes “the existing traditions and customs of a country” can show that a particular people would benefit from changing to a different form of government.
country are invariably offered in conjunction with appeals to another, higher law. All the
major characters refer to an objective moral standard, and these repeated references help
the reader realize that if English law fails sometimes, it does not mean there is no way to
know what is right; it merely means that the law should be reformed in accord with that
standard.375 This standard is fas, used only nine times in the work, but nevertheless an
important word, and one which can be best understood in relation to other similar terms.

One of the advantages of the Group Three texts is that Latin has a great variety
of words with which to describe law and its principles. Discussing this work here in
English, however, presents linguistic difficulties. Three different Latin words, ius, lex,
and fas, could all be translated into English with the same word, “law,” while both rite
and legitimus mean “lawful,” and both ius and fas are sometimes best translated as
“right.” The most important difference between fas and all the rest of these words is that
fas is an objective term for an abstract concept, while ius can, and lex always does, refer
to specific laws of a particular nation. In the History, one reads about both “English laws
[Angliae iura]” (388.20) and “British laws [Britanicarum legum]” (404.5), but fas is
always universal, never confined to England or any other nation.

The range of Daniel Kinney's translations illustrates both the difficulty of
rendering this term in English and show that it is a moral term of general applicability.
Thus, fas indicates that something “is legal” (372.27), “is permissible” (388.18), or “is

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375 As Wegemer puts it, “[More] believed in a created order which human beings could come to know and
which included an objective law of nature written in the human heart, one that anyone can know by reason”
(1996, 73). Richard III is one of More’s works which supports this statement.
allowed” (390.14) simply, without reference to any particular law code or society. Fas is a dictate to do the right thing. Characters in Richard III refer to this standard regardless of factional allegiance or personal intent. Edward uses the word (334.13), as does Richard (480.8) and those allied with him, such as Buckingham (372.27) and Dr. Shaw (450.19), as well as their opponent the Queen (388.18, 390.14), and also the Narrator (320.12, 324.1, 412.13). The debate about law in this work, then, is not whether there is a standard, but what that standard requires and how England's laws could best reflect that standard. Some of the events in Richard III show that the laws of one's own nation are not always good, but there is a standard by which to judge actions and make decisions which someone can reference when reforming laws. Some of the same questions that Buckingham asks about sanctuary are also asked about English law, but always in the context of fas.

Section I noted that the Queen agrees with her opponents that the purpose of law is to protect persons, which includes protecting their property, but especially protecting their lives (388.24-7). This principle justifies the Queen in protecting her son's body as well as his goods, even though the law in question apparently lacks an explicit sanctuary provision, and it also justifies other reasonable inferences regarding other laws.

376 Daniel Kinney's translations sometimes connect fas with religion, but the text itself does not do so. In classical writings, fas without any modifying adjective often refers to divine law. However, as Chapter Three has shown, references to God are systematically removed from Group Three, while the phrase "naturae fas" (law of nature), appears twice there (324.1, 334.13), and fas is closely associated with nature once more (372.26-7). There is no such parallel phrase divina fas, or anything similar. Richard's careful fulfillment of his oath in accord with fas is (with irony) called “pious” (412.13-4), suggesting that in this case the reference might be to divine law, but it is taking too much liberty with the text to translate contra tius ac fas in one place as “in defiance of man's law and God's” (320.12) and in another as “unlawful and impious” (450.19). It is not clear from either context whether the crime violates the law of God or the law of nature or both. Certainly, however, whenever fas is used, it is an appeal to an objective standard higher than positive law.

377 Fas is related to the Latin word for speak (for, fari, fatus sum).
Reasoning about why a law has certain provisions can make it clear that it ought to have other, similar ones. If one reads Richard III with this principle in mind, one can notice flaws in other laws besides that of inheritance, while also seeing that English law in fact has some extremely beneficial aspects that sadly are not as widely applied as they should be.

Sanctuary is itself an institutional recognition that human law is imperfect. As Section I showed, even Buckingham admits that at least some few persons who break a law are not actually guilty of any wrongdoing, and the Queen argues that there may in fact be many more. The right of sanctuary technically arises not from a law, but from a privilege, which literally means from a private law [a privato lege], one made for the benefit of an individual in special or uncommon circumstances. As Buckingham points out, sanctuary is a privilege because the institution specifically allows a person to escape the punishment which a general law commands: “when the danger is from the law [lege] itself, then truly protection is to be sought from a privilege [privilegio]” (372.28-374.1). What laws pose a danger, however, and what can be done about it?

In Richard III, three categories of British laws are examined: criminal law, civil law, and constitutional law. Criminal law seems to be the most immediately dangerous. The previous chapter detailed several prominent examples in Richard III of men and women who suffer unjust criminal punishments, including death. It appears, however, that the real source of danger for those victims was the ruler, rather than the

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378 The “privilege” of sanctuary is the most common way of referring to the boy's right to safety (372.20, 374.1, 374.20, 386.4, 386.22, 388.28).
379 Here, “constitutional” is used in the Aristotelian sense, not the American sense. Britain had, and in fact still has, no written constitution like that of the United States, but every regime has a structure and order of offices.
law. Burdet, for example, “was cruelly slaughtered by the abuse of laws [legum]” (458.6), and the judges “murdered an innocent man ... by their perverse turning of laws [legum]” (458.10-11). In both cases, the law itself was right, but was misused. It was not the law, but the king and those working for him that posed a danger. Similarly, as Chapter Four showed, all the tyrannical actions of Richard were at least apart from the law, and often against it. Richard advocates violating the privilege of sanctuary (364.7), tries to press false charges of witchcraft against Mistress Shore (424.5-6), and executes Hastings based on fraudulent evidence contrived beforehand (422.17-20). In fact, far from being generally dangerous in itself, England's criminal law includes certain protections meant to lessen the likelihood of abuse, and which also make tyrannical abuse easier to spot. Chapter Four and Section I above both also briefly mentioned how Richard violates England's due process requirements. Part of what makes the execution of the Queen's relatives so outrageous is that they are denied a chance “to respond [respondere]” and die “unconvicted [indemnatos], unheard, and not even indicted [accusatos]” (430.25-432.1), while English law requires formal indictment, allows criminal defendants to give testimony in their own defense, and postpones any punishment until after legal conviction in a court. Furthermore, conviction requires evidence, and if that evidence is testimony, it must be given under oath. Each of these elements is given careful attention in Richard III through the presentation of several formal legal proceedings and careful use of technical juridical terminology.380

380 For example, according to Lewis & Short's Latin Dictionary, accuso means “to call one to account publicly (ad causam publicam, or publice dicendam provocare), to accuse, to inform against, arraign, indict,” condemn means “to sentence, condemn, convict,” and respondeo means “to appear before a tribunal, to answer an accusation, meet a charge.”
Filing formal charges against someone is the first part of an English criminal prosecution. Chapter Four noted that before George was executed he was formally “charged [obiecta est]” (322.12), and because of the notoriety of Shore's wife, Richard is forced to follow the law and bring a formal “charge [crimen at 424.6 & obiectum at 424.7]” against her as well, in order to justify confiscating her wealth. In the account of how Lord Rivers tried to take the captaincy of Calais from Hastings, the latter “was then arraigned as a defendant [reus ... factus] before Edward, having been indicted [accusante] by Rivers” (418.3-4) and he feared the “guile of the accuser [accusatoris]” (418.9).381 The protection that public charges provide is illustrated by both Mistress Shore's case and Hastings's dispute with Rivers. In the former, Richard was forced to drop the much more serious witchcraft charge for lack of evidence (424.3-4). Judging from what happened to Richard's other enemies, her public indictment probably saved her life. In the latter, it “shortly afterwards became clear” that it “was a purely malicious prosecution [calumnia],” and Hastings did not lose his post (418.6-7). Public accusations can be answered with reasonable explanations, and unreasonable charges are not usually publicly defensible. Indictment can protect innocent people, but only, of course, if it is actually used.

These cases, along with others, also illustrate the second protection of English due process: the right of the defendant to respond to the accusation and refute the charges. In Shore's case, “at length the charge was brought down to one which she could not deny” (424.5-6), because she could deny all the others. They had “no evidence [signum] against

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381 All the italicized words in this and the following two paragraphs have specialized juridical definitions which refer to a public action and formal legal measures. Richard III frequently employs legal and juridical technical terms when it describes both English due process and when it discusses civil law.
her that could stick” (424.4). Someone accused of a specific charge can deny that accusation and present evidence of his own, if he is given the chance. The right to respond can be a powerful and effective protection for the innocent.

This right is particularly effective when combined with the requirement for evidence and for oaths. When Edward's mother accuses him of being married already, to Elizabeth Lucy, the oath is effective: The wedding “was delayed until, with the case examined [in court; cognita re], the falsity of that rumor would be proven. Lucy was summoned [before the court; accersita], and although she was suborned [subornata] and propped up by secret counsels, and offered the hope that she would be the King's wife if only she would assert that she was given a promise of marriage, nevertheless, at once when she had sworn [adiurata est] she was going to speak the truth, she confessed that the King had been bound by no promise of marriage” (446.17-21).

As with other aspects of legal process, however, oaths fail to protect innocent men from Richard. When Richard and Buckingham “began to set in motion a quarrel [or “move a process-at-law;” movere litem] against Richard Grey, [Edward V's] maternal half-brother, falsely charging [or “bringing a false action-at-law against;” calumniantes] him with conspiracy (348.4-5), the young king is “easily able to vouch for their innocence” by his testimony, which is confirmed by an oath (348.19), but they seize Grey anyway. In the same way, just before executing Hastings, Richard swears an oath (412.7-10), and the Narrator notes that the punishment is hastened since, “It was not lawful [fás] for [Richard] to recline at table until [Hastings] had fallen in death, so that the pious man would not perjure himself [peieraret], of course” (412.13-4). Richard does not have to
perjure himself, because he only swore that he would not eat until Hastings was dead. Neither Richard nor anybody else ever gives testimony under oath that Hastings is guilty of treason or any other crime.

The requirement for legal conviction is similarly a key part of English due process. In George's case, “punishment” comes only after “the full senate sentenced [or adjudicated; adiudicavit]” him (322.13-4). Likewise Hastings, on behalf of Richard, mollifies the Council by telling them that the Queen's relatives will get the same treatment. They have been accused of treason: “Truly or not, it will be your judgment [iudicum],” he said, “for which these Dukes are preserving those men [(Woodville, Grey, etc.)] to be examined by you; they complain that, though they deserved nothing, nevertheless they were injured by those men. Yet, either you will judge [iudicabitis] that legal action [litem] by your arbitration [arbitratu] or you will settle it” (356.7-10). Even when the law “was abused” and “perverted” in Burdet's case, there was a trial and a decision by a panel of judges before he was executed, which gave Chief Justice Markham his opportunity to publicly oppose injustice (458.3-11). Formal judgment by a legally established body prior to administering punishment is thus a third beneficial aspect of British law, but once again it is sometimes ignored by the ruler. All of these episodes show that England's criminal law is not really the danger. By mandating certain formal procedures, the law protects the innocent by establishing a place for reason, argument, evidence, and truth. The danger comes from rulers who disregard the law.

If there is a failure of the criminal law, it is simply that by its nature it cannot enforce itself. The law can tell someone what to do, but not make him do it.
Furthermore, mere knowledge of the law is insufficient in itself. Principles must be put into practice by able and willing officials. Edward and Richard both disregarded due process in some cases, but since neither of them are lawyers, perhaps one could argue that education could prevent misuse of law. The example of Catesby, however, shows that education is not enough. Despite “his eminent expertise in British laws” (404.5), he still was willing to advance tyranny through treachery (404.9-16) for personal gain (406.10-3). In addition, the Narrator explains that Richard himself was aware of the law's command, but ignored it. Instead, “he decided, against positive law [ius] and natural law [fas], to take the life of his own nephews, (who were orphans and entrusted to him) and to transfer their kingdom to himself” (320.12-3), and he “contriv[ed] many things against the law of nature [naturae fas]” (324.1). Natural law and British laws both forbid evil and protect the innocent, and thus both are correct in themselves, but neither can stop evil by themselves. Being innocent is not “in itself ... a protection against the wicked ” (386.25-6), and willful disregard of the law cannot always be cured by simply making the law known. A nation's criminal law cannot stop the greatest criminal, the tyrant, as long as the tyrant can gain control of the powers of law enforcement.

Turning now to a consideration of Britain's civil law, several depictions of its operation in Richard III show that it is similar in some ways to its criminal law. Civil law also is based on good principles that help ensure justice, and also is sometimes ignored by rulers. Most importantly, though, there are some suggestions that the principles of civil law can and should be applied to Britain's constitution, with the result
being an improvement, not only in constitutional law, but in civil and criminal law as well, along with other substantial benefits for the republic.

One of the good aspects of civil law has been discussed already. Recall that the Queen draws the principle of avoiding conflicts of interest from the law of inheritance, part of the civil law. When she brings it up, she applies this principle to the office of the Protector, an aspect of constitutional law, arguing that inheriting a whole country is similar to inheriting property, and therefore should be accompanied by similar precautions (390.11-8). If the office of Protector could only legally be held by someone who had no personal interest in killing his wards, the good of her sons would be better served. This lesson can be generalized: Laws which restrict offices to those without conflicts of interest can prevent the opportunity for injustice from ever occurring in the first place. Lives can be saved.

The civil law also can prevent violence from following from personal interests even after conflicts arise, and without removing those interests, by preventing those conflicts from descending into violence. The Narrator consistently contrasts law with force and violence, and associates it instead with reason and persuasion. This is perhaps best exemplified by the encounter between Woodville and the Dukes after the former wakes up a prisoner in Northampton. This meeting is a parody of a courtroom scene. Since Woodville was conscious of no guilt of his own ... he determined to approach the Dukes and to question the reasons for their endeavors of this kind with trust in his own conscience. When they first had him in sight, they began immediately and of their own accord to complain [queri; to make a complaint before a court] and to charge [accusare; to accuse, arraign, indict] that he had sown discord among the
nobles and that he was striving to alienate the King's mind from them and trying to destroy them through a treacherous plot, which, having been discovered, they would deservedly throw back against its author. As he was marveling at this oration and attempting to exonerate [purgare; to clear from accusation] himself, since they were deficient in reason and cause, they turned to force [vim]. They apprehended him and left him imprisoned in a cave, employing guards. (346.14-23)

The Latin words given in brackets in this passage are all double-entendres, in that they sometimes are used in normal speech, but commonly are used as juridical technical terms with the meanings given. A civil proceeding requires the litigants to persuade a judge or jury that they are right. If these words were allowed their technical definitions, and Woodville were given the opportunity to speak at a trial, the complaint or indictment would be dismissed, since “they were deficient in reason and cause.”

Chapter Four showed that private interests cannot always be eliminated, but nevertheless “private controversies” do not have to turn into “public sedition and internal war” (356.10-2). There is a choice between settling land disputes “by violence or by legal right” (410.26), and this aspect of civil law is again a possible model for constitutional law. Heretofore in England, whenever “the title of the kingship comes into question (which has not happened only once), ... [that question] concerning the right is decided by arms” (370.3-5); but violence is not the only option. As the example of the first stage of the dispute between Richard, Duke of York and Henry VI shows, it is possible to settle not only private conflicts over land, but even constitutional questions like who should rule, “not hostilely with arms, but in a civil manner with laws in the senate” (320.19-20). Indeed, “by a resolution of Parliament—whose power among the English is supreme and absolute—[Richard, Duke of York] was designated the successor
to King Henry, while [Henry's] offspring (although an eminent prince) was rejected”
(320.20-24). This Parliamentary decree embodies an extremely important principle: even
the highest office in England is under the law. Bloodshed is not required in order to
choose a king when the succession is in doubt. England's civil law can serve as a model
for its constitutional law, and in fact already has to some extent.

Another land dispute shows yet a third way that the civil law works for justice.
When Elizabeth Grey first approaches her future husband, King Edward, it is to gain back
some lands which had been confiscated because her first husband fought on the side of
Henry VI (436.20-2). She points to a provision in the law which allows her independent
ownership, and makes a determination which can again be easily generalized so as to
apply to constitutional questions: “nothing which was already made her own could fall
into forfeiture from any crime of her husband” (438.2-3). One principle drawn from her
statement is that family members are not responsible for each other's crimes, and the
punishment of one should not extend to all. The factional conflict depicted in Richard III
is largely based on reciprocal hatred between families, and one way to lessen this kind of
conflict is by making family members independent in their private interests. Drawing
once again on the analogy the Queen makes between power and property, offices should
be held by persons, not by families. If there is misuse of an office, the man who holds it
should be punished, but not his family. There are many implications which result from
applying these principles to all aspects of constitutional law, but they will await
discussion in the next section. For now, it is enough to note that these principles have not
been consistently followed.
Civil law, like criminal law, sometimes fails to stop injustice. For example, Middleton would have been willing to turn assassin simply because he was unwilling to give up his land holdings, whether the Earl of Derby evicted him “by violence or by legal right” (410.26). This shows that a civil verdict is not always accepted on its own authority. Some of those who lose a civil case would ignore the decision against them if they could. Like criminal law, civil law requires enforcement. Civil law is also similar to criminal law in that it is susceptible to manipulation by the ruler. As Wegemer argues, “Even the best of laws can easily be abused.” Edward is very open to selling a favorable civil judgment to Elizabeth Grey for sexual favors (438.13-8), and he refused to grant the county of Hereford to the Duke of Buckingham, even when the latter “laid a legal claim to it [vendicabat] as his inheritance” (400.5-7). As with criminal law, rulers who enforce the law are crucial to the realization of the just principles found in civil law.

Wegemer 1996, 36.
Louis Karlin gives a similar argument (77, 87). Chapter Six will deal with some ways the characters of individuals can contribute to, or hinder, the rise of tyranny, but the purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate that Richard III also shows that institutional factors are important. Wegemer asks a key question: “[C]an laws and their attending institutions be a substitute for the personal virtue of the one executing the laws?” (1996, 69). The next section will argue that the answer is “Yes,” at least to some extent. Institutional reform can increase the likelihood that the laws will be enforced. Wegemer himself seems to admit this, despite his consistent emphasis on personal virtue: “In drawing out the implications of a statesmanship based on freedom, law, and conscience, More presented a consistent defense of institutional arrangements now taken as basic to all democratic government: rule of law, division of power, separation of church and state, elected representation, and protected forms of free and public deliberation” (1996, 211). Elsewhere, Wegemer also notes the importance More places on institutions in Richard III in particular: “When More calls London's Guildhall and England's Westminster Hall each a "forum," when he calls London's assemblymen and England's parliament each a "senate", and when he shows the English people's respect for law, he points to institutions necessary for peaceful and prosperous self-government, institutions that existed in England and especially in London for over 300 years” (2011B, 67). Wegemer says furthermore that “[t]he solutions artfully alluded to in Richard III for England’s strife-ridden government” include
However, what has resulted instead is a string of bad rulers. None of the kings mentioned in the History actually enforces the laws well. The ineffective king Henry VI precedes the unjust Edward IV, who is followed briefly by his powerless son Edward V, and finally by the tyrant Richard. These failures of kings lead to the failures of civil and criminal law. The next section of this chapter will therefore examine a very important critique found in Richard III: that of the kingship. Several characters reveal a great many weaknesses in the kingship, including many that are tied to hereditary succession, showing how the design of that institution has contributed to many of the evils England has recently experienced, including the rise of Richard. As Wegemer has noted, “Richard III ... shows in brilliant relief the major weaknesses of a primitive form of hereditary government doomed to self-destruction.” Unlike Buckingham's critique of sanctuary, however, the discussions of kingship go beyond merely pointing out all its problems. They also suggest positive changes in its design which will increase the likelihood that future kings will rule with less bloodshed and more justice, when due process will be more respected in actions of criminal law, and private feuds will be more likely to be resolved by civil law without violence.

“stronger laws and more effective institutions and customs” (2011A, 183).

384 Wegemer 2007, 48. Linking the discussion of sanctuary with that of kingship in an intriguing way, Wegemer also asks “What is the ‘law itself’ that is the source of the danger of Richard III? Is it the law of hereditary monarchy, that form of government that Aristotle and Erasmus both identified as ‘primitive,’ an institution that necessarily evolves out of existence because of the demands of human nature and political development?” (2011A, 182-183).
Section III: Reforming Hereditary Kingship

The final three speeches in the *History* provide an excellent explanation of the institution of kingship in the England described. In reading these speeches, it is important to keep in mind the circumstances in which they are delivered. The first of these is Buckingham's address to the citizens of London (454.22-472.25), which attempts to win their approval for Richard's coronation (472.1-4). The penultimate oration (476.21-480.23) is Richard's acceptance speech, given to “the nobles and citizens” (474.3). The last speech is part of Richard’s larger, carefully choreographed public relations endeavor (482.25-484.21). In all three cases, the speaker's words are likely true, even if his heart is not, because these are all public speeches given for the express purpose of gaining widespread approval. Because these speeches are public, and thus not addressed merely to one faction or another, they must be couched in terms of the common good, which the whole public could support. Even if both Buckingham and Richard intend to act for their own private advantage, they intentionally choose their words in a way they hope will win as universal an agreement as possible. Buckingham asks the people of London to join in the larger “consensus” (466.15) that he claims exists already among “the nobles and the people (in good part)” (466.9) and does all he can to construe their response as this “consensus” (472.24). In the second speech, Richard is also thinking about the people's “consensus” as he speaks (480.12), and even keeps in mind how his words will appear to “foreign nations” (476.26). In his last speech, Richard targets “the nobles, the merchants, the artisans, and in sum every kind of man” (484.5-6). Because of their broad public audience and their aim, which is to gain acceptance of the
king whose views on kingship are ostensibly described, these speeches explain the purpose of kingship and the duties of the king as if from someone aiming for the public advantage, and thus are an appropriate guide to what a good kingship would look like. As has been shown regarding other topics, the views of Richard and Buckingham about the purpose of kingship and related questions, such as what the good king does, what qualifications he should have, how he should rule, and how he should be chosen, are shared by other characters, including Edward and the Narrator. In fact, there is indeed a consensus such as Richard and Buckingham seek, and it extends beyond the crowds they address to include all the characters who comment on the topic. This consensus, however, is not that Richard would rule best, but rather what the best ruler would be like. As various aspects of kingship are considered in these three speeches, a gap emerges between the means and the end. When a reader recalls the earlier parts of *Richard III*, he sees that the good king everyone claims to want is extremely unlikely to arise under the present design of the kingship.

The first important aspect of kingship which these speeches note is the accompanying weight of responsibility. The office is repeatedly characterized as a heavy load. Buckingham speaks of the “burden of administering the kingdom” (466.16-7), predicts that Richard will “assume such a burden upon himself reluctantly” (468.3-4), and begs Richard to “subject his shoulders to a country fallen on him alone” (476.9-10), to “suffer that worshipful head to be burdened with a diadem” (476.13), and to weather the “storms of dominion” (476.14). Richard continues in the same vein, proclaiming that the kingship “always brings more gall than honey to him who intended to rule in such a
manner that it ought not to be permitted for him to rule who did not want to rule in that manner” (478.4-6). Richard's remark is particularly interesting, since it indicates that not just anyone should be king, and that there is a clear difference between good and bad rule. The duties of the kingship are important enough that some people “ought not to be permitted” to rule. Certain skills and characteristics are evidently required. Edward earlier notes two important parts of a king's duty at the same time that he agrees with Buckingham and Richard that doing that duty is hard. He remarks to his mother, “Indeed, I would not even want new titles in a distant domain to come to me in my wife's name, since now so much land and sea of that kind is owed to me already that it would indisputably be enough and more than enough for any one man to defend and to guard faithfully” (444.4-7). Active defense and careful watchfulness are both difficult, and require certain virtues to do well.385

In one of his predictions of Richard's reluctance, Buckingham mentions some of the virtues needed for the kingship, along with the first major class of persons who should not be allowed to rule:

But without doubt he will not willingly accept this [burden]. Since he is adept on account of his wisdom, he would easily weigh how much more care than advantage dominion carries with it, particularly for one who has thus resolved to govern in the way I know well enough he is going to govern, if he takes it. I proclaim to you that that duty is not child's-play, and certainly that very thing is what that wise man perceived who said, 'Woe to that kingdom whose king is a child.' And thus there is more reason both for rejoicing in your fortune and for giving thanks to those above, by whose kindness it has been provided that he whom they have

385 Perhaps these two aspects of a king's duty in fact each require different qualifications. Buckingham praises Richard by noting that “not only the warlike virtues, but all appropriate arts for governing a dominion besides coincided by divine providence in this one man” (466.10-12). This might indicate that the king needs two kinds of virtues, one set for war and another for peace.
destined for this kingship not only is of mature age, but indeed even has joined admirable prudence with experience of affairs and the highest glory at home and abroad, acquired by his virtue. (466.18-468.2)

Since the kingship requires prudence and experience, children, who lack both, rule poorly.

By this point in the work, the reader has seen that one major weakness of England's kingship is that it has no way to prevent children from coming to the throne, and that young kings expose the republic to many dangers. The Narrator states that Edward V, the child king given particular attention in this history, is among the very best of children, but that is not enough. In Edward's sons “such extraordinary natural talents and illustrious signs of kingly virtues as it was possible for their ages to be capable of were observed” (320.3-5), but youth can accommodate very little virtue. No matter who the boys are, “their age is weak and improvident in itself” (330.3). The boys were only thirteen and eleven years old (314.9-10). This is “too immature for the kingship” (326.9). Both Edward and Richard agree that a young king exacerbates the problem of faction in a country. Not only has someone who is young not “matured in that area of experience by which they could restore [factions] in concord, with their [disputes] reconciled” (330.23-4), as Edward notes, but a mere “boy” like Edward V is “compliant by nature, of an age for vice, credulous, and not guarding enough against the false accusations of denouncers” (338.24-5), as Richard tells his followers. Even when speaking of his own son, Edward IV admits that a youth cannot stop factional feeling and can be easily led to support private interests instead of the public good, especially if a faction flatters him: “the tender mind of adolescence, imbued with depraved flattery, is rolled headlong into vices and
drags the kingdom with it into destruction” (332.11-3). Edward also acknowledges that a boy cannot even rule himself, let alone others: “a boyish age must be ruled by authority, and an adolescent age must be propped up by counsels” (332.3-4). Furthermore, a child king also exposes a nation to the dangers of tyranny. A tyrant like Richard can take advantage of “the opportunity of his nephews' age” (328.7-8), and seize the throne with no opposition from the young king. In a pitiful scene, the Narrator shows the response of a child to the aggression of a tyrant. When Richard replaces all of Edward V’s servants, “since he was not able to prevent it, he did the only thing he could: he wept over it” (350.3). Tears, however, cannot thwart tyranny. England needs a way to ensure that prudent and experienced men will hold the kingship and resist potential tyrants. The institution of kingship thus fails to stop Richard partially because it is hereditary.

Edward's sons are in line for the kingship because their father was king, not because they can do a good job.

There are further indications that the use of inheritance as a means of succession also leads to many other difficulties. Although the Queen refers only to the office of Protector when she mentions that the civil law forbids conflicts of interest, it is reasonable that the kingship, too, should be reformed in accordance with this principle in order to truly benefit society. A hereditary kingship like England's as described in the History creates several conflicts of interest. The first is that it gives family members an incentive to kill their relatives. The Queen objects to Richard as Protector precisely because upon the death of her sons he would inherit the kingdom (390.15-8), and it is clear that Richard's opportunity for tyranny only arises because he is in line for the
throne. His usurpation can only have any plausibility at all because he is descended from Richard, Duke of York (320.23-6, 450.16-9, 464.24-6, 480.10). The danger is not only to children, either. With a hereditary kingship, George's "desire for ruling" could "incite[] him against his brother [Edward]" (322.7), and "whether [George] remained in fidelity to his nephew or aspired to the kingship, he would hold [Richard] himself as a mortal enemy" (326.14-5). Although the Narrator reports that George's motives are only given as possibilities, rather than certainties (326.15-8), the conflict of interest is real whether or not it actually led to murder, and it most certainly did lead to George's death. These and similar speculations as to motivations serve an important purpose even if the truth of the matter cannot be known. It is not necessary to prove how George really felt or why he acted as he did, or even if he was really guilty, in order to demonstrate the weakness of the hereditary kingship. If readers admit that both of the motives the Narrator gives are plausible, and can understand why George would have tried to seize power in such circumstances, then that in itself is enough to recommend reform of the kingly office.

Another passage encourages the reader to draw a broader conclusion from such evidence. This fratricidal tendency is not peculiar to Richard's own family. The Queen's rhetorical question shows that the conflict of interest is universal: "[W]e have learned by experience how easily the accursed thirst for kingship swallows every affection of blood-relationship: a brother removes a brother and the offspring rushes toward dominion over the very body of his parent, and a nephew is secure from his uncle?" (394.14-8). Furthermore, even a usurpation like Richard's would be less bloody if the kingship were not hereditary. A large number of people die only because they would be in some way in
line for the throne. It is precisely their “kinship of blood with the Prince” which is “fatally harmful” (384.16-9) for the Queen's relatives, and the only reason that the younger brother is in danger is because Richard knew that “if he were to deprive the one brother of dominion, immediately universal zeal would incline towards elevating the other” (360.9-11). However, his sisters all survive, because England's kingship is only hereditary through the male line. The very first contrast of this History full of contrasts is between the male and female children of Edward IV. All are named in the first paragraph, but only the girls have futures to describe; for the boys there is only an ominous silence (314.8-20). Nobody “undertakes a war with a woman” (366.9) because there is nothing to be gained from it. Girls survive when boys die because there is no interest served in killing them.

A hereditary kingship can lead to hatred within families, but on the other hand, love for one's relatives can also create a conflict of interest. Kings can be moved by “consideration [ratio] of blood-relation” (340.4), and thus could consider their children's interest instead of the public's when governing. Sometimes, a desire for familial glory can lead to war as much as personal ambition. Richard, Duke of York wanted the “the kingship for himself and his posterity perpetually” (320.24-5). Whether a man loves power more than his children, or loves his children more than the public, there is a tendency toward bloodshed, and the common good is often not served. In the case of kingly succession, avoiding conflicts of interest, as the civil law does, could prevent violence by removing the personal interest for violence.
Other conflicts of interest arise from the relationship of England's hereditary kingship to marriage, both because only marriage can produce legitimate heirs and because some foreign hereditary kingships, unlike England's, can pass through the female line. Edward was trying to arrange a political marriage to the Princess of Spain before he met Elizabeth Grey (436.7-10), and his mother points out two reasons that he should follow through: “if he would firmly bind himself to a foreign king by marital affinity” he would obtain “not only protection, by stabilizing the kingship, but hope of enlarging his sovereignty” (440.9-12). Edward claimed not to be interested in further kingships, but regardless of whether he is telling the truth, another man might be. For such a man, his private interest in more power would conflict with the public's interest in keeping the king's responsibilities small enough that he can manage them well. In Edward's own case, the public interest in international peace, which might be advanced through a political marriage, conflicts with his private interest in having a beautiful and chaste wife (440.1-3). Closer to home, Edward's mother asks, “Are you able to endure that you beget mongrels and degenerate kings for this most flourishing kingdom that you possess” (440.23-5)? A hereditary kingship means that choosing a woman with whom to have children is not a private matter. At least one of those children will be expected to rule a nation. The interest of the republic requires that child to have the capacity for prudence and other virtues necessary for rule, but there are important immediate private interests concerning marriage that make planning for the whole kingdom's future very difficult. Edward points out the dilemma: “For I certainly could neither marry a woman I do not

386 Wegemer notes that “the narrator shrewdly shows the disastrous consequences of politicizing marriage” (2007, 44; see also 1996, 35; Curtright 2012, 50-51).
love nor love a woman I do not see, nor do I judge it well enough deliberated, [that someone would,] by the hope of future increase ..., spoil the enjoyment of present goods. What sense of those goods could there be for a man holding a woman in perpetual society for life whom he could not willingly look at” (442.25-444.3)? It would require enormous self-sacrifice for a man (especially a man like Edward) to marry a woman without regard for her beauty, solely with a view towards producing children with the requisite combination of virtues for ruling a kingdom, but that is precisely what a hereditary kingship asks.387 There may be some truth to Dr. Shaw's claim that “[Edward] was led astray, by the beauty of a widow coming upon him, to hold fidelity after pleasure” (450.21-3), but a different kind of constitutional executive office would not require the king to make that choice.388

Another failure related to marriage involves the succession. One of the greatest benefits of having a settled succession is that it could prevent civil war. This appears to be a great strength of hereditary kingship, since theoretically the next king is always publicly known ahead of time, and his right to the throne thus cannot be plausibly challenged. However, because the kingship is inherited only through legitimate sons, Richard is able to find a pretext, even if only a mediocre one, for excluding everyone

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387 It is also doubtful, to say the least, whether the virtue of children could be predicted by analyzing any characteristics of their parents, even if a man were inclined to choose a wife on that basis. 388 For example, Wegemer agrees with Shaw’s view of Edward: “[W]e see Edward IV rejecting his own weighed judgment and the wise advice of his friends and family on the politically sensitive question of his marriage. Instead of following what he recognizes as the reasonable course of action, he ‘tak[es] counsel of his desire’ and ends up with a marriage that predictably causes grave civil unrest” (1996, 29; cf. 35). Curtright makes the same point (2012, 50-51). Certainly, if Edward was morally better, he would have acted more for the public good, and the emphasis these commentators place on Edward’s personal responsibility is important. The argument of this chapter, however, is that Richard III also offers examples of how institutional reform can keep bad private choices from having disastrous public effects.
ahead of him in the line of succession: He casts doubt on his brother's marriage and his mother's fidelity. After Richard thinks it over with his co-conspirators, they exploit this part of the law:

[F]inally in the end it came to this plan: that the people would be persuaded that both Edward himself and all his offspring were born from illegitimate sexual intercourse, and thus he did not ever justly reign, nor could his offspring legally succeed him. (434.17-20)

Richard and his henchmen refer to his nephews' and brother's illegitimacy repeatedly (436.2-3, 448.24-25, 450.18-21, 452.4-8, 464.24-466.8, 476.21-3, 478.21-3), and although the Narrator emphasizes that the charges were false (446.15-6, 17-8, 24-5), “that fiction, however feeble, satisfied [Richard], for whom it was enough only to say something, since indisputably, securely, and certainly, proofs of it would not be demanded” (448.21-3). England's law requires that the heir to the throne be legitimate, but there is no formal provision for a legal process by which to prove or disprove claims of legitimacy. Instead, “if the title of the kingship comes into question ... [the question] concerning the right is decided by arms” (370.3-5). All of these inherent weaknesses of England's hereditary kingship suggest that it should be replaced with something better, if something can be found.

In fact, even if not completely in law, the hereditary aspect of kingship has already been repealed in England, because its failures became too acute. At the time of the History, Henry VI was the last man crowned King of England whose father also had been king. Richard, Duke of York thought himself better qualified to be king and successfully lobbied Parliament, which altered the succession in his favor, although he was supposed to take office only after Henry's death (320.18-24). This compromise
actually made things worse, because it did not adequately consider in what way the previous arrangement had failed. The controversy arose because Henry VI was bad at ruling, lacking as he did the “prudence” required in a ruler (320.21).\textsuperscript{389} Allowing him to continue to govern badly for the remainder of his life does not serve the common good if a better ruler is available. Nor, however, does establishing a new line of inheritance. Parliament apparently recognized that Henry VI did not have the princely virtues and qualities he needed, but rather than removing him from office immediately, it left him to reign while “[Henry's] offspring (although an eminent prince) was rejected” (320.23-4). A poor ruler still rules for the time being, while a princely is precluded from any opportunity to rule.

This misguided attempt at reform by Parliament leads to a great deal of violence and loss of life. Immediately, Richard of York went to war and “fell in the battle of Wakefield together with many aristocrats” without ever becoming king (320.28-9). According to Buckingham, his son Edward caused even more bloodshed, since “while he was beginning his kingship, then guarding it, then was driven out, then returned and regained it again, and then took vengeance on his expellers, he spilled as much English blood as it cost (not long ago) for France to be subjugated twice” (460.16-9). The whole plot of the History shows how Richard, Duke of Gloucester deposes Edward V before he is even crowned, and thus continues the cycle. This evidence leads to the conclusion that the problem with the institution of kingship is not so much that it is hereditary, but that it was, that its negative effects were felt, that heredity was then ignored in practice on a

\textsuperscript{389} Accepting the authority of $H$, I agree with Daniel Kinney's English, although he prints “sapientior” from $P$ in his Latin.
case-by-case basis, but that no better systematic approach was adopted in its place. The danger the Queen wished to avoid in the case of sanctuary is realized in the case of the kingship: A traditional and somewhat defective institution is disregarded instead of being improved or replaced by something better.

Returning again to the three last speeches for indications of a better method of succession, we see that they claim several kinds of legitimacy for Richard. He is indeed said to be owed the kingship by inheritance, but also “destined” for it by the gods (466.25-6, 476.16-7), chosen by divine providence (452.20, 466.13), naturally capable of exercising the office because of his maturity and virtue (466.10-1, 466.26-468.2), and elected by the consensus of the people (480.12-3). Each of these reasons why Richard should be king represents an alternative authority for determining who should rule, and thus, indirectly, various methods for choosing the king. Should he be chosen by heredity, destiny, providence, nature, or the people? Richard of course represents a coincidence whereby all these ways result in choosing the same man, but even if he were really what Buckingham claims he is, it would still be worth reflecting on which of these grants of legitimacy is in fact the most decisive, unless one expected such a coincidence to happen every time a king died. It has definitely occurred that the man most naturally fit for kingship was not chosen by heredity, as the examples of both Henry VI and Edward's sons show. What should a nation do in those circumstances?

Actually, there is a clear preference for one source of authority. Dr. Shaw's sermon, Buckingham's address, and Richard's speeches all demonstrate that ultimately the people are the source for all these kinds of legitimacy. First, Buckingham ascribes
Richard's innate qualifications (his "mature age" and "virtue") to the gods (466.24-468.2), so natural and divine legitimacy are not really claimed as two different sources.\(^{390}\)

Furthermore, Richard and his allies show by their words and actions that they do not really expect that divine providence will be enough to make Richard king. If Richard were really divinely chosen, why would he seek so hard to gain the further approval of the people? These last speeches invariably refer to divine approval as evidence that the orator hopes will be instrumental in gaining popular approval, and Richard tries to manufacture more evidence, as well. Dr. Shaw and Richard “agreed beforehand” to coordinate Richard's arrival at the church with Shaw's mention of Richard's name, so that it would be thought that the preacher was inspired to proclaim his words not by a human plan, but by some divine nod of approval. Then the people would be moved by that thought so that they would acclaim Richard as king instantly; thus it would appear to posterity that he was chosen \(\text{delectum}\) for the kingship by divine providence \(\text{divinitus}\) and almost by a miracle. (452.15-21)

This plan fails because of poor timing, but, especially given the way the Narrator describes it, a reader can easily see that any appearance of divine approval can be deceiving. A nation should not simply make a law that states that whoever is divinely approved will be king, because any claim to be divinely chosen needs to be judged by someone. From his repeated attempts to gain their approval, it appears that Richard believes that a judgment by the people to that effect would bring the perception of legitimacy he seeks.

Secondly, neither Richard nor any of his supporters ever claims that heredity \(\textit{in itself}\) is any sort of claim to the kingship. Rather, appeals based on Richard's descent

\(^{390}\) The fuller implications of the references to the divine in this passage will be considered in Chapter Seven.
from his father are always appeals to law, not to nature alone. Dr. Shaw reminds the people “that perpetual succession to the kingship had been decreed for his descendants alone by an ordinance of the Senate \textit{[senatus consulto]} and a statute of the Commons \textit{[scito plebis]}” (450.16-8); Buckingham condemns Edward for “anticipat[ing] the legitimate time of his reigning” (458.25-460.1) and notes that “the right \textit{[ius]} of administering this kingdom is owed to Richard, Duke of Gloucester, ... since truly he now remains the only one who legally \textit{[rite]} is able to succeed to his father, the most renowned Duke, on whose blood, by a formally proposed law \textit{[lata lege]}, the kingship was confirmed” (464.24-466.1); and Richard himself claims the throne, “by right \textit{[iure]} of inheritance” (480.10). Richard and his supporters make other assertions of \textit{ius}, that is, of Richard's right based on positive law (448.26, 466.17, 478.4), but nobody ever even tries to assert that Richard can claim the kingship based on \textit{fas}. Law grants legitimacy to a claim based on birth, not the other way around. Sons inherit, just as mothers are guardians, because they are the relatives named in the common law.

Furthermore, these speeches argue that the law's authority itself is derived from the people. Dr. Shaw's phrasing shows that he recognizes that English laws, including the inheritance law upon which Richard bases his claim, are passed by the whole society, the Lords and the Commons.\footnote{Shaw's use of two different terms prevalent in the Roman Republic thus more fully explains the Narrator's earlier description of the same law as “a decree of Parliament \textit{[senatusconsulto Parlamenti]}” (320.22). Parliament is not simply a Senate like Rome's, because its laws require the approval of the House of Commons as well.} Buckingham also claims the support of the “nobles and the people” (472.3) and “the fathers and the people” (478.21-2) in an attempt to obtain the greatest legitimacy for the usurping Protector. Richard himself also describes the
unique authority of the people in a passage where he does use *fas*: “I neither see it to be possible nor perceive it to be right [*fas*] that unwilling men be ruled by anyone.

Certainly, it [the kingship] belongs to me; although I know there is no other to whom the kingship is owed by right of inheritance, nevertheless I consider these your wills [*voluntates*] of more import than all laws, the whole force of which depends on you” (480.8-11). By acknowledging that all laws depend on the will of the people for their effectiveness, Richard, even if he wishes it were otherwise, in effect admits that he recognizes the importance of consent in providing legitimacy for rulers. How effective can a king be if he rules without the public's consent, regardless of his other claims? By citing *fas* in this public statement, he indicates that there is a consensus that the consent of the governed is not only necessary for positive law to have its desired effect, but is even required by objective law. If the consent of the people is so crucial and provides widely accepted legitimacy, then a possible replacement for the present constitutional arrangement which makes the kingship hereditary is one which makes it an elective office, with kings chosen either by the representatives of the people in Parliament or by the people themselves. If the mode of election were changed, all of the conflicts of interest related to a hereditary kingship would be eliminated, while every king would have the best possible legitimacy. As an additional benefit, such an executive (whether called a king or by another name) would be obligated to the very people he should serve. Buckingham tells the people of London that “by selecting such a prince not only would you have benefited the entire kingdom for the public, but also you will especially procure advantages separately for yourselves, for whose favors he would always carry a debt,
exactly as if you had given him dominion” (468.12-4). If the king were always in fact
given his dominion by the people, there would be no need to reassure the people he
would act “as if” he were elected. Moreover, if the king were selected by the whole
people, not just that of London, he would be obligated to the whole people, which would
provide an incentive for him to serve the whole people, and work for the common
advantage, rather than any separate one.

The existing laws of England treat the kingship like property, specifying its
transfer from father to son in the same way as land. Richard makes a comment, however,
which challenges this prior conception and invites a reader to wonder whose property the
kingship really is:

On this day, I take upon myself the government of the two realms of
England and France ... Indeed I consider merely the administration
of them mine, truly the right \textit{ius} and profit and ownership of each
of them totally yours, not at all doubtfully public. The day on which
I shall have ceased to have that mind is the day I pray that those
above take away from me, not only this realm of yours, which I
would have wickedly tried to steal, but even my life itself, which
would be unworthy to be maintained. (480.18-23)

If the public own the realms, then inherited transfer of the kingship makes less sense.
Why should administration alone be passed from father to son? If legal title always
remains in the hands of the people, then inheritance law is a poor model. England could
avoid wars between families over the kingship by making the kingship a public
possession, rather than a family heirloom.

Parliament's decree altering the succession may have contributed in the short run
to chaos and bloodshed, but as Section II noted, it set a precedent that could improve
things in the future. If the Lords and Commons have the power to determine who will be
king in the future and who will not, there is good reason to say Parliament's “power among the English is supreme and absolute” (320.22-3). They have been acknowledged and accepted as having the ultimate authority over even the highest executive office in the land, as even Richard and his allies acknowledge when they publicly appeal to that very authority for justification during their attempt to claim the kingship. Parliament's failure thus was in stopping too short once they began. They removed the hereditary right from Henry VI's line, but they did not remove heredity as a determining factor altogether, and we have seen that heredity itself is problematic in many ways. They asserted their authority when they chose Richard, Duke of York, but they did not assert their right to approve future kings as well, and thus that step is left to future reformers. Given the lessons learned from the sanctuary debate and from the critique of the hereditary kingship offered in the History, a reform-minded reader can see that either they should not have altered the traditional method of choosing kings at all, or they should have striven to make the succession more rational. Changing the family line without changing the mode of succession lessens respect for tradition without any long-term benefit, and, as the events depicted in the History show, much short-term bloodshed ranging from Richard, Duke of York’s attempt to seize the throne before his appointed time down through the actions of his son, Richard III. Judging from the effects of their action as depicted in this work, a reader would likely conclude that if it is not a prudent time for Parliament to emphasize the consent of the people in selecting a king, perhaps it is not prudent to remove even a king who is not prudent.
Besides these major problems mentioned so far which have to do with who should rule and how he should rule, there are also weaknesses resulting from the present scope of kingship that should be taken into account when reforming the office. The kingship portrayed in the *History* has too great a scope in at least three ways. First, it extends too far by claiming to bring more than one people under its authority. As we have seen, the important question about the possibility and desirability of a multi-national kingship first comes up in Edward's dialogue with his mother. Among the reasons she gives for why Edward should marry a foreign noblewoman rather than Elizabeth Grey is the “hope of enlarging his sovereignty” (440.12). She obviously considers a bigger domain to be something desirable. Edward, however, questions her assumption:

> I would not even want new titles in a distant domain to come to me in my wife's name, since now so much land and sea of that kind is owed to me already that it would indisputably be enough and more than enough for any one man to defend and to guard faithfully. (444.4-7)

Edward's approach to kingship indicates first, that a larger sphere of authority is not an unmitigated good, next, that there is at least a theoretical limit beyond which any single king's domain should not extend, and third, that the reason there is such a limit is that kingship involves duties, not only personal benefits. This view of kingship implies some kind of consent, since, if the king must “defend and ... guard faithfully,” there must be someone to whom he keeps his faith. Only after the reader has learned Edward's approach to this question does Richard's statement on the same issue appear. He says, “On this day, I take upon myself the government of the two realms of England and France, the one so that I might guard and enlarge it, and the other that I might subject it to
the first and restore it to obeying your authority, to whom it ought to submit” (480.14-8).

It seems as if Richard combines the views of Edward and his mother. He says he will both “guard” like the former, and “enlarge” like the latter. Can a king have it both ways? Are two nations “more than enough” for one man to “guard faithfully?” In order to answer these questions, Richard's words must be read very carefully. Remember that Richard is here speaking to the “public” and trying to gain their support. He is telling them what they want to hear. As we saw earlier, when he discusses certain aspects of kingship, such as the need for consent and to act for the public good, he is likely to accurately describe a good kingship, because the people who will be directly impacted, for better or worse, by his opinion concerning those matters are the same people listening to him. He is not speaking to the French, however, so he does not try to gain their support. Richard never says he can guard two peoples faithfully. He will “guard” the people of England, but “subject” the people of France. If England is “enlarge[d],” it will grow by adding people and land that will not be kept safe for the inhabitants, but “subject[ed]” to the “authority” of a foreign people. A careful listener in the crowd or a careful reader of his speech would realize that Richard's words about consent, the public good, and public ownership of the kingdom are not heartfelt, since they are not consistent. If the people of England own England, the people of France own their kingdom, too, and thus for the English people to rule France would be just as bad as for

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392 He in fact uses virtually the same Latin words as they do for both “guard” and “enlarge”: “tuear atque inaugeam.”

393 Chapter Three noted that no persons are called “subjects [subiecti]” in Group Three, although many are citizens. The noun in fact never appears, but the verb subicio (subject) is used here and the verb subiugo (“subjugate”) at 460.19 to refer to France being ruled by an English king. The French people in these instances are the closest to being called “subjects” of anyone in the last drafts of the History.
the English king to do so. Richard's claim should be taken as a warning. A kingship which can make subjects of one people can make subjects of another. Instead, a good kingship would be restricted in scope to the one people which consents to its authority and for whose good it exists.

The second problem with the scope of kingship is that it extends too far in time. The problems which arise from asking someone to serve as king too soon in their lives would be mostly eliminated along with abolishing inheritance as the basis for succession, but there are also potential problems with allowing kings to rule too long. It has been noted already that some bloodshed could have been avoided if Parliament had removed Henry VI from office as soon as they decided he was not doing a good job. Furthermore, the Narrator notes that even apart from any lack of skill, “the progress of time ... turns most princes toward arrogance by their long confirmed power” (318.21-2). The same thinking that considers the kingship as public property would mean that misdeeds of the king could be punished by confiscating the kingship, without threatening the lives or the private property of the king's wife and children. Private property and public property could be kept separate with great benefit to Edward's sons, among others. The Queen's analogy thus appears even more apt. The king is meant to be a legal guardian of the public property, not the heir himself, and the purpose of guarding the property is to serve the good of the owners. If a king “wickedly trie[s] to steal” (480.22) the power of the kingship for himself, he needs to be held to account somehow. Although no character makes a specific proposal, the implication is that limited terms, impeachment, or both should be part of any reform of the kingship. Given the need noted above for many
virtues in a king, however, one could argue that a limited term would be a bad idea. How can the public find another man virtuous enough to take the existing king’s place? Here Buckingham’s comment may be read with heavy irony: If Richard refuses the crown, “they would easily find somebody who would be concerned for the republic” (480.2-3). The sad truth is that there is no difficulty in finding somebody else who cares for the public good at least as much as Richard does, and the same could be said for other rulers who have been in power a long time.  

The third way that the kingship is too large is in power. The king has more power than is necessary to serve the purpose of his office, and this extra power is shown to be sometimes misused to harm the public. In accord with the argument Buckingham makes regarding sanctuary, looking to the purpose of kingship can help in its reform. In his last speech, Richard succinctly states its purpose when he proclaims that he has “perceived that to be king is precisely [or solely, demum] to execute the laws [leges exequi] and to act as their servant” (484.4-5). Instead, however, kings have often acted as the law’s master, both by legislating and judging. Many such abuses have been noted in Chapter Four and Section II above, but perhaps the best description of how a king is understood to legislate is Buckingham's closing statement in his argument against the inviolability of sanctuary. Almost in passing he mentions that “[n]either his life nor his liberty is able to come into peril from any law [jure] and through injustice [iniuriam] truly it is able [to

394 Wegmer offers an alternative, but still ironic interpretation of this statement, which also draws attention to the weaknesses of Britain’s political order: “When Buckingham's theatrics lead him to say to Richard in front of the assembly of faction-ridden nobles that "they could easily find some other candidate [to be princeps] who cared for the respublica", we are meant to smile—at Buckingham's audacity, and at the absurdity of the claim given the diseased state of this faction-torn regnum so devoid of wise and courageous leaders” (2011B, 58-9, citations omitted).
come into danger] almost less” not because the law is the highest power in England, but because his “brother hold[s] the highest power of all” (376.10-2). The public cannot all have a brother as king. Only when the king is under the law instead of above the law can they get the protection they need. If the Queen is correct that it is unwise for her to entrust both boys to one man, and unwise for anyone to entrust all his goods to one ship (390.11-8), is it not also unwise to entrust both the legislative and executive power to the king alone?

A similar argument exists regarding the separation of judicial powers, although because the focus of the History is on the excessive power of the king, rather than on clearly articulating boundaries between branches, there does not appear to be any attempt to suggest strictly separating the judicial power from the legislative. As has been noted, George's trial is offered as a good example of due process, but it is clearly the “senate” which “adjudicates [adiudicauit]” his case (322.13-4), not any judge. Importantly, though, the king was not the judge at that trial, either. Along the same lines, when Richard identifies the kingship as a purely executive office, he is at King's Bench, which gets its name “because judgments are reported in that court as if they were pronounced from the mouth of the king himself” (482.29-484.1). From Richard's comment, the reader learns that England already has an example of a judicial body which is equal to the king in authority and even in name, and Richard suggests that perhaps it should be even superior, if the king is a “servant” of that court's “judicial decisions [iura]” as well as other “laws [leges]” (484.3-4). On the other hand, a reader sees bad results whenever the king judges, or when judges are controlled by the king. Section II mentioned Edward's
willingness to trade a favorable decision in a land controversy for sexual favors when he acted as judge (438.11-18), and Buckingham describes another instance: When a judge who “resist[s]” the injustice of the king has “his office taken away precisely on that account,” the result is a “perverse turning of laws [legum]” (458.8-11). A good judiciary should be both authoritative and independent of the king. Thus, the final part of any reform of the kingship should restrict the authority of the office to executive powers only, so that the king will be able to protect the public, but not to tyrannize them.

England's kingship may have failed to stop tyranny, but by portraying that failure Richard III succeeds in showing what a better form of executive office would look like. The attempts of the tyrant and his allies to gain support work for future good when they reveal the portrait of the good king. As a result, just as the discussion of sanctuary in Richard III can be used as a paradigm for reforming any political institution, the discussion of the kingship can be used to develop a model for reforming any political office.

Now that this chapter has shown the ways in which offices and institutions failed in the face of tyranny, and how the History indicates some ways in which they could be profitably reformed, the next chapter will turn away from the public sphere and inquire about what the History shows regarding actions of individuals, both how they failed to stop tyranny and what can be done to prevent those failures as well.
Chapter Six:
*Fides & Personal Causes of Tyranny*

Now that Chapter Five has discussed flaws in various aspects of England's political order, this chapter will examine the flaws of the individual men and women who are described in the *History*. Although many virtues and corresponding vices are mentioned in *Richard III*, this chapter will be limited to investigating only one. Just as the *History* gives special attention to sanctuary and the kingship as exemplars of institutions and offices, respectively, failures regarding the virtue known in Latin as *fides* receive the most prominent and extensive treatment. Wegemer notes, “More uses *fides* well over thirty times, habitually in the context of a critical decision. By doing so, he repeatedly calls to mind what was for the Romans the basis of society and of all justice.”

Discussion of *fides* is somewhat problematic because this word has a wider range of meaning than any English equivalent, and thus some of its repetitive and associative force is lost in translation. One obvious English translation is “faith,” but the religious connotation is weaker in Latin. Other appropriate translations include “trust” and “confidence,” but all these cover only one aspect of *fides*, when it describes a quality of the actor or giver: that is, when a person has *fides* in this sense, he has faith or trust or confidence in another person. In Latin, however, the same word can also describe a quality of the recipient. Thus, someone can be described as having *fides* in an intransitive

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395 Wegemer 2011A, 121.
396 Wegemer 2011A, 125. See also Wegemer 2011B, 48-49.
397 As Wegemer points out, “In More’s English text, the most frequently used equivalent of *fides* is ‘trust’ and sometimes ‘special trust’ ..., but More also uses “faith” or “good faith” (2011A, 121, n.10).
sense, meaning he himself is faithful, reliable, or trustworthy; a person with fides has the quality known in English as fidelity, trustiness, trustworthiness, faithfulness, or reliability. In the translations which follow, fides is often rendered as “fidelity,” and often as “trustworthiness,” but all its connotations should be kept in mind. Meanwhile fiducia, based on the same root, is always translated as the noun “trust,” while the closely related verb confidere is rendered “to trust.”

Section I: Fides & Political Action

Many of the characters in the History either fail to stop or actively aid tyranny because they lack fides in the second sense mentioned above. They are not trustworthy, and thus they cannot be relied upon by the people to act for the public good. The tyrant himself falls into this category. The very first mention of fides in the History occurs when the Narrator declares that “fides” did not “have any influence whatsoever” with Richard (320.8). He is obviously not faithful to Edward V or to his younger brother, and indeed there is no evidence that he is actually faithful to anyone, or that he is ever reliable except when it suits him. And although the other characters may not reach Richard's extreme, many show themselves to be similarly untrustworthy in ways that advance that most untrustworthy man's agenda. One prominent case is that of the Chancellor, who makes a solemn pledge to the Queen based on his fides:

In this matter I here bind my fidelity to you: that day they anoint as king anyone other than that son of yours whom they have with them, on the next day we will, in this very place, mark with the diadem this other son whom you have here with you. So that you may doubt this the less, behold this seal, which the illustrious prince your

398 In two instances (446.14 & 20), fides is also used in a third sense, as a technical term referring to a binding promise of marriage. Although Richard III considers marriage in some detail, a full consideration of this important institution is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
husband entrusted to my fidelity, I now resign to you for the use of your offspring. (354.5-11)

The bishop mentions his fidelity to the former king, the present king, and the Queen, and does so specifically with the intent to prevent a usurpation, yet very soon goes back on his word and “retrieve[s] the seal from her” (354.28). That chance to challenge the Protector's authority is lost, and tyranny advances, as a result of this failure in *fides*.

Immediately afterwards, there is another missed opportunity to stop Richard that is also related to *fides*. The nobles on the council were somewhat suspicious of Richard and Buckingham (356.1) until “Hastings ... bound his own fidelity, which all held not to be doubtful, on behalf of the Dukes” (356.3-5). The Narrator stresses that this ally of the tyrant is effective “because the trustworthiness [*fidem*] of the man was believed” (356.18). Contrary to their belief, however, Hastings is not trustworthy, since “it was his complicity the Protector had used against the captured blood-relations of the Queen” (408.21-2). Both the Chancellor and the Chamberlain make promises they do not keep, and these promises forestall other men from interfering with Richard's plot.

The Narrator also emphasizes Catesby's lack of *fides* and its role in Richard's success. Catesby is “a man with ... very little fidelity” and also a linchpin in Richard's whole structure, since “by the dissembling of this one man this whole heap of evils stood firm” (404.8-10). Because Catesby “promise[d] so much to [Hastings] by his love and fidelity” (404.1-2), Hastings relied on him completely, and convinced others to do so. Hastings felt so “secure in this man's trust [*fiducia*] that he restrained the rest as they were going, until—[Hastings] unsuspecting, the others delaying—everyone was overcome alike” (404.12-4). Thus, Catesby is added to the list of those whose broken
promises advance tyranny, and he contributes a third reason why men do not keep faith. The first has been demonstrated by the Chancellor, who breaks his promise because he “fear[s] that his resigning of the seal to the Queen without the King's command would appear to be of light and hasty counsel” (354.26-7). Perhaps he is worried about losing his reputation or his position, or maybe he is afraid to publicly confront Richard over an action he has privately condemned to the Queen. In any case, his fear of some adverse response is stronger than his sense of fidelity. Hastings and Catesby break faith for a second reason: they do not fear to lose, but hope to gain something. Hastings wants the elimination of the Queen's family since they are his faction's enemies (330.10-2, 342.2-5). His hatred overcomes any fides he may have had. Catesby's motivation is “ambition” for political power (406.12). Given the example of these men, a reader might well wonder how solid any man's fides really is. If fear, hatred, and ambition are stronger than fides in these cases, how trustworthy can anyone be? How can someone know if another person is motivated by such passions? Or, in the final consideration, how can one know whom one should trust (cf. 398.19-20)?

As a start towards answering these questions, consider next the History's depiction of the ways men fail in their fides according to the first meaning given at the beginning of this chapter. All the failures examined so far have been traced to a lack of trustworthiness, but there are also many failures in placing trust. These two kinds of failures, in being trusting and in being trustworthy, are distinct, although related.

In the Catesby episode itself, there are actually two promises broken. Catesby indeed makes a promise to Hastings, but Hastings in turn makes a promise backed by a
solemn “pledge” to the Earl of Derby: “[T]rust [confide] [in me]; with my life as a pledge, so long as a certain man is present there (who is never absent), no doubtful word could ever be spoken in such a way that it would not be conveyed to me as soon as it escapes from being spoken” (402.23-6). This broken promise is slightly different than the others mentioned already, because Hastings promises something he himself cannot deliver upon, but nevertheless he does intend it to be fulfilled. He is not lying when he makes it; he believes that Catesby will keep his promise, and this is what Hastings is really promising the Earl. The promise is entirely based on trust in another person, and it fails despite the fact that Hastings does not want to break it. His fidelity to Catesby is not enough to let him keep his own promise to Derby without fidelity from Catesby, too. Hastings thus demonstrates the danger of relying on sequential assertions of trust.

Hastings was not lying to Derby, and thus was trustworthy in relation to him, but because Hastings trusted Catesby, both Hastings and Derby were betrayed. A chain of trust is only as strong as its weakest leak. Thus, from Hastings one can learn whom not to trust, at least. His mistake is to assume reciprocity: “[H]e deemed himself dear to and bound to [Catesby] to the same extent he knew [Catesby] was dear to and bound to himself” (404.2-3). In fact, being faithful to someone does not necessarily ensure fidelity in return. In Hastings's own case, it makes it “worse,” since he, “in a familiar conversation with [Catesby], disclosed the fears of the others in a boast of his own trust” (406.4-5). This leads to his own death being moved up sooner in Richard's plan. Thus the Narrator accurately describes Hastings relationship to both Catesby and Richard: “trusty [fidus] enough, trusting [fidens] too much” (420.7-8).
The *History*’s account of yet another broken promise shows that Hastings's case is not an isolated incident, nor dependent on his specific character. Hastings, after all, lies to the public and the council before Catesby lies to him; but when the Cardinal makes a promise, he has not lied to anyone, and yet, as with Hastings, although there is no indication that the Cardinal is ever lying to the Queen, his promise is nevertheless ineffective. At the end of the sanctuary scene, the Cardinal, speaking on behalf of himself and some other nobles, tells the Queen that if she would “entrust the boy [to them], they would bind their own fidelity for his safety” (392.3-5), yet as soon as they receive the boy from his mother “the Cardinal and his attendants led him directly into the palace to the Protector .... [F]rom there they went immediately to London to the Prince ... from where they both went directly through the middle of the city into ... the Tower ... from which they are believed never to have set foot again” (396.10-20). Just as Hastings does, the Cardinal promises something he cannot personally provide, and cannot keep his word because he places his trust in the wrong person. The Cardinal may be trustworthy himself, but he judges “the Protector's trustworthiness” incorrectly, thinking it to be “irreproachable” (392.1-2). If it is possible to trust “too much,” as Hastings and the Cardinal do, then having *fides* is not always a virtue, at least when *fides* is meant in its first sense. There is thus some tension between the two meanings of *fides*, between having trust and having trustworthiness. Having trust in an untrustworthy person can even destroy one’s own trustworthiness. Furthermore, how does one discover how much trust is too much to place in someone?

399 In fact, as Wegemer has noted, “This inability to trust wisely characterizes not only individuals like Hastings, but also England itself during this period” (2011B, 50-1).
The answer becomes more clear in the sanctuary scene. Besides the discussion of institutions covered in Chapter Five, this part of the History also explores the theme of trusting and closely connects *fides* in both of its senses with prudence and counsel. Richard is the first to suggest the connection, when he taunts the nobles as part of his attempt to convince them to pressure the Queen into releasing her other son into his hands: “For why else did she take the boy into a sanctuary ... unless because she wishes you to appear to the rabble to provide for the Prince either insufficiently faithfully or not wisely enough, if it would be a danger to entrust his brother to me, when you have entrusted [the Prince's] body itself to me for nurturing and safeguarding?” (360.25-8). The tyrant builds on his previous success in gaining trust to cast aspersion on the nobles, and in so doing, he claims that there are only two reasons that the Queen (and, by implication, anyone, for that matter) would not trust someone else's judgment. The Queen must doubt either their fidelity or their wisdom. Richard's argument has not only great rhetorical force, but upon closer examination, excellent reasoning behind it, too. Perhaps without intending it, Richard has succinctly stated the only two ways that someone can willingly cooperate with tyranny. One of these virtues or the other must be lacking in them, or they would not commit the Prince to the care of the Protector.

To see more clearly the fact that all possible ways of aiding tyranny must involve someone failing in either trustworthiness or prudence, consider the subsequent rephrasing of Richard's point. When the Cardinal repeats this argument to the Queen, he makes it

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400 Although *prudentia* and *sapientia* are not used in precisely the same way by More in this work (See note 245 in Chapter Two), they are certainly both intellectual virtues, and Richard does not seem to mean something different when he relates wisdom to trust than the Cardinal and Queen do later when they speak of prudence. The point is always that a trustworthy person could still be deceived if he did not understand another man's character well. Both wisdom and prudence mean a kind of “knowing” or “understanding.”
even more explicit: Her refusal to release the boys to himself and the other nobles sent by Richard, he says, shows that she must doubt “either their prudence or their fidelity [fidem]: their prudence if they were thought gullible to another’s faithlessness [perfidae], their fidelity if they were thought to be knowing [literally “prudent,” prudentes] accomplices” (392.6-8). The Cardinal understands that if one considers any hypothetical situation involving the rise of a tyrant, he will be found to be correct. There are only two types of people whom the potential tyrant could draw upon for willing help: those who want him to take power and those who do not. Those who support him and his goals would certainly not be trustworthy. Deceit is an integral part of tyranny, and this must always be the case, since tyranny is widely recognized as something detrimental. If there were such a thing as an honest supporter of tyranny, he would not be a threat, because an open and honest claim to work for the goal of tyranny would cause virtually the entire population to reject such a plan. Buckingham, for example, who decides to aid the tyrant out of a mixture of fear and self-interest (396.21-400.8), conceals his support. On the other hand, those who oppose tyranny would only help a tyrant unwittingly, and thus their aid to him would come about not because of their lack of fides, but because of their imprudent trust in an inherently untrustworthy person. They could possibly even be trustworthy themselves, but they would show bad judgment as to the trustworthiness of others. Thus, as helpfully phrased in the Queen’s thoughts, the two dangers are that men will be “deceived” or “corrupted” (392.24-5) by a tyrant: the former if they lack prudence, the latter if they lack fides. These two virtues are so important because together they are sufficient to defeat the rise of a tyrant. A nation composed of wise and
trustworthy persons would be far less likely to fall prey to a man like Richard, and part of what the History teaches readers is how to be wise and trustworthy.

The History thus seems to suggest that someone must have prudence in addition to fides before his judgment should be trusted. A trustworthy man, after all, could still be deceived, while a man who understands exactly what is going on could still be corrupted. There are several examples of the latter in the History. Intellectual acumen\(^{401}\) is obviously not sufficient in itself, since the Narrator notes both Richard's own “cunning intellect” (396.27) and Sir Richard Radcliff's “great and evil intellect” (430.21-2), and makes a direct contrast concerning Catesby: “Truly, he had so great of an intellect that you would not have wished it in a man with so very little fidelity” (404.8-9). Richard knows that, far from impeding his plans, intellect can actually be of some help to him. He specifically tries to attract men as his allies who might be of use for their “intellect,” including Edward Shaw, London's mayor (432.16). Intelligence therefore is not enough to guarantee goodness. Fides, in the sense of trustworthiness, is a necessary complement to intellect.

Similarly, prudence must complement fides. Besides men like King Richard, Richard Radcliff, and Catesby, who fail to be trustworthy despite their ability to accurately judge others, there are many others who fail to understand their fellow men correctly. Richard's plan succeeds with the help of some who are intelligent but

\(^{401}\) The Narrator never actually calls any evil person either wise or prudent, raising some question about whether a man both intelligent and bad can properly be referred to with either of those words, which traditionally are considered intellectual “virtues.” That question is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation.
untrustworthy, but he also enlists the aid of many characters like Hastings, who “trust too much.” How much, though, is too much?

The next step in discerning how trusting becomes excessive is to analyze the various standards by which some persons assert one man can ascertain the trustworthiness of another, but which turn out not to accurately reflect character after all. One possible criterion is that of Buckingham, who claims that one of the reasons the younger boy does not need sanctuary is because his “close relationship by blood proves his fidelity towards the Prince” (374.3-4). Buckingham also argues earlier that “the Prince's brother could not be otherwise than dear [to Buckingham's faction], since we ourselves are indeed blood-relations to him” (366.13-5). This seems to be the same argument used earlier by Richard, who characterizes the king's side of the family as “no less certain in their fidelity to [the Prince] and as a far more honorable part of the royal family than his maternal blood” (338.16-8). As the previous chapters have shown, however, family ties do not guarantee fidelity even when they are based on blood. Richard is willing to betray his brothers and his nephews just as much as his in-laws, and, as Chapter Five noted, the Queen recalls that the English “have learned by experience how easily the accursed thirst for kingship swallows every affection of blood-relationship: a brother removes a brother and the offspring rushes toward dominion over the very body of his parent” (394.14-7). The ambition which overcomes fides in Catesby is evidently widespread, even overcoming the bonds between family members; and thus no relationship, including friendship and kinship, is a guarantee of trustworthiness.

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402 Ambition is emphasized in this work. Mudan writes that “ambition ... infects every character in the History” (111-2) and Yoran agrees, in fact seeing this stress on “one and only one motive” as unrealistic.
Another flawed standard by which some judge *fides* is the holding of public office. Hastings's promise is accepted by the Council because “all held [his *fides*] not to be doubtful,” and “the fidelity of the man was believed” (356.4-5, 18). The Cardinal, too, mistakenly “believed [the Protector's fidelity] was irreproachable” (392.2) and Burdet lost his life because he “believed in [the corrupt judges'] fidelity” (458.10-1). In all of these cases, there is belief, but no good basis for belief. Holding an important office is not enough in itself. Being the Chamberlain or the Protector or a judge does not in itself make someone more worthy of trust. In fact, judging from the Narrator’s prominent emphasis of these failures, it may be prudent to distrust powerful officials more than other men.

From the examples in the *History*, it appears the only good way to discover someone's trustworthiness is to test it. Richard is aware of this method. He is careful to use only “messengers of tested fidelity” (338.13-4), and he does not trust anyone's unsupported word. He thinks it would be “insane ... to have much trust [*confidendum*] in someone who, from being an old enemy would profess himself to be a recent friend” (340.16-8). Richard in fact makes incremental testing part of his normal procedure: “He did not ever entrust his own plans to others more than was necessary to execute those plans through them, but not even to them either earlier or more fully than the matter urged” (324.8-10). He waits to see if they faithfully carry out one part before he trusts them with more. Those “by whom the Protector's cunning intellect was more accurately ascertained” know “that the last” steps of Richard's plans were never revealed to his accomplices “before the prior steps had been accomplished” (396.26-398.1). Only after
“the Protector had obtained both boys” did “he open[] himself with more trust [fiducia] ... to several others” (396.21-2). It is by this method that Richard determines that Hastings must be done away with. He orders Catesby to “prove, by cunningly testing [Hastings's] mind, whether he could hope that the man could be enticed to their party in any way,” and the test reveals that Hastings would never join them fully (406.1-4). The Queen, too, uses this approach at times. Part of her deliberation concerning whom to trust involves acknowledging that “the Cardinal had a mind which had been tested well enough” and that “the fidelity of some of the nobles” was “no less verified” (392.22-4). Strikingly, however, the Queen and Richard are the only two characters who withhold trust unless someone has actually been proven trustworthy. Thus, one way to view the sanctuary scene is as a contest over trusting between the two characters with the most rigorous standards for trust.

The Narrator insists, however, that at least once Richard's plan has progressed beyond a certain limit, there is in fact no good way to test trustworthiness. The Narrator makes two similar statements on this point. First, after Richard imprisons the Queen's relatives and obtains both boys, the Narrator says an accurate judgment about trustworthiness is impossible, and this fact is known both to Buckingham and to Richard. Buckingham reasonably decides not to try to oppose Richard at this point, because “that state of affairs and those dispositions of minds were such that you could not determine for certain in whom you could trust and whom you should fear” (398.18-20). Later, Richard sows enough seeds of doubt that the Narrator declares that “since one could neither know in what way the affair would turn out, nor whose counsels he could trust
[credere\textit{t}], the Protector reckoned that the occasion should be seized” (432.7-9). Thus, from the example of both Richard and the Queen, one learns that it is often prudent to withhold trust unless trustworthiness is proven by testing it, while from the Narrator's statements one learns that in some cases testing trustworthiness is impossible. In both types of situations, the common error is to trust too much. When someone has not been, or cannot be, tested, trust should be withheld if possible.

The next step in determining an appropriate amount of trust is to establish the alternative to trusting. If testing is the proper way to measure fides, than an imprudent trust is equivalent to an unverified one, and the proper approach to unverified persons is not trust, but the opposite. A major reason that the tyrant succeeds is that there are not enough people motivated by these opposites, which in this History are distrust, suspicion, and fear. Richard understands clearly enough that if too many fear him, he cannot succeed, and thus he takes steps to ensure that fear, especially prudent fear, is downplayed as a motive for any of his enemies' actions.

It is for this reason that a large portion of the sanctuary debate concerns the Queen's true motive. Is it fear or malice?\textsuperscript{403} It is worth examining this aspect of that debate in some detail. Richard begins by accusing the Queen of acting “hatefully” and “for no other reason than that bitter malevolence could be incited among the people towards the nobles .... For her, there was such hatred for them that (like the fables report about Medea), she burned to take vengeance on those she hated, even at the expense of her own children” (360.14, 20-24). He tries from the very start to emphasize the Queen's hatred in order to divert attention from another alternative which could motivate her:

\textsuperscript{403} cf. 368.2-3 & 382.14.
namely, rational fear. He and Buckingham consistently deny or disparage the possibility that she could be acting from fear, caricaturing the Queen by comparing her to a literary character, and despite the fact that the very act of taking sanctuary is clear and strong evidence of fear. Richard admits that “it will not be easily believed that anyone hides himself in a cave for whom it is possible to live in light and liberty without danger” (362.16-8). As he indicates near the end of his speech, he wants “the whole world” to restrict its assessment of the Queen’s motivation to either “deliberate malice or stupidity” (364.11-2). Nobody must recognize she might really be afraid, and with good reason.

However, the Cardinal, who agrees that the boy should come out of sanctuary, but is not a direct part of Richard's conspiracy, misses Richard's point, and draws the obvious conclusion: It is “womanly fear that stand[s] in the way” (366.4-5). Immediately, Buckingham jumps in to deny it: “Womanly fear! ... On the contrary, the invincible stubbornness of a woman. For I certainly would even bet my soul that she fears absolutely nothing either for her son or for herself” (366.6-8). Thrown off track by the necessity to parry the Cardinal's reference to fear, Buckingham next tries to argue down two contradictory paths simultaneously. He insists that her reason for keeping her son “is more malice than fear,” but then immediately adds, “But if she is so fearful that she sincerely fears what does not exist, let her truly fear; for who can prevent her even should she dread her own shadow? Certainly, the more she fears to entrust her son to us, conversely, the more rightly it must be feared by us to leave the boy with her” (368.4-8). Buckingham tries to allow for two possibilities which could be compatible with Richard's plan: either she is not afraid, or she is irrationally afraid of something that is not really
dangerous. By doing so, he weakens Richard's argument, which insists on the total absence of fear, but he makes Richard's earlier point even more striking in the process. Why would Richard and his party fear to leave the boy in sanctuary? The only threat anyone has mentioned which could impact them is Richard's assertion that “the whole world” will believe the Queen is indeed acting out of fear, and therefore the nobles' reputation will be damaged because they previously trusted Richard as Protector. Buckingham sarcastically notes the same threat shortly afterwards: “[A]ll mortals everywhere will proclaim us worthy men, of course, who would counsel the Prince, whose own full brother we allowed to be lost right under our eyes through insanity” (368.20-2). What, then, is Buckingham's real argument? Essentially, he tries to convince his listeners to believe something to be true which he himself admits no person in the rest of the world, who did not have his reputation at stake, would believe is true.

Buckingham cannot explain how the Queen's actions thus far could reasonably arise from anything except fear, and when he mentions the possibility that she and her son will flee abroad, his argument is even less coherent and more contradictory. He insists both that “her mind will be constrained by a false suspicion of danger to seek some stronger protection outside the kingdom,” and yet “even now, although fearing nothing of the kind, nevertheless I do not doubt she is contriving that very thing in her mind” (368.15-7). As Richard's ally, he seems to realize how much of an obstacle to Richard's attainment of the kingship it would be to have an heir out of their reach. Richard himself “feared much more” than even the boy's remaining in sanctuary that he would be “sent out of Britain into safety somewhere else” (360.12-3). Richard, however, more wisely
than Buckingham, never voices his true greatest fear. Buckingham is reduced to saying (in consecutive sentences, no less) that the Queen is contriving a plan that only makes sense if done out of a motivation he insists does not exist. Eventually, he wraps up his argument by using a hypothetical example of a woman acting “as if she were thoroughly terrified,” but really only “disgusted” (374.25-6) and claiming that “although ... a boyish fear ... is some fear, ... this is none at all” (376.3-4). It is clear from how strenuously both Richard and Buckingham deny the possibility of fear as a motivation for their enemy that fear and the recognition of danger that accompanies it are dangerous and fearful to tyrants.

The Queen, for her part, sees what Richard is trying to do, and responds clearly. She says he “interprets [her] fear as malice” (382.14), and defends her judgment: “it is not something you should marvel at if I should fear that the same men who have cast undeserving men into chains might brood over the destruction of innocents” (384.4-6). She insists she does indeed fear, and in fact has a good reason to fear. The Cardinal responds with half of Buckingham's argument: “what she feared was most empty, since for her there was neither any evil impending nor could any be threatened” (384.10-1). She has an excellent question in response: “But how could I trust in that?” (384.13). She has no reason to trust either Richard or Buckingham. The Cardinal then repeats Buckingham's second point: “the more you, Queen, are terrified to entrust him to such close friends, the more others, in turn, fear to leave him with you, lest that womanly fear, having been groundlessly conceived, should put into your mind [the thought] that you should send him somewhere farther away” (384.24-7). In response, she questions the
Protector's motives again: “Does he so love my son to death that he dreads nothing as much as that he may not escape elsewhere and evade his hand?” (386.9-10). What could possibly make Richard afraid of losing the boy? Even a very powerful positive motivation, love, seems unlikely to produce that response. The Queen goes on to justify her own response by invoking natural and human law: “Nobody should investigate my fears. It is right [fas] for maternal anxiety to fear even empty things; although in this matter I am no more cautious than the common law [lex]” (390.13-5). While fas and lex both command cautious fear, the tyrant asks for trust.

It has been noted that part of prudence is trusting appropriately, and the Queen's actions should be examined with this in mind. On the one hand, she appears to be among the most prudent characters in the way she withholds trust. She is the only one to continually distrust some of those who in fact are untrustworthy. She does not trust Hastings, even when the Archbishop does (354.3-5), and she refuses to trust either Richard or Buckingham throughout the sanctuary debate. Eventually, though, she gives in, and gives up her son, with tragic results. Is her trust misplaced?

It is important to discover where she went wrong.\textsuperscript{404} It was stated above that, if a person fears to trust someone, it must be because that first person thinks either prudence or fidelity is lacking in the second. Buckingham's argument would be logically sound if his premises were valid: “[I]f, in returning her son to liberty, [the Queen] should refuse to follow the counsels of men whose prudence is not doubtful, nor fidelity uncertain, who

\textsuperscript{404} This dissertation interprets the Queen’s decision as the best possible under difficult circumstances, and while clearly a mistake in hindsight, not clearly wrong at the time. For a discussion of several alternate views, see note 369 in Chapter Five. Those of Wegemer and Frank are especially contrary to the interpretation of this chapter, since they see the Queen’s decision to hand over her son as itself an imprudent and emotionally motivated one.
does not easily understand that the cause of such wicked resolution is more malice than fear?” (366.27-368.3). If the Queen really does act out of fear, as she claims, then she must indeed doubt either the fidelity or the prudence of those men; however she says she does neither. Instead, she tells them, “I am neither so imprudent myself that I distrust your prudence, nor am I so suspicious that I doubt your trustworthiness” (394.45). This statement is very problematic.

First, the superficial verbal balance between the two clauses is belied by an underlying logical dissimilarity. When the Queen references prudence and trustworthiness in two separate clauses, she describes the process of assessing other people's character in a confusing way. Because people must be both trustworthy and prudent in order to avoid helping further an evil cause, both attributes need to be assessed together, but here they are not. As a result, both clauses make misleading statements. The second clause at least makes literal sense as far as it goes, because each person must always trust another to the extent he is not suspicious of that other person; the Queen would, and logically must, doubt these men's trustworthiness if she were suspicious of them. Note, however, that the second clause really says nothing about whether this is good or bad. Suspicion is implied to be a negative quality, but that assumption is not proven. In fact, as shown above, suspicion could be good or bad, depending on whether the suspicious person has accurately judged the person in question or not. It is good to be suspicious of a tyrant, for example. The second clause thus says something true, but merely tautological, while implying something that is false. The first clause, meanwhile, while speaking of prudence, a different sort of virtue than fides, nevertheless uses the
language of trust, just as in the second clause. As a result, the first clause really says something even more problematic than the second clause. Distrust (a synonym for suspicion here) can in fact be either prudent or imprudent, depending on the character of the person being judged. By making this problematic statement, the Queen superficially appears to approve the character of the Cardinal and his entourage entirely. Her other thoughts and words, however, show that this is not the case, and thus raise questions about why the Queen makes this statement at all.

The Narrator indicates that the Queen did not doubt these men's trustworthiness: “[T]he Cardinal had a mind which had been tested well enough, nor was the trustworthiness of some of the nobles who came together with him less verified, whom, as much as she feared that they could be deceived, so she had persuaded herself that they could not be corrupted” (392.22-5). Since “she feared that they could be deceived,” however, it would seem that she does doubt their prudence, at least their ability to trust prudently, despite her previous statement; and her subsequent words and actions bear this out. In the Cardinal and his attendants, she sees “much prudence ... [and] more trustworthiness” (394.25-6). If they are more trustworthy than prudent in the same way that Henry VI is “more innocent than prudent” (320.21), it is their prudence that she fears may fail. This is reinforced by her closing words to them: “Only this much, by your trustworthiness, and by the memory of my husband, and by my concern for my sons and my trust in you, do I beg you—that as I appear to you to fear too much, so may you in turn not trust too much” (396.1-4). These last words show that the Queen realizes that trusting someone is not always prudent. She says there is such a thing as trusting “too
much.” Why then say that she is not so imprudent as to doubt their prudence, when it is precisely their prudence that she doubts? Maybe she thinks she cannot directly state what she has judged, and so she prefers to try to subtly make the Cardinal more prudent, rather than alienate him by directly questioning his judgment.

She may have some doubts about her own judgment, too, since “she thought there was a chance that their uncle's mind towards his nephews was not as merciless as she herself had conceived” (392.19-21), but her main reason for turning over her son is not any newfound confidence in the Cardinal's prudence, nor that she no longer fears and therefore distrusts Richard, but her realization that “if her fear were not empty, certainly it was too late” (392.21-2). If, as Chapter Five has argued, she has realized that Richard is willing to carry off her son by force, and thus “she [does] not even trust [fidet] enough in sanctuary” (368.10), she believes she has run out of options. She fears she has neither prudent men nor trustworthy institutions to rely on, and thus she does the best she can, giving her son to the Cardinal, a man she believes to be trustworthy, rather than allowing Richard, a man she knows is not, to take him directly, and at the same time she does what she can to tactfully spur the Cardinal to fear and distrust more prudently than he has before.

Moving beyond the sanctuary scene, several examples from elsewhere in the History also show that an evil plan can succeed either when people fail to fear tyranny at all, or fear its possibility too late. Richard, aware of this, plans to “crush” the opposing faction “with a treacherous plot while they were incautious and not fearing any evil” (328.19-20). In the same vein, Edward did nothing to prevent Richard's rise because he
“feared nothing less than that which happened” (328.29-330.1). Hastings and the Earl of Derby “delay[ed]” so long that they “could only condemn, not avoid” (404.14-6) Catesby's treachery because “they discussed it, rather than distrusted [diffiderent] it” (402.16-7). Most characters in this History consistently trust too much and distrust too little or too late. They do not acknowledge the real possibility of evil in the men around them. In other words, they have an imprudent trust in the stability and effectiveness of their political order. They do not see, until too late, that tyranny can arise in their own country.

From this consistent presentation, one may conclude that fear and suspicion, since they prevent people from “trusting too much,” could be significant obstacles for a tyrant. There are many examples that show it is often not prudent to trust, and many that show it is often prudent to fear. A healthy dose of fear and suspicion might even help prevent the rise of a tyrant. Richard ultimately attains the throne not only by his brutal tactics, but also by his clever subtlety. He does not make his plan known, and thus most people do not realize they should fear him until it is too late.

The History illustrates how failures of fides aid tyranny, but in so doing, it also reveals what individuals and societies should strive for. By reading Richard III, citizens can learn the value of being trustworthy, but also learn to recognize that not everyone is. They can see the benefits of being suspicious of great power and become aware of the motivations which lead men to break their promises. They can learn to be prudent in both their trust and their fear, and come to realize that knowing of danger is not the same as protecting themselves from danger.
Rulers and potential rulers also can learn something. Richard, who has been so careful not to trust too much, even when he has achieved his goal, when the power of the kingship is his, still does not feel safe. He has “broken all ties of human society” (320.11-2), and so “he was not secure even [as king], nor did he trust [anyone] ... ; he did not withdraw his hand from his sword-hilt and he looked around in all directions just like he was about to strike back” (484.18-21). When the people trust a ruler too much, it allows a tyrant to gain political power, and they suffer as a result; but the tyrant's own lack of trust in the people leaves him isolated.

Section II: Fides & Political Education

As Chapter One explained, as a rhetorical history, Richard III teaches important moral and political lessons about tyranny, but it also goes a step farther: It teaches how to teach such lessons. One of the work’s themes concerns giving and receiving messages properly. This inquiry into education shows that fides is an important virtue even when dealing with people of others times and places. In particular, this History can be an example to someone who wants to write history well, as well as an instruction guide to those who would read histories well.

During his deathbed oration, Edward points out that sometimes messages are misunderstood with bad results, and that such misunderstandings can arise in two ways: “either the speech of someone badly narrating distorts a thing which was not badly done, or the affection of the listener exaggerates something petty in itself by interpreting it harshly” (332.20-2). In either case, the message fails to match the deed it describes. Note, however, that “badly narrating” itself covers two distinct kinds of actions, since it
can cover both the case of someone who lacks skill giving a message and the case of someone morally bad giving a message, either with or without skill. It may not always require much skill to mislead. The Queen asserts that it “is easy for anybody” to “distort[] a thing by the viciousness of his speech” (382.11-2). Be that as it may, even if the message is delivered well, “the affection of the listener” can be a problem. The History addresses both the importance of avoiding passion in receiving messages (whether as a “listener” or as a reader) and shows how narrators can go wrong in both senses noted.

Unsurprisingly, the Narrator is the character who provides the most information about narrating. He does this primarily in two ways: (1) by how he himself gives reports and (2) by his commentary on how others have given reports to him, since he sometimes refers to his sources. He draws attention to one of his sources in particular by calling it

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405 There is no difference in the term used to describe spoken and written messages in the Latin of Richard III. The entire written History is described by the Narrator as a “discourse [sermo]” (322.19); and the same term is used for the “conversation” of the servants in the key passage about the “faithful report” quoted below, the words spoken by the dukes to Woodville (344.14-5), the Cardinal's dialogue with the Queen (378.3), the conversation of Hastings with his namesake herald (418.15), Shaw's sermon (450.2, 454.5-6, 454.14), Buckingham's speech to the people (472.6), and the Recorder's repetition of that speech (470.13).

406 The following discussion treats the Narrator as being himself an example of fides. However, other views of the Narrator have been proposed. Rubio argues “that More wished his readers to evaluate the narrator of his story, and to be aware of the extent to which this narrator was untrustworthy. ... [O]ne of More's central interests in his Richard III was to display the way in which "history" was constructed and written by his contemporaries, and thus to call into question the works of those historians who, unlike More's narrator, pretend to be objective and to report everything of relevance, but who, in fact, manipulate their readers by means of the same techniques employed by the narrator in Richard III” (13; see also 167-9, 187-8, 200, 208-9, 214-6, & 221). This view sees the Narrator as personally responsible for the factual errors in the work—he “frequently lies” (168)—and interprets him as a negative exemplar, a satirical and exaggerated caricature obvious enough that “we are made aware of the tricks by which the narrator attempts to lead us to his conclusions” (216). In partial contrast, Yost holds that “More’s narrator does not shift grounds on us; he is not a liar or a self-promoter; he has two attributes that provide us with stable irony: 1) An ignorance of the main features of the time he is writing about combined with an unwarranted assurance that he is not making errors. 2) A polemical or ideological bias that allows him to maneuver through, manipulate, or simply cleave any potential difficulties” (36). In this view, the Narrator may not be a liar, but he is not much help, either, being both ignorant and biased. Wegemer views the Narrator largely in a positive light, as “a wise and winning citizen,” “deeply compassionate,” but with “a distinctive voice of
a “faithful report [fideli relatione]” (326.18). This phrase should make a reader wonder about what makes this report different from an unfaithful one, and about the broader question of what place fides should hold in reporting. Since it turns out that the passage which contains this phrase also touches on many other significant aspects of the questions this section of the chapter will examine, it is worth quoting at length:

There are those who suspect that even then the secret and skillfully concealed plans of that man for the destruction of his brother the Duke of Clarence were not lacking, although he resisted and opposed [his brother's destruction] openly. Yet, (as it appears to those appraising the matter) he did so somewhat more feebly than it was thought that one would do who had seriously determined for himself that he would be inclined to his full brother's welfare. Those to whom this appears true hold that Richard, (undoubtedly having already been persuaded then, while Edward was still living) had contrived this plan about claiming the kingship for himself, if ever by some chance his brother would have died (as it did happen) with his children too immature for the kingship. The frequent carousing and intemperate diet of the King gave hope of just such a thing. Therefore, for that reason they think that Richard desired the death of the Duke of Clarence, since his life did not appear favorable enough for his own purpose; whom, indeed, [Richard] saw that, whether [the Duke of Clarence] remained in fidelity to his nephew or aspired to the kingship, he would hold [Richard] himself as a mortal enemy. But I am able to assert nothing certain regarding this matter, since I merely followed the suspicions and conjectures of men, by which footpaths, just as one sometimes arrives at the truth, so, too, one frequently errs. Although this I myself already long ago ascertained from a faithful report: A certain Mistlebrook, immediately when Edward had died, hurried at a run to the house of Potter (who was of Richard's household); and [Potter's] door was

irrepressible comic irony” (2011B, 45); but he also argues that “More’s narrative technique could be compared to what today would be called a limited narrative point of view, a narrative strategy that expresses what a particular character would think himself. At different times, the narrator portrays a particular character’s self-understanding ... At crucial points in Richard III, the narrative perspective changes according to circumstances and character—which readers are meant to observe and which is part of the reader’s education in ‘sharp-sightedness’ and good judgment” (2011A, 129). This view holds the Narrator himself to be trustworthy, but some of his statements not to be, coming as they do from other, often untrustworthy, characters' thoughts. This dissertation consistently treats the Narrator as trustworthy, knowledgeable, and helpful, while sometimes reading his words as (accurate) descriptions of other characters' thoughts, and occasionally as sarcastic or ironic.
pounded on uncivilly long before light. Since the pounding, both by its violence and by its untimeliness, made proof [fidem faceret] of his great and urgent business, he was promptly admitted. He announced that the King had died that very hour, to which statement Potter said, as if exulting, "Then there is no doubt but that my master the Duke of Gloucester will be king immediately," whether he was acquainted with his plans, or whether he had foreknowledge of the future by some other sign (for I do not suppose it was spoken by chance). I remember that this conversation was already reported to my father then—when as yet no suspicion was held of his treason—by one who had overheard them talking. (326.1-328.5)

The first and perhaps most notable aspect of this passage for the purposes of this discussion is that the Narrator very carefully separates himself from his sources. The Narrator speaks of “those who suspect” Richard and “those appraising the matter,” and the latter appear to be a subset of the former. He says these same persons, “[t]hose to whom this appears true,” hold a certain opinion about Richard's state of mind, and “[t]herefore, for that reason they,” but perhaps not others, “think that Richard desired the death of the Duke of Clarence.” In contrast to these statements of the views of “those” other people, the Narrator also clearly and directly speaks in the first person: “But I am able to assert nothing certain regarding this matter, since I merely followed the suspicions and conjectures of men, by which footpaths, just as one sometimes arrives at the truth, so, too, one frequently errs.” The Narrator will not assert in his own name what he acknowledges that others do assert. He is willing to repeat their views, but not to vouch for them. What is certain and what is conjecture are thus strictly separated. This approach of the Narrator's to his sources is consistent throughout his narrative, as when he notes that “some suspect” Richard had given orders for the younger boy
to be seized no matter what (376.27-378.2) or that “[t]here are also those who deny that Penker was initially conscious of what had been proposed” (434.7-8). Besides these specific references to sources, some portions of the narrative are introduced with a qualifying phrase such as “it is reported [ferebatur]” (316.16, 330.15, 346.25, 426.12) or “it is believed” (396.20), or both (404.19-406.1), which seem to indicate something similar.407 The Narrator's practice of distinguishing his words from other reports seems to indicate that the source matters. Does he consider some reports more doubtful than others, and if so, why? Are some sources more trustworthy than others? The rest of the evidence must be considered before these questions can be adequately answered.

Frequently, the Narrator will note conflicting accounts of motivations, while emphasizing that the deed itself is not in question. For example, “whether the Queen's faction devised a treacherous plot against him ... or the Duke likewise, out of his own pride, was striving to make his way to the kingship—certainly he was charged with treason” (322.8-12). The Narrator emphasizes that some things are certain even though other related things may be doubtful. The precise verbal pattern, “[w]hether ... whether ... it is certain” (328.6-8), or “whether ... or ... it is certain” (358.24-5) repeats itself throughout the History, but other similar

407 The Narrator's repeated employment of such phrases “to introduce certain hard-to-believe parts of the work ... to avoid responsibility for the veracity of the statement, or at least not openly to vouch for it” (Reiter, 14), as well as “the frequently used device of saying that he only reports what others have said” (Reiter, 10) have been widely noted by scholars (see Rubio, 191; Harris, 59; Hanham 1975B, 35; 1975A, 157, 159; Donno, 420; Yost, 46; Wegemer 1996, 218, n.9; Hallet, 22-3). There is no consensus on the literary purpose thereof, however. The debate has been somewhat clouded by peripheral misunderstandings, such as confusion over whether “More ... speaks in his own person as narrator” (Reiter, 10) or whether “More's narrator functions as a character in the narrative as More presents it” as Rubio thinks (167) and as this dissertation has assumed, and over whether More's intention was to be factually accurate or not, as discussed in Chapter One.
constructions also serve the same purpose. In some of these cases, it is not clear if there are conflicting sources, or whether the possibilities mentioned are the Narrator's own tentative suggestions. In the “faithful report” passage itself, the Narrator is not sure “whether [Mistlebrook] was acquainted with [Richard’s] plans, or whether he had foreknowledge of the future by some other sign,” but he definitely “do[es] not think [existimo] it was spoken by chance.” Thus here the Narrator excludes one possible explanation without endorsing either other alternative. In all such cases, however, it is clear that these kind of contrasts between possibilities and certainties are further evidence that the Narrator intends to “arrive[] at the truth.”

Not all narrators share this aim, however. The Narrator says that bias corrupts some who give messages. It is possible, he says, that “a rumor born from hatred” can “add[] ... to the truth” (322.28-9), and it is a normal part of human nature that “we engrave our benefits in dust, but our evils, if such we suffer, in marble” (430.6-8). Thus, a reader is often left with something less than the truth about receiving good things, and something more than the truth about how bad someone is who is hated for some reason. Since the rumor mentioned is about Richard, the Narrator tacitly admits that even the evil of tyranny can be exaggerated and implies that even tyranny is worth speaking accurately about. If a rumor adds to the truth, but the Narrator's own words avoid this mistake, perhaps rumor and history are opposite kinds of narration. The “faithful report” passage quoted above,

408 Consider “as ambiguous [as it is] concerning him, it is settled [concerning] Shaw” (434.9), for example, and similar constructions at 374.20-1, 402.1-6, 410.26-412.1, 414.1-7, 426.12-3, 428.24-430.2, 446.14-8, & 468.26-470.2.
containing as it does the account of the views of some who think one thing and others who think something else, and which draws attention to the uncertainty of the whole story, is immediately followed by the Narrator's words, “Yet let me return to the history” (328.6). Reporting rumors evidently requires departing from history. How, though, can someone recognize a rumor? How can one know whether a report is truly trustworthy?

The *History* reveals how to tell which reports are trustworthy primarily by pointing out several characteristics that easily might seem appropriate to a trustworthy report, but which in fact accompany lies. Through several examples of such false reports, a reader can learn what to be wary of, and can see some mistakes one should avoid when receiving a message. First, appearances can be deceiving. Beautiful messages are not necessarily truthful ones. The edict explaining the execution of Hastings, for example, is “ambitiously composed and ... diligently limned onto the parchment,” but such ornamentation makes it merely “elaborately false” (422.15-8). The same is true of spoken messages. Buckingham, an “eloquent” man (454.20), speaks “distinctly and ornately, with such a suitable voice, face, and posture,” but it does not make his argument any more true, and so the result is “that anyone who was present would easily grant that he had never before heard such a bad cause declaimed so well” (468.23-6). Ornate composition and excellent declamation are not necessarily signs of the truth, and in fact are sometimes signs that the speaker is trying to mask the truth. The Queen condemns Richard's facetious argument for why her son should leave sanctuary as an
“ornamental speech” (386.28-9), and Buckingham himself criticizes Edward's use of “theatrically elevated [cothurnatis] names” to “prop[] up” exaggerated criminal charges (458.23-4). The word cothurnatis literally means “buskined,” referring to the type of sock worn by actors in Greek tragedies (a different word than the one for the sock used by comic actors). Buckingham's metaphor thus makes it clear that ornamental speech, along with actions and ceremonies, can be part of a fictional stage-play, and that a dramatically declaimed discourse can have a tragic purpose.

A reputation as a good speaker can also be misleading. Section I of this chapter noted that some characters are widely regarded as trustworthy, although they really are not. In a similar way, the preachers Penker and Shaw “[b]oth were

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409 The Narrator in several other places describes Richard's whole ascent to the throne using the metaphor of a theatrical stage-play. His initial description of Richard likens him to a skilled actor, who can “put on and wear and zealously guard whatever theatrical mask [personam] you please—cheerful, severe, grave, or lax” (324.10-2). Near the end of the History, the Narrator explains that Buckingham's offer of the kingship to Richard was part of some pre-arranged “agreement,” similar to a play, when everyone knows “that one who plays [ludat] an emperor in a tragedy is perhaps a craftsman,” and warns any of the people who may be reading not “to disorder the whole play with an untimely truth,” since “the tragedies they had watched were kings' stage-plays [ludos]; the people had been called into it only to watch, and one who is wise would only be going to watch. Some who, by an impulse, appeared on stage and intermingled themselves with the theatrical company disordered the play through their inexperience and thrust themselves into great danger” (482.15-24). It is clear that Richard is the leader of this “theatrical company,” and it seems that the reference to those who tried to share the “stage” with him is meant to recall those who suffered death or other punishments at his hand. Finally, Richard's reign begins (and, suggestively, the History ends) with a “staged [ludicia] election” (484.22).

Elaborate ceremony is thus completely consistent with fiction, and playing the part of a king does not make a man a king. However, while L.F. Dean interprets this metaphor to mean “that matter-of-factness and honesty can have no place in state-craft, that all must be done by formal hocus-pocus” (322), it would be more accurate to say that “all could be done” or that “all is often done” that way, since the History depicts honesty as not only desirable, but also possible in state-craft, as the examples of Chief Justice Markham and the Recorder both demonstrate. Hallet puts it well: “Above all else, More’s theatrical metaphors constitute a devastating attack not just on the misuse of the actor’s talents but on the complicity between performer and audience that is appropriate in the theater but not in the public arena... More, of course, targets Richard’s false show. ... But More also targets the fear of the ‘wise men’ to mar the play lest one of the cast in these ‘kings’ games’ might ‘hap to break his head’ (History, 95). The complicity of the witnesses allows evil to flourish” (26-7). More's point is precisely to encourage fides, not to teach that it is impossible.
celebrated for the glory of their discourses. Yet, the erudition of each of them was as much below his reputation as his virtue was below his erudition” (432.23-5).

Reputation does not necessarily indicate either great learning or great virtue, as both men's discourses support the Protector's false claim to the throne.

If a reader keeps in mind that Shaw's sermon is not a trustworthy report, even more can be learned from Buckingham's description of that sermon shortly afterward. Buckingham tries to enhance Shaw's authority, and in doing so he lists some good qualities of that sermon: “Nor do I arrogate so much to myself that I would claim that my words were of equal effect with those of a man who preaches the Word of God itself to the people, particularly one of such prudence that no one understands better what should be said, and furthermore, one so religious that he would certainly advocate nothing contrary to what he thought, particularly from that place to which no good man ever ascends intending to lie” (464.17-23). Since Shaw is backing Richard, Buckingham indirectly proves that even these four qualities do not necessarily indicate a trustworthy message. First, the subject matter is no assurance of trustworthiness, even if the message is based on the “Word of God,” and even if the author is “distinguished in [his] profession of Holy Scripture” (432.22-3). Second, the great intellect of the author is also insufficient evidence of his willingness to be faithful. Even someone who “understands ... what should be said” does not always say what should be said. Third, and very similarly, he may well be “so religious that he would certainly advocate nothing contrary to what he thought,” but if he thinks badly, he will advocate badly. He might think
Richard should be king, but since that is not true according to any objective standard, his message is not true. Fourth, the place a message is given does not guarantee its trustworthiness. Even this sermon in a church is offered in support of a usurpation, and Richard's own public declaration “that to be king was precisely to execute the laws and to act as their servant” is no more an indication of good intentions coming from a man who has ignored the law so many times, just because the statement is made at King's Bench, where “legal judgments [iura] are announced to the people by the mouth of the king” (484.1-5). Finally, a messenger's relationship to the one receiving the message is not a reliable gauge of a message's trustworthiness. Even “maternal piety” can “impart authority and weight” to “an adverse rumor” (446.15-7). Thus, nothing about how or where a message is given, or about the reputation of the messenger is a sufficient guide to the message's trustworthiness.

Moreover, not only the apparent, but even the real fidelity of messengers is not sufficient. Admittedly, Shaw, Buckingham, and the King's mother all deliver their messages knowing that they are lies, and intending, for their own reasons, that their lies be believed. However, even persons who intend to do good deliver untrustworthy messages, in a way that is parallel to the manner described in the first section of this chapter, in which trustworthy persons nevertheless help untrustworthy ones such as Richard by failing to exercise proper prudence. The Protector both uses “messengers of tested fidelity” to deliver his own untrustworthy words to his erstwhile allies (338.13-4), and specifically chooses the Cardinal as a
messenger to the Queen because he is someone “for whom there is some amount of
both love and trust [fidei] from her” (362.24). The Cardinal in fact does make a
faithful report of sorts, in that he delivers a very accurate account of the Protector's
and Buckingham's arguments, but of course their words (and thus his report) are

Almost all the Cardinal's words are those of the men who sent him. The Cardinal only makes three
comments of any significant length during his debate with the Queen, and each is largely a repetition of
what Richard and Buckingham argue earlier, sometimes word for word. In the first (378.5-20), the
Cardinal says that her motivation is “[the nobles'] own infamy” (378.8) which repeats Richard's claim that
she takes sanctuary “so that bitter malevolence could be incited among the people towards the nobles”
(360.21-2). The Cardinal says “malevolence had resulted and was blazing up among all the foreign
nations” (378.8-9), recalling Richard's concern about England's reputation “even among foreign nations”
(362.14). Compare also the following. The Cardinal: “not even our country was exempt from calumny, as
if it had begotten such an inhuman and savage people that there would be danger to a brother even from his
brother” (378.10-13); Buckingham: “if there was someone with such inhuman savagery that he would
zealously strive to harm an innocent boy” (368.10-1). The Cardinal: “he himself had been sent to her ... in
view of his own fidelity and love towards her” (378.13-4); Richard: “he should be someone for whom there
is some amount of both love and fidelity from her” (362.24). The Cardinal: “she [should] return him to the
most joyful companionship of his brother” (378.16-7); Richard: he should be returned to “the most blissful
camaraderie of the King, in whose perpetual companionship ...” (364.8-9). The Cardinal: “for [the Duke
himself] it would be the greatest advantage especially to live together” (378.19-20); Buckingham: nothing
“would prevent us from leading the most illustrious Duke out for his own good” (372.18-19).

The second passage (380.14-382.2) is similar. The Cardinal: “[T]here is not one of all the nobles
who would not wish both [your children] to be nurtured most of all under your eye and in your hands, if
only you could make up your mind that you would go out into those places which are not unbecoming either
to your dignity or to their majesty” (380.16-20); Buckingham: “there is nobody who would not be even
more pleased that the Prince himself was being cared for by his parent, if only she would make up her mind
to live somewhere in which it would be unbecoming for neither of them to dwell” (366.25-7). The
Cardinal: The boy should live “free, in dignity, and in splendor,” not “in lairs and in squalor” (380.22-5);
Richard “she stole him away from his liberty, dragged him away from ... light and splendor ..., [and]
miserably hid him in a sanctuary as if in darkness and squalor” (366.18-20). Only the Cardinal's comment
about how there are some cases in which it is better for someone besides a mother to raise a child (380.25-
382.2) is his own.

The brief rejoinder (384.7-12) and last substantive point of argument (384.24-386.8) continue the
pattern. The Cardinal: “for her there was neither any evil impending nor could any be threatened” (384.11-
2). Buckingham: “she fears absolutely nothing ... for herself. For who undertakes a war with a woman?”
(366.8-9). The Cardinal: “lest that womanly fear, having been groundlessly conceived, should put into your
mind [the thought] that you should send him somewhere farther away” (384.26-7), Buckingham: “And thus
her mind will be constrained by a false suspicion of danger to seek some stronger protection outside the
kingdom. Indeed even now, although fearing nothing of the kind, nevertheless I do not doubt she is
contriving that very thing in her mind” (368.14-7). The Cardinal: The boy “is not endowed with the
judgment with which he could ask [for sanctuary], and lacks the malice by which he could need it” (386.1-
3); Buckingham: The boy “neither has the age by which he could ask for it, nor the malice by which he
could need it” (376.9-10). The Cardinal: “they propose that the privilege of this place would indeed not be
infringed if they should come to tear him away from here even with you unwilling” (386.3-4); Buckingham:
“I propose that the most illustrious Duke be removed while it is possible, even with his
mother unwilling” (386.22-3).

The extremely close correspondence between the words of the two dukes and those of the Cardinal
not trustworthy. A chain of trust, as noted above, often results in reports of dubious reliability from persons who are themselves reliable, because the failure in trustworthiness occurred somewhere else along the line of transmission. The Narrator’s own sole mention of a “faithful report” is a subtle way to indicate the problems with a chain of trust. At first glance, it appears that the “faithful report” holds the greatest authority for the Narrator, since it is the only report to come from a named source, rather than an anonymous group, and this source is none other than the Narrator’s own father (328.3). We have seen in the case of Edward’s mother putting out false information about her son’s engagement, however, that a mother’s message can be rumor instead of truth (446.5-18), and so perhaps a father’s could, too. A reader should not give the story weight merely on account of his relationship to the messenger. Since the Narrator insists that this is a “faithful report,” though, the father himself, at least, is considered to be trustworthy. In this particular case, however, there is a fairly long chain of trust that could have been broken at any point. The Narrator reports the story only fourth-hand. The alleged conversation was between Mistlebrook and Potter, who are thus the primary sources. The next link is an unnamed person “who had overheard them talking.” The third link is the father, and the fourth the Narrator (328.2-5). A reader might wonder how accurate a story at fourth-hand is likely to be under any circumstances\textsuperscript{411}, and especially whether a person about whom nothing is known shows that he certainly is a trustworthy messenger, and thus throws into even starker relief the contrast between the trustworthiness of the messenger and that of the message.

\textsuperscript{411} Breen, recognizing that the narrative is “based ... upon a series of third- and fourth-hand accounts” (471), notes that \textit{Richard III} “call[s] attention to the limits of its own historical certainty” (474).
other than that he is an eavesdropper should be considered a trustworthy source. In
any event, it is only after mentioning this tenuous chain that the Narrator says he is
“return[ing] to the history” (328.6). Apparently, even a “faithful report” can repeat
a rumor.412

For someone who listens to speeches, or for someone who subsequently
reads histories containing those speeches, there is no substitute for careful analysis
of both a message's sources and the message itself. The Narrator repeatedly holds
up contrasting examples of those who listen well and those who do not, and makes
clear that the difference is the degree of prudence they exercise. In the “faithful
reports” passage, he notes that “those appraising the matter” have a different
opinion than those who do not.413 Determining the worth of a message means
determining its trustworthiness or reliability, and it gives one a different
understanding of affairs. In several cases, one or more persons see through
Richard's lies by making reasonable judgments about the message and the
messenger. Sometimes this is easier than others. The edict explaining why
Hastings was executed was such a transparent lie that “any boy easily perceived
[its] conspicuous emptiness,” because Richard and his allies “were understood to

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412 Thus this source, like the others, is held up by the Narrator as potentially untrustworthy. To contrast the
“faithful report” with those others, as Harris (60) and Grace (1978, 34) do, requires overlooking the long
chain of trust. Anderson takes this view to its most extreme, arguing that “it is entirely plausible that [this]
conversation took place” (90). Hanham sees what More is really up to: “More tells us that he himself (aged
five) heard the things reported to his father by someone who was present. ... With mock solemnity, More
concludes by explaining, lest we have missed this point, that indeed it is ‘hard to say’” (1975A, 158).

413 The Narrator frequently cites the wise, the prudent, or those who have weighed the evidence carefully as
a separate source. Yost believes that “if he says a story is 'wise,' or 'truthful,' or 'credible,' it is sure to be
preposterous” (46), while Hanham holds that in all cases, without distinction, “[w]hen More ascribes a
story, or an opinion, to someone else, one may be sure there is something fishy about it” (1975B, 35; cf.
1975A, 157). No matter which of these commentators is correct, the reader must judge for himself whether
the judgments of those called wise by the Narrator are truly wise.
have reflected upon the punishment for a deed beforehand which they wished to appear to have first discovered unexpectedly only now” (422.17-9). On the other hand, the account of why Woodville and Grey were charged with treason was somewhat more convincing:

This fiction, although it rendered the matter more suspect to those weighing [the evidence], who easily guessed that those who had determined on such a crime in their mind would rather have worn their arms on their bodies than collected them in casks, bound and encumbered, nevertheless satisfied the simple and rough people so marvelously that from the sight of the arms it was just as if treason was certain and proven, and everywhere they proclaimed health for the Dukes and hanging for the captives. (358.7-14)

The weighing or pondering required in this case is apparently only done by a few intelligent or prudent men. In the same way, when Richard publicly forgives Fogg and shakes his hand, the “deed [was] accepted and scattered with praises by the vulgar, [but] the prudent held [it] as empty” (484.15-6). Not all messages are universally recognized for what they are, and in fact sometimes almost nobody judges accurately. After Buckingham offers his sanctuary argument, “all the laymen who were present and truly also most of the clergy assented to this speech of the duke” precisely because they were not sufficiently cautious listeners: “they were as yet suspecting nothing evil” (376.18-9). The Narrator laments that Richard succeeded in asserting such a “feeble” “fiction” as questioning the validity of Edward's marriage, but he also points out why the Protector got away with it: “it was enough only to say something, since indisputably, securely, and certainly, proofs of it would not be demanded” (448.21-3). The lesson is therefore that a good reader or listener receives messages with suspicion and doubt, and accepts
them only after thoroughly and carefully judging them according to their own merits, rather than by the mistaken criteria noted above, and only if adequate proof is forthcoming.

A good narrator must take even more into account. He must judge his sources carefully, of course, like any other good reader, but to tell his story accurately, he must also repeat untrustworthy reports in such a way that he does not, like Edward's mother, “impart authority and weight” to them by his presentation. Any truly faithful messenger does not merely repeat a bad argument, as the Cardinal does, but rather emulates the Recorder, who speaks “in such a way that everything he said would be taken as the Duke's words, not his own” (470.14). An accurate history may require an accurate report of an inaccurate statement, and a good narrator provides that a diligent reader, at least, is not misled. He should point out which reports are doubtful and which are not, which speeches are probably trustworthy and which are not, and why they are trustworthy or not.

Furthermore, however, in order to fully educate a reader in prudence he must sometimes also point out reasons for accepting or rejecting a story that others might miss. He has to consider that readers are not all prudent, and they may be swayed by evidence that is not really relevant, or fail to be convinced by evidence that is in fact decisive. Thus, the Narrator tells the reader why Edward's own political calculations would preclude his killing Henry VI (324.23-6), recounts the reasoning of the prudent about why men planning an attack would not enclose their weapons in barrels (358.9-11), and goes to great lengths to explain why Richard's
attack on Edward's marriage is a “false accusation” (436.4, 448.20). There is
definitely a right way and a wrong way to narrate, and “it would absolutely not be
proper” for “these narratives” about Edward's marriage “thus to be omitted, lest one
be ignorant” of Richard's lie (448.17-8). Part of what a good history does is
remove ignorance by educating its readers.

Finally, a good Narrator must realize that his readers will read other
histories, too. He cannot always be there to tell them which reports to trust and
which to distrust. Certainly, he should give them some examples of prudent
analysis to imitate, but he also should give them some opportunities to practice
their own prudence. In this History, the Narrator often withholds judgment on
certain issues, allowing the reader to grapple with the question in his own mind and
make his own determination, based on what he has learned elsewhere in the work,
or elsewhere in life. In fact, this tactic of “proffer[ing] two or more, sometimes
opposing, sometimes equivocal, explanations or possibilities to account for the
motivations or actions of his characters ... permeates so much of the text as to
become a distinct stylistic feature.”414 The Narrator leaves some details uncertain
not because he doubts his source, nor because he is “as much in the dark as we
are,“415 but in order to help spur the mind of a reader towards a greater independent
grasp of the truth. When Richard was made Protector, was it “done out of
ignorance or [did it] happen[] by fate” (358.24-5)? Did the clerics agree with
Buckingham on canon law because “they were flattering the Duke or [because]
they truly thought so” (374.20-1)? Did Hastings delay sleeping with Shore's wife “from reverence or from some comradely fidelity” (426.12-3)? Was Edward's wedding delayed because “the bishops did not dare to proceed, or [because] the King was unwilling that his nuptials be besmirched by an adverse rumor” (446.14-6)? Did the crowd listening to Buckingham's speech remain silent because “they were stunned from wonder or from fear, or [was it] that each man preferred to follow another leader in speaking than go ahead himself” (468.26-470.2)? In none of these instances is the outcome of events in question, but all of them force the reader to think about the characters involved and about human nature more generally.416 How would such a man or such a crowd behave? Which of the options is more likely in each circumstance? Or should an astute reader choose “none of the above”? Whatever the correct answers may be, these questions and others like them imply that a good historian leaves some things to be deliberated by his audience, and More is a good historian. As Wegemer notes, “In various ways and at every stage, this literary masterpiece challenges and engages the thoughtful reader to exercise careful observation and ‘sharp-sighted’ judgment.”417 Perhaps the most trustworthy reports do not simply repeat their sources, nor merely aim that their readers will repeat what they have read by rote, but instead try to enable readers to find the truth for themselves.

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416 P. Dean, 104.
417 Wegemer 2011A, 126. He adds a little later that “Richard III and Utopia are both masterful puzzles that exercise the subtle and kingly prudence they artfully advocate” (Ibid., 189). Benjamin Beier agrees: “More attempts to help the reader cultivate his or her power to act well by presenting puzzles that, in order to be solved, require the reader to accept More’s invitation to actively engage his text” (209).
In political action and in the transmission of truth, *fides* is an extremely important virtue, but one which is often absent. More's *Richard III* helps a reader to see how important it is to be trustworthy, and helps one to see that prudence precludes complete reliance on the fidelity of others. It shows which kinds of messages can be believed and which ones cannot, reveals some aspects of a message which are often given too much weight when judging its trustworthiness, examines the relationship between a message and its messenger and that between a message and its audience, and, finally, highlights some good practices which should be adopted by both authors and audiences. This work demonstrates that chains of trust are prone to failure, but those who trust nobody at all will not be able to feel safe around anyone else or learn the truth from any messenger. A careful reader of this work will realize that an accurate understanding of both the need for *fides* and the ways men fail in *fides* is required to better plan for the future of a political society or the whole society of men. The *History* teaches that ultimately, learning to be both trustworthy and prudent is of vital importance in the prevention of tyranny, and that learning this lesson is in everyone's own best interest.
Chapter Seven:
Non-Human Causes of Tyranny

The previous two chapters have analyzed certain flaws in the political order and interpersonal relationships of the members of the British society depicted in Richard III. Both of those chapters trace the political dysfunction in that society (the most serious symptom of which is Richard's successful usurpation) to human causes, some of which are collective, such as defective offices and institutions, and others of which are individual, such as failing to keep promises and failure to exercise good judgment. The present chapter will consider the non-human forces at work in the History, including fate, fortune, and divine providence. Can some of the blame for the political problems of this society be attributed to them? If so, how much? In particular, this chapter will analyze how and to what extent these forces’ effect on human society limits freedom of the will. Prior chapters have included some suggestions that a potential political reformer could learn from Richard III about how to design better offices and institutions by following certain principles, such as avoiding conflicts of interest and encouraging

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418 Many commentators have recognized these themes. George Carver, for example, describes More’s History as “replete with tragedy, tragedy induced by a sense of fate impending” (35). Patrick Grant says, “Richard III is ... a story of the rise and fall of a prince on fortune's wheel” (158). Richard Marius writes, “This is ... a lean, fast-moving narrative intended ... to instruct [More’s] readers in the vagaries of fortune” (101). H.A. Kelly notes “there are numerous providential or supernatural references” (129), while Fox goes as far as to claim, “One intellectual preoccupation links all of More’s writings: his attempt to discover the precise nature of the divine providence by which he believed the world must be ruled” (1983, 5). This chapter will show that a teaching on the nature of divine providence can indeed be gleaned from Richard III, although, as the numerous other important ideas raised in other chapters have shown, to call the investigation of divine providence the major preoccupation of even this one work is an exaggeration.

419 Wegemer argues that “[c]entral to [More’s] political theory was the role of free will” (1996, 12; cf. 23, 34), and even that “one cannot understand More without understanding the centrality of free will in his thought” (1996, 29). Joshua Avery similarly asserts, “It was a point of fundamental principle for More that individuals are free ... to cultivate virtue in themselves” (130). This chapter will thus consider in detail to what extent, in what way, and with what limitations More thought men exercised free will, as evidenced by Richard III.
personal and public interests to coincide. In such cases, a better understanding of human motivations and typical human choices can result in a better government. This chapter will show that a reformer should also learn from this History that such knowledge about humanity itself is not enough. Forces that transcend human power and that are not affected by human choices nevertheless influence human life, including politics. Good politics requires understanding not only human nature, but the nature of the world humans live in. One consequence of this is that a reformer must extend his consideration to include both human and non-human factors while contemplating any design for a new political order. This in itself makes political reform somewhat more difficult. However, it will also be shown that non-human forces place some absolute limits on what can be accomplished by any human power, including anyone who exercises political power. This makes some aspects of political reform impossible. The present chapter will try to show that Richard III offers a complex, but helpful consideration of the relationship between human and non-human power. Importantly, this consideration is not merely open-ended speculation, but rather ultimately brings the reader to an understanding of crucial truths: that powers beyond human control have a real and discernible impact on human life; that because of them, some things are impossible; but that also because of them—rather than, as one might well think, merely in spite of them—some things are always possible; and in fact, paradoxically, the very forces which limit human freedom also serve to guarantee it.
Section I: The Four Theories of Who Controls the Future

A good starting point from which to see how the History’s argument concerning human freedom unfolds is the work’s intriguing treatment of prophecies, omens, and the possibility of predicting the future. Prophecy and human freedom are closely related topics because they both deal with the future. To claim that human beings are free is to claim that they can change their future. Even a more narrow claim of political freedom indicates that men can change their political future, and only in a world in which the men of a political order can change their future does any program of political reform make sense. As will be shown, however, investigating prophecy gives rise to plausible doubts about the existence of human freedom.

The theme of prophesy runs through all of Richard III, but one section of the work is particularly devoted to discussing it. This section, which follows the description of the execution of Hastings, runs from 414.1-422.26, and contains two parts: a flashback recounting some of what Hastings said and did during the ten hours before his death, and an account of what happened in the two hours after he was killed.

More's inclusion of this section in the History is a testament to the importance of the theme of prophecy and its relationship to human freedom in this work. It constitutes part of “the ageless debate about free will and foreknowledge.” Aside from this section's important philosophical development of this theme, there is not a very good reason for it to be in the work at all. Far from moving the narrative along, it disrupts what would otherwise be a strictly chronological account by shifting the timeline back a

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420 Hanham 1975A, 172. J.P. Jones adds that “More raises the complicated questions of destiny and free will; and in doing so, he places his story in the tradition that links Shakespeare with the classical drama” (54). This chapter will show that More’s contribution to that tradition is clear and helpful.
day; and in the conversation that takes place during the flashback, it strains the chronology even more in order to recount events from years in the past. This part of the History does not have an obvious connection to the main topic of the work. It is not at all clear how it relates to the titular Richard. It does not directly explain anything about how or why Richard's plan succeeds, nor does it give any information that a reader would find necessary to understand the rest of the story. In fact, if it were not included in the manuscripts, it is unlikely anyone would know it was missing. The story would flow very smoothly from Hastings's burial directly to Mistress Shore's arrest, yet the Narrator tells the reader to pay particular attention to this interruption of the plot in the words which introduce this digression:

> It is worth the trouble to learn what dreams and omens preceded [Hastings's] death, whether such things should be thought of as warnings that a treacherous plot might be forestalled, or as preceding signs of an unavoidable fate, or whether, in the affairs of mortals, either a demon is playing, or either chance or fortune are playing together [or colluding], or the soul, prescient of the future with the senses lulled by sleep, and representing imminent fates with confused images, foretells the outcome to the body. (414.1-7)

Two lessons, then, are “worth the trouble to learn.” First, one should learn “what dreams and omens preceded [Hastings's] death.” Given that the reader does not need to know this to understand anything about Hastings's relationship to Richard or to understand anything else about the rest of the story, the purpose of the lesson seems to be, in accord with the thematic tendencies described in Chapters Two and Three, to instruct the reader in something universal, using Hastings as an example. Thus, the reader learns from this account what prophecies are and how they could possibly present themselves to a man. The first question investigated in this section is thus about dreams and omens and
whether they are really prophecies: In other words, is it possible to predict the future, or not?

The second lesson the Narrator thinks is “worth the trouble to learn” is how “such things should be thought of,” even postulating they are indeed prophetic predictions, since there are several different possible explanations, including the five alternatives the Narrator lists and perhaps others that might occur to the reader. The Narrator also makes a point of including two contradictory ways that prophecies could be thought of as the first two items on his list: They could function either as “warnings” of something that “might be forestalled” or as “preceding signs of an unavoidable fate.” The second question raised in this section, therefore, is whether or not the future is inevitable. At this point, the clash between prophecy and freedom becomes apparent. No matter which way either of these important questions is answered, the result appears to be a world in which there is no human freedom.

On the one hand, if the answer to the first question is that we cannot predict the future, then human freedom would appear to have no place, because our actions in the present would not have any predictable effect. We would not know what would happen as a consequence of anything we did. A completely unpredictable future would be one of totally random outcomes. The History deals with this possibility by raising questions about the power of chance and fortune (also mentioned on the Narrator’s list): Does the power of fortune mean we do not control our futures? Are men her slaves, subject to random whims? On the other hand, if the future *is* predictable, that leads immediately to the second question, about inevitability. If that question is answered affirmatively, then
human beings are still not free. Some persons, perhaps Hastings, for example, might know through omens what the future will be, but they cannot change it. The future will not be unexpected, as it would if fortune ruled absolutely, but it will be just as much out of our hands. The History deals with the possibility of an inevitable future by investigating fate and destiny. Finally, the last possibility does not seem to make any sense on its face, and therefore requires further explanation. What would it mean for the future to be predictable, but not inevitable? Is a prediction that does not necessarily come true still a prediction?

The conversation which the Narrator describes immediately after he makes his key remark about prophecies provides the beginning of the way out of the predicament, but also raises some additional questions.

Immediately after the Narrator’s opening statement, this section of the work continues with a conversation between Hastings and a messenger sent by Lord Stanley. Like other similar parts of the History, this conversation may be read as a philosophical dialogue on a key topic with wide implications. A difficult and important issue is

421 More was particularly skilled at composing philosophical dialogues. His poem known at The Fortune Verses, The Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation, The Dialogue Concerning Heresies, and his most famous work, Utopia, are all of that genre. In each of them, in the style introduced by Plato and later employed by Cicero, Augustine, and others, More introduces important moral or political topics which are then discussed by at least two interlocutors, and the conversation is designed to lead a discerning reader closer to the truth. More's variations on this traditional style are evident even in these four works, as The Dialogue of Comfort and The Dialogue Concerning Heresies are both specifically Christian and theological, rather than philosophical in the way the Socratic dialogues are, while Plato did not write dialogues in verse, like More's Fortune Verses, and Utopia, while very similar to Plato's dialogues in Book I, uses that dialogue as a frame story for Hythloday's "history" (CW 4, 42.24; see Chapter One for a discussion of More's conception of "history") in Book II.

Richard III and Utopia are thus both works of somewhat mixed style. Utopia incorporates a history into a larger Platonic dialogue, while Richard III incorporates several short philosophical dialogues into a larger history. Among these are the indirect dialogue on faction between Richard and Edward noted in Chapter Four (328.8-336.16), the five-part sanctuary dialogue discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
treated through a difference of opinion. In this way, this short section represents the way the work as a whole handles the topics which the present chapter will analyze. In *Richard III*, by the way that many characters speak about the limits to their freedom and the way that they go about making decisions about their future, four different theories concerning human freedom are brought into dialogue with each other, and the weaknesses of three of them are revealed as Richard's plot successfully proceeds. The fourth view, however, is presented in such a way as to subtly suggest to a potential political reformer that it in particular might be a better model for explaining humanity's relationship to forces beyond our control than any other. Only by considering all four of these theories, however, can the strengths and weaknesses of any of them be adequately measured.

These theories may be classified by taking humanity's relationship to non-human forces as a starting point. They differ in their emphases on which side of that relationship is more determinative. The first two theories, which describe the future as inevitable and unpredictable, respectively, both emphasize the power of forces beyond our control. The third theory sees the future as up to humans to determine, and emphasizes our power. The fourth theory holds that both human and non-human forces have an important effect on the future.

**Section II: The Power of Fate & Fortune**

The opening paragraph of the *History* introduces the first kind of emphasis to begin the dialogue, by showing that non-human power is certainly real and great, and

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(360.25-396.15), and the dialogue between Edward and his mother about the proper purpose and nature of marriage (440.8-446.4).
possibly so overwhelming as to render human efforts inconsequential. From these early pages, it seems as though Richard's tyranny is a result of these forces, rather than human causes. The very first sentence of the work says that “King Edward ... concede to the fates” (314.3-5). Clearly, this is another way of saying that “he had died” (316.1). After reading farther, though, it seems that Edward's death is what sets Richard's plan in motion. It appears Richard would not have become king if Edward had lived; and if life and death are under the control of the fates, then Richard’s tyranny seems inevitable. Someone might argue for this reading of the entire work: Richard was fated to be king, and thus, at the end of the History, becomes king.422 The rest of the first paragraph supports such a reading by reiterating the influence of non-human forces on politics and human life.423 Just as the fates determine that Edward will no longer be king, it is by following the fates that his daughter Elizabeth becomes wife to one king and mother to another (314.10-11). Furthermore, besides the power of fate, the power of fortune is also noted: Cecilia is “not as fortunate as beautiful” (314.12), while Catherine “has continually experienced a varied lot in life, sometimes calm, more often unfavorable” (314.17-18). Like Edward and Elizabeth, the lives of these latter two daughters are not something they themselves accomplish; they get the lot they are assigned. Whether good or bad, their future is out of their hands.424

422 Scholars have done so, with some support from the text. See note 428 below.
423 Wegemer asks, “Why open a history attributing the major action to fate or fortune?—a view opposed by any Christian historian or classical author such as Sallust, whom More imitates closely, a view later opposed in the same work by the narrator himself, who seems to have the same stance as Sallust: that fortune changes with character” (2011A, 126). This chapter argues that More opens his work in this way to bring these major theories into dialogue with each other and with an orthodox Christian understanding in order to more clearly explain the truth.
424 A.D. Cousins notes, however, that while “the narrator makes a point of observing that Elizabeth's life was guided providentially, that Cecily's was not fortunate in proportion to her beauty, that Catherine has
In this way, the History raises, from the very beginning, the question of human beings' influence on their future, and thus the question of human freedom and responsibility, as well as the question of the purpose of politics, and especially of any attempt to improve political systems. If human beings do not control politics, attempts at political improvement are misguided, and if fate or fortune determines the future, men are neither free nor responsible. This first paragraph, though, in the very process of drawing the reader's attention to the restraints placed on human freedom by the power of non-human forces, also lays the groundwork for the work's eventual affirmation of human freedom. It does so by naming two such forces, fate and fortune, which turn out to represent two different ways of thinking about how the future is determined. The dialectical treatment of these two views in the rest of Richard III reveals that they are in fact somewhat contradictory. Both theories cannot be true, yet both have aspects that appear true in some cases, at least, and both resonate with human experience to some extent.

First, consider the theory regarding the power of fate. Fate (along with its synonyms, such as destiny) by definition refers to a pre-determined and inevitable outcome. Whether personified in the singular, or (as is sometimes the case in Richard III,

been tossed about by extremes of chance[, h]e emphasizes that Bridget chose a life of virtue. Her having done so seems to have placed her beyond chance's power, for her life is summarised as one set devoutly apart from the world. Anne, on the other hand, seems to have married well and to have been left otherwise untouched by chance—in so far as that can be associated with her marriage. So the England, the world, in which More's Historia Richardi Tertii unfolds has much in common with the world portrayed in his Fortune Verses. In particular, both insist on the power of chance over individual lives and that virtue enables escape from chance” (75). Cousins makes a very important point. While this chapter will argue that the power of fortune is limited, and that the changes of fortune shown in the work are consistent with free will, More does seem to argue both in Richard III and elsewhere, including the Fortune Verses, that a life of voluntary poverty, such as that in a religious order, can entirely or almost entirely remove the power of fortune over one’s life. For a more extensive analysis, see my article, “The Structure, Design, and Argument of Thomas More’s Fortune Verses,” pp. 69-120.
including in the opening paragraph just mentioned) in the plural (perhaps referring to goddesses), or whether conceived of as an abstract force, the implication is the same: the future is not something humans can change. Events fated or destined to happen will happen.

More than one character contributes to the reader’s understanding of this theory. The Queen, for instance, like the Narrator in the opening paragraph, sometimes speaks as if fate controls both politics and the rest of life. When she talks to her future husband, Edward IV, about her first husband's death, she attributes to “the fates” the power to have “preserved him unhurt” (438.5), although they in fact did not, and he was killed; and then when she takes sanctuary with her younger son, she notes that it is possible that that boy could “perish by fate” as well (382.8). The responsibility for these politically significant deaths is ascribed to someone or something besides human beings. Edward, too, says that “enmity nowhere is exercised more hostilely than among those who the dictate [fas] of either nature or of [human] laws ought to deter most powerfully from all animosity,” and that this sad occurrence happens “by I know not what evil fate” (334.11-14). He understands fate to be stronger than natural or human law; fate causes evil in spite of both human nature and human political endeavors. The Narrator himself, moreover, does not merely raise the question at the start. He subsequently refers to Hastings's death as his “fate” (418.21), and, in an important juxtaposition, explains after the success of one of the most crucial steps in Richard's plot, his appointment as Protector, that “whether it was done out of ignorance or happened by fate, it is certain that the lamb was deliberately entrusted to the fidelity of the wolf” (358.24-26). This statement serves to restate the
opening question quite well: was it “done,” or did it “happen?” Did human beings act in the wrong way, or did fate determine that Richard would succeed? Could tyranny have been avoided if people acted less ignorantly, or not? From this question, it is not clear whether or not the Narrator accepts this theory as true, but his formulation nevertheless help the reader to understand what is at stake. In the conversation about Stanley’s dream, Hastings brings this view to its logical conclusion: If the dream is telling them what will inevitably happen, then fleeing will fulfill the prophecy as much as remaining, and there is no reason to do anything (414.23-24).

That brief conversation, though, and the discussion of portents which follows, help show that there are great difficulties with prophetic omens in general, regardless of whether they reveal something that “might be forestalled” or “an unavoidable fate.” Beginning with the dream, there are other reasonable explanations for why Stanley would have had this experience. Hastings himself does not think that dreams come from non-human forces, and notes two other possible explanations. First, they may arise from the movement of “bile” within the body (414.20). In other words, dreams could be explained as the result of a physical process. Or, secondly, they might stem from some interaction between thought and memory (414.21): that is, they could be a mental phenomenon. In either case, no information is coming to the man from outside himself. His own body and mind are reasonable postulated sources for dreams. The Narrator also mentions a second omen: the triple stumble of Hastings’s horse (416.8-10). Once again, there are at least two other very reasonable explanations for such an occurrence without resorting to non-human forces: It could be the fault of the horse or a mistake of the rider (416.10-11).
Finally, both of these omens are ignored at the time, and only believed later (416.7-8), not only because there are other more plausible explanations for why they happened, but especially because until the events come to pass, Hastings has no basis for expecting any correlation. On the one hand, a horse stumbling three times might indeed always precede misfortune (416.12-13), but since it is something that happens “every day” (416.11), it also precedes events of notably good fortune and unremarkable occurrences as well. The dream, on the other hand, although such a thing is not a daily occurrence, was not particularly credible because dreams very often do not come true; and dreams about the future do not only occur before cataclysmic events. Without some way to differentiate between prophetic dreams and ordinary ones, or prophetic stumbles and ordinary ones, there is no good basis for action, even if action were admitted to be possible. If there is no way of differentiating prophecies and omens from similar, but false impressions of prediction traceable to human causes, they are not a useful guide for humans.

Aside from such “superstition” concerning omens, however (414.21, 416.12), a specifically Christian variation of the theory of fate is mentioned by the Queen during her defense of sanctuary; and this view helps to highlight the difficulties with theories of inevitability in themselves, regardless of whether they arise from superstitious beliefs or religious faith. While the references to fate by that name in the *History* almost invariably refer to events with negative connotations, such as death and tyranny, the Queen’s variation has the same concept of the relationship between human and superhuman power, but with a positive postulated outcome: She speaks of how she is sure that St. Peter will always defend his sanctuary (386.19-21), invokes its other heavenly guardians
as well (390.22), and expresses confidence that her son would be safe if left there (394.10-11). Friar Shaw relies on the same kind of Christian view of inevitability during his sermon, when he insists that illegitimate heirs will eventually be discovered and punished through divine providence (450.8-14); and it is this view which underlies the system of hereditary kingship, which, as Chapter Five has explained, the History both describes and critiques. Favoring such a system implies that one believes that God or some other superhuman power will always provide the nation with the correct rulers. This view of divine providence, just like the theory of fate, assumes an unchangeable future; and thus both, if accepted in their full rigor, leave no room for human freedom if consistently applied to human morality. The latter insists that evil is fated to succeed, the former that divine powers will ensure that it fails; but both assume that a particular future outcome is the inevitable result of powers beyond our control. Both claim to know what will happen in the future, and neither require any human beings to do anything in order for that outcome to occur.

The second, opposing theory of the future discussed in Richard III is the theory of fortune. Like the first theory, it stresses the power of a superhuman force, but it points to the unpredictability rather than the inevitability of outcomes. Hastings, as noted above, rejects the usefulness of prophecy completely, but he cannot be the only standard by which to measure. After all, the Narrator notes that Hastings is particularly bad at noticing what will happen. He thought he was in danger over the affair in Calais, but he went on to gain an even greater position in royal service; but when he thought his power was on the ascent, and his enemies were about to be destroyed, he found himself arrested
and then immediately executed (416.26-418.11, 418.25-420.1). Importantly, though, the Narrator does not ascribe these failures to Hastings’s personal faults, but to the “dense fog of mortality” (418.24-25). In the Narrator’s view, human beings in general, regardless of whether they share other aspects of character with Hastings, do not see the future clearly. This argument could lead a reader to think that the future is completely unpredictable, and in fact many parts of the *History* emphasize how little we can know about what is yet to come. In the opening lines, the Narrator notes that Catherine’s lot in life is still uncertain, because she is still alive, and therefore things could change (314.18-19). Edward, in his deathbed speech, laments the fact that he could not accurately foresee the evils he later suffers (334.22-26). And others besides Hastings are also caught by surprise. The Queen regrets the fact that she failed to expect Richard’s ploy to bring the young king into his hands (392.14-17). King Edward V does not suspect foul play, right up until the two dukes seize the members of his escort (348.2-3). Woodville, too, thought everything was fine and enjoyed those same dukes’ company one evening and was thrown in jail the next morning (346.7-11). All the members of the Council are shocked at the change in Richard (408.2-3) that immediately precedes Hastings and themselves being arrested (410.18-19, 412.4), when they were merely expecting tasty strawberries (406.18-22). And several prominent characters proceed through such extreme swings of fortune that any prediction of the future comes to seem impossible. The Archbishop falls from being Chancellor to being unemployed (358.26-360.1). Edward deposes Henry VI (436.7), then is himself deposed (448.5-7), then deposes Henry again (448.14-15). The Queen goes from being the wife of a commoner (436.14-16) to the wife of a knight
(436.16-18), to a widow of the King’s enemy (436.11-12), before becoming Queen; and afterward she is forced to flee into sanctuary (448.11-12), then emerges triumphant (390.7-9), then flees there again (352.1-3). As the Narrator points out, nobody would have predicted that Shore’s wife—the beautiful (426.14-16), intelligent (428.5-7), charming, vivacious (428.7-11), and powerful (428.22-430.6) mistress of the King—would end her life ugly (426.23-428.1), friendless, ignored, and in poverty (430.8-14). She herself could not even foresee that Richard would arrest her (424.1-3). The Narrator also stresses the unpredictability of all the events he describes when he says, “For that state of affairs and those dispositions of minds were such that you could not determine for certain in whom you could trust and whom you should fear” (398.18-20), and indeed Edward V and his brother parade through London to shouts of acclaim into the Tower, which they left only to enter the silence of the tomb (396.16-20). Judging from such evidence, it does not seem to matter whether someone is a king or a prostitute: Far from being precisely determined, the future seems chaotic, unpredictable, and completely out of one’s own hands.

Judging from their actions, however, not a single character in the History actually believes in either fate or fortune to their full extent. Some of them describe the theories, but none of them live by them. Consider Stanley: He believed the dream was a kind of prediction of the future, but it spurred him, not to accept the inevitable, but rather to suggest a drastic action (414.11). Stanley must therefore have interpreted the dream as an indication of something that “might be forestalled” (414.2-3). Edward similarly thinks that things could have turned out differently if he could have foreseen the evils that he
later experienced. He would have changed his behavior (334.22-26). And his advice from his deathbed, after having “conceded to the fates,” was not to accept the inevitable, but to strive to make things better and prevent bad things from happening. He seems to really believe that if the men at his bedside will forgive and forget, the future will be better than if they remain jealous and ambitious (334.26-28). And many characters purposely choose certain courses of action even in the midst of the variability of fortune. The Queen purposefully enters sanctuary after misfortune (350.22-352.3), and she sends her son with the Cardinal because after deliberation (392.9), she comes to believe he will be better treated if she gives him up voluntarily than if he is taken by force (392.25-394.2); tellingly, despite her words, she does not actually rely on divine protection to save her son. Earlier, she strings Edward along precisely in order to drive him to propose to her (438.14-25). She thus thinks she can improve her lot in life by taking deliberate action. She also carefully makes a plan to ensure that her family has influence over the future king (338.8-9). She thus thinks her plans can change the future.426

In fact, there is quite an emphasis on planning in this History. The word consilium, along with its variants, is one of the most common words in the work. Characters frequently “deliberate,” “take counsel,” and make “plans.”427 And despite all the emphasis on the variability of fortune in people’s lives, and all the talk about fate, the

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425 As Allison Meyer notes, “More's Elizabeth also demonstrates a belief in her own power to influence the future when she ... seeks sanctuary for the rest of her family” (158).
426 As Gregg shows, “Close reading of More’s History suggests that, despite its references to fate, its author implicitly disputes such arguments through his exploration of the workings of several characters’ intentionality and choices. We see the plans adopted by these characters assimilated into their wills, their dispositions to act, and their orientation towards others and the world. Their very identity as people is thus changed by such intending and willing” (223).
427 See Gregg, 217.
History places even more emphasis on planning, and dramatically shows the success of one plan in particular: that of the titular Richard.

However, many commentators have raised questions about whether Richard’s plan is something he actually chooses, or whether instead Richard’s plan is simply the playing out of his inherently and unchangeably evil nature, and indeed there is some textual support for this latter view. For example, Richard’s inferiority in “moral virtue [probitas]” is listed along with his lack of beauty and his intellectual strength (322.19-21), which appears to classify his evil character as something innate and unchangeable. Moreover, the Narrator says that Richard was “always, even before birth, perverse” (322.24-25), notes one possible explanation of Richard’s evil as being that in his case “nature, with foreknowledge of the future, did many things inversely at the origin of him who was, in his life, going to contrive many things against the law of nature” (322.29-324.2), and states that “his nature was more suitable [for war] than for peace” (324.324.2-3). From such statements one might conclude that Richard was created evil, that he was destined to violate natural law, and that he could not be otherwise than violent. Thus some argue that he was a monster, but he had no choice: he was made that way. His successful usurpation was inevitable, given his nature.

However, some of the Narrator’s other statements stress that Richard made a conscious choice for evil, and that he was not borne along by forces outside of himself:

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428 Myron Gilmore writes, “In Sir Thomas More's History of Richard III, ... Richard is born evil in an unnatural manner and remains evil all his life” (56). Marius says “More ... gives us a villain ... doing evil continually only because evil is his nature” and “mak[es] Richard’s character a matter of fate, destined from birth and sealed by appearance” (102). Gregg also admits, “Given Richard’s existing predispositions, one might initially conclude that his actions reflect the working out of urges and feelings that Richard cannot control but which drive him ever further down the path of moral infamy” (228).
“In fact, Richard, Duke of Gloucester ... decided [decernere], against justice and right, to take the lives of his own nephews (who were orphans and entrusted to him) and to transfer the kingdom to himself” (320.10-14); “it is certain that he decided [decernere], once the life of the boys was removed, to take control of the kingship as if it were a reward for his crime” (328.9-10). As Gregg puts it, “More clearly views Richard as a man who has thoroughly thought about and formally adopted a plan.” Furthermore, the description of Richard’s thinking while he is planning to remove the younger prince from sanctuary clearly shows that his will was able to overcome his nature: “Therefore, when he had been made Protector, although every day appeared longer than a year to him which delayed his impulse (which was passionately desiring and impatient of delay), and although he was greedy to usurp the kingship as soon as possible in actual fact, which he had already seized before in his mind, nevertheless he supposed that not a thing should be attempted heedlessly before he had enticed the remaining part of his prey into his snare” (360.4-9). This proves that Richard is capable of controlling his natural impulses and making a rational plan. His premeditation combined with his ability to postpone gratification conclusively demonstrates his possession of free will. As L.F. Dean says, the Narrator’s overall message is that “kings, too, are men with the power to be virtuous if they choose.” Richard chooses vice instead of virtue, but he certainly chooses freely.

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429 Gregg, 229.
430 L.F. Dean, 323. Cf. Martin Fleischer: “[More] views the events which comprise the story of Richard’s reign as the result of the successes and failures of human will and wit and not the inexorable workings of fate” (164; see also n. 51 on that page). Karlin agrees, “More does not make Richard’s rise seem inevitable, much less providential” (88).
Section III: The Power of Man

The theory of human freedom exemplified by Richard is the third main theory presented in this work. In contrast to the theories of fate and fortune, this theory stresses the power of human beings, rather than the power of non-human forces. Richard does not think that God’s power will stop him from taking the boy from his mother. He is clearly willing to violate sanctuary, and anticipates no obstacle from St. Peter. But also, he certainly does not think he is fated to become king. He never simply waits for the kingship to inevitably come to him. He carefully plans each step of his usurpation and works hard to make sure it comes about. Buckingham tells the people that Richard has been chosen by “divine providence ... so that he alone could appear born for the kingship” (466.12-13) and that Richard is “destined for the kingship” (466.26), but Richard himself never stops trying to convince people by means of many other arguments, too. In fact, he purposely concocts a plan so that he will seem to the people to be divinely chosen (452.15-21), clear evidence that he does not actually believe in divine providence, but that he does believe in the power of human planning. Even after he is crowned, he actively tries to gain support from all groups (484.5-6). These are not the actions of a man who believes in fate.

Richard does not think that the future is unpredictable, either. He thinks that human reactions can be anticipated and accounted for in his plans. For example, in the first step of his plan, he sees how hard it would be to seize Edward V if he was escorted to London by a strong body of soldiers. Therefore, he presents the Queen with certain arguments which he predicts will result in a reduction of the king’s bodyguard, and he is
successful (342.6-344.5). Later, he is careful to keep Edward V alive and nominally in power until he has his younger brother in his hands, too, since he anticipates that if he killed only one, his enemies would immediately crown the other (360.9-11). In all of these instances, Richard carefully reasons that some actions on his part will result in the outcomes he wants, and others will result in outcomes he does not want; and he acts accordingly.

Richard’s conduct suggests that he believes the future is entirely determined by human actions. It should be noted, however, that he does not believe that other humans are governed by different metaphysical rules than he is. Nothing he says or does indicates that he thinks he is a god, or that only his actions determine the future. Rather, he knows very well that other humans, too, influence events. He fears that the Queen might flee abroad with her son, for example, so he tries to prevent it (360.11-13); and he makes a strategic alliance with the Duke of Buckingham in order that their new combined power “would be augmented by half” compared with what he could muster alone before (398.4-5). He realizes that the power he starts with is not enough to accomplish his goals, and so he increases his power at each stage, so that he will have enough power to accomplish the next step. His worldview, then, is one in which humans completely control the future, but some humans can have more effect than others. The world is not a place controlled by God or fate, or subject to random unpredictable changes from outside. Rather, it is an arena within which all men struggle with each other to gain the upper hand. Those who plan intelligently and execute their plans ruthlessly can get the future they want, and Richard intends to be one of those people.
This third theory, then, differs from the previous two in that human action, human freedom, and human choice indeed have an important role. Human life is not pointless; we are not passive participants waiting for inevitable fates or caught up in a random melee. In one crucial way, however, all three of these theories are similar: In none of them is justice or injustice something of human concern. According to the first theory, either the forces of evil will inevitably triumph despite us, or, in the Christian version, good forces will always protect the innocent. There is no reason to make a moral choice either way; justice or injustice is something guaranteed. According to the second theory, both good and bad things happen to humans, but these have no relation to justice or right. Sometimes sanctuary protects an innocent child, and sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes a prostitute has money, power, and friends, and sometimes she doesn’t. Sometimes a nation has a good king; sometimes it has a bad one. Moral choices thus have no effect on the future; justice and injustice are random and uncertain things. According to the third theory, choice is important, but not goodness. Justice is merely the will of the stronger. The point of human life is to acquire power to do with as you wish: to take care of yourself. There is no providential plan. Nothing is certain except what you can gain if you are better at effectually exercising freedom than everyone else.

The History shows that this third theory of human freedom, like the theories of fate and fortune, represents in fact only a part of the truth about the way human and non-human forces interact in the world. First, although Richard’s plan succeeds in his main goal of securing the kingship for himself, its limitations are also made apparent to the reader. Some of Richard’s deceptions fail, especially during the later stages of his plan.
The London officials merely pretend to believe the charade acted in suits of armor which Richard intends to support his claim of Hastings’s treason (420.21-422.2); and the proclamation regarding the same claim that is read to the people at large fails to fool them precisely because it is over-planned (422.13-20). When Richard then similarly attempts to indict Mistress Shore based on false allegations, he cannot make them stick, and is embarrassingly and ridiculously forced to reduce the charge to mere prostitution (424.1-8). Richard then immediately makes another misjudgment when he insists on punishing even this offense. He thinks public humiliation will turn the public’s support away from Shore and towards himself, but he only succeeds in increasing the sympathy the people feel for her. He fails to foresee both major reactions of the crowd: Some pity her because they think she is being unfairly singled out for punishment, while others support her because of the very same physical beauty which Richard asserts that she misused (424.13-22). In the end, Shore is not executed, and Richard’s support among the people lessens. Then, as noted in Chapter Five, another carefully planned charade descends into farce when Friar Shaw and Richard fail to keep their timetables, and their attempt to simulate the support of a divine providence they do not believe in backfires (452.15-454.8). Next, even when Buckingham’s speech is delivered three times (454.22, 468.15-26, 470.12-14), the people still do not acclaim Richard as king (470.15-17). He eventually takes the crown, but with almost everyone knowing that they have witnessed a usurpation (482.2-7). His final feigned gesture of friendship towards Fogg similarly convinces only a portion of the intended audience (484.10-16). In the end, Richard has attained as much power as it is possible for anyone to attain. He is the king and de facto
dictator. Nevertheless, he lives in fear. “[H]e was not secure” in his position (484.19), because he realizes his power is not total, and could be overthrown. He has all the power it is possible for him to have, but that is not enough to prevent his losing power at some future time. Even Richard, who is consistently presented throughout the work as the epitome of tyrants, is limited in how much evil he can accomplish. Even the most powerful man’s freedom is not absolute.

All three of these theories, then, have considerable weaknesses. None really proves to be consistent with the reality of human experience. However, each of them has some evidence to support it. None of them is completely contrary to human experience, either. The theories go wrong by suggesting that the future is entirely fixed, or entirely random, or entirely up to us. More’s History helps a reader to see that the future actually is determined by a combination of these factors, and that it is important while making all decisions in life, but especially when considering political reform, to take a more nuanced view of how much any man, or even a whole society of men, can do.

First, how much is really inevitable? Upon examination, it is found to be very little indeed. This work emphasizes how much freedom humans have, and show that the idea of fate or destiny ought to be very limited. The most common usage of the word “fate” in the work is in connection with death (314.5, 382.8, 418.21, 438.5), and death is certainly inevitable for human beings. It is not within any man’s power to live forever, nor does death come only to certain men at random. Death is universally fated. But its time and manner are not fated, and the History contains several examples to show that even death is something we can have some effect upon. When Edward died, he may have
“conceded to the fates” (314.5), but the Narrator takes care to note Edward’s bad choices (316.24-318.3), and Richard in fact takes hope that his own plan might well succeed because Edward’s overindulgence in food and sex was likely to shorten his life (326.10-11). If Edward had chosen more wisely, he could have lived until his children were old enough to take over from him, even though he could not have lived forever, however well he chose. Of course, whether our lives are long or short does not entirely depend on our own choices. The Queen notes that her son might well “perish by fate” from his sickness (382.8), even though he is only a young boy and has not made the unhealthy choices his father has. The time of our deaths is thus not entirely within our power, but our choices do play a big part.

Several other deaths that are ascribed to fate indeed do not primarily result from the choices of the person who dies, but since they do come about as a result of other men’s choices, they are examples of human freedom, rather than destiny. Henry VI and Hastings, along with Vaughn and the other relatives of the Queen, die at the times they do because Richard decides to kill them. The wry humor which follows the proclamation of Hasting’s crimes to the people of London draws attention to this fact. The people see that the proclamation had to have been written beforehand, and they realize, with common sense, that there is one very sure way that Richard could have predicted Hastings’s

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431 Samuel Gregg makes the same point, while also extending it: “Though More speaks of King Edward IV succumbing to “fate” (concessit fatis), Edward’s early death – and the subsequent turmoil into which England is plunged – is presented as partly resulting from his own licentious choices. Likewise while Edward refers to “some evil influence” – perhaps better translated as “evil fate” (malo fato) – in his deathbed address, the king himself identifies the core of the problem as something that is not at all predetermined: factionalism” (215-216). “‘Fate,’” he notes, “is less the issue than people choosing paths inimical to morality and the common good” (216).
execution before he even came to the meeting at which he supposedly committed treason: if Richard intended to execute him whether he did anything or not (422.13-20). Prophecy based on knowledge of someone’s destiny is thus not the only way to predict the future. A man can know his own intention and plan accordingly, as Richard did, and men can also act on their knowledge of other people’s intentions. Edward’s friends, for example, gave up trying to convince him not to marry the future Queen because “they saw the future” (440.4-7). They knew his mind was made up. Buckingham also mentions Burdet by name among several men who died at Edward’s hands (458.2). They, too, died when they did as a result of human choice. The Queen similarly speaks of “fates” being decided by battle (438.5). The actions of the men fighting, not some superhuman force, determine who lives and who dies in such a case. And, as Richard notes, the outcome of a battle is, far from being a matter of fate, something “always uncertain” (342.8-9). The theory of fate, then, is strongly discredited. Finally, the very last word of Richard III is “destinatus” (484.25), and the context of that last sentence aptly sums up what the whole plot has demonstrated: events are not determined by fate. All the food that had been prepared was “destined” for the coronation of Edward V, but in fact was eaten at the coronation of Richard III (484.23-25), largely as a result of Richard’s own choices. In this way, the actions of a tyrant are, however surprisingly, in fact a strong affirmation of human freedom, and a definitive rejection of the idea that political events—even who will be crowned king—are the inevitable result of fate or providence.

The power of fortune also is more limited that it might seem at first. It is true that human life contains a great deal of uncertainty, and, as was noted above, Richard III
certainly describes many lives that go up and down and back again. But it also provides evidence that this variation is not a result of “chance or fortune playing in the affairs of mortals” (414.3-5), but rather, as proved to be the case with much that was described as “fate,” a result of the choices made by other humans. Woodville and the Queen both experience “adverse fortune” (350.9, 352.28) as a direct result of Richard’s actions, when he imprisons the former and forces the latter to flee to sanctuary. And in the case of Shore’s wife, the Narrator specifically says that her “adverse fortune” (430.13) is “not by chance” (430.4). It is instead because of human choices. Richard actively opposes her and seizes a large amount of her wealth (424.1-3), while later others, even those she helped, choose to ignore her (430.12-14). Similarly, the Cardinal tells the Queen that some are accusing her of dragging her son away from his “brilliant fortune” into sanctuary (360.19). Thus, the word “fortune” is commonly used to describe something that can be taken away by other people, rather than the effect of some power beyond all human control.

Almost all of the occurrences, then, that could be cited as instances of fortune or fate are in fact of human origin. We all experience the effects of each other’s choices. No superhuman power forces us to make any particular choices, and none fixes the events of the future in stone. To some extent, indeed, the choices that others make are unpredictable, or affect someone in an unforeseen way, and this uncertainty is experienced as variations in fortune. Thus “the morality of acts that permeates More’s

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432 Gregg is correct: “The History’s treatment of the morality of acts thus confirms Thomas More as someone not at all inclined to deterministic explanations of the origins and significance of human choice” (217).
History [is] a morality which, ... (1) subtly critiqu[es] accounts of history that explain human actions in terms of destiny or fate and (2) defend[s] the reality of free choice.433

Section IV: Limits to Human Power

Although all humans have the freedom to make choices, some humans’ choices have more influence on their fellows than others, as Richard demonstrates. Power, including political power, is a real phenomenon, and men with more power can shape the lives of others to a greater extent than those with less. To that extent the third theory is correct. But the History points to a power beyond human power that limits the amount of power that any human being can wield. This ultimate constraint to which we are all subject has two very important implications: one for men who are relatively powerful and one for men who are relatively weak.

First, consider the implications for the powerful. Richard’s qualified success, which is the main subject of this work, demonstrates that those who are ambitious must look beyond politics if they wish to be truly secure. Even if someone is among the few who can fight their way to the very top, even if one can succeed in becoming king, he cannot rest easy afterwards. Others, too, can strive for the same power and might also succeed. Furthermore, human power is inherently limited, and this fact does not depend on the political order in which one lives. As Chapter Five has shown, a reader should come away from this work with an appreciation for the benefits of separation of powers; any such separation, however, is not what limits Richard. He does not feel unsafe because Parliament has some legitimate political power which limits his own. He keeps

433 Gregg, 236.
his hand on his dagger (484.20-21) because he fears an assassin. Laws against murder cannot prevent all assassinations, and no royal edict can make a tyrant immune to the effects of a blade. Additionally, no bodyguard is perfectly effective, nor are bodyguards themselves completely reliable, and it is realizations such as these which make Richard feel insecure.

Now, there are two main sources of a tyrant’s greater power over others than they have over him, and Richard’s difficulties illustrate that there are two great corresponding limitations built into human nature. One source of power is a tyrant’s own personal strength, of various kinds. Richard, for example, is notably intelligent and courageous (322.19-20), and very skilled at dissimulation (322.24), at keeping secrets (324.8-10), and especially at combat (324.2). These innate talents would make him somewhat more powerful than stupid, unskilled men even in themselves. But without political power, even a very skilled man will have a fairly small amount of influence on others. Richard in fact puts his talents to work to seize political power, rather than using them merely to influence individuals he encounters. By far the largest amount of any tyrant’s power comes from controlling others through the institutions of the state. Political orders make concentration of power possible, and political institutions like kingship accustom the members of a society to obedience and cooperation. Laws are followed, taxes are paid, and conscripts report as ordered to the army that, for its part, ensures that laws continue to be followed and taxes continue to be paid.

The limits to human cooperation, however, ensure that even the worst tyranny cannot completely obliterate human freedom. Even when bad men try to cooperate, they
often fail, as demonstrated by the timing problems during Shaw’s sermon and those connected with the proclamation about Hastings mentioned already. In addition, bad men do not always cooperate. Buckingham was at first reluctant to join Richard at all (398.20-400.2); and while he zealously supported him for a time, the Narrator notes that later they turned against each other (400.9).

Furthermore, no man, whether very good or very bad, has complete knowledge, complete foresight, or can completely anticipate the actions of others. Therefore, politics is always somewhat limited in what it can achieve. On the one hand, no tyrant can entirely subject others to his evil will. On the other hand, no political reform can prevent all evil men from coming to power, nor stop all the effects of evil. Finally, if a man surpassing even Richard’s political skill arose, and he managed to coordinate the whole society for his own purposes, human mortality would ensure that his effects were still

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434 Hanan Yoran fails to see both sides of the implications of human limitations, and thus takes from Richard III a lesson in despair. He notes that rhetoric, that tool so lauded by Cicero, is shown in this work to be a tool employed for nefarious purposes by evil men, and thus concludes that “[f]ar from being an instrument of rational and moral negotiation, rhetoric is presented as intrinsically corrupt and corrupting” (532), and goes on to note that both Dr. Shaw and Buckingham fail in their attempts to use rhetoric to convince others (533). Yoran takes from this that “the 'lesson' of the work is that the political world is essentially and irredeemably corrupt, that no moral and rational political order based on secular principles—on natural reason and the natural qualities of human beings—is possible” (522). This chapter argues that instead, the lesson of the work is that on the one hand a perfectly rational and moral political order is indeed impossible, but on the other hand, a perfectly irrational and immoral political order is also impossible. The limitations of human rhetoric, like other human limitations, help to preserve both freedom and justice.

Fox falls into a similar trap. He cites Hastings and Shore as examples of how men cannot control events around them (1989, 122-3), as well as Richard’s failure to arrange things just the way he would have liked (1989, 123). He then concludes from such evidence, “More was acutely conscious of the ironic discrepancy existing between human will and human fate; no man, he seems to be stressing in the History, can ever fully understand or control his destiny” (1989, 123); “[More] had come to doubt that human beings can ever fully grasp the real nature of their situation or the meaning of the their experience” (1989, 125). Being unable to fully change events to one’s liking is not the same as being unable to understand that human life is meaningful, however. And being unable to fully understand or control one’s destiny does not preclude one from partially understanding and controlling it. As this chapter has argued, the History shows that men’s power to change the future is real, but limited. More did not “doubt the extent to which men can ever establish the truth concerning human experience in the world” (Fox 1989, 122; emphasis mine); rather, he illustrated that extent.
quite limited, and that even the power due to his innate ability will disappear. Eventually he would die, and his society would be at least a little more free than before, under his less skilled successor. In fact, exercising extreme amounts of power usually provokes a reaction from some others within the society, so that “immoderate power is rarely long-lasting” (448.10).

It seems that these two great limitations—that is, human mortality and our imperfect ability to coordinate our actions—in fact constitute divine providence. God has so ordered the world that all human beings are, in a sense, equally free, but not equally powerful. All men have the ability to choose what to do; some men have more power to translate those choices into concrete acts; and no men are able to attain unlimited power over their fellows.435

Just as this kind of providence provides an upper limit to what even the most powerful man can do, it also provides a lower limit for human freedom, which has important implications for the relatively weak. Even the weakest people still have

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435 This interpretation thus disagrees with Yoran, who holds that “no 'monograph', not even one that describes more fortuitous times and events than those of Richard III, can demonstrate the work of Providence. Only a universal history, such as Augustine's, provides the scope within which are revealed the providential power that direct the history of mankind. Indeed, one of the most distinctive characteristics of Richard III is its secular representation of the political world, its insistence that the human world is fashioned by human intentions, motivations, and actions” (522, n. 21). Yoran has apparently either accepted Richard’s view as the work’s final view, or misunderstood the relationship between providence and free will. This dissertation argues that Richard III does demonstrate the work of Providence, and moreover, while agreeing that the History insists that “the human world is fashioned by human intentions, motivations, and actions,” holds additionally that this is consistent with a Christian view of God’s providence. Yoran holds that Western Culture traditionally “asserted that the destiny of human beings was determined by providence and that human history was meaningful only as part of a divine plan beyond human comprehension. ... In More's text, by contrast, the director of the play of life is no longer divine providence but human beings—or, more accurately, politically powerful men” (529). But the limitations on even the most politically powerful men are the way divine providence remains “the director of the play of life,” and thus More shows that both are true: Human history is only meaningful as part of a divine plan, and human beings’ destiny is not determined by providence, but by free will. More’s History as a whole argues against the mistaken theory of Christian divine providence described by the Queen and Dr. Shaw, and shows that you do not have to cease to be Christian to start being free.
freedom of choice, although their choices have less effect on the rest of their society than do those of someone who has political power. Importantly, even the weakest have the power to choose between good and evil, including whether or not to cooperate with injustice and even tyranny. They may be unable to stop injustice, but even the most powerful tyrant cannot force them to contribute to it or cooperate with it. In his speech to the citizens of London, Buckingham notes two prominent examples of men who were unjustly punished by Edward IV: Burdet (458.4) and Sir Thomas Cook (458.11). Neither of these men is able to prevent injustice from happening to him. Burdet is killed (458.5-6), and Cook is reduced from wealth to poverty (458.14-19). Their swings of fortune, like those of others, are the result of the actions of a powerful king. In the same place, however, Buckingham also names Judge Markham. Markham, like Cook, held a political office and could not prevent himself from losing it in the face of the greater power of the king. He lost his office, though, “precisely” because he would not rule against an innocent man (458.7-11). Edward could force Markham out, but he could not force him to join in. A good man, even when he is weaker than a bad man, always has a choice: He can suffer loss instead of cooperating with evil. Weaker men cannot always ensure justice for others—Burdet is executed despite Markham’s refusal—but even the weakest man can choose justice and live it himself.\footnote{Fenlon is therefore correct: “More’s understanding of tyranny was the Christian understanding of tyranny. It was not Machiavelli’s, which sees in tyranny a mere turn of the wheel of Fortune. ... For More,}{436} Fenlon is therefore correct: “More’s understanding of tyranny was the Christian understanding of tyranny. It was not Machiavelli’s, which sees in tyranny a mere turn of the wheel of Fortune. ... For More,
tyranny was something into which the state declined on its own responsibility, through
dereliction of office and complicity in evil." Tyranny is presented as the result of
human choices, both of the tyrant and of those who fail to stop him. The fourth theory
which appears in Richard III thus lies between the first two theories and the third. It
holds that humans are not completely controlled by forces beyond human power, that
human freedom is real, but nevertheless the effect of one’s free choices on the future is
more or less limited, depending on one’s circumstances.

Section V: The Consensus on Who Chooses Rulers

The way that Richard and his supporters describe non-human forces when they
speak publicly helps to both further clarify how those forces influence who becomes a
political ruler and to show that this fourth theory is really closest to the truth. Father
Shaw, Buckingham, and Richard himself all reference such forces in their respective
speeches to the people near the end of the History, and all three do so in largely the same
way. In all three cases, an analysis of their words shows that they do not really believe

437 Fenlon, 476.
438 Accepting this fourth theory as the final teaching of the History distinguishes this dissertation from two
other interpretations. H.A. Kelly, on the one hand, sees Richard III as an example of a work which teaches
that God’s providence chooses rulers. Kelly holds that Richard is shown as never receiving divine
approval, but claiming it. All his attempts at divine approval backfire, and Richard himself loses power
soon. The History thus shows, he claims, that divine providence is determinative, and that Richard is not
chosen (129-130). Rubio, on the other hand, holds that “Richard III ... is designed to call all theories about
the operations of Providence into question” (221), and that “neither More nor his narrator ... pretends to
explain the ways of God to men” (170). While Rubio is right that “More did not intend to present Henry
Tudor ... as an agent of Providence” (207) in the sense the Tudor governmental authorities tried to (184; cf.
Hanham 1975B, 35), this does not mean that More rejected Providence altogether. As this chapter has
argued, one can believe that God’s providential plan is at work in human history and in human politics
without accepting that any political rulers at all are directly chosen by God. Wegemer interprets More’s
writings as a whole in this way: “In [More’s] view, history unfolds as a result of individual free actions, but
always guided by a provident God who does not hesitate to intervene, often through the great individuals he
brings into existence” (1996, 72). God's interventions themselves are not heavenly pronouncements of
divine approval, but rather consist in the creation of extraordinarily talented men who become great by
freely choosing to act for good.
what they tell the crowd, and also allows the reader to see that both they and the people they address really do accept this fourth view.

First, none of these three men ever claim that the throne comes to anyone merely by fate or fortune. Part of the reason for this is that Richard is seeking more than just the kingship; he is also seeking legitimacy, and that cannot come by fate or fortune. Perhaps fate and fortune can give things to men, but by their very nature they have nothing to do with merit. To be fated to be king means that one will indeed take power, but destiny can be good or bad. At most, an argument from destiny could dissuade or discourage some people from trying to stop him, if they think he will inevitably become king. They will not be convinced that he is a good king, or that he deserves to be king. Similarly, to be chosen to be king at random says nothing about him other than he got lucky.

Why, though, does Richard care? His actions show that he does not care about legitimacy in itself. He is willing to falsely accuse his own mother of adultery in order to make Edward and his sons seem illegitimate (434.21-26), and he is willing to repeatedly lie in order to make himself seem legitimate. He thus does not think that he must actually be next in line to be king, or be legally entitled to be king in order to get the benefit he wants. Rather, he wants something that comes from the appearance of legitimacy. He realizes that he must not only take office, but be thought to deserve to become king, in order to fully benefit from the kingship’s power. If everyone admits that he is in fact king, but also thinks that he should not be, he knows his hold on the crown will be tenuous. This is especially true after the recent events in his society. Henry VI and Edward IV both lost their power because others thought they did not deserve to have it.
Claiming that he is king by decree of fate or whim of fortune could possibly help Richard obtain the kingship, but those kind of claims cannot help him keep it, which is what he really wants. He does not merely want to have power, but to have it securely and lastingly; and an argument based on fate or fortune can be used just as well by any who want to take it from him. They, too, could claim to be fated to be next, or that the wheel of fortune has turned to them now. Richard realizes that a moral claim is stronger. If he could convince everyone else in his society that it is right for him to be king, there would be no danger of losing this power at all. They would all agree with him. The best he could possibly do, then, would be to convince each person to want Richard to be king as much as he himself wants it. Another option would be to get all the people to agree that, even if they themselves do not really (or do not strongly) want him to be king, he nevertheless should be king. This latter option can be understood in two ways: either that he should be king because he is entitled to it, or because he would be best at it. For this reason, Shaw, Buckingham, and Richard refer to divine providence rather than fate or fortune, and they speak as they do with these three workable possibilities in mind.

The Narrator makes it clear that Shaw’s part of the plan was intended to be two-fold. He would present a certain argument to the people about divine providence, but he and Richard also intended to choreograph a scene. Richard would arrive just at the close of the part of the sermon on divine providence. Then, “with such a speech coinciding with his arrival, it would be thought that the preacher was inspired to proclaim [that speech] not by a human plan, but by some divine nod of approval. Then the people would be moved by that thought so that they would acclaim Richard as king instantly;
thus it would appear to posterity that he was chosen for the kingship by divine providence and almost by a miracle” (452.16-21). The way that Shaw preaches about divine providence is thus particularly designed to reinforce the idea of divine choice, and to depreciate the importance of any “human plan.” Thus he preaches on Wisdom 4:3, “Bastard shoots do not produce deep roots” (450.2-3), and stresses God’s action rather than man’s: “[T]he matter is arranged in such a way by God that shortly, with the truth bursting out through some crack, the legitimate successors are restored and the genuine shoots are returned to their earth, with the bastard shoot discovered and plucked out before it produces deep roots” (450.11-14). Shaw, of course, does not really believe this; if he did, he would think that Richard would soon be revealed as an illegitimate claimant to the throne. He (and Richard, too, since they planned this speech together) must think, though, that this argument would be effective. There is an inherent reasonableness to the idea that God supports the truth, and that divine providence is on the side of “justice and right [ius et fas]” (450.19). As noted above, taken to its extreme, this kind of providence amounts to fate. If God will guarantee justice, then no more needs to be done. Shaw, of course, is not really suggesting that. He does not want God to act; he wants the people to act. He wants them to acclaim Richard as king. He certainly does not want them to sit back and wait for God to acclaim Richard as king. He does, however, also expect that God’s will could be miraculously expressed to the people in a way that makes it clear to them that Richard should be king. This invocation of divine providence thus really amounts to arguing that God wants the people to act in accordance with justice, now that He has revealed the truth. Shaw, then, expects his audience to accept both divine
providence and free will. However, as was already mentioned, this attempt to display a very direct kind of support from divine providence was “ridiculously spoiled” when neither Shaw nor Richard could keep their timetable (452.22).

Buckingham, the next of the conspirators to speak, therefore describes a more indirect providence. Buckingham does mention Shaw’s sermon, and briefly reiterates that Edward IV and his sons have no legitimate claim to the throne (464.14-466.8), but does so only almost at the end of his speech. By far the largest part is a litany of injustices committed by Edward: He assessed too many taxes (456.5-19), seized the property of his enemies based on false indictments (456.19-458.2), executed and otherwise punished innocent men (458.3-460.8), spilled British blood in needless warfare (460.8-21), and was an extraordinarily promiscuous womanizer (460.26-462.21). Thus most of Buckingham’s argument has nothing to do with whether Edward was a legitimate king, but rather with showing that he was a bad king. After the reference to Dr. Shaw’s sermon, however, Buckingham then ties both halves of his argument together. He claims that the nobles and “a good part” of the people have already asked Richard to be king (466.9), for both reasons: They could not tolerate “to be ruled any longer by a bastard seedling, nor that such bitter evils become longer established” (466.13-14). He implies that illegitimacy and injustice go together. In the same way, this imaginary group of nobles and commoners is said to have recognized that “not only the warlike virtues, but all appropriate arts for governing a dominion besides coincided by divine providence in this one man [Richard] in such a way that he alone could appear born for the kingship” (466.10-13). He then mentions all three of the non-human forces mentioned in the
History in a very careful way: “[T]here is more reason both for rejoicing in your fortune and for giving thanks to those above by whose benevolence it has been provided that he whom they have destined for this kingship not only is of mature age, but indeed even has joined admirable prudence with great experience of affairs and the highest glory at home and abroad, acquired by his virtue” (466.24-468.2). Note that it is fortunate for the people, but not for Richard. He was not chosen at random. Also, he is “destined for the kingship,” but not by an impersonal or possibly evil fate, but by benevolent deities. Moreover, their benevolent providence is revealed both through Richard’s comprehensive ability to govern—both in war and in peace and “at home and abroad”—and through his legitimacy. Importantly, the choice of “those above” is communicated to men, not by a miracle, but by natural signs: “prudence,” “virtue,” and skill in “all appropriate arts.”

Still, though, the basic theory of providence is the same as it was for Shaw. The divine will is revealed to the people, but not forced on them. The man “whom [those above] have destined for this kingship” will not inevitably be king. Buckingham does not end his speech with this reference to divine providence, but adds one more paragraph asking for the people’s support (468.3-14). He couches it in such a way as to suggest that the people are needed to convince Richard to accept the kingship, but the implication is the same whether it is their choice, or Richard’s, or both that matters: Human beings have a choice about whether to act in conformity with divine commands or not. Shaw’s and Buckingham’s speeches both show that they, and the crowds they are addressing, understand that human choice must play a part in politics, and thus that the theories of fate alone and fortune alone are unsound.
Finally, Richard’s speech to the crowd also explicitly references God’s providence, and helps to show that even Richard himself realizes that his third theory, of human freedom alone, is similarly untenable. He knows that if he takes all the credit for any good things that have happened during his protectorate, the people will not believe him. Just as he publicly expresses a view of kingship which is much superior to his private view (as discussed in Chapter Five), he publicly embraces a theory of divine providence which he privately rejects. He tacitly admits that most of the people listening to him realize that human power is limited. In his speech, Richard mentions both ways that a ruler can help his country: by doing positive good, and by preventing evil (478.11-17). For the good, he gives credit “to God, not to himself” (478.14). This is a very reasonable thing to do, because even if he has used his innate talents for the common good, he did not give himself those talents. Part of divine providence consists in the distribution of talents to various men. However, even while he pretends humility in giving God the credit, he says “he had assisted the republic some small amount” (478.12-13). Regarding the evil that he halted, he says he did so “partly by his own industry, but mostly by divine providence” (478.16-17). Just as God should receive the credit for good done with abilities He bestowed, so He deserves credit, too, when evil fails, because it was by His plan that humans would remain limited in the amount of evil they could succeed at. Even publicly, though, Richard can claim the fight against evil was partially his own. The people realize that individual actions make a difference, and that humans deserve some credit for what they do. Richard, too, thus expects the people to accept the
theory of real but limited human freedom argued for in this chapter as the final lesson of this work on the topic.

This fourth theory of human freedom might seem to conceive of a God who is not quite as good as that described by the Queen when she is insisting that sanctuary could never be violated. She speaks of a God who is good because He ensures justice in this world—indeed something very good. This fourth theory holds that God does not ensure justice here, but rather only provides for its possibility. In fact, however, this is an even more benevolent providence than the Queen’s, since not only justice, but also freedom, is provided for. According to this theory, politics is the necessary means by which human beings can strive to achieve both of these ideals.

Consider the alternatives: If humans were made in such a way that injustice was not possible, freedom would be lost. If men could not choose to misuse their power, they would not be free. Under that condition, human life would hardly differ from that of animals. There would be no evil, but also no possibility of merit. Men without freedom could not possibly earn any reward, or accomplish something good for themselves. Human life would be essentially meaningless, since nothing men did of their own choice would have any impact on themselves or those around them. A free choice necessarily entails the possibility of both good and evil. As Wegemer puts it, “Because human beings are free, tyranny with its savage horrors is always possible.”

On the other hand, if all men were both free and constituted in such a way that no man was able to wield more power than any other, bad men would be able to do evil, and no superior force could be assembled to stop them. Human life would have meaning,

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since all could choose whether to do evil or not, but it would also be filled with unstoppable unjust suffering, since a choice to do good could not prevent anyone who would choose evil from inflicting it on any innocent person. Such an equality of both power and freedom would mean that evil would flourish and would largely go unpunished. In other words, if some men were not able to be more powerful than other men, justice would not be possible; and it is precisely politics which enable some men to be more powerful than others. Only by good men cooperating with each other can laws against injustice be effectively enforced. Thus the possibility of justice requires inequality of power. The possibility of tyranny is thus a necessary consequence of the reality of freedom combined with the possibility for justice. A permanent solution to political problems, including that most extreme political problem, tyranny, would require either a permanent removal of human freedom or a permanent abandonment of the quest for justice.

Politics, therefore, is a way of reducing and confining the effects of evil choices while still allowing those choices to be made: in other words, of harmonizing freedom and justice. Allowing humans to be political is thus a more benevolent kind of providence than always preventing injustice. It allows for each human life to have its full meaning while also—to the extent possible in each society, given the choices of its members—minimizing the evil inflicted upon men who choose the good, and maximizing the possibilities for those who choose good to enjoy the fruits of their good choices.

An advocate for political reform must realize that the goal of politics is justice, while recognizing that the reality of human freedom means that not all of his fellow
citizens will necessarily share that goal, and in fact many will not. The existence of even one man like Richard requires that care be taken in adopting political institutions, and if most of a society makes a choice for evil in one or more areas, even very well-designed institutions will fail. Good political institutions may thus be viewed as means by which a people which chooses to live in an orderly way—according to reason and justice—can protect the majority's free choices for good from a minority's attempts to choose evil. Even the best political institutions, however, cannot compel a society of men who freely choose evil to live in accord with virtue.

For that reason, educational endeavors like this History are a crucial part of any society’s attempt to preserve and increase justice. Future generations need to learn, among other things, that it is important to live virtuously, that justice is never certain, that men like Richard may combine great natural gifts with a free choice for evil, and that such men need to be opposed by both good political institutions and the actions of virtuous citizens. Reformers need to learn prudence, judging carefully both how far their society needs to go to attain justice, and how much is actually possible given that no humans are perfectly virtuous, and many of us are quite far from virtue.

In the final analysis, Richard III—a literary work which culminates with the attainment of its evil protagonist’s goal, which offers for contemplation the carefully planned murder of innocent children, which depicts political maneuvering at its most brutal, which showcases the dire weaknesses of the institutions of its author’s native country, and which draws portrait after portrait of failures of judgment and moral fiber—nevertheless carries a message of hope. In the end, the tyrant’s victory is the victory of
freedom over destiny, not the victory of evil over good; and if men value justice and freedom, they will see the goodness of God’s providence reflected even in bad things. Richard’s success proves that men are free, while human mortality ensures that no bad man’s reign can last forever. Even tyranny and death are therefore signs of God’s love.

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440 This seems to be what Wegemer has in mind when he says, “Most fundamentally ... More considered government to be a natural product of human beings who are genuinely free. Human beings are so free, in fact, that they can choose a tyrannical life” (1996, 23; cf. 34).
Conclusion

Richard III is a narrative about tyranny which offers a subtle and nuanced lesson in moderation to statesmen, especially potential political reformers. Through this work, Thomas More skillfully guides careful readers to a mean between two inappropriate extremes. On the one hand, this work opposes tyranny by vividly illustrating its evil, and by rejecting the philosophical or spiritual complacency which would accept any ruler or any type of government, no matter how bad, as the will of God or the result of fate. In support of this half of its argument, Richard III proposes both general principles of political reform and specific concrete examples of how reforms of the political system presented in the work could improve British government and could have prevented Richard’s tyranny. On the other hand, this work cautions its readers that reforming political institutions is not always the answer to political problems, for two main reasons. First, not all reforms actually improve the situation, even when there are obvious defects in the present system. Second, political reform is inherently limited in its results. By distinguishing between various causes of tyranny, this work shows that no system of government, no matter how well designed, can absolutely preclude the possibility of tyranny.

Part Two of this dissertation has shown that More’s History contains a carefully constructed composite picture of Richard III’s usurpation of the British crown in its historical and political context. The failures of Henry VI and Edward IV as kings are noted, and much is made of the irregular manner in which the kingship has passed from one man to another even before Richard makes his plan. Parliament had altered the line
of succession away from Henry’s posterity, Edward had deposed Henry, Henry had then
deposed Edward, and Edward had then deposed Henry again. When Richard deposes
Edward’s son, then, it is not a singular event, but rather the fifth time in Richard’s own
lifetime that the traditional practice of a son inheriting kingly office from his father was
disregarded. Yet Richard is unique in that he alone acts tyrannically.

Chapter Four investigated what makes Richard’s actions different from the other
usurpers, and in particular what separates the tyrant Richard from Edward, who is also
shown to be a bad king in many ways. That chapter arrived at a definition of tyranny—
that is, an exercise of political authority that is both savage and unjust—which
distinguished tyranny from merely bad government. Furthermore, that chapter also
demonstrated that the History describes an opposite, good kind of government, called a
“republic”—which protects the lives, families, and property of its citizens through the
pursuit of peace and justice—as a goal towards which good men aspire. The description
of Edward and his reign is the beginning of the History, and is an important reference
point for the work’s central lesson of moderation. On the one hand, from Richard one
sees that things could be even worse than under Edward; on the other hand, the
discussions of the attributes of a republic show that there is also a clear understanding
that things could be better. Finally, Chapter Four discussed how Richard III teaches
readers about the “principle of interests”—that in laws, offices, and institutions, public
and private interests should be aligned, while conflicts of interest should be avoided.

Chapter Five opened with an analysis of the sanctuary scene as a guide to prudent
political reform, showing that even a flawed institution such as sanctuary can serve a
good purpose, that arguments in favor of reform are sometimes the tools of evil men, that a potential reformer should have a good understanding of both the intended purpose and the unintended side effects of an institution, and also that even institutions that have always worked before sometimes fail. That part of the argument tends toward instilling caution in a reformer. However, the chapter also described how the work draws attention to some important strengths of the British legal system (including guarantees of due process, legal prohibitions of conflicts of interest, and determination of kingly succession by law rather than by violence) and to how a legal reform in accord with principles already found in existing laws could make tyranny less likely. Furthermore, Chapter Five systematically presented evidence from Richard III against hereditary kingship, which also strongly urges against simply accepting one’s present form of government.

Chapter Six argued that, aside from any institutional considerations, Richard III shows that there are many opportunities to stop tyranny (or fail to do so) that depend on the choices of men at crucial junctures. Men must choose whom to trust and whom not to trust, whether to cooperate in injustice or not, and how best to respond in difficult and fluid political circumstances. Thus political reform is only part of a statesman’s toolkit; moral and political education are also important. Part Two of Chapter Six showed that this work not only teaches many of these moral and political lessons, but also teaches its readers how to best teach these lessons to others in turn. So this chapter, too, shows that the work is meant to encourage statesmen to take the middle road. By exploring what several characters choose to do and what they choose not to do, the History shows that better choices even with unreformed institutions could have prevented Richard’s rise to
power, and conversely, raises doubts about whether even better structured institutions would have sufficed if the persons involved still chose so poorly. On the other hand, by stressing the statesman’s role as educator and by demonstrating how to educate well, the work aims to spur its readers to undertake this different form of political action, not to accept tyranny as inevitable.

Finally, Chapter Seven showed that More’s *History* also investigates possible non-human causes of tyranny, and concluded that the work’s final lesson on this subject is a strong affirmation of human free-will. Political outcomes are not determined by fate or imposed by God; nor are they the result of random chance, disconnected from men’s preceding actions; rather they result from men using the power they have and the power they acquire for good or for evil. Human power is limited, but real and important. No one can alter human mortality, and the power of each man to alter his political order varies widely among persons, depending both on someone’s inherent talents and on the office one holds, but at the very least all men can refuse to cooperate with evil, and sometimes some men can stop it. However, just as evil men cannot compel cooperation with their plans, neither can good men. In the end, More’s *History* argues that tyranny can and should be opposed by all good men—both by means of political reform and by education—but that these efforts will not always be successful, and that the lack of a permanent solution to political problems is in fact a great gift of Divine Providence that gives meaning to human life by simultaneously allowing both freedom and the possibility of justice.
Appendix:
A Literal and Consistent Translation of More’s Richard III
from Latin to English

Note on the Translation

What follows is intended to be a literal, word-for-word translation of Thomas More's History of Richard III from Latin into English. The footnotes are meant to provide supplemental information as well as to enable critical comparison with Daniel Kinney’s critical edition and translation found in CW 15. The P manuscript is the main source-text for this translation, but H is preferred in those few places where it differs substantially. Any reliance on Latin from any source besides P and H is noted. Kinney’s Latin is sometimes his own amended or reconstructed text, and sometimes it is based on other sources besides P and H. This results in situations where this translation not only differs from Kinney’s in the English words chosen, but is in fact translating different Latin words. All such differences in the underlying Latin are noted.

The main aim has been to translate precisely, literally, and consistently. Whenever possible without losing intelligibility, the same English word is used to translate the same Latin word throughout the work, while synonyms in Latin are represented by synonyms in English. Within a single sentence, this is invariably followed or an exception is noted. Common Latin idioms are translated consistently, but not literally. Word order varies from the Latin, from necessity, but lists of terms are always presented in the same order as that found in the original. Words in square brackets [ ] are additional words in English implied by the Latin grammar or supplied by the translator to fill the sense. Usually they are English nouns which replace pronouns in the Latin that would not be clear as pronouns in English. Sometimes they are implied nouns and phrases, in which case they are always identical to the word or words which appear elsewhere which are understood to be repeated. Finally, in a few cases, they are words simply not found or directly implied in the text, but which seem necessary to complete the sense. Words in tailed brackets { } are additional words added in English in those cases where a single underlying Latin word cannot be adequately translated by one English word. These brackets have been added in the hopes a reader will more easily recognize which Latin words are repeated in the text and which are not. Forms of the verb “to be,” auxiliary forms of “have,” possessive pronouns, “as,” “that,” and existential “there” have been frequently added without brackets as needed to make smoother English. When translating the ablative and dative cases, appropriate prepositions have been inserted without brackets. Tenses of verbs have also sometimes been altered without notation to conform to English usage. Paragraph divisions are those of the translator.

Numbers in square brackets are the page and line numbers of the corresponding Latin text in CW 15.
Translation by Carle Mock


King Edward (the fourth of that name), [after] he had achieved fifty-three years, seven months, [and] six days of life, when he was numbering the twenty-second year from the beginning of his kingship, conceded to the fates in the 483rd [year] beyond the 1000th year after Christ's birth, with two surviving children of the male sex [and] five of the female—namely Edward, the king-designate, of around thirteen years; Richard, Duke of York, who was younger by two years; Elizabeth, who afterwards, led by the fates, was the wife of Henry the Seventh and mother of the Eighth, a queen extraordinary in appearance and innate talent; Cecilia, not quite as fortunate as beautiful; Bridget, [who], exhibiting the virtue of her whose name it was, made profession and is leading a religious life in a monastery of enclosed nuns near Dartford; Anne, afterwards honorably married to Thomas, at that time Lord Howard and afterwards Earl of Surrey; [and] Catherine, who has continually experienced a varied lot [in life], sometimes calm, more often unfavorable; at the last (if this is the last, for she still lives), by the piety of her nephew King Henry the Eighth, [a lot in life] has ensued that is most prosperous and thoroughly worthy of her.

[316] This king of whom I am speaking, when he had died in the palace which is near the abbey of the Benedictines, about a mile from London toward the setting sun, was carried away from there to Windsor in a magnificent funeral procession, and there he was buried with many tears; indeed he was a prince so benevolent and mild while there was peace (for in war it was necessary that the parties be mutually hostile) that no other who ever reigned in England was more esteemed by the fathers and the people; nor was he himself at any other part of his life equally esteemed as at that part which was the last for him. But nevertheless, that very esteem and longing for him was increased by the cruelty of the following period [or storm], the inhuman and hateful principate of a parricide. For at that time when he finished his life, all malevolence from the deposing of King Henry VI—which long had blazed among his favorers—finally was put to sleep, subsided, and was extinguished, since so many of them, in the more than twenty years of his dominion (a great part of a mortal lifetime), had died; others meanwhile had been received into his favor and friendship, in which winning over it is reported that he was receptive and inclined towards.

He was tall in body [and] truly kingly in appearance; there was much courage and no less counsel in [him]. In hostile circumstances he was unafraid; in prosperous [circumstances] more joyful than proud; equitable and merciful in peace,

441 Femellae in late Latin sometimes meant “female,” and 1565, which often corrects More's grammar and spelling, puts foeminei here.
442 tempestatis
443 The words for “hateful and “malevolence” in this sentence are the same Latin root.
444 or “high, noble”; procero
445 animi
446 rebus
fierce\textsuperscript{447} and ferocious\textsuperscript{448} in war\textsuperscript{449}; quick in approaching dangers, but nevertheless not brash farther than reason demanded. If someone should appraise his deeds of war correctly, he surely will no less admire his prudence whenever he retreated\textsuperscript{450} than he will praise his daring when he conquered. His face and countenance were what you would wish to see; his body was ample and with great strength, with his limbs drawn out, although by a \{rather\} free [mode of] living and by indulgence of his body, he finally was made a little too stout, [but] nevertheless not unbecoming. Yet he was completely given over to his appetite and lust immediately from entering the age [of maturity] [318] and throughout his whole life, to the extent that affairs of government\textsuperscript{451} did not call him \{away\}, in the custom of nearly all men; for you could hardly persuade \{those who are\} healthy to [adopt] a \{due\} measure towards a great license of fortune.

That vice of his was not very troublesome to the people, because the pleasure of one man was not sufficient to spread itself so widely as to become a grievance to everyone, and he was accustomed either to purchase what pleased him for a price, or to \{obtain \[it\] by\} flattery with his pleas.\textsuperscript{452} He never acted with violence; moreover, from the turning-post of age, he was (as \{usually\} happens) made more moderate in his last days, in which his kingdom was quietest and in a state of flourishing affairs. There was neither any war present nor any impending (except that which nobody expected) since every external fear was absent [and] at home the commons were quiet and there was concord procured\textsuperscript{453} among the aristocrats by the King. To the King himself all were obedient, not by force, but by their own \{free\} will; and they more truly revered him than feared [him]. From the demanding of money (which is nearly the only thing which disjoins the minds of Englishmen from their prince) he had now for a long time utterly left \{off\}, nor had he decided anything from which an occasion [for taxes] could arise. He had already obtained the revenue of tribute from France by then. He had taken \{possession of\} Berwick by arms one year before his death.

\[318.19\] Although this king, through the whole time of his dominion, was of such friendliness towards everyone \{without distinction\} that no part of his morals was more [highly] appraised, nevertheless, with the progress of time (which turns most princes toward arrogance by their long confirmed power) that [friendliness] increased and grew in a marvelous manner; indeed, in that summer which was that \[man's\] last, \{when\} he dwelt at Windsor, he summoned the Mayor of London and several of the senators to himself for no other reason than that they might enjoy hunting with him. There he exhibited to them a face not so \{much\} magnificent and lofty as friendly and popular, and from there he sent game so abundantly into the city that you would not easily discover anything that won for him [such] goodwill, either of more \[people\] or greater

\textsuperscript{447} Or “sharp”; \textit{acer}
\textsuperscript{448} Or “bold, brave, wild, fierce, savage”; \textit{ferox}
\textsuperscript{449} \textit{militie}
\textsuperscript{450} \textit{cedo}; elsewhere “cede”
\textsuperscript{451} \textit{res gerendae}
\textsuperscript{452} a pun: “price” is \textit{precio}; “pleas” is \textit{precibus}
\textsuperscript{453} \textit{conciliata}
among the people, for whom commonly a slight deed done more friendlily outweighs great benefits and is considered\textsuperscript{454} as evidence of a greater love towards themselves.

[320] Thus this prince met his death [just] then, when his life was most greatly desired, [when] his favor among his own [people] was so extraordinary [that] it would no doubt have been a marvelous foundation for the principate for his children (in whom themselves also such extraordinary natural talents and illustrious signs of kingly virtues as it was possible for their ages to be capable of were observed), if the division of their friends among themselves had not disarmed them and [if] a detestable thirst for dominion\textsuperscript{455} had not incited to their destruction that [man] who, if it had been possible [for] either nature or fidelity or gratitude to have any influence\textsuperscript{456} {whatsoever}, ought to have thrown his own body before their enemies. In fact, Richard, Duke of Gloucester, by nature their uncle, in name their guardian\textsuperscript{457}, bound [to them] by benefits, obliged by {sacred} oath, with all ties of human society broken, decided, against justice and right, to take the lives of\textsuperscript{458} his own nephews ([who were] orphans and entrusted to him) [and] to transfer the kingdom to himself.

[320.15] Yet since the deeds of this man almost fill {up} the [subject] matter of the present work, it would not be off topic\textsuperscript{459} to display his morals, {in order} that it might be more well-known\textsuperscript{460} of what sort that man was who undertook to conceive such a crime in his mind. Richard, Duke of York, a noble, factious, [and] powerful [man], disputed with the King concerning the kingship, not hostilely with arms, but in a civil manner with laws in the Senate. Either his lawsuit or his favor (since the King was more innocent than prudent\textsuperscript{461}) {had} so much influence that, by a resolution of Parliament—whose power among the English is supreme and absolute—he was designated the successor to King Henry, [while] [Henry's] offspring (although an extraordinary prince) was rejected. [Richard, Duke of York] would enter into\textsuperscript{462} the kingship for himself and his posterity perpetually immediately upon the death of Henry.

He [however,] not waiting for that, while he was trying (under the pretext of civil dissension) to anticipate his legitimate time for ruling and to claim the scepter for himself [while] Henry still lived, fell in the Battle of Wakefield together with many aristocrats, leaving {behind} three children: [322] Edward, of whom we have spoken, George, and this Richard, who, {just} as they were all born to an illustrious place, so they were also of vast and lofty ambition,\textsuperscript{463} greedy for power, [and] patient enough with neither superiors nor equals. Edward avenged his father's death, conquered Henry in war, stripped [him] of the kingship, and substituted himself. George, Duke of Clarence, tall\textsuperscript{464} and elegant,
could have appeared fortunate in every respect, if either the desire for ruling had not incited him against his brother, or the calumny of enemies had not incited his brother against him. For whether the Queen's faction devised a treacherous plot against him—between whom and the blood-relations of the King bitter hatred burned (as women not from malice, indeed, but from nature almost always hold as enemies whichever persons are dear to their husbands)—or the Duke likewise, out of his own pride, was striving to make his way to the kingship—certainly he was charged with treason, for which, whether he was innocent or guilty, the full Senate sentenced him to the bitterest punishment. But although the King withheld the viciousness of the penalty, he upheld death as the penalty. So that the King might complete the execution most leniently, with George's head plunged into a cask of Cretan wine, he was prevented from breathing and breathed his last. The same man who ordered his death, when he learned that it was accomplished, miserably lamented.

[322.19] This Richard, on whose account the present discourse is instituted, was equal to both of his brothers in intellect and strength of mind, but inferior to both in beauty and probity, with poor disposition of body, with unequal and deformed limbs, a protruding back, and with one shoulder higher than the other. His face was not lovely, but wild, and plainly of the sort which is called warlike and military in aristocrats, but is usually called otherwise in other men. He was skilled in dissimulation, irritable, malevolent, and always, even before birth, perverse. Indeed, there is a rumor he could not otherwise be removed from his mother's womb than with a sword as midwife; indeed, they also report that he was even born an Agrippa, and he came out with his feet foremost, and besides, not untoothed—whether rumor born from hatred has added anything to the truth, or whether nature, with foreknowledge of the future, did many things inversely at the origin of him who was, in his life, going to contrive many things against the law of nature. Yet he was held to be no inactive leader in war, for which his nature was more suitable than for peace; he often conquered, sometimes he even was conquered, which occurrence not even any of his rivals ever ascribed to his fault, whether to inexperience or to ignorance. Generous beyond his resources, so that he would not lack means, he was forced to pour out from some what he would pour forth into others. By these devises, it is evident that he produced frail love and firm hatred. He did not ever entrust his own plans to others more than was necessary to execute those plans through them, but not even to them either earlier or more fully than the matter urged. He would put on and wear and zealously guard whatever persona you please—cheerful, severe, grave, lax—just as his own advantage persuaded him to take up or put down. In his face was modesty, but in his mind there was arrogance: uncontrollable, unlimited, and inhuman. He would flatter with words those whom, inwardly, he greatly hated; nor did he abstain from

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465 Lit. “treason was charged”
466 adiudicavit
467 forma
468 inamabile
469 or “was a shape-shifter or werewolf”; versipellis
470 rem
471 tueri
embracing those whom he intended to kill. He was cruel and merciless, not always out of anger but more often because of ambition, either while striving after enlarging his own fortune or [while striving] {to make it} firm. Indeed, his reasoning was that friends and enemies were equal compared with his [own] advantages; nor did he ever abstain from anyone's death whose life appeared to obstruct his plans. There is a constant rumor [that], while Henry VI, {having been} stripped of the kingship, was being guarded as a prisoner in the Tower of London, he was cruelly stabbed and butchered by that [man] with a dagger thrust under his ribs, and that [was done] without the King either ordering [it] or being aware {of it}—who, if he had completely decided to remove [a man] whom he probably considered to be more to his advantage alive and in his own hand, nevertheless, no doubt he would have put in charge of such an awful carnage someone other than his own full brother.

[326] There are those who suspect that even [then] the secret and skillfully concealed plans of that [man] for the destruction of his brother the Duke of Clarence were not lacking, although he resisted and opposed [his brother's destruction] openly. Yet (as it appears to those appraising the matter) [he did so] somewhat more feebly than it was thought that one would do who had seriously determined for himself that he would be inclined to his full brother's welfare. Those to whom this appears true hold that Richard, (undoubtedly having already been persuaded then, while Edward was still living) had contrived this plan about claiming the kingship for himself, if ever by some chance his brother would have died (as it did happen) with his children [too] immature for the kingship. The frequent carousing and intemperate diet of the King gave hope of [just such] a thing. Therefore, for that reason they think [that] Richard desired the death of the Duke of Clarence, since his life did not appear favorable enough for his own purpose; [regarding] whom, indeed, [Richard] saw [that], whether [George] remained in fidelity to his nephew or aspired to the kingship, he would hold [Richard] himself as a mortal enemy. But I am able to assert nothing certain regarding this matter, [since] I merely followed the suspicions and conjectures of men, by which footpaths, just as one sometimes arrives at the truth, so, [too], one frequently errs. Although this [much] I myself already {long} ago ascertained from a faithful report: A certain Mistlebrook, immediately [when] Edward had died, hurried at a run to the house of Potter (who was of Richard's household); and [Potter's] door was pounded on uncivilly long before light. Since the pounding, both by its violence and by its untimeliness, made proof of his great and urgent business, he was promptly admitted. He announced that the King had died that very hour, to which statement Potter said, as if exulting, "Then there is no doubt but that my master the Duke of Gloucester will be king immediately," whether he was

472 Lit. “destined”
473 ducat
474 prefectus; same base as word translated “mayor” elsewhere
475 or “ill-omened” dirus
476 Lit. “made, did”
477 opportuna
478 Lit. “hold mortally as an enemy”
479 Lit. “much”
480 fidel; elsewhere “fidelity”
acquainted with his plans, [328] or whether he had foreknowledge of the future by some other sign (for I do not suppose it was spoken by chance). I remember that this discourse was already reported to my father then—when as yet no suspicion was held of his treason—by [one] who had overheard them talking.

[328.6] Yet let me return to the history. Whether Richard had already seized the kingship within his own mind, or whether he had conceived his plan from the opportunity of his nephews' age (as [opportunity] usually impels even sluggish and quiet [men] to crime), it is certain [that] he decided, [once] the life of the boys was removed, to take control of the kingship as if it were a reward for his crime. Therefore, aware of the long-standing factions among the courtiers with which [the court] was belabored (which he had even diligently nourished, as far as was [in] his [power])—with the blood-relations of King Edward envying the authority and resources of the Queen's blood so {much}, and conversely were not less envied regarding the same things—he thought that this circumstance would be a great support for his plans if, [using] the pretext of the parties, as if he were going to avenge old injuries, he should secretly conduct his own business and exploit the anger and ignorance of one faction for the destruction of the other. Then, from that [faction] that survived (who could be advantageously led {over} little {by little} to his opinion), if he encountered those who were insufficiently suitable, he would crush them with a {treacherous} plot [while] they were incautious and not fearing any evil. For he conceived in his mind [that] this was certain: if by any crack his plan should leak out too prematurely, at once a treaty between the disagreeing factions would be ratified in his own blood.

[328.24] These divisions of his friends, although they were somewhat troublesome to Edward himself, nevertheless, while he was healthy, he handled them the more negligently for this reason: because he knew he could restrain either party when he wished, according to his own judgment. Yet, when he was lying {ill} with his last sickness, he sensed that his strength was wavering and that his health had been despaired of by the doctors. [So,] considering in his mind the age of his children, although he feared nothing [330] less than that which happened, nevertheless he foresaw many evils which could arise for them from the dissension of their friends, since their age, weak and improvident in itself, would be stripped of the counsel of friends, by which alone it could be supported. While [their friends] disjoined themselves by dissension and discord, intent on parties and {partisan} endeavors, they would care less what was true, and often—so that each might advance his own faction in the Prince's favor—they would all counsel what would be pleasing more than what would be profitable. Turning over these things and [others] of this sort in his mind, he ordered many from [among] the aristocracy to be summoned, specifically the Marquis Dorset (the Queen's son by her prior marriage)

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481 peritus
482 invado “invaded, attacked”
483 capio, “seized, taken”
484 Lit. “which thing”
485 Lit. “thing”
486 commodum
487 Lit. “held”
488 studiis
and Richard Hastings (a noble man [and] his own chamberlain) who had conspicuously engaged in enmity among themselves, besides others of both factions who were then in the palace and were able to be had. When the King saw that they were present, he raised [himself] a little and, propped up with cushions, it is reported that he spoke thus:

[330.16] "Men most illustrious, who are also my blood-relations and dearest in-laws, in what place my life is, both you see and I feel; which circumstance\(^489\) makes [it so] that, the less long I calculate my future with you [will be], the larger the anxiety [which] enters my mind [over] which states of mind I am leaving you holding. For truly, in whatever [state] you are left by me, in such [a state] it is necessary that my children receive you. If (May those above prevent it!) they should find you at discord\(^490\), it would appear [that] they themselves undoubtedly would be joining parties and setting in motion new disputes among themselves before they will have matured in that [area] of experience by which they could restore you in concord, with your [disputes] reconciled. You perceive their tender age, of which I suppose the only protection [332] is built on your concord, since your love\(^491\) for them is not a sufficiently firm thing if you have hatred for each other.\(^492\) Your fidelity would perhaps suffice for the strength of a manly age, but a boyish [age] {must} be ruled by authority, [and] an adolescent [age] {must be} propped up by counsels, which things neither will they be able to obtain from anywhere else unless you will have given [them], nor will you [be able to] grant [counsel] if you disagree.\(^493\) Indeed, when {those} who are mutually hostile think different [things] and one {makes} fun of the counsels of the other out of hatred of {the one} counseling, then it is necessary for good counsel\(^494\) to perish badly, since it is not possible that [differences] be settled except by consensus. Moreover, while each one strives to ingrati ate\(^495\) his own faction with the prince, it would undoubtedly happen that they would be persuaded [to act] for favor much more than from [what is] true and useful. Thus the tender mind of adolescence, imbued with depraved flattery, is rolled {headlong} into vices and drags the kingdom with it into destruction, except if God should inspire anything better. If that should happen—that the prince should recover {his senses} and return to morality\(^496\)—then truly those whose parties had been foremost with him will fall farthest from his favor. Thus favor\(^497\) acquired badly perishes quickly; [but] truly that [favor] obtained through good arts is that [which] endures stable and firm.

[332.19] "For a long {time} now great hatreds have blazed among you, often not from great causes. For usually either the speech of [someone] badly narrating distorts a thing which was not badly done, or the affection of the listener exaggerates [something] petty in itself by interpreting [it] harshly. One [thing] I know: for you the reasons for wrath and [those] for love are not at all equal. That we are men, for {example}, [and]

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\(^{489}\) Lit. “thing”
\(^{490}\) discordantes
\(^{491}\) caritas
\(^{492}\) Lit. “if you are mutually with hatred for you”
\(^{493}\) dissenseritis
\(^{494}\) consulta
\(^{495}\) insinuare; elsewhere “insinuate”
\(^{496}\) ad frugem
\(^{497}\) gratia
that we have sworn our oaths\textsuperscript{498} in Christ, who gave one and only [one] countersign\textsuperscript{499} to his soldiers, [that] of charity—I pass over [these things] commended by preachers, although I do not know whether the words of any preacher ought to move you more than my [words], [since] I am departing from here directly to those places about which they preach so much. [334] But [just] this much you will be asked by me: that you ponder within yourselves that one party of these factions are my blood-relations, [while] the other are my in-laws, and you yourselves are mutually joined either by the bond of blood or [that] of affinity {of marriage}. If the institutions of Christ had as much weight as they ought to have among Christians—And if only they did have!—that relationship, joined by the Sacrament of Matrimony\textsuperscript{500} certainly would comprise no less a motivation towards uniting minds {in friendship} than the reason\textsuperscript{501} of blood itself. May those above prevent that this very thing should be the cause by which you are in concord\textsuperscript{502} less, which ought to arouse you most greatly to concord!

\[334.11\] "For myself, by I know not what evil fate, we see it to happen such that enmity nowhere is exercised {more} hostilely than among those who the dictate \{fas\} of either nature or of [human] laws ought to deter most powerfully from all animosity. Pride and the desire of surpassing \{others\} is such a detestable monster that, when once it has crept into the noble breasts of illustrious men, [it] does not cease to slither \{forward\} by contention so as to blend all [things] with slaughter and blood, while each [man] tries first to be next to the highest [person], soon to be equal [to him], [and] finally to surpass and surmount him. This so [very] shameful ardor for glory has stirred up so much of a conflagration in this kingdom within the last few years [and] produced so much slaughter that I wish that God would be willing to forget [it] as easily as we remember [it]. If it had been possible for me as a private \{citizen\} to anticipate and foresee those evils with my mind [rather] than to have experienced the thing itself afterwards (much more to my sorrow than pleasure), [then], [on my life, I would not]\textsuperscript{503} have procured the honor exhibited by bent knees by [means of] so many men's heads. But since the things which have been done cannot be undone, attention should be carefully given \{so that\} the [same] thing from which we know so much loss was endured before does not happen henceforth.

\[334.29\] “All \{things\} are pacified now, and the hope is that [all things] will be prosperous under my children, your blood-relations, if neither life abandons them nor \[336\] concord [abandons] you. If one or the other of them absolutely [must] be lacked, indeed there would be less of a loss in [the former]. If the common lot of men should bring \{about\} that [loss], nevertheless England would perhaps easily find kings in no part inferior. Truly, if discord should occupy you in a child’s kingship, it appears that many good and extraordinary men would undoubtedly perish, with the Prince, meanwhile, not safe\textsuperscript{504}, and you yourselves especially exposed to danger, before the people, once raging with internal sedition, would return again to peace and concord. Therefore, with this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{498} \textit{iurare in verba}; “to swear a prescribed oath”
\item \textsuperscript{499} \textit{symbolum}
\item \textsuperscript{500} Lit. “sacrament of joining;” \textit{coniugium}
\item \textsuperscript{501} \textit{ratio}; elsewhere “reasoning.”
\item \textsuperscript{502} \textit{concordetis}
\item \textsuperscript{503} Lit: “may I perish if”
\item \textsuperscript{504} \textit{tuto}; elsewhere “guarded”
\end{itemize}
speech, which today it appears to me is the last I am going to have with you, I exhort and implore you through that love which I have always [until] now [had] towards you, which you in turn [had] towards me, [and] which God has had towards all of us, [that], from this time [forward], with all offenses forgiven and pardoned, you will embrace [each other] with mutual love; which I trust you will indeed do, if you have any respect, either for God, or for the Prince, for your blood-relations, for your country, or finally, for your own safety.”

[336.17] When the King had said these [words], no longer supporting himself, he lay back down on his right side, with his face turned toward the nobles, of whom there was none who was able to refrain from tears. Yet they consoled him with words as much as each [one] was able. Then, responding with [words] about the matter which they perceived would be pleasing, as if a treaty had been struck out of regard for the dying king, they joined hands among themselves; although, as appeared a little afterwards, they were far disjoined in their minds.

[336.24] [After] the king died, his older son hurried to proceed to the royal city, namely London. [While] his father was living, he lived at Ludlow in Wales. For that [place] is the proper domain for the first-born [sons] of kings, successively, [while] their parents are still living. Since that [place] was situated at a distance from the King, [and] therefore it was held negligently, it began to be barbarized in its almost wild morals, with wicked men attacking in robberies and murder licentiously, and unpunished. Edward the son was sent there with dominion so that by the authority of the Prince's presence the audacity of the criminals would be restrained. The [man] given as governor for the Prince's childhood was the Queen's brother, Anthony Woodville (with the name “Rivers” from his domain) a man you could not easily discern as more excellent in battle or in counsel. Then others were consulted as counsellors [such] that each one was nearest to the boy by maternal descent.

[338.8] This situation arranged by the Queen—by which she would strengthen the influence of her faction immediately from the tender years of the Prince—Richard made a pretext for overturning those [men] and the beginning of accomplishing his remaining undertaking, [and thus] frustrated her great hope. For of those whom he knew the most implacable hatred toward those [of the Queen's faction] and had benevolent minds towards himself, he admonished them in part personally, others by letter and by messengers of tested fidelity, urging that the situation was in no way to be endured that, with his father lost, the young Prince, a blood-relative to themselves, was in the hands and custody of [the Queen's] relatives, [while] they were nearly banished, who

505 Lit. “you will embrace yourselves mutually”
506 Lit. “if any respect has you”
507 temperare; “to moderate, to govern”
508 Lit. “greater by birth”
509 or “matured”
510 or “to solicit the royal city for a public office”
511 Lit. “moderator”
512 Lit. “hand”
513 Lit. “thing”
514 Lit. “thing”
were no less certain in their fidelity to him and [were] a far more honorable part of the royal family than his maternal blood, which, except that it might have appeared otherwise to his father's lust, was exceedingly unworthy to be mixed with his and with theirs; [and] that it was neither honorable for him nor safe\textsuperscript{515} for themselves that they were now not first with the King; [thus] he proposed that it was of \{very\} great [importance] that it not be tolerated by anyone that their rivals' power with the Prince increase\textsuperscript{516} from gratitude and favors, [since he was] a boy compliant by nature, of an age for vice, credulous, [and] not guarding\textsuperscript{517} enough against the \{false\} accusations of denouncers.

[338.26] “I think you remember,” he said, “that although his father was mature in years and in the experience of things, nevertheless he was turned in any \{direction\} by the persuasion and pressure of her faction, assuredly far more \{often\} than would have been either [340] for his own honor or \{for\} anyone's advantage\textsuperscript{518} except the immoderate \{advancement\} of those for whom it is uncertain whether they more greedily desire their own good or our evil. And so if the favor of one of us had not been more effective with the King than any consideration\textsuperscript{519} of blood-relation, certainly it would have been \{only\} a little away from them seizing some of us, [who would be] surrounded, in a \{treacherous\} plot\textsuperscript{520} as easily, by Hercules, as they had seized him who was no less nearly away from the King's blood. Truly, with those above favoring \{us\}, we are done with that danger. Yet nevertheless an even greater \{danger\} would be impending if we tolerate the Prince's affections to be driven in whatever \{way\} is pleasing for our enemies, for whom it would not be difficult also\textsuperscript{521} to \{provide a\} pretext of ignorance \{to\} an order for our destruction, unless God or your vigilance turns their malice towards themselves. In this matter none of us should conduct himself more irresolutely on \{account of\} the concord badly botched together shortly ago. It should not be doubted how sincere it was: they who entered into it were submitting to the King's affections rather than their own. I suppose that none of us is so insane that he could think there could be much trusting in someone who, from \{being\} an old enemy would profess himself \{to be\} a recent friend, unless perhaps someone would suppose a peace suddenly compelled in one hour and not even sustained a whole month yet to have settled more deeply into their hearts than a malevolence nourished and rooted for so many years.”

[340.22] With these words and letters and other \{things\} of that kind, he more vehemently enflamed men burning from \{within\} themselves, but especially two: Edward, Duke of Buckingham, and Richard Hastings, both with renowned fame \{and\} great wealth, but the Duke with a more illustrious lineage. The other \{man, Hastings,\} had grown much in authority from the office he administered,\textsuperscript{522} \{since\} indeed [342] the

\textsuperscript{515} elsewhere “guarded”
\textsuperscript{516} Lit. “mature”
\textsuperscript{517} Following H. P. A. \& 1565 have “being hardened (or experienced)”
\textsuperscript{518} re
\textsuperscript{519} ratio
\textsuperscript{520} Lit. “it had been, certainly, a little absent that they would have suppressed/oppressed-crushed someone of us surrounded by an ambush/trap/plot”
\textsuperscript{521} Following H, 1565
\textsuperscript{522} gerere; elsewhere “governed, managed”
King had appointed him {as officer} for his chamber [i.e. Chamberlain], which is extremely honorable among the English. Although these [men] did not as much want a mutual benefit for themselves as they desired evil for the Queen's faction, they easily conspired with Richard to the extent that they removed the Prince's maternal friends on the pretext of [being] their enemies.

[342.6] [After] that matter was decided, they heard that those [of the Queen's faction] were leading {down} the King with so great a company {of soldiers} that nothing could be safely dared against them by unarmed [men]. Conversely, if they prepared troops themselves, the matter was going to come to combat. Both [because] the result of [combat] would always be doubtful, and since the Prince would be from the opposite party, [and thus] their own [party] would come {under} the name and appearance of treason, they determined [that the other party] would be disarmed by intellect. And so they {took} care that through suitable [acquaintances] of the Queen she would be persuaded [that] there was much danger in that plan which had been entered {upon} for the sake of removing danger; for with things peaceful, [and] with the nobles brought {back} into concord, and with everyone's minds intent on receiving the King and marking [him] with a diadem, if the Queen's friends gathered a multitude, no doubt they would inspire fear in those [of the other party]—[since] animosity once had existed between them and those [of the Queen's party]—that [the multitude gathered] was not for the sake of protecting the King, whom no peril threatened, but [that] it was being gathered [for the sake] of attacking themselves, with discord breaking {out again}, and it would [happen] in this way that these [men] in turn would assemble their troops. Next, as if they were repulsing violence, they would attack. Their resources, as she knew, extended widely, [and] the whole kingdom would be in arms and tumult from this affair. Then everyone would ascribe all the damage of the [tumult] (which was both expected to be immense and might fall in large part on those from whom she most wanted to avert [it]) solely to her and to her friends, since they would be alleged to have disordered the republic by a regard for private hatred, [and of] having violated through injustice the concord of which her own dying husband [344] had been the author for ratifying. The Queen was led by these reasonings such that she pled {her case} to her brother Woodville and her son Richard Grey, who were then the foremost [men] in the Prince's court, so that they, having repudiated her prior counsel, refrained from an {armed} convoy {and} brought {forth} the King towards London with a moderate escort.

[344.6] On the King's route there was [a town], Hampton, which, although it is located almost in the belly of the kingdom, nevertheless is called Northampton in comparison with another town of the same name which lies on the southern strait. On the same day that the King departed from this [town], the Dukes of Gloucester and Buckingham entered, and it happened by chance that Woodville (the Queen's brother

523 *praeficio*; same as the word for “mayor”
524 Lit: “wanted mutually well ... desired evilly”
525 *tuto*
526 Lit. “men”
527 or “capturing” or “succeeding”
528 *tuto*
529 *vim*; elsewhere “force”
whom we spoke {of}) remained in the same [town], {intending} to go the next morning to the King at [Stony] Stratford where he spent that night, [eleven] miles from Hampton. Therefore, Woodville, obligingly meeting with the Dukes, also was received in turn with the greatest joy. When it appeared that as much time [as required] had passed in discourse and a feast, he was dismissed, so charmed by the humanity of the Dukes that he went to bed filled with the best hope, cheerful, and secure in his mind.

[344.18] But those [men], who had contrived in their mind [something] far different than [what] they had displayed by their face, [after] all the others had been ordered to leave, retained Richard Ratcliff (a knight) and [others] who were most intimate with these kinds of plots and, reclining at table, they deliberated about their undertakings into the late night. Having {taken} counsel [about] these matters, standing up, they sent [someone] who with no tumult would warn their attendants so that they could prepare themselves, [since] indeed there was not much [time until] the Dukes would be on their horses. Awakened by this messenger, their escort was present at hand when Woodville's servants were still snoring. Moreover, they brought {it about} so that with all the exits of the town [346] blockaded, nobody was allowed to exit. Then, a little farther from the town in the direction of the Stratford road they had arrayed knights, who, if they apprehended any [men] who by chance had evaded custody, they could drive [them] {back} into Hampton again. They {gave as a} pretext the reason that (as though the Dukes obviously were intending to demonstrate their obligation) they had determined [that] they themselves [would be] the first of all [persons] that day to salute the Prince.

[346.7] But when Woodville heard the exits were closed in every {direction}, [that] truly a means for leaving [was available] for neither his [men] nor for himself, [and that] such a vicious deed both was not by chance and was begun with him unknowing, [then], comparing their present deeds with [their] face and words of the previous night, he was distressed by such a great change of affairs in the interval of a few hours. Yet, since he was not allowed to depart, and by enclosing himself he was going to obtain nothing other than that it would appear that he was seeking a hiding-place, [and] because he was conscious of no guilt of his own on account of which there would be a need for doing [so], he determined to approach the Dukes and to question the reasons for their endeavors of this [kind] with trust in his own conscience. [When] they first had him in sight, they began immediately [and] of their own accord to complain and to charge that he had sown discord among the nobles and [that] he was striving to alienate the King's mind from them and trying to destroy [them] through a {treacherous} plot, which, having been discovered, they would deservedly throw {back} against its author. [As] he was marveling at this speech and attempting to exonerate himself, since they were deficient in

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530 same word as “brought forth” on 344.5, end of previous paragraph
531 consiliis
532 Lit: “adult, mature”
533 elsewhere “part, party”
534 or “stationed troops”
535 Lit. “accuse; indict, arraign”
reason and cause, they turned to force. They apprehended [him] and left [him] imprisoned in a cave, employing guards.

[346.24] Soon, having mounted their horses, they {eagerly} hurried to Stratford and discovered the King just then preparing to depart for the reason (as is reported) that he could leave the town ([which was] {too} narrow for everyone), free for them. Therefore, they sent their horses {away}, [and] a long line of bodyguards preceded [them]. When [the line] came nearly to the King, the escort split itself into parts [and] they proceeded through the middle of the ranks and, sending themselves onto their knees, they saluted the Prince [348] reverently. He in turn embraced them lovingly, [and] raised them from the ground with an outstretched hand, neither suspecting nor learning of their evil even then. Without any delay or reverence for his presence, they began to set in motion a quarrel against Richard Grey, his maternal half-brother, {falsely} charging that he and his full {brother} the Marquis, with his uncle Woodville, had conspired against [the King's] blood and had decided, with the nobles circumvented and removed by fraud, to arrogate to themselves the government 536 of King and kingdom together. And [that] toward that purpose, immediately [after] the King had departed, the Marquis broke into the Tower of London and, having plundered the King's treasury, 537 he distributed pay to the soldiers whom he had assembled in a fleet for strengthening the resources of that faction. Thus they inverted through a {false} accusation a matter which they were well aware 538 was decided by the Common Council 539 and had been proposed 540 that it be done in the best 541 interest of both the King and the public, lest there would be nothing which they could say.

[348.15] But the Prince, anticipating Grey, [who] was preparing to respond, said, “What the Marquis did, although I hope it was nothing evil, nevertheless, since he was not with us, I cannot know for certain. Truly, [as to] what pertains to my brother Grey and my uncle Woodville, I am easily able to vouch {for} their innocence, by Hercules, as they have not ever been away from us for a long while now.”

“No doubt,” said the Duke of Gloucester, “they diligently concealed such a wicked plan from you, best Prince,” [and] with no more talking, he laid hands on Grey and Thomas Vaughan, knight, the Queen's blood-relations. Grey, as he was both noble [well-born] in mind and not ignoble [not short] in body, was moved by the present danger

536 regimen; pun with Regis ... regni ... regimen
537 This is aerarium, the public treasury, as distinct from fiscus, the emperor's money. See pp. 138-139 in Chapter Four above, and note 728 below.
538 Lit. “expertly acquainted with”
539 This could be translated “by common deliberation,” but it appears to me to be a reference to the lower house of the bicameral London legislature. The upper house, called the “Senate” in More’s Latin, was composed of men known in English as aldermen. Both of these assemblies were elected, but in different ways. There were 24 wards in London, and one alderman was elected from each ward. All freemen of the ward voted in the election, but the office of alderman was restricted to men of baronial rank, and these wealthy citizens were elected for life terms. The Mayor was always chosen from among the aldermen. The Common Council was elected annually by the freemen from the wards, and commoners could hold office. The Common Council chose one Sheriff and the Aldermen the other, among other power-sharing arrangements that gave both parts of the London legislature some power over the affairs of the City.
540 retulisse
541 plurimum; Lit. “most”
[and] brought his hand towards his sword-hilt. Then, rebuked by someone admonishing that the attempt was [too] late, [and] failing\textsuperscript{542} in spirit, he pulled {back} his hand and gave himself [up] to be captured. Therefore they moved the King back to Hampton where they {took} counsel anew. There [350] they discharged those they wished from [among] the King’s servants and substituted those more pleasing to them than to him; gravely offended by those deeds, since he was not able to prevent [them], [he did] the only thing he could: he wept over [them].

[350.4] At lunch, the Duke of Gloucester sent one of his dishes to Woodville, having ordered the steward that he should console him and order him in the name of the Duke that he should be of good spirit\textsuperscript{543} and that he should not doubt that this tumult was going to end\textsuperscript{544} calmly and mercifully. [Woodville], [after] thanking the servant, pleaded that he take the same dish to his nephew Grey and refresh him with such a message, [as] he was less accustomed to bearing adverse fortune and for that reason he thought needed more consolation than himself, [since] truly with his [own] more frequent\textsuperscript{545} experience of both, a turbulent [fortune] appeared less new to him. Yet the Duke of Gloucester, after such a civil consolation, sent {away} all the captives in different directions\textsuperscript{546} into prison, and not much later they were led from [those prisons] into one town named Broken Bridge [Pontefract], and he cut off their heads.

[350.16] But on the night which followed that day on which these [things] were done at Stratford, a frightened messenger came to the Queen at West[minster] Abbey, announcing all the sad and vicious [deeds]: that the Prince had been captured by his uncle and abducted by force contrary {to his will}; [that] her brother Woodville and Richard Gray, [and] then other friends of hers were apprehended and sent {away}, with it uncertain as to where [and] uncertain in what way they would be treated; [that] the whole of things was changed; [and that] everything, having been overturned, was ruined. Accordingly, the time should be seized by her, and she should {take} counsel for herself and the remnants of her fortunes while it was possible, lest her enemies, [who were] running quickly, should intercept [those] remnants. The Queen, devastated by this message, groaned over such a significant calamity (so great, [and] so unexpected) for her children, her friends, and herself. In addition, condemning and cursing her own counsel, which had persuaded [her] that the Prince's convoy\textsuperscript{547} be dismissed, trembling [352] and afraid, she rushed {out} of the palace into the abbey—for that sanctuary adjoined the palace temples. There she fled with her household and her younger son and her four daughters into the house of the Abbot.

[352.4] That same night, a servant was sent by Hastings the Chamberlain to the Archbishop of York (who himself also dwelled not far from West[minster] Abbey) who told the Bishop's servants [that] it had been commanded to him by his master that he should not spare the rest of the prelate, [since] that [message which] he brought was of

\textsuperscript{542} Lit. “conceding”
\textsuperscript{543} \textit{animo}
\textsuperscript{544} or “die”
\textsuperscript{545} Lit. “more often”
\textsuperscript{546} Lit. “one one way and another another”
\textsuperscript{547} \textit{presidium}; protection
such importance. They measured the magnitude of his business from his haste, [and so] they interrupted the sleep of their lord without delay. He admitted the messenger to his divine seat\textsuperscript{548}; [and] when he had heard [that] the Prince had been turned back and his blood-relations had been captured, he was astounded, struck by the inhumanity of the deed and by its viciousness.\textsuperscript{549} Then the messenger said, "My master orders you, reverend father, to be of good spirit, and he promises you [that] all [things] will nevertheless be well."

"Be off," he replied, "and report {back} that howsoever well they will be, nevertheless they will never be as good as they were."  

\[352.17\] Then, with [the messenger] dismissed, he immediately roused his household and, surrounded by his own [men], with the royal seal hanging from his neck, (for he was the Chancellor), he hastened straight to the Queen. There he discovered everything full of confusion, lamentation, dread, and tumult. Wicker baskets, packsaddles, and bundles were bustled, hurried, [and] conveyed into the sanctuary from the palace. No one was unoccupied: some picking {up}, others setting {down} burdens; others, having deposited what they had brought {in}, were seeking new [loads]; others were breaking {through} the middle wall, which alone divided the palace from the sanctuary, so that a shortening of the path might be made; nor were there absent [those] who were carrying {away} some [things] to somewhere other than where they had been intended\textsuperscript{550} (as usually happens in such a {great} tumult). He saw the Queen sitting on the ground alone, sorrowful and stunned, with her hands folded, and bewailing her own fortune and [that] of her [family]. The Bishop consoled her so that she would not be dispirited\textsuperscript{551} with present affairs {out of} despair for better [times]. He had been given\textsuperscript{552} hope [that] the affair would not turn {out} as viciously \[354\] as fear, an inequitable judge of things, imagines for itself. He added, so that he might strengthen her more, that the author of his hope was the Chamberlain, by a messenger sent to him.

"Ah, may he perish," she said. "For he is the standard-bearer of those who, from their implacable hatred, act {with violence} for the destruction of my blood."

Then he said, "Queen, raise your spirits. In this matter I here bind my fidelity to you: that day they anoint as king anyone other than that son of yours whom they have with them, on the next day we will, in this very place, mark with the diadem this other son whom you have here with you. [So] that you may doubt [this] the less, behold this seal, which the illustrious Prince your husband entrusted to my fidelity, I resign to you right now for the use of your offspring," and as he spoke these [words], he gave {back} the seal to the Queen and went home before it was light. Already then, looking from the window, from which there was a view on the Thames for him, he saw that the whole river was leaping with skiffs, with the Duke of Gloucester's henchmen obviously blockading the sanctuary lest anyone should flee to it through the water or sail \{by\} unsearched.

\textsuperscript{548} pulvinar; a couch in a Roman temple for the idols and those persons who had received divine honors
\textsuperscript{549} following P and A here, rather than 1565 as Daniel Kinney does
\textsuperscript{550} destinabantur
\textsuperscript{551} Lit. “cast down her mind” or “her mind be dejected”
\textsuperscript{552} Lit. “made”
Now the matter was immediately dispersed: it was in the mouth of the entire people; everyone was filled with astonishment, anger, fear, and grief. Here and there they gathered together in armed {bands}. Various [men] flitted {about} in troop-companies and were threatening each {other} according to their zeal for their parties or [according to] their fear of the danger [which] had joined each of them {together}. In addition, as each {one} was carried {away} by hatred or by favor, so some [were striving] by their words to mitigate the malevolence of the deed [while another] party was striving to magnify [it] by their speech. Then, lest London suffer some sudden calamity, there was an undertaking by the citizens to keep {watch}, while whichever nobles either were already in the city or were not far away {took} counsel concerning the rumors and the tumult. But the Bishop of York, fearing that his resigning of the seal to the Queen without the King's command would appear to be of light and hasty counsel, had retrieved the seal from her before he went into the council, in order to conceal his deed.

There most [people] were reproaching that deed of the Dukes and interpreting [it] hatefully, as if private animosities were being {used as a} pretext for a {treacherous} plot constructed against the Prince. Hastings, on {the other hand}, (who was {not} known to be conscious of the deed) bound his own fidelity, which all held not {to be} doubtful, on {behalf of} the Dukes, [pledging] that nothing had been contemplated against the King [and] that those placed in custody by [the Dukes] were those by whom, it was believed, their own safety was attacked. “Truly or not, it will be your judgment,” he said, “for which these [Dukes] are preserving those [in custody] to be examined [by you]; they complain that, [though] they deserved nothing, nevertheless they were injured by those [men]. Yet, either you will judge that {legal} action by your arbitration or you will settle [it]. Only do not decide with the case {judicially} unexamined, lest private controversies turn into public sedition and internal war; you would bring the case {to trial} [with the result] that you would irritate their minds, the coronation of the Prince would be disturbed (whom [the Dukes] are accompanying); it would not be possible for the case to be settled and [things] {made} whole {again}. In that struggle, if other [things] are equal, nevertheless it is necessary that greater right and authority be in that camp in which the Prince will be.”

This speech, because the man's fidelity was believed, had great force for persuading; but even more greatly, the imminent arrival of the King restrained their tumultuous minds. The Dukes, with a magnificent escort, (treating [him] completely reverently) were leading [the King] towards London. Yet wherever they went, they {took} care that the rumor was spread that those who were in chains had endeavored to overthrow by force first themselves, then others of the nobles, and thus to arrange a way for themselves by which to equally rule [both] King and kingdom. So that faith in this fiction would be produced in the commons, the wagoners and other servants of the Dukes who were following the baggage for protection displayed everywhere among {358} the seized household {goods} certain containers filled with arms, which, when the court of the Prince was transferred, it had been necessary for the lords to carry with them, unless

553 comitantur
554 a pun: Regem pariter ac regnum regerent
they wanted to throw [them] {away}. Although they knew this [well] enough, nevertheless, dissembling out of malice, when they displayed them everywhere (as if they were evidence of a manifest crime), they cried {out}: "Behold, the very arms which those traitors had secretly concealed in containers, so that they could slaughter the Dukes and all the nobles through a {treacherous} plot." This fiction, although it rendered the matter more suspect to [those] weighing [the evidence], who easily guessed that those who had determined555 on such a crime in their mind would rather have worn their arms on their bodies than collected [them] in casks, bound and encumbered, nevertheless satisfied the simple and rough people so marvelously556 that from the sight of the arms it was just as if treason was certain and proven, and everywhere they proclaimed health for the Dukes [and] hanging for the captives.

[358.15] When the King was announced to be coming nearer, the Senate of the City with a great number of citizens went {out} towards [him and] met [him] four miles from the City. The Prince, thus honorably received, was conveyed into the City by a numerous procession of the nobles and the citizens on the fourth day of May in the first (and also last) year of his kingship. But, by the magnificent display of honor, and with his face composed in respect for the Prince, the Duke of Gloucester went from [being regarded with] the highest malevolence and suspicion, which was burning a little before, immediately to [being regarded with] such love of all and such an opinion of integrity that, alone among everyone, he was declared the Protector of the King and his kingdom by the consensus of the nobles. Therefore, whether it was done out of ignorance or happened by fate, it is certain that the lamb was deliberately557 entrusted to the fidelity of the wolf. Soon the Bishop of York, bitterly rebuked because he had handed {over} the seal to the Queen, was deprived558 of his administration. [360] Russell, Bishop of Lincoln, was authorized with that office, a man both with experience of affairs and with singular probity of life, then no doubt among the principle men of letters in his time.

[360.4] Therefore, when he had been made Protector, although every day appeared longer than a year to him which delayed his impulse ([which was]{passionately} desiring and impatient of delay), and [although] he was greedy to usurp the kingship as {soon as possible} in actual fact, which he had already seized559 before in his mind, nevertheless he supposed that not a thing should be attempted heedlessly560 before he had enticed the remaining part of his prey into his snare. He was not ignorant that if he were to deprive the one brother of dominion, immediately universal zeal would incline {towards} elevating the other, whether he persisted in the sanctuary or (which he feared much more) if he was sent {out} of Britain into safety561 somewhere [else]. Therefore, at the next assembly of the nobles, he vehemently complained {about} the Queen, [saying that] it was done hatefully by her, who dared to separate from the sacrosanct majesty of the Prince his only and most beloved full brother,
as if she begrudged to them both those sweet amusements of mutual companionship, or
[else] she was more impious towards that [brother] whose care she especially let be
seen\textsuperscript{562}, since she stole him away from his liberty, dragged [him] away from the light and
splendor of his most brilliant fortune, [and] miserably hid him in a sanctuary as if in
darkness and squalor. All of this was accomplished for no other reason than that bitter
malevolence could be incited among the people towards the nobles who were from the
council for the King. For her, there was such hatred for them that (like the fables report
about Medea), she burned to take vengeance on those she hated, even at the expense of
her own children.

[360.25] "For why else [did she take] the boy into a sanctuary," he said, "unless
because she wishes you to appear to the rabble to provide for the Prince either
insufficiently faithfully or not wisely enough, if it would be a danger to entrust his
brother to me, [when] you have entrusted [the Prince's] body itself to me for nurturing
and safeguarding?\textsuperscript{563} [362] His [body's] health certainly does not appear to me to be
supported [well] enough by any care for sustenance\textsuperscript{564}, unless she would also add the
pleasure of play, which in a marvelous manner refreshes and invigorates boyish spirits.
Nor can the tender age of boys obtain that [pleasure] from old [men]. An agreeable\textsuperscript{565}
playmate ought to be invited who neither surpasses his years nor is too much beneath
[them]. Then he will approach his nobility as nearly \{as possible\}. Thus reasoning will
simultaneously be employed\textsuperscript{566} \{both\} for his age and for his majesty. Who, therefore, is
more fitting in every respect\textsuperscript{567} than his [own] full brother, whom now his mother, worse
than a stepmother, withholds? If anyone deems this is \{very\} trivial (which I certainly
think it will appear to no one for whom the Prince's welfare would be of concern), he
should consider\textsuperscript{568} that sometimes the greatest enterprises are not able to stand except
with the support of lesser \{things\}. In addition, how dishonorable is this to us nobles, how
malevolent to the King himself, [for it] to be tossed through the mouths of all, not only in
this kingdom but even among foreign nations (as an evil rumor flies swiftly), that his
brother has been driven to that [point] of necessity that, [while] the affairs of [his brother]
are flourishing, he himself lurks in sanctuary? For it will not be easily\textsuperscript{569} believed that
anyone hides himself in a cave for whom it is possible to live in light and liberty without
danger. When once this belief\textsuperscript{570} has settled in their minds, you would not easily tear it
\{out\} afterwards, and it will finally grow into a greater evil than anyone could easily\textsuperscript{571}
divine.

\textsuperscript{562} \textit{praee se fert}
\textsuperscript{563} \textit{tuendum}
\textsuperscript{564} \textit{victus}; a juridical term, “necessities of life”
\textsuperscript{565} \textit{blandus}; “flattering, pleasant”
\textsuperscript{566} Lit. “held”
\textsuperscript{567} \textit{partibus}; elsewhere “party”
\textsuperscript{568} Lit, “hold”
\textsuperscript{569} \textit{temere}
\textsuperscript{570} \textit{persuasio}
\textsuperscript{571} \textit{in proclivi}; other use of “easily” in this sentence is “facile.”
"Therefore, so that this plague might be dealt with quickly, I propose that some man weighty in age and powerful in authority should be sent to their mother, and he should be [someone] for whom both the honor of the King and the reputation of our order is of concern. Also, he should be [someone] for whom there is some {amount} of both love and fidelity from her. For all these reasons, from looking around no one presents [himself] to me as a more suitable [man] than this most reverend father" (for he was present) "the Cardinal, who alone appears to me by his prudence will report {back} [that] the matter is accomplished, [if] only he does not refuse the labor. However, I hope he will not refuse, [364] either for the sake of the King, or for our [sake], or for the [sake] of the Duke himself, my dearest nephew, second to the Prince himself. For all these [reasons], if (as I hope) he will have persuaded the Queen right {away}, it would not be easy to say how much trouble he will remove. Yet if, out of womanly stubbornness, she will have so {far} persisted in her wicked undertaking that she is not able to be turned from her mind's desire towards the truth by any [trait] of such a father, neither by his authority, nor his counsel, nor his fidelity, I certainly would be the author of his being removed from the abbey by a royal edict, and of his being led into the most blissful camaraderie of the King, in whose perpetual companionship he will dwell so honorably that it will be possible [for] testimony to be reported to the whole world, for us and against his mother, that she, when she was closing him into a sanctuary, had either deliberate malice or stupidity. This is my opinion concerning this matter, unless any one of you thinks the contrary. For my {own} reasoning will not ever flatter me to such {an extent} that I would not be prepared to submit to whomever of you is counseling more proper [things]."

Nearly all the nobles [who] were present agreed {with} this speech. The Cardinal and the rest of the bishops approved only the other [points]; [but] they proposed that nothing should be dared with his mother unwilling, nor [anything] proceed by force if perhaps she would not comply with their words. For the deed would appear hateful to those above and to men [if] a sanctuary of such ancient {age} and [one] so sacrosanct was profaned, [one] which such good kings and popes instituted, [and] so many [others] held as fixed and holy. And [it would appear hateful] to bring an assault into a place which was the place Peter himself, the Prince of the Apostles, escorted by a great chorus of those above, long {ago} dedicated to God and to himself so particularly that for so many past ages there was neither any king so daring [that] he did not reverently fear to violate [it], nor a bishop so religious [that] he would dare to consecrate [it].

“Therefore, by no means,” said the Cardinal, “will the immunity of this sanctuary be diminished with me as the author, because so many who would have

572 Lit. “might be gone to meet with”
573 Lit. “that which I hope”
574 contubernium; the “tent-companionship” of soldiers; also used for that of animals and slaves, but not for free men.
575 a consilio
576 a pun: “be prepared to submit” is paratus parere
577 sanctuarior; the more common word for sanctuary in More’s Latin is asylum.
578 following P; Daniel Kinney has imminuetur from A and 1565.
otherwise miserably perished so often have lived\textsuperscript{579} by its protection. But [although] I hope it will not be necessary, truly even if it were necessary however {much}, I propose that it not be done. [366] Indeed there is hope that the Queen will listen to reason, but if it should succeed less [than] {according} to my liking, nevertheless I will try so diligently that everyone would easily understand that it was not my industry that was lacking in [this] business, but maternal indulgence and, [even] more, womanly fear that stand {in the way}.

[366.6] “Womanly fear!” said the Duke of Buckingham, “On {the contrary}, the invincible stubbornness of a woman. For I certainly would even bet my soul that she fears absolutely nothing either for her son or for herself. For who undertakes a war with a woman? But if some of the males of her blood were women, too, things would assuredly be situated\textsuperscript{580} better. Although it is indeed not the Queen's blood that was harmful for them, but their mind[s] connected for sedition. Yet, [if] she and her blood-relations were supremely hated by us, nevertheless the Prince's brother could not be otherwise than\textsuperscript{581} dear [to us], [since] we ourselves are indeed blood-relations to him. Truly, if she were led by as much zeal for his safekeeping as either her [own] desire or her malevolence for us is dear to her,\textsuperscript{582} she would hurry to send him {out} from that cloister; she would no less reluctantly tolerate her son to be hidden\textsuperscript{583} there as now she is scurrying to conceal [him] and confine [him]. For if she had some intellect (as she no doubt has [one] not contemptible for a woman) she would by no means assign to herself any more foresight than [she would] to some of us, and [especially\textsuperscript{584}] to those [men] whose fidelity is not doubted; but she has truly been persuaded that her son's welfare is no less dear\textsuperscript{585} to them than to her; [and] the more they wish him well, the less they wish him to be with her, if it is settled as fixed in her mind to lurk in a sanctuary. And conversely, I suppose that there is nobody [who] would not be even [more] pleased that the Prince himself was being cared {for} by his parent, if only she would make up her mind\textsuperscript{586} to live [some]where in which it would be unbecoming for neither [of them] to dwell. On {that account}, if, in returning her son to liberty, she should refuse to follow the counsels of [men] whose [368] prudence is not doubtful, nor fidelity uncertain, who does not easily understand that the cause of such wicked resolution is more malice than fear?

[368.3] “But if she is so fearful that she sincerely\textsuperscript{587} fears what does not exist, let her truly fear; for who can prevent [her] even should she dread her own shadow? Certainly, the more she fears to entrust her son to us, conversely, the more rightly it {must} be feared by us to leave the boy with her. For {indeed} if she shapes in her mind such empty fears as that she imagines that there is danger for her son, assuredly (as is [the

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\textsuperscript{579} Lit. “were, existed”

\textsuperscript{580} Lit. “held”

\textsuperscript{581} Lit. “not”

\textsuperscript{582} Lit. “it lies in her heart”

\textsuperscript{583} condi; also “preserved” or “buried”

\textsuperscript{584} Lit. “that” for emphasis of the whole idea of the previous clause

\textsuperscript{585} Lit. “lies no less in their heart”

\textsuperscript{586} Lit. “lead her mind in”

\textsuperscript{587} Lit. “from her heart/mind”
way of) a mind disturbed by fearing) she will not even trust\textsuperscript{588} enough in sanctuary. She will certainly easily think to herself that if there was someone with such inhuman savagery that he would \{zealously\} strive to harm an innocent boy, with such an impious and profaned mind that neither the fear of those above nor shame \[before\] men could restrain \[him\] from a \{disgraceful\} crime, the name of sanctuary would be trivial and empty for him. And thus her mind will be constrained\textsuperscript{589} by a false suspicion of danger to seek some stronger protection outside the kingdom. Indeed even now, although fearing nothing of the kind, nevertheless I do not doubt she is contriving that very thing in her mind, so that she could do \[it\], just as much as we, conversely, \[are contriving\] that she not do \[it\]. If she should accomplish such a wicked plan\textsuperscript{590} by womanly heedlessness (for she will easily accomplish \[it\] with us yawning), all mortals everywhere will proclaim us worthy \[men\], of course, who would counsel the Prince, whose \{own\} full brother we allowed to be lost \[right\] under our eyes through insanity. Therefore I propose that the most illustrious Duke be removed while it is possible, even with his mother unwilling, rather than he be abandoned there meanwhile until the woman's evil intention sends him into danger under the pretense of fear.

\[368.26\] “Nevertheless, not by any means would I want the immunity of sanctuary to be violated. Since it takes its strength from its ancient \{age\}, I am not \[the man\] who would recommend\textsuperscript{591} infringing \[it\] and conversely if the deed were \[done\] anew, I would not recommend\textsuperscript{592} instituting \[it\]. Nevertheless, I do not deny that it was well and mercifully done that \[370\] for those whom shipwreck, or a badly expunged debt, or some other adverse violence\textsuperscript{593} of fortune makes destitute, a haven was opened which preserved their bodies, at least, untouched by the savagery of their creditors. In addition, if the title of the kingship comes into question (which has not happened \[only\] once) while \[the question\] concerning the right is decided by arms, and the men \[on opposite sides\] hold each other in the place of traitors, it is not unsatisfactory that there be some place in which both \{sides\} could \{take\} refuge where, with affairs in turn doubtful or miserable, with victory alternating, they could be in safety.\textsuperscript{594} Yet, as for the thieves and robbers who have filled those places, and who once they are tainted by these \{kind of\} \{disgraceful\} crimes never afterwards come \{to their senses\}, it is surely a crime that any sanctuary is \[available\] for their protection; and much more \[so\] for murderers, whom God ordered to be torn \{away\} from the very altars and slaughtered, provided that they purposely assented to the crime. But among us, unless the misconduct is intentional, indeed there is no need for sanctuary. For if in other \[cases\] either necessity armed someone or chance pushed \[him\] to a homicide, either the law gives\textsuperscript{595} his offense indulgence or the prince grants pardon. Let anyone now count how rare are those he discovers in sanctuary whom any favorable necessity compels \[to go\] there \[and\]
conversely how great a crowd of incorrigibles swarms there, whom dice, luxury, and lust destroyed. Moreover, what a hideous and horrid filth of robbers, of assassins, of cutthroats, of murderers, and of inhuman traitors flows together into sanctuary as if into the most pestilent bilge-water hold. And [they swarm] chiefly into two [sanctuaries], of which one is at the hand of the city [and] the other was located in the city’s very bowels. I would surely dare to affirm that anyone {who} would compare the advantages of sanctuaries with the disadvantages would proclaim that rather than enduring so many disadvantages, it would be more advantageous even to be deprived of the advantages themselves.

[370.28] “And in addition I affirm that [the comparison] holds {to such a degree} that other [examples] [need] not be added, in which [372] the most {disgracefully} criminal men abuse the license of sanctuaries to the ruin of good [men] more and more every day. For now a wicked youth freely squanders, wastes, [and] fritters away from no other cause than his trust in these places. Indeed, some wealthier [men] fly in there with the goods of lower-class [men]. There they build, amuse themselves, and tell their creditors to go hang. Wives flee there with their husbands’ movable goods, making their [husbands’] harshness a pretext for their own lust. Thieves carry what they have taken by theft there, and there they afterwards live and triumph. There they devise new robberies; from there they creep out every night, steal, kill, and return after committing a crime, as if reverence for [that] place not only safeguarded their life in repentance for prior wicked deeds, but even granted license for devising new ones. However, if prudent men would exert themselves a good part of this evil could easily be abolished, and that with the good grace of Divine Peter. As for the rest, since I know not what pope and prince more merciful than prudent instituted [it], and [since] others successively maintained [it] from religious fear, I propose that we should tolerate [it] to the extent reason would tolerate [it], and reason is not so agreeable to sanctuary that it would prevent us from leading the most illustrious Duke out for his own good, for whom the privilege of that place has no place.

“I certainly have always supposed that the true and original use of sanctuaries is that they protect the bodies of those who otherwise would endure evil both great and, principally, deserved. For so that undeserved evil might be avoided, there is no reason you would invoke a privilege peculiar to any [particular] place. For injustice should not be introduced to any place {at all}; laws, customs, and nature grant that immunity to any place equally, unless someone knows of some place in which it is right to perpetrate an evil deed. But when the danger is from the law itself, then truly protection [374] is to be sought from a privilege; and from there, I think, the use of sanctuaries was born and nourished. [However,] that most illustrious Duke is far away from that necessity, whose close relationship by blood proves his fidelity towards the Prince [and] whose tender youth declares his innocence towards everyone else, lest someone think that there is a need for sanctuary for him to whom it could not even be applied. For {refuge} is not taken in sanctuary in the same manner as in baptism, such that the benefit is obtained by

596 Lit. “with a crime having been committed”
597 tuaretur
598 tuorentur
the vicarious voice of sponsors and godparents, but it is given for his own good. It is proper that the suppliant himself demands\textsuperscript{599} and begs [for it]. And that is very deservedly so, since it is suitable for nobody except for him whose mind, conscious of a crime, makes him in want of, and needing, so much help. What wish, therefore, does that little boy have, which could require the useless protection by sanctuary for himself, who, if his age were advanced so that he could understand the use of that place, would assuredly be not a little angered with those who persuaded him of remaining there? Now to remove [him] from there [when] he is not opposing [being removed] appears to me nothing to be so very terrified of, so that I propose that even against those for whom there is truly a need for the aid\textsuperscript{600} of sanctuary, nevertheless more should be dared than we are accustomed to. For if someone steals himself away to that place with another's goods, why is it not permitted for the king to return those plundered [goods] from the fugitive to their owner\textsuperscript{601} without any prejudice to the privilege?"

Nearly all those from the clergy who were present, whether they were flattering the Duke or whether they truly thought so, confirmed his words, [saying that] it is thus stipulated by divine [law]\textsuperscript{602} in [that] case\textsuperscript{603} that the goods of debtors [who] congregate in sanctuaries are distributed to their creditors, with only the liberty of their bodies [permitted to] remain, with which they could earnestly seek sustenance by labor.

"I believe that you speak truly," he said, "and if a woman deserts\textsuperscript{604} there disgusted with her husband but [acting] as if she were thoroughly terrified [of him], it certainly appears to me that the husband, having seized his wife by the hand, could drag her out from the middle of Peter's temple with Divine Peter unoffended. Otherwise, if nobody could be led out of there who said he wished to remain, certainly any boy who flees away from his teacher would have to be left there. Although that example could appear trivial (as it is), nevertheless this case\textsuperscript{605} of ours is considerably more trivial. For although that is a boyish fear, it is nevertheless some [fear], but this is none at all; and indeed I have often previously heard of sanctuary men, but now is the first I have heard of sanctuary boys."

[376.7] "Therefore, so that I may finish at last, anybody that commits that [kind] of crime such that there is a need in his case\textsuperscript{606} for the help of sanctuary, let him remain there. But this illustrious duke should not be sent away there, who neither has the age by which he could ask for it, nor the malice by which he could need [it]. Neither his life nor his liberty is able to come into peril from any law [iure] [and] through injustice [iniuriam] truly it is able [to come into peril] almost less, with his brother holding the\textsuperscript{599}

\textit{flagito}; “to demand fiercely or violently.” This is related to the term rendered “{disgraceful} crime” throughout.

\textsuperscript{600} a pun: \textit{ope opus}

\textsuperscript{601} \textit{domino}; elsewhere “lord, master”

\textsuperscript{602} Only 1565 has “law.”

\textsuperscript{603} \(P\) and \(A\) have “\textit{in rem},” but Daniel Kinney’s Latin omits it.

\textsuperscript{604} Lit. “deserts over to the enemy”

\textsuperscript{605} \textit{causa}; a juridical term for a legal case

\textsuperscript{606} Lit. “for him”
highest power of all\textsuperscript{607}, he himself powerful in wealth and even more powerful in friends, [and] indeed with his most renowned uncle and all of us exerting \{ourselves\} for his health and safety. Finally, \{those\} who would drag someone \{out\} of sanctuary for his own good and advantage, even if they do violence \{to him\}, I nevertheless deny that they do violence to sanctuary.”

\[376.18\] When all the laymen \{who\} were present and truly also most of the clergy assented to this speech of the Duke, they were as yet suspecting nothing evil, and for \{this reason\} they finally \{assented to\} his removal, so that, if he should not be returned of her own accord, it would appear that he should be led \{out\} from the sanctuary by force. Yet, it appeared it should be attempted by words before \{it was attempted\} by force. Therefore, the Cardinal hastened straight from the council into the sanctuary, and with him several of the nobles, whether concern\textsuperscript{608} for the man's dignity was considered\textsuperscript{609}, or whether the Protector intended that from the presence of so \{many\} nobles the Queen should gather that what was being done then was not from the opinion of one man, or whether indeed he did not dare to entrust such a matter to one \{man\}. Although some suspect that, if the Queen should stubbornly continue to \{flatly\} refuse \{him\} her son (which he expected), it had been demanded separately \[378\] from some of the attendants that they immediately tear \{him\} \{away\} from the unwilling \{mother\} by force, and not give \{her\} time for sending \{him\} \{away\}, a plan for which thing it seemed she would consider, after that discourse had been held, \{if\} only her space \{of time\} sufficed.

\[378.5\] Therefore, when they came in sight of each \{other\}, the Cardinal explained that it appeared to be a vicious thing to the nobles that the only brother of the King was separated\textsuperscript{610} from him by her, being guarded as if in a prison, by which deed, although nothing was sought beyond their own infamy, nevertheless, undoubtedly malevolence had resulted and was blazing up among all the foreign nations \{towards\} the Prince himself, whose only full \{brother\} was said to be hiding in a sanctuary. Meanwhile, not even our country was exempt from calumny, as if it had begotten such an inhuman and savage people that there would be danger to a brother even from his brother. Accordingly, he himself had been sent to her by the King and the nobles so that in view of his own fidelity and love towards her he might also counsel upright and profitable things, principally of this kind: that the Duke be sent \{out\} of the recesses of his lair into the most august palace of the Prince, \{and\} that she return \{him\} to the most joyful companionship of his brother. If she would act in \{that way\}, she would be \{taking\} upright counsel \{considered\} both publicly, for the interests of the kingdom, and commonly, for \{the interests\} of her friends, and privately for her own \{interests\}; but principally she would be extraordinarily gratifying to the King and even to the Duke himself, for whom it would be the greatest advantage especially\textsuperscript{611} to live together.

\textsuperscript{607} \(fratre rerum summa potiente\)
\textsuperscript{608} \(ratio\)
\textsuperscript{609} Lit. “had”
\textsuperscript{610} \(seiunctum\); “disjoined”
\textsuperscript{611} “greatest” is \textit{maximum} (following \(P\) here, which Daniel Kinney does not); especially is \textit{maxime}
To these [words] the Queen said, "For {my part} I would not deny, honored father, that the condition you put {forth} is to be desired for this son of mine: namely, that he permanently dwell with the King and live with his brother. Yet also, conversely, I would propose [it] to be a matter of no small advantage to either [of them] if their mother should protect and raise them both for some years still, [if] the {tender} youth of either is appraised, but especially [that] of the younger. Besides the tender years of his infancy, which even in itself needs care [that] is not sluggish, a fever (by {no means} a trivial [one]), has also attacked [him], by which [380] he was long afflicted; [and] he has so recently recovered, [or] rather has begun to be sick more mildly, that I dare to entrust him to no one of all mortals except only myself, since {moreover} experts in medical affairs say (which daily experiences prove even {if} they were silent) that no one falls {back} into a disease except with double the danger (I suppose because a nature exhausted by an earlier conflict brings less vigorous strength to the second encounter). Nevertheless, I do not distrust that those could be found who, for their part, would diligently attend to his welfare. But I think there is no one anywhere who either has explored more thoroughly what his body could bear and requires than I (who have been accustomed to be with him continuously for so long), nor who would care for the boy less laxly or more indulgently than his mother."

[380.14] To these [words] the Cardinal [replied]: "No one is going to deny, most renowned Queen, that there is no one anywhere who is more fitting than you alone for governing the life of your children, especially in their {tender} youth, and there is not one of all the nobles who would not wish both [your children] to be nurtured most {of all} [under] your eye and in your hands, [if] only you could make up your mind that you would go {out} into those places which are not unbefitting either to your dignity or to their majesty. But {if} you have persuaded yourself that you must be hidden in this sanctuary, it has been judged by the common opinion of all that it is far more to the Duke's advantage to live with the King, free, in dignity, and in splendor, and for the good and advantage of both, than—to the harm of one, the disgrace of the other, [and] certainly to the sorrow of both—to lead a miserable life with you in lairs and in squalor. For it is not in any way {whatsoever} so necessary for a boy to be raised by his mother that an occasion does not sometimes occur in which it is preferable that he [be raised] in another {place} by someone {else}. For also when once your dearest son, then the king-designate, was about to go {forth} into Wales, to live far away from you for the sake of his own advantage and [that] of his fatherland, [382] I remember that the deed was done in {accordance with} your extraordinary prudence and also with you yourself approving [it]."

[382.3] "Not approving very {much}," she said, "{and} nevertheless, this case has nothing similar with that [one], since the one was then healthy and the other is now

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612 tueretur
613 pericula
614 diffido
615 moderandae
616 Lit. "lead your mind"
617 invidia
618 causa
in infirm health. [With him] in that state, I cannot wonder enough, by Pollux, why the Protector is trying so eagerly to draw him to himself! In that [condition], if the boy (may an omen be absent from my word), apart from any guilt of his, should perish by fate, nevertheless he could easily fall into suspicion of foul play. Now, that he distorts (which is easy for anybody) by the viciousness of his speech a thing [which] is not dishonorable in itself, even if necessity were lacking, and [which] is now so necessary that it would easily merit forgiveness even if it should turn aside a little from honor, while he attacks this pious concern of mine for my son with harsh words, and interprets my fear as malice, and [says] that I do not seek the welfare of myself and my child but [rather seek] malevolence towards himself and the nobles—these [things] I certainly do not suffer very indignantly. If [only] I were not distracted by greater troubles than [the fact] that there is leisure [for me] to be disturbed by words! Nevertheless I do not see [well] enough how he is consistent with himself. For the same [man] who pretends that everything is safe for me [can] hardly stand for me to keep even my son; and [the man] who feigns that I would be safe anyplace does not even permit [me] to rest in [that place] where even robbers are safe. For what iniquity holds, if indeed I am a free woman, [if I] live where it pleases me? Or why would it be disgraceful for a little boy to remain with his mother? For though he shouts that this is dishonorable [first] to him, next to all the nobles, and then finally to the Prince himself, I certainly propose, conversely, that for nobody is it not honorable to leave the Duke especially there, where it is credible that the most accurate reasoning for his welfare will be had. Such reasoning, I think, no one doubts is to be had in this place, while I remain here, and it is not my plan to leave from this place yet and to throw myself into peril after my remaining relatives, who I wish were here with me in safety rather than I myself were dwelling outside with them in danger for my life."

At these words, a certain man from among the nobles who, as an attendant, had come there with the Cardinal said, "Then do you know anything, Queen, about why danger ought to be imminent for any of them?"

"Not why it ought to," she said, "nor indeed why they are thrown into prison, into which, nevertheless, they are thrown. On that account, it is not something you should marvel at if I should fear that the same men who have cast undeserving men into chains might brood over the destruction of innocents."

Then the Cardinal, warning that loose-tongued [man] with a nod that he should be quiet and not touch that chord so ungracefully any more, at once consoled the Queen over the misfortune of her friends, [saying that], indeed when their case had been examined and judicially investigated, there would be no peril. [And] truly,
concerning herself, what she feared was most empty, since for her there was neither any evil impending nor could [any] be threatened.

[384.13] "But how could I trust in that?" she said. "By my consciousness of my innocence? As {if}, indeed, they are guilty? Or perhaps because I am less hated by their enemies, by whom they are hated even especially because of me? Or does this kinship of blood with the Prince keep [me] secure? But by how {great} a degree of blood-relationship are they distant, for whom now you see how a blood-relationship is good for nothing? That it might not even be fatally harmful is still in my prayers. For {that reason} I have also determined to keep myself within these walls [and] not to send my son from {here} until I will have found safer [ones]. For [regarding] that [boy], the more eagerly I see certain [men] labor so that they could bring him {back} into their power on a pretext of inane excuses628, undoubtedly the more vigorously I myself also dread to send him {away} from me."

[384.24] "But conversely," he said, "the more you, Queen, are terrified to entrust him to such close friends, the more others, in turn, fear to leave [him] with you, lest that womanly fear, having been groundlessly conceived, should put {into} your mind [the thought] that you should send him somewhere farther [away]. There are those who deny that you even are able to separate his brother from the King, since [386] the boy's simple and innocent age incurs629 none of sanctuary's lot—[a boy] who is not endowed with the judgment with which he could ask [for it], and [who] lacks the malice by which he could need it; therefore they propose that the privilege of this place would indeed not be infringed if they should come to tear him {away} from here even with you unwilling—which perhaps they are going to do, since you obstinately are opposing the interests630 of your [children]. The Protector, his most loving uncle, is so concerned that you, while you are imagining empty fears in your mind, not send the boy {away} into certain danger elsewhere."

[386.9] "Is {that so}?" she said. "Does he so love my son to death that he dreads nothing as much as that he may not escape elsewhere and evade his hand? Of course he fears lest I should send him farther from here, whom, thus weakened, I am indeed not able [to send away] except at the cost of his welfare, which I am not willing to endanger; [but] certain [people] are not willing to see [this]. Lest I send him {away} from here? I believe that I would be sending him into snares laid on his path. By Pollux, it is possible for him to sleep soundly631 as {far as} what pertains to this matter. For where would I hope he would be safe632 if I despaired [of it] here? Is there any place anywhere more holy than this one, the immunity of which no tyrant has been found so {far} who was so impious that he has not feared633 to violate [it]? And I certainly trust that the nod634 of most holy Divine Peter for the protection of this sanctuary will be a no less powerful

628 Lit. “things”
629 Lit. “makes”
630 commodis
631 Lit. “on either ear”
632 tuto
633 vereor
634 numen
avenger\textsuperscript{635} against violators of his own sanctuary\textsuperscript{636} today than it was once. But his boyish age is not capable of [claiming] the privilege? It is beautifully obvious that where robbers are unhurt, there the innocent is forsaken. As for what is argued—that a \{little\} boy does not require the benefit of sanctuary—I wish that he did not need it, and certainly he would not need it if innocence in itself was a protection\textsuperscript{637} against the wicked.

[386.27] "Does the Protector (who, I pray to those above, may prove \{to be\} a protector), does he think me so stupid that I do not perceive where his ornamental speech tends \{towards\}? The lair of the sanctuary \textsuperscript{388} dishonors the majesty of the Prince; it stirs up infamy towards the nobles \{and\} malevolence towards the Prince. For the benefit of both brothers, let them not dwell separately, especially since the Prince needs a playmate \{regarding\} which, I implore all those above that a happier playmate fall to both \{their lots\} than he who with crafty counsels \{makes\} pretext of pretended\textsuperscript{638} follies with such grand words), as if nowhere could there be found \{someone\} who would joke with the Prince (if only he were at leisure for this!) unless his brother, for whom, through \{poor\} health, it is not pleasing to play, be drawn out of sanctuary—that is, outside his fortifications—as if he were going to play; as \{if\} boys have such a reasoning of majesty that they will abstain from joking rather than admit inferiors, or as if they were not able to play except with their brothers, by whom at that age they are generally entertained less than by strangers.

[388.13] "But this boy does not suffice, of course, for asking \{for\} the benefit of this place. What if he should hear him asking \? But imagine he could not, imagine he would not—nay, let it be supposed that he refuses and tries to leave—nevertheless, whoever would remove him, even willing, from me unwilling, I contend he clearly desecrates this holy sanctuary, unless we should think that where it would be a sacrilege to lead \{away\} a horse from me, there it is right that my son be dragged \{off\}. Indeed, unless the experts deceive me, \{in the case of\} a son to whom no estate liable to knight's service comes by inheritance, English laws entrust him to be guarded\textsuperscript{639} by his mother; and can anyone drag \{off\} my ward from me with the liberty of sanctuary\textsuperscript{640} unoffended? And even if my right is not able to guard\textsuperscript{641} him and he \{is not able\} to ask \{for\} his \{right\}, nevertheless when his guardianship\textsuperscript{642} belongs to me, who would not see I am able to ask \{for\} his \{right\} in his stead? Unless perhaps the law intends only that guardianship\textsuperscript{643} of his goods be had with no care had for his body, for the sake of which alone the law \{takes\} care that the goods are safe for the ward.

[388.28] "If it is \{the case\} that precedents are effective in obtaining the privilege for the boy, I do not need \{to go\} far for \{the precedents\} sought. Indeed, this place itself in which \[390\] we are now standing \{of which it is now disputed whether it can be of use

\textsuperscript{635} vindex; “one who lays legal claim to a thing,” “defender, protector, vindicator”
\textsuperscript{636} sanctuarii
\textsuperscript{637} tuta
\textsuperscript{638} personatas
\textsuperscript{639} tuendum
\textsuperscript{640} sanctuarii
\textsuperscript{641} tueri
\textsuperscript{642} tutela
\textsuperscript{643} tutelam
to a boy) once received my other son—namely the prince himself—[as he was] being born, sheltered\textsuperscript{644} him as he cried, and preserved him for a more prosperous fortune, which now I pray may be perpetual for him. For as you all know, I am not now an inhabitant of a sanctuary for the first time; formerly, when my husband had been cast off from the throne of the kingdom and was exiled, I took refuge here [while] pregnant, here I gave birth to the king; from here I went forth to congratulate my returning and victorious husband; from here I offered my infant son for the first embraces of his parent, for whom, now [that] he is ruling, I wish that the palace may be as safe\textsuperscript{645} as this place was once for [him when he] was the enemy of the one ruling.

\textsuperscript{[390.11]} “I have also determined not to send my other son from this place, and not to entrust both to any one [person], especially to that [man] to whom, with both [of them] departing, the laws of our country destine the kingship. Nobody should investigate my fears. It is right for maternal anxiety to fear even empty [things]; although in this matter I am no more cautious than the common\textsuperscript{646} law, which, if the experts tell the truth, admits no one ever as a guardian\textsuperscript{647} of [someone] by whose destruction he would gain an inheritance even considerably less than a kingdom. Against these dangers the most certain and only proper protection\textsuperscript{648} is in the immunity of this place, from which he whom I have [with me] will not leave with me willing. If it is such that anyone would drag him out [with me] unwilling, and would consider\textsuperscript{649} that the most holy reverence\textsuperscript{650} of sanctuary ought to be violated (which I do not think [is the case]), then I implore its guardians from above\textsuperscript{651} that the same [person] shortly be in need of the immunity of sanctuary, [and] that he may lack the opportunity, intercepted and prevented, forbidden access to all the holy seats; for I would not wish even an enemy [who] had gone {in} to be dragged {out}.”

\textsuperscript{[390.26]} The Cardinal, when he saw that he was accomplishing nothing much by urging, but that she, more and more incensed, was uttering her later [words] more harshly [392], and with stern words was attacking the Protector's fidelity (which, since he believed it was irreproachable, he reluctantly heard [it] accused), he finally replied that he would not dispute the matter {any} longer: if the Queen wished to entrust the boy [to them], they would bind their own fidelity for his safety; if she had determined to keep [him], they would depart immediately and not add a word more in this matter, in which she held as suspect either their prudence or their fidelity: their prudence if they were thought gullible\textsuperscript{652} to another's faithlessness, their fidelity if [they were thought to be] knowing accomplices\textsuperscript{653}.

\textsuperscript{644} \textit{tego}; “concealed, protected”
\textsuperscript{645} \textit{tuto}
\textsuperscript{646} \textit{publica}
\textsuperscript{647} \textit{tutorem}
\textsuperscript{648} \textit{praesidium}
\textsuperscript{649} \textit{duco}
\textsuperscript{650} \textit{religio}
\textsuperscript{651} \textit{superos presides}
\textsuperscript{652} \textit{creduli}
\textsuperscript{653} \textit{prudentes ministri}; also “prudent servants”
[392.9] After these [words], the Queen {fell} silent, deliberating for a long [while]. Since the Cardinal appeared to her more ready for leaving than some from his escort, and [since] the Protector himself was present in the palace with a band of henchmen, it began to enter her mind that her son could not be kept openly in sanctuary, [that] there was truly no hope of concealing [him], [that] there was nothing which was not unready for leading him {away} from there, nor was the time sufficient, nor had it been provided654 where he should be sent, [that] his attendants as yet were uncertain, [and that] all [things] were unprepared; to such {an extent} this messenger had overwhelmed her security, [since she] was thinking about nothing less than force being brought {into} the sanctuary; which, she considered, was even now blockaded, nor was there any way {out} for the boy except to be given into a trap.655 Conversely, as hope sometimes glitters meanwhile among ruined affairs, she thought there was a chance that their uncle's mind towards his nephews was not as merciless as she herself had conceived. Finally, if her fear were not empty, certainly it was {too} late. Moreover, the Cardinal had a mind [which had been] tested [well] enough, nor was the fidelity of some of the nobles who came together [with him] less verified, whom, as [much as] she feared that they could be deceived, so she had persuaded herself [that] they could not be corrupted. Therefore, if she would send {away} her son at all, she supposed it preferable that she surrender him willingly, rather than she appear [to do so] unwillingly, calculating that to some {extent} it would enkindle care and industry for safeguarding the boy in those to whom she was now surrendering [him] [394], if she herself committed her son [to them] with her own hand as if into their guardianship656 and fidelity.

[394.3] Therefore, [when] the boy was led {out} and placed in their presence, she said, "Men most renowned, I am neither so imprudent myself that I distrust657 your prudence, nor am I so suspicious that I doubt your fidelity; [and] today I will give that proof of my trust such that, if either {one} were lacking in you, it would inflict an eternal wound both on me and on the republic." Grasping the boy by the hand at {the same time} she said, "Behold this [boy] whom you wish, my [son] and the son of dearest Edward, once your king, whom I do not doubt658 that I could protect659 by the holy reverence of this place if I had not determined to entrust him to you. Nevertheless, I doubt660 even less that there are others so mortally hostile to my blood that if they knew that [such] blood was hidden in their own bodies they would not hesitate to drain it. In addition, we have learned by experience661 how easily the accursed thirst for kingship swallows every affection of blood-relationship: a brother removes a brother and the offspring rushes toward dominion over the very body of his parent, and is a nephew secure from his uncle? Certainly, each of my children is a protection662 to the other while

654 provido; also “foreseen”
655 insidias; elsewhere “{treacherous} plot”
656 tutelam
657 diffidam
658 ambigo; “doubt” is usually dubio.
659 tueri
660 ambigo
661 periculum
662 praesidium
they are separated; they give life to each other; the health of either preserves the other; and for this reason nothing is more perilous than to entrust both boys to one man, if indeed any merchant who risks his entire lot at once in one ship is usually held to be insufficiently cautious. Nevertheless, I give this boy into your hands, and in him simultaneously his brother; I commit both to your fidelity and from you I will demand them both back in the presence of gods and men. I know there is much prudence in you and more fidelity; resources and power are abundant and there are not lacking those who will gladly join themselves to you in this cause. Only much, by your fidelity and by the memory of my husband and by my concern for my sons and my trust in you, do I beg you: that as I appear to you to fear too much, so may you in turn not trust too much." At once turning to the little boy, she said, "Goodbye my dearest son; may those above summon caretakers for you—nay, may they themselves have your care. Embrace and kiss your mother once at least as you depart, uncertain whether it will ever be possible again." Then her mouth approached his mouth, having simultaneously blessed him with the cross, she turned herself away and, weeping, departed from him, who was wailing. After he was received, the Cardinal and his attendants led him directly into the palace, where the Protector with the nobles were awaiting their return, through posted ranks of henchmen the whole way. When he had been led up, the Protector, having embraced him and lifting him up from the ground in his arms, said, "You have come, my dearest nephew and lord, undoubtedly welcome to all, and assuredly most welcome by far to me." Then from there they went immediately to London to the Prince (he was lodging in the palace of the Bishop), from where they both went directly through the middle of the city with a numerous procession, and with favorable outcries from all sides, they entered the Tower with those who were going to frustrate the prayers of those shouting, from which they are believed never to have set foot again.

Therefore, when the Protector had obtained both boys, he opened himself with more trust not only to several others, but especially to the Duke of Buckingham; although I am not unaware that to many he appeared to have been a participant in all his plans already from the beginning. Certain friends of the Protector even recount that he was the author of the affair when it was begun, a secret messenger having been sent of his own accord to Gloucester immediately after the death of Edward. But others, by whom the Protector's cunning intellect was more accurately ascertained, deny that the last steps were communicated before the prior steps had been accomplished; yet, when the relatives of the Queen had been thrown into prison and both sons had been brought into his hands, then he revealed the remaining steps less fearfully to those whom the affair appeared to require. And to the Duke, especially, with whose addition he thought that his own forces would be augmented by half, he insinuated the affair through men who were astute and masters at handling affairs. It was proposed to him that the Prince was angry for the sake of his blood-

663 mutuo sese animant
664 lustro; “purified by means of a propitiatory offering”
665 excipio; or “taken, captured”
666 artifex; “one that is master in the liberal arts”
relations, and if ever it were possible, would be their avenger. If they should be released, they would incite [him], since the memory of prison and chains would always stick [with them]; but [if] they were slaughtered, their death would no doubt become a concern for him, [since] their prison was a sorrow [for him]. In addition, nothing could be gained by repenting. There was no place left for compensating for\(^{667}\) his offense through kindnesses. For it was more likely he would destroy his own hopes than benefit the Prince, whom, with his only brother and his blood-relations, he saw already had been thrown in a {place} where the Protector would be able to destroy them all with one nod; nor was there [any] doubt that he would dare [to destroy them] if any new endeavor was threatened. [Regarding] whom, as there was likely a secret bodyguard\(^{668}\) for himself, so for the Duke he had [likely] arranged spies and, if he should oppose [the Protector], a trap\(^{669}\); and this, perhaps, from those whom he least suspected. For that state of affairs [and] those dispositions of minds were [such] that you could not determine for certain in whom you could trust [and] whom you should fear. By suggesting such [things] they prevailed {upon} the Duke's exhausted mind so [far] that he proceeded on that [course] which he already regretted\(^{670}\) having entered {upon}, and [which], when he once began [upon it], he would pursue zealously all {the way}. Therefore he joined himself to the wicked plot, (which he believed could not be averted) as a promoter and partner, [400] and determined that since the public evil could not be corrected, he would turn [it] as {much as} possible to his own good.

[400.3] It was agreed that the Protector, having used the Dukes’s service towards [acquiring] the kingship, would join {together in marriage} the only legitimate son whom he had to [the Duke’s] daughter; in addition, he would concede, with litigation precluded, the County of Hereford, which the Duke {laid a legal} claim to as his inheritance, [but] was not able to obtain [while] Edward survived. To these demands of his the Protector of his {own accord} threw in a great quantity\(^{671}\) of treasure and royal furnishings (unless [the Protector] reproached him with a false [story] [when] there was discord [between them] afterwards, as if [the Duke] was ungrateful for such great benefits of his). Therefore, when it was agreed between them, the auspices of the principate (the day declared for which thing was approaching) were adorned with paraphernalia magnificent in appearance, with the labor interrupted not even at night, [and] with many [people] working. And for this celebration, so that they might the more turn the eyes and minds of men elsewhere, away from their own plans, nobles were present in {great} numbers, summoned from every part of the kingdom.

Yet the Protector and the Duke, when they had assembled the Cardinal and the Chancellor with the Archbishop of York and the Earl of Derby and the prelate of Ely, [and] not without\(^{672}\) Hastings the Chamberlain and many other nobles, [who] were going to talk about the order, rite and solemn ceremonies of the King's {marking with} insignia,

\(^{667}\) Lit. “redeeming”

\(^{668}\) praesidium

\(^{669}\) insidias; elsewhere “{treacherous} plot”

\(^{670}\) penitebat

\(^{671}\) vim; usually “force”

\(^{672}\) nec non
they themselves meanwhile, withdrawing themselves with those whom they had proposed as participants, were handling far different matters in another place. Although few were admitted to that council, and they least of all were unreliable, nevertheless suspicion began to be spread, and the people [began] to murmur [402] as if things would not be good for long, although no one knew either for what reason he feared or from which author; whether by their minds having presentiments of boundless evils by a somewhat secret force of nature, in the manner of the sea, seething of its own accord in the face of an impending gale, or whether some one [man] smelled a stench [and] filled many men with suspicion. Although the matter itself, even with how much it was dissembled, aroused men’s thoughts somewhat, since everyone gradually flowed away from the kingly tower, [and] court was [held] in the Protector's house. Crowds and multitudes abided there, [but] there was silence and desolate solitude around the Prince. And with most [people] turning away to where the expediting of their businesses was to be hoped [for], some were even warned that those for whom there was no necessary business would frequent the King incautiously.

[402.13] Thus when many signs concurred, part [of them] by chance, some intentionally, at last it was brought to pass that not only the commons, who are thoughtlessly agitated by any sort of thing, but also the prudent, and even a few of the nobles, awakened and noted the matter, nevertheless only so far that they discussed it, rather than distrusted it. Yet the Earl of Derby, who had become old in experience of many things, providentially suspecting these affairs, rebuked Hastings (because they were mutually aware of each other's secrets). He said, “These two councils held separately really do not please me at all. Indeed, while we are transacting public affairs frankly and openly in one, who knows what affairs they are clandestinely whispering about in the other?”

“Say no more,” said Hastings, “and trust in me; with my life as a pledge, while a certain [man] is present there (who is never absent), no doubtful word could ever be spoken in such a way that it would not be conveyed to me as soon as it escapes from being spoken.”

[402.27] By this he was hinting about Catesby, with whom he was extremely familiarly intimate; [404] nor did anyone promise so much to Hastings by his love and fidelity, so that he deemed himself dear to and bound to [Catesby] to the same extent he knew [Catesby] was dear to and bound to himself. Indeed, he had advanced [Catesby] greatly in wealth and authority, and he was [someone] who could not be difficult to advance. For besides his extraordinary expertise in British laws, he added greatness of body and an appearance not unpleasant to be seen, so that he was held to be suitable not only for pleading cases but even for performing great public deeds. Truly, he [had] so great of an intellect that you would not have wished it in a man with so very little fidelity, inasmuch as by the dissembling of this one [man] this whole heap of evils stood firm. Otherwise, Hastings, and the Earl of Derby, and many other nobles of their party would have collected their troops in a timely manner [and] no doubt

673 mos
674 communem rem
675 Lit. “nodding at’
hastened to march \{off\} towards this [threat], if Hastings had not [felt] secure in this [man's] trust [such that] he restrained the rest as they were going, until—[Hastings] unsuspecting, the others delaying—everyone was overcome alike. Then at last they perceived his faithlessness, when they could only condemn [it], not avoid [it].

[404.17] But both the Protector and also the Duke duped Hastings with a marvelous pretense of friendship, lest he suspect anything. Although it is believed that he was sincerely\textsuperscript{676} loved by [the Protector], he was hated by [the Duke], [and] in addition, for the plans of neither \textsuperscript{406} was he advantageous. It is reported that Catesby was ordered by the Protector that he prove, by cunningly testing [Hastings'] mind, whether he could hope that the man could be enticed to their party in any \{way\}, [but] he reported \{back\} that all [means] were hopeless and contrary [to their plan]. Even worse, it happened that Hastings, in a familiar conversation with [Catesby], disclosed the fears of the others in a boast of his own trust. Therefore Catesby, dreading that many [men], by disturbing and harassing [Hastings] against his own pretending, might \{make\} progress, and that the plans which now appeared to be creeping \{out\} would burst \{forth\} all \{at once\}, proposed that the crime should be expedited, that they should be attacked while they were hesitating, [and] that [Hastings], since he could not be turned, should be removed. He urged that \{proposal\} so \{much the\} more greedily since Hastings' power (which then was \{very\} strong in the County of Leicester) was destined for himself. Detestable ambition for that [power]\textsuperscript{677} had joined Catesby into the society of an accursed crime.

[406.14] Therefore, a little afterwards the nobles were consulting in the Tower where the Protector had convoked them. He himself, coming into the council later, excused his tardiness by cheerfully blaming his sleepiness. Then he, merry and almost playful, reclined \{at table\} and immediately turned towards the Bishop of Ely.

“Father,” he said, “I hear there are distinguished strawberries ripening in your gardens. I know you will not unwillingly gather\textsuperscript{578} one dish towards a lunch for so many nobles as your symbol.\textsuperscript{679}

“I wish I could as easily \[do\] something more as I willingly do this,” he said, and at once sent \{off\} a servant who would bring \[them\] to \[the lunch\]. But the Protector, as if he were going to do \[know not what \[kind\] of necessary thing in the next room\textsuperscript{680} and would at once be returning to the council, stepped \{out\}, [while] the nobles meanwhile rejoiced in his great cheerfulness, as much [as] they had not seen in him before by \{mere\} chance, and they simultaneously praised his humanity and his benevolence. He returned, not having tarried long, but it was amazing how totally he was changed from the [man] who had just left so happy. Indeed, \[408\] now on the contrary he was sad [and] fierce; [and] with his eyebrow knit, his forehead creased, [and] his lip gnawed, he was threatening, with everyone astonished at the intemperance which had seized him so suddenly.

\textsuperscript{676} Lit, “from the heart”
\textsuperscript{677} Lit, “thing”
\textsuperscript{678} conferes; “bring together, unite, be useful, attack, compare, hurry to, employ, impute, ascribe, postpone”
\textsuperscript{679} likely a play on symbolam, “a contribution to a feast”
\textsuperscript{680} cubiculo; “chamber,” as Hastings is the keeper of the king's chamber
[408.4] With this face, he threw himself into his chair, [and] when, with a short, sad silence he had {kept in} suspense the terrified minds of those [who were] waiting, he burst {out} in this way: “What worthy punishments could be devised for the crimes of those who have been contriving with impious arts to do {away with} me, not only so near by blood to the Prince, but the Protector of [both] him and of this kingdom?”

At these words, all who were present {grew} quiet, astonished by the viciousness of [such a] deed, silently mulling {over} to themselves who could be a conspirator in such a {disgraceful} crime, of which each of them knew himself to be innocent. But Hastings, to whom the presumed favor of the Protector towards himself gave courage for speaking, answered that they merited the ultimate punishment [and] to be made examples, whoever they were.

“But,” [the Protector] said, “the contriver of this wickedness is my brother's wife.” He meant the Queen. At that sentence, those who favored her were transfixed by dread.

[408.16] But Hastings, for whom alone murder was imminent, began to be refreshed when he discerned [that] that evil which he had {greatly} feared for one of his friends was diverted to his enemy. Yet he asked himself with a somewhat anxious mind why the Protector had concealed this matter from him, [since] he was aware [that] he was not averse to crushing the Queen, nor could he devise a reason why this dissembling was required in his {presence}, as it was his complicity the Protector had used against the captured blood-relations of the Queen, [who] were to be slaughtered that same day in the town in which they were being guarded. [Hastings was] obviously not supposing that death for himself in turn had been fixed at almost the same hour by another secret plan.

[408.26] Meanwhile, the Protector said, “You will see that my body was bewitched by this wicked [woman] with Shore's wife and other sorceresses; she drained [it] with magical potions.” At once, having rolled up his sleeve to the elbow, [410] he extended his arm, [which] was no doubt very pitiable, but nevertheless in the same {way} it had been from the beginning. Then truly the whole [council] except his conspirators rightly became afraid, reflecting that it was only an opportunity to be seized—for strife, first, and then for open slaughter. For they knew {very} well that that arm was pitiable, that the Queen was far away from [using] magical charms, [and] that if she had determined to exert herself [in them] completely, she would not ever select Shore's wife as a partner, a woman renowned for her lust, but not for magic, [and] at {that time} the most hated of all [women] by [the Queen] for once being the most pleasing to the King of all his concubines.

[410.10] Therefore Hastings, struck then by the mention of his girlfriend (for he is reported to have been {passionately in} love with her), said, “If they have dared [to do] such [things], certainly they deserve to be punished.”

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681 Lit. “was”
682 ultima exempla; “to be given the ultimate punishment as examples”
683 Lit. “to nod at, hint”
684 conscientious; same word as “conspirator” in previous paragraph
685 conscientia
To this [the Protector] said, “Why do you [say] ‘if’ to me? I tell you they did and if you would defend that, traitor, I will prove it by a duel with you;” and he struck his hand powerfully against the table, as if angered. And then at the door it was shouted, “Treason!” and at once, intent upon this sign, his henchmen broke in [and] filled the whole place with arms. The Protector detained Hastings on the spot and said, “I arrest you, traitor.”

He said, “Me, O Protector?”

“You yourself, O traitor,” he said; and immediately a certain Middleton hurled an axe towards the Earl of Derby in such a manner that although [Derby was] in the middle of the table, if he had not quickly dodged the blow under the table, it would have divided his head all to his teeth, since even deflecting it thus by a swift slide, nevertheless the outermost edge [of the axe-blade] overtook [him], striking a wound to the top [of his head], [and] completely drenched [him] with blood. There once was a dispute between the Earl and this assassin concerning estates, and from this a long-standing enmity came between [them]. For the Earl ejected him from possession, whether by violence or by legal right is uncertain, but certainly unwillingly; so now he in turn, dared more than he was entrusted with, [and] indulged his own grief in another's tumult.

[412.4] Now the remaining nobles and bishops were apprehended and, lest they mutually consult, they were thrown into different chambers. But the Protector ordered Hastings that he should prepare himself for death, and if he wanted anything with a priest, he should hurry: “For,” he said, “as I hold that Divine Paul, to whom I am especially devoted, is propitious, I will not taste any food before I see your head cut off.” Therefore, since it would have profited nothing to ask the cause, he, silent and sorrowful, made some kind of confession to a priest who was not present for that purpose; for a longer one was not possible, lest the Protector not be early enough that [man] had fallen in death, so that the pious man would not perjure himself, obviously. On that account, with the urging of the Duke of Buckingham (whom [Hastings] stared at beseeching as he implored that he be pitied), his death was hastened, and he was led forth into a level area which was encircled by the walls of the Tower; he was ordered to lay his head on an oblong beam which was lying on the ground destined for [use in] building, and it was beaten off with an axe. His body was carried to Windsor with his head, where his friends buried [them] not far from the bones of Edward, his most beloved prince.

[414] It is worth the trouble to learn what dreams and omens preceded his death, whether such things should be thought of as warnings that a treacherous plot

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686 *manum inicere alicui*; “to lay the hand on one, to detain, arrest him”

687 Not a juridical use. *Sisto* means “to produce in court, or to appear in court after being bound over by the judge or by promise to the adversary (*vadimonium*)” in juridical terms. *Sisto* also means “I stop,” “I stop a hostile attack,” “I end.”

688 or “privately”; *peculiariter*

689 or “to whom I am a slave”

690 or “destined for the structure”

691 *operae pretium est*
might be forestalled, or as preceding signs of an unavoidable fate, or whether, in the affairs of mortals, either a demon is playing, or either chance or fortune are playing together,\textsuperscript{692} or the soul, prescient of the future with the senses lulled by sleep, [and] representing imminent fates with confused images, foretells the outcome to the body. Now his first [omen] was in the middle of the night which the day of the deadly [event] followed. Stanley's servant, out of breath, exhorted in his master's words, urging that he hasten to flee immediately, for his lord in his nocturnal sleep was shown a terrible apparition of great evil and the destruction of both of them, unless their flight prevented [it]. For a boar was seen to attack [them] both with his tusks [while they were] prostrate. Hastings was killed unexpectedly, with [Stanley] himself alive, his head torn so that blood flowed copiously into his lap. This image in his mind imprinted such a deep terror, since he remembered that a boar was the Protector's emblem, that he had entirely decided to delay no longer [if] only [Hastings] would agree to be his companion on the road. Before they would be missed, more of the way could still be traversed than would allow [anyone] to overtake them if they pursued [them].

“Bah!” said Hastings, “Is he so fearful that he dreads empty figments of dreams which either his bile shapes in his mind or a thought of the day returns in sleeping? It is undoubtedly superstition and almost as far as impiety to care {about} those worthless trifles, which, if he thinks they are signs of future [events] at all, why does he not think they could be fulfilled\textsuperscript{693} even by fleeing? Or rather, the more certainly {they will be fulfilled} if we are dragged {back} off the road (as nothing is trustworthy\textsuperscript{694} for those fleeing), [and] the boar will have seized us by {legal} right, as if we were fugitives with consciousness of a crime. Therefore, either there is no [416] danger anywhere (and certainly there is not) or there is even more there. But if there were [any danger] at all, nevertheless I would [rather] appear to have fallen by the evil faithlessness of another than either by our {own} guilt or cowardice. Depart, then, and report that he is to remain, for I hold that man (whom he knows) to be as sure and faithful to me as this right [hand] of mine.”

“May those above,” he said, “truly accomplish the outcome that you have attested,” and thus departed. With Stanley remaining [because of] this message, within the next ten hours they were seized, [and this] gave\textsuperscript{695} both [men] faith in the neglected dream. It is certain that when he then proceeded into the Tower, he was [only] a little away from being cast {down} onto the ground by his collapsed horse as often as thrice within a brief space. Although there is no day that this thing does not happen, either by the fault of the horse or by the carelessness of the one sitting on [it], nevertheless by an ancient superstition it is so observed as if it notably preceded a misfortune.

[416.14] Now what follows was not so much a warning as the jest\textsuperscript{696} of an enemy. A certain knight (then extremely inferior, [but] now among the first of the aristocracy) came to him [while] he was still sleeping, with the pretense of his duty to escort
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[Hastings] to the Tower, yet [actually] by an order of the Protector and informed of [Hastings'] destruction so that he could hasten his arrival. [The knight], as a joke, interrupted [Hastings who] was tarrying in the road and conversing with a priest known to him, who by chance had met [him], [and] said, “Why [talk] so much with a priest now? For there is no need for you [to talk] with a priest yet,” secretly taunting that there would be shortly.

[416.23] But I would rather pass {over} anything than [pass over] the most empty [state] of the human mind and its security [when] it is bordering {on} destruction. In the Tower's entrance itself, so close to the place in which so soon his head was to be lopped {off}, by chance a herald was met with his [same] family name. [418] From this meeting a recollection came {into} his mind of another time, at which time he similarly had communicated his sorrow and fear to the same [man], meeting [him] in the same place. For he was then arraigned as a defendant before Edward, having been indicted by Rivers, the Queen's full {brother}, as though he had contrived a plan about betraying Calais (of whose garrison he was the captain) to the French. Although, (as shortly afterwards became {clear}) that was a purely malicious {prosecution}697, with Rivers resenting that [Hastings] was preferred to himself in that office [of captain], which he had hoped {for} {just} as if it had been destined and promised698 [to him]. Nevertheless, with the guile of the accuser and with the King's ears preoccupied with the nocturnal speech of the Queen, at first it appeared to him that he was thrown into great danger. Therefore an immense desire699 now seized him of conversing with that [man] about the peril now past and avoided [right] there where at another {time} he had shared [it] as [something] present. “Hastings,” he said, (for that was the name of the herald, as well), “Do you remember anything about those things we once joined700 in discourse [about] in this very place?”

“I remember,” he said, “and I certainly rejoice very {much} that the {treacherous} plot intended [for you] by those malevolent [men] worked {out} badly for them and well for yourself.”

[Hastings] said, “How {much} more you would think that if you knew those [things] which as yet have been learned [only] by me and a few [others], which you, too, will hear {of} a little later.” By this he meant that the Queen's blood-relations, whom we indicated before were captured, were to be slain on that {same} day. He was not at all aware how near to his {own} neck the same fate was imminent. “Indeed,” he said, “I give thanks to those above that, as things were never equally doubtful for me as they were then, so in turn they were never as certain and confirmed as now.” O the dense fog of mortality! [When] he was fearing, nothing evil impended; [when he felt] secure, within two [420] hours he perished miserably.

The man was not from obscure lineage; indeed he was [descended] from an ancient race of knights, but nobility was added to that [lineage] by himself. In war he was unwearied [and] not inexperienced; he was not of an austere [way of] life, but he had earned much popular regard by his friendliness; he was extraordinarily dear to the King.

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697 calumnia
698 or “prophesied”
699 ingens libido; also “immoderate lust,” “unlimited longing,” “boundless inclination”
700 conserere
on account of his fidelity; moreover, he was not displeasing either in society or in {joint} consciousness of pleasures; 701 he was easily exposed to those {treacherously} plotting [against him], inasmuch as he was less foresighted because of the innate daring in his mind, and [thus], trusty 702 enough, trusting 703 too much.

[420.9] A rumor of this slaughter flew {forth} suddenly, first through the city, [and] from there in every {direction}. But the Protector, directly after the crime was accomplished, summoned the mayor and some senators of the city into the Tower in {order that} he could conceal his guilt with some cloak. When they came, he indicated that a {treacherous} plot had been devised that [very] day against himself and the Duke, [against] which they themselves, since they ([who] imagined nothing less) had discovered [it only] a little before lunch in the [midst of] the very attempt, were unexpectedly compelled to snatch {up} armor of whatever {kind}. (So that it would appear they spoke truly, they stood enclosed by [suits of] armor so despicable that not even 704 the lowest [man] from the companies of soldiers there would think to put [them] {on} except in urgent danger). Yet [now that] the danger had been zealously and strenuously repulsed, and most of those conspiring had been captured, nevertheless their benevolence was content with the punishment of Hastings alone, because he was incurable of his malevolence. They preserved all the remaining [conspirators] for repentance. At this, those [men] (as if they believed [them]) extolled their fortitude, praised their mercy, [422] and gave {thanks} for their safety, although meanwhile they silently wished both {of them} the gallows.

[422.3] The Protector, reckoning that the people would be likewise mollified by the same fiction, had meanwhile sent a herald with an edict prepared somewhat before {that time} for that [purpose], from which, [after] the commons were convoked to the sound of a trumpet in the most frequented places, almost the same [things] were proclaimed by the voice of the crier. But, so that his death would be heard more favorably, 705 there were added against Hastings (as if beyond that crime) many [charges] 706 of {disgracefully} criminal counsels [and that] he was being punished for his attempt lest parricides, stimulated by their consciousness of their desperation and of their treason, might perhaps excite a crowd for the sake of his being freed. With their hope now providently crushed by his [well]-deserved punishment, no danger hindered all good [men] from living most quietly under the best prince. Now this edict, which was proclaimed within two hours of his death, was both longer than could have been written in that interim, even if it had been randomly dictated, and so ambitiously composed and so diligently limned onto the parchment that indeed it could not have been prepared in a doubled interval of time. Thus any boy easily perceived the conspicuous emptiness of

701 Societas is contrasted with conscienta voluptatum. That is, he is not unpleasant when sharing either business or fun.
702 fidus
703 fidens
704 Lit. “any”
705 aequius; also “more impartially”
706 Daniel Kinney treats multa as “fine, punishment” rather than “many”; “it were a penalty for [giving] evil counsel.” Cf. 1557: “And much [multa?] mater was ther in ye proclamacion devised ... as y' he was an euil counsellor to y' kinges father” (CW 2, 53a.19-21).
such an elaborately false fiction. Indeed, they were understood to have reflected {upon} the punishment for a deed beforehand which they wished to appear to have first discovered unexpectedly only {now}. And so (except that the matter was more vicious than would admit of these witty jests) a certain master of schools not unamusingly mocked [that] so [very] skilful stupidity of the edict. For, as he (intermingled in the crowd) was listening to the [man] reading, comparing the shortness of the time with the length and care of the writing, he was immediately reminded of the saying from Terence and said, “Davus, with these time-intervals of yours, [things] have not been separated deftly enough.”

[424] But immediately after {that}, the house of Shore's wife was invaded; she was dragged {out} and thrown into prison, with her goods plundered, (out of indignation, of course) and conveyed to the Protector as if it were a fine for [making] magic {potions}, which, inasmuch as it was {completely} baseless, when no evidence against her could stick, lest they confess she had been harassed through injustice, finally the charge was brought {down} to one which she could not deny, [which] indeed, as much as the people knew it was true, just {as much} nobody did not laugh for it to {only just} then [become] such a vicious charge: namely, that she was a prostitute. But the Protector, as a pious and pure prince descended from heaven onto this miserable orb for correcting the morals of mortals, compelled [her] so that in the Temple of Divine Paul with a great multitude, with the Senate of London coming {forth} praying, she should precede the cross and the choir of psalm-singers barefoot and distinguished by a wax-taper she carried (which is the custom of public repenting there). Yet that [woman] marched {along} with her face and gait so composed and, although her dress was neglected and disheveled, nevertheless with a countenance so charming, especially when shame poured a most fitting blush into her white cheeks, that that boundless dishonor produced not a little praise and favor for her among those more {eagerly} desiring her body than concerned about her soul; although even good [men], by whom her faults were hated, nevertheless pitied her disgrace rather than rejoicing {over} [it], reflecting that it had been managed by the Protector with pretended and corrupted affection [and] with no honorable zeal.

[424.23] This woman, born from good parents of London and educated well and chastely, was coupled in a marriage otherwise favorable except that it was too hasty. For although she had a husband [who was] honorable, elegant, wealthy, [and] young, nevertheless, because she married [when] she was immature, [426] she did not ever love him at all, having obtained him before she desired [him]. And for {that reason}, her heart, once it turned {away} from her husband, was easily carried to the King, [who was] wooing her. And besides, the splendor of such a suitor and the unusual sight of a man feared by others flattering and begging her, [and] in addition the hope of pomp and of conspicuous womanly attire, and finally of leisure, of luxury, and of pleasures, was easily

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707 Res is repeated in the Latin. Lit “which deed”
708 magister ludi; also “master of jokes,” “master of stage-plays,” “master of public spectacles”
709 Lit “that”
710 Lit “drove to”
711 insolens; also “immoderate”
able to arouse the amenable heart of a girl. But when her spouse\textsuperscript{712} learned she was having an affair with the King (as he was a modest\textsuperscript{713} man, [and] deemed himself not {to be worthy} of so {great} an honor as that he should touch the princely concubine), he ceded her entirely to the King, much more civilly than others for whom by no means whatever was the right to her equal [to his]. [After] the King died, Hastings succeeded [him]. Although he had {deeply} loved her [when] [the King] was living, nevertheless it was reported that he abstained [from relations with her], whether from reverence or from some comradely fidelity.

[426.14] This was [a woman] with white skin, [and] with an extraordinary appearance to her whole face; but especially marvelous were the enticements in her eyes. As for the rest of her body, there was nothing you would want to change, unless perhaps one might wish her taller. For she was more pretty than tall\textsuperscript{714}, which itself is especially pleasing\textsuperscript{715} to almost {every} very tall [man]. Those who saw her flourishing tell of her in {this way}, and with [the result that] most of those looking at her today (for she is living even now) do not believe [it], since they appraise her past figure from her present [one], [and] suppose she was never comely. Their judgment appears to me almost the same as if someone would guess the beauty of a long deceased virgin from a bald pate dug {up} from a grave; since {indeed} now the old {woman} of seventy, wrinkled, feeble, emaciated, [and] cadaverous, has nearly faded {away}, with no part of her so {greatly} praised former body [428] remaining except bones covered with dry skin. Nevertheless, even in {the way} [she is], by observing her face more deeply it is possible to conceive which parts, [if] restored and repaired in a certain way, would return beauty to her face.

[428.4] Nevertheless, she did not captivate any [man] as much by her beauty as by a certain friendliness and by her dexterous [and] enticing cordiality in banqueting, since, with her witty and festive intellect, having been taught just {enough} that she was able to read her own language and to write [in it] to some extent, she was not uncouth in weaving conversations, and was notable neither for her silent rusticity nor for her immoderate loquacity. Nobody was more suitable for gladdening a banquet, whether by deftly diverting melancholy [conversations] or by offering happier [ones], sometimes playing by witticisms and jests without anyone's grief, [but] not without laughter. The King, since he was quite merry, was accustomed occasionally to declare that he had three harlots, each distinguished with different gifts: one the cheeriest, the other the shrewdest, [and] the third harlot in turn, the holiest of all [the harlots] there were anywhere, since she would unwillingly ever turn {away} from the temple anywhere except to his bed. I have not learned [well] enough who the others were, [but] it is agreed that the cheeriest of these was [the one] of whom we are speaking. For that reason, she was dearest to the King; although he had others, he {earnestly} loved only this [one], with no harm beyond his lust. For he both embraced his wife with great affection and treated [her] honorably.

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\textsuperscript{712} \textit{coniunx}; Lit. “one joined in marriage”

\textsuperscript{713} \textit{modestus}; or “moderate”

\textsuperscript{714} \textit{procera}; or “noble”

\textsuperscript{715} Lit. “it lies at his heart”
Indeed, this working-girl (for it would be a crime to falsely accuse the devil), was so far from abusing the favor of the Prince for anyone's evil that in many ways it was even for their good. For she also calmed the King's offended mind very frequently, obtained favor for those hated [by him], and obtained mercy for those offending [him]. In sum, she was of use in many of their great affairs, very frequently with either no reward or with a very small [one], and that something looked at for its appearance more than for its price, whether she held her consciousness of her deed to be enough in itself, or whether it was pleasing [for her] to display with benefits how much she could do with the King, or whether a girl frolicking in her present [good] fortune was neither anxious about the future nor continually gaping at riches. It is certain that she was so far beyond being regarded with malevolence that, except for the Queen alone, she was loved equally by both factions that were hostile to each other. It is not by chance that she is now inferior in authority and esteem to any of those [men] who in various ages were anyone influential with their princes [and] became famous to posterity by the reputation of their crimes alone. The worse the memory, the longer-lasting, as we engrave our benefits in dust, but our evils, if such we suffer, in marble. But that very woman, once so celebrated, now has survived almost all her friends and acquaintances and advanced with the years as if into another age, with the memory of her early luxury almost erased, even for herself, by her long evils. Today, she sustains her miserable life with difficulty by begging. Nevertheless, there are some living and pretending not to notice her who now would be sharers in adverse fortune with her except that she herself had at one time preserved their possessions uninjured.

But, as we touched on above, at the same hour at which Hastings was dismembered in London, Anthony (sometimes called Woodville), the Queen's brother, [and] Richard Grey (whom we said were apprehended in Hampton and Stratford) were punished by beheading in the town of Broken Bridge [Pontefract], with Richard Radcliff, knight, taking care of the slaughter, whose service the Protector very frequently used in tyrannical crimes of this kind, since he was a man of exceedingly silent disposition, of experience in many things, [and] of great and evil intellect. He was uncouth in discourse, rustic in disposition, [and] never timid toward wickedness. He neither pitied men nor revered those above. He took care that they were led forth from the prison and accused [them] of treason before the surrounding crowd, and, forbidden to respond to the charge, lest with their innocence known it would enkindle malevolence for the Protector, unconvicted, unheard, and indeed not even indicted, he took care that they were quickly killed, with no other guilt than that they were either too closely related to the Queen or too faithful to the Prince.

Therefore, with these deeds accomplished and with those nobles he thought would turn against [him] most killed, with others still captive, [and] with nearly all the remaining [nobles] residing in London then, far from each of their armies, and therefore with everyone astonished and stricken since one could neither know how the

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716 mercede; or “bribe”
717 dissimulantibus
718 res
719 criminatus
affair would turn {out} nor whose counsels he could trust, the Protector reckoned that the occasion should be seized, and, with [the nobles] occupied with the fear of their doubting, he should place himself in possession of the kingship before there would be time, with their counsels having been pondered and {carefully} weighed, [for the nobles] to depart in various [directions] with the forces of their parties strengthened. Yet in this [case] he was perplexed as to what semblance could be alleged {as a pretext} for a matter disgraceful in itself, by which the disgrace could be mollified.

[432.14] They admitted many to these consultations whom they hoped by some inducement might be easily led {over} to themselves for the use of either their strength in resources or of their intellect. Among these, for example, [they led over] Edward Shaw, mayor of London, by the hope of boundless rewards, which were lavishly promised to this man ([who was] starved for such [things]), [if] the citizens would be moved from their opinion. From the clergy, [men] were selected for whom authority in preaching had been obtained among the commons, [and whose] minds were not pious to the point of superstition, especially John Shaw, the mayor's brother, in fact, and Penker, the provincial of the Augustinian friars in England. Both were distinguished in their profession of Holy Scripture. Both were celebrated for the glory of their discourses. Yet the erudition of each of them was as much below his reputation as his virtue was below his erudition. These [men], the former before he was king, the latter after his kingship had begun, gave the most carefully {prepared} discourses from the podium in praise of the Protector, full of intolerable adulation. Penker came {down} in the middle of the course of his speech, bereft of his voice, with a listener ascribing the deed to those above, as if they were the avengers of sacrilegious flattery. Shaw lost all his reputation for honor , [and] not long afterwards also his life, from weariness of the solitude into which he had withdrawn himself from the shame of his public appearance; but the friar, who had {thoroughly} rubbed {away any blush} from his forehead, {just} as he had often wiped {away} spittle from there in {the course of} preaching, had long been numb to infamy.

[434.7] There are also those who deny that Penker was initially conscious of [what] had been proposed, but [after] the deed was completed, in the common custom, he strove for favor with a prince hungry for praise. Yet, as ambiguous [as it is] concerning him, it is settled [concerning] Shaw [that] he shared in the plan to such {an extent} that even the foremost parts of the matter to be insinuated to the people were assigned to him. For it appeared that the most advantageous way of beginning the business was if, in a solemn discourse, with the matter proposed and handled elegantly, he would draw the shaken minds of the commoners from the King to the Protector. Yet their whole labor was turned toward devising a reason for changing the king, lest such an impious plan, shamelessly expounded, be immediately booed {off the stage}. In this matter, with some

720 spacium
721 invisae
722 invidia
723 causa; elsewhere “cause, reason”
724 ingentiun
725 praemiorum; also “booty, bribes”
726 Lit. “held”
[men] conferring with others, finally in {the end} it came to this: that the people would be persuaded that both Edward himself and all his offspring were born from illegitimate {sexual} intercourse, [and] thus he did not ever justly reign, nor could [his offspring] legally succeed [him]. With that reasoning, the Protector alone remained eligible for the kingship, as the sole legitimate son of the Duke of York. But the defect of birth charged against Edward was indeed going to openly defame the Protector's mother, since she was common to [both] him and Edward. Nevertheless, he did not therefore propose that it be abstained from, but [rather proposed that] that topic should be entered {upon} obliquely, by leading, and [should be] handled briefly, as if timidly, so that when everything was said nevertheless much would appear to be suppressed [436], lest his pious mind towards his mother be offended, of course. But he wanted that other [charge] about Edward's sons being held as bastards to be made straightforwardly and openly and to be extended as much as possible. [Concerning] this matter, how false and [how] long refuted and rejected an accusation? he revived will be better understood if we revisit some deeds from prior to Edward's marriage.

[436.7] [After] Henry was deposed, [and] Edward obtained the kingship, he had {sent as a} legate to Spain the Earl of Warwick, a man powerful in sovereignty [and one] not yielding to anyone in either military reputation or popular favor, [who] was going to handle [negotiations] concerning taking the daughter of the King of Spain as his queen. But meanwhile, by chance, Elizabeth Grey came to him, shortly afterwards his wife, [but] then, indeed, a widow, extremely poor in fortune, but of great and ancient nobility in her maternal lineage, [and] in her paternal [lineage], not equally {so}, but not obscure. When she dwelt in Henry's court, submitting to his queen, she was married to Grey, indeed an elegant and vigorous [man], but more honorable than renowned for riches, since as yet he was distinguished by no rank either in peace or in war. But afterwards, when he was about to enter {into} battle against Edward, Henry made him a knight. He rejoiced in that honor for not [even] two days, [since] in {the course of} that same battle he lay {in the grave}.

Therefore his wife, as I said, with her husband lost, with Henry defeated and captured, [and] her goods remanded, (repaid into Edward's privy {purse})? obviously, because her husband had stood and fallen with the opposing party, and those conquered are called traitors by both {sides}) threw herself at Edward's feet [and] prostrated herself in supplication in her mourning attire. Then, seeing him turned towards her and waiting like he was about to listen, she propounded her suit with words and added prayers that he would order some estates returned to her [which were] of no great value, [and] had been given to her on account of marriage? by her husband long {before}; for nothing which was already made her {own} could fall into forfeiture from any crime of her husband, even if it was granted to be a crime to remain in his fidelity to the king before whom he had spoken an oath, even to death; nor [would he have been] less steadfast (if

727 *calumnia*, elsewhere “false accusation”
728 This is *fiscus*, as opposed to *aerarium*. See note 537 above.
729 It is possible that estates *ob nuptias ... donata* are equivalent to the *donatio propter nuptias*. See Burrill, 397. But, it is not clear whether this would be legally equivalent to jointure, as 1557 has it, or instead mean “dower.”
The fates had preserved him unhurt) to the new king, with the right about to be decided by
victory.

[438.7] The King, {with his attention} fixed on the face of the one speaking, was
amazed at her presence of mind [in connection] with such modesty, and, with her beauty
doubling his gratitude for her speech, he not only pitied his supplicant, but even began to
love [her]; and for the present responding calmly, ordered [her] to hope well, for shortly
he would {judicially} examine her suit. But a little afterwards, having recalled [her], he
{first} spoke a few [words] about her business, [then] showed himself to be easy [if] only
she would reveal730 herself not to be difficult. Indeed, he would give [even] more of his
{own accord} if she in turn would gratify him with a certain teensy [thing].

As long as the ambiguous speech of the King permitted, she pretended {not} to
know what he wanted. Meanwhile, she responded to everything benevolently and
circumspectly, [and], from caution, she did not promise [anything] contrary to honor.
But when the ambiguities were removed [and] she was solicited with dishonor, then truly
she resisted openly, but in truth with her discourse moderated such that it inflamed his
desire. When she noticed it was more strongly enkindled than could be easily
extinguished, pretending {as an excuse} sometimes the infamy and sometimes her
consciousness of guilt, she begged that he desist imploring uselessly, for {just} as she
was far {away} from that arrogance by which she might suppose herself to be worthy for
his marriage, so she did not [suppose] herself to be so degraded as to appraise herself no
greater than [someone] his lust might play with in a {disgraceful} crime. To the King,
not {at all} previously accustomed to be so [440] obstinately rejected, that new
perseverance was [a cause] for admiration. Indeed, putting such rare chastity conjoined
with [such] uncommon comeliness in the place of the greatest riches, and consulting his
love, he quickly determined to marry731 her. And already certain to do [it], he consulted
with his friends, but in {such a way} that they could easily know that for anyone who
was going to persuade [him] to the contrary his work would [only] be for playing.
Therefore, because they saw the future, they eagerly approved.

[440.8] Yet his mother tolerated the matter so reluctantly that in dissuading [him]
she could hardly refrain732 from quarrels.733 With his own affairs not yet peaceful enough
at home, he would take counsel more honorably and profitably if he would {firmly} bind
himself to a foreign king by {marital} affinity. From that [would come] not only
protection, by stabilizing his kingship, but hope of augmenting his sovereignty besides.
“For that marriage {of yours},” she said, “[which could] by {no means whatsoever}
reasonably [be considered] kingly, would be as if somebody with a little sovereignty
would be {desperately} in love with his serving-maid and would admit [her] into
{marital} society with himself. Whenever that happens, even {those} who rejoice with
the girl ridicule the lord, although he is not as far above the condition of the virgin as the
lowliness of this widow sinks below the eminence of your majesty. {Just} as there is

730 Double-entendre in Latin: This is praebet, a different word for “show” than his ostentat. Praebere se
can mean “show oneself” or, with a woman, “surrender oneself to a lover.”
731 ducere; elsewhere “to lead”
732 temperaret; elsewhere “be moderate”
733 iurgium; also a legal term for “divorces”
nothing I disapprove of in her body or her innate talent of mind, so I would contend there is nothing so special that the same thing would not even be present in excess in other women who would match more with you in many ways besides. Certainly unequals are unsuitably joined, nor do they ever unite well who are strongly dissimilar. Those born from disparate parents are always defective and incomplete. Are you able to endure that you beget mongrels and degenerate kings for this most flourishing kingdom that you possess, and that your blood give brothers to the sons of Grey? Certainly if she was appropriate for you most of all in other respects (as it is now, nothing about her could be less appropriate), nevertheless the sacrosanct majesty of a prince—for whom it would be equally proper to come near a priest in purity as he nearly approaches him in dignity—I would propose by no means whatsoever should be defiled by the indelible stain of being twice-married immediately with his first marriage. What about the fact that you have proceeded farther in handling matrimonial negotiations elsewhere than you could withdraw from without dishonor, perhaps not even with safety, since your legate in that matter is the Earl of Warwick, the most powerful man in your whole kingdom, after you. I see that you do not appraise well enough how strongly it concerns your interests that he not grieve that his labors, which he strengthened, be frustrated and made fun of."

But although the King eagerly wished that she whom he had chosen would be approved by his mother, too, nevertheless in whatever manner she took the matter, he was firm regarding the proposal itself. Thus, he responded to many of her points seriously and some jokingly, as he remembered he had released himself from maternal guardianship. "Notwithstanding that matrimony is something divine," he said, "and therefore ought to be contracted for virtue, not for wealth (with God obviously inspiring mutual love and fidelity in the spouses, which I certainly trust has happened for us), nevertheless if someone would appraise this marriage of mine even crassly, in the common custom of men, preferring useful things to holy things, he himself, unless I am deceived, would not find that marriage so exceedingly disadvantageous. For I certainly consider that the love of no people is more preferable to me than that of mine, whom I hope would thus hold me not a little more dear if I appear not to spurn their marriage. Truly, regarding intimate connections with foreign princes, which your maternal affection proposes should be most strongly solicited, but from which, we see, a flood of evils often bursts forth, nevertheless it will still be possible to join foreign princes in marriage, with less harm for me, if some of my kinsmen perhaps could endure to be wedded with unknown women. For I certainly could neither marry a woman I do not love, nor love a woman I do not see, nor do I judge it well enough deliberated, by the hope of future increase (which foreign marriages promise more often than they provide),

734 Lit. “not dishonorably”
735 tuto
736 tutela
737 duco
738 ducere
739 consultum
spoil the enjoyment of present goods. What sense of those [goods] could there be for [a man] holding [a woman] in perpetual society for life whom he could not willingly look at? Indeed, I would not even want new titles in a distant domain to come to me in my wife's name, since already now so much land and sea of that kind is owed to me that it would indisputably be enough and more [than enough] for any {one man} to defend and to guard faithfultly. But everywhere there are some [women] who yield in no endowment to this [woman] of mine [and] even surpass [her] in many [qualities]? By Hercules, I neither deny that nor indeed am I preventing those [men] to whom they appear that way from having them. And for {that reason}, in turn it is an injustice for anyone to be upset [when] I, too, indulge my own inclination. Not [even] the Earl of Warwick, whom I do not fear so strongly however he is minded, [should be upset]. Nevertheless, I think his mind is not so turned against me that he would lament because he perceives it is pleasing to me, nor so unfair that he would demand that I be ruled by his eyes rather than mine in choosing a spouse, as if I were still a ward for whom the authority of a guardian is required. Indeed, upon my life, I would wish rather to be a free private {citizen} than a king in such servitude that a wife would be forced on me unwillingly by the judgment of a stranger. Now, dearest mother, that stain of the twice-married {state} which you attack does not terrify me very strongly. A {little} bishop might reproach me with this [if] I perhaps suffer to solicit the priesthood. For, as much as I remember, it does not hinder administering a kingdom. Finally, that she has children from a prior marriage, by the Graces, I even put that {down} as a gain. Indeed several are not absent for me, too, a yet unmarried [man]. In {this way}, we have mutually given proof that our nuptials will not be sterile. For {this reason}, [446] sweetest parent, you, too, [I ask to] approve this marriage, which I myself have chosen, with those above assisting. And help us, so that [our marriage] might turn out happily with your favorable supplications [to those above]. If you continue for the present to oppose it, nevertheless shortly from now a {little} grandson will be born for you who will win you {over} to us with his allurements.

[446.5] When his mother saw the king's mind was inflexible, she in turn was more resolute, not now in {the same manner} [as before], from the lowness of her daughter-in-law, as from anger inflamed by the spurning of her counsel; [so] she commenced a new way for thwarting their nuptials. There was a certain Elizabeth, with the surname Lucy, a girl not ignoble and extremely beautiful. By chance, the King had {taken that} virgin's virginity. Therefore, when the day of their nuptials approached, and according to custom the people were admonished that, if anyone knew of an impediment, they should not tolerate [that] the sacrament be made {fun of}, his mother, as if she was going to release herself from a religious {scruple} [regarding] defiled holy [things], reported that Lucy was truly wife to her son, with his promise {of marriage} given and affirmed by intercourse. Therefore, whether the bishops did not dare to proceed, or with the King

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740 tueri
741 tutoris
742 Lit. “may I perish, if not”
743 blandiciis; elsewhere “flatteries”
744 data fide
being unwilling that his nuptials be besmirched by an adverse rumor, to which maternal piety would impart authority and weight, meanwhile [the wedding] was held up until, with the case {judicially} examined, the falsity of that rumor\textsuperscript{745} would be proven. Lucy was summoned, [and] although she was suborned and propped up with secret counsels, [and] offered the hope that she would be the King's wife [if] only she would assert that she was given a promise\textsuperscript{746} {of marriage}, nevertheless, at once when she had sworn she was going to speak the truth, she confessed that the King had been bound by no promise of marriage. Yet he had displayed so much love that she had hoped their nuptials would follow her yielding [to intercourse]. Otherwise, she would never have allowed him [to have] intercourse [with her]. Therefore, with the falsity of the fictional marriage finally disclosed and {officially} declared, [and thus] with that scruple finally removed\textsuperscript{747} [448] the King married\textsuperscript{748} Elizabeth Grey and [admitted to] society with himself as queen [a woman who] shortly before was the wife of his enemy [and] often made prayers against his welfare. She was too dear to those above for her own evil [prayer] to be granted.

[448.4] But the Earl of Warwick, [after] he returned, so unwillingly tolerated his legation to be made {of} that, having gathered a band {of soldiers}, he drove the King into exile. Henry (whom Edward had deposed with the help of that same Warwick) was restored to the kingship from prison. That man was so [rich] in other resources\textsuperscript{749} and in popular favor that the kingship inclined towards whichever party he stood in, and he was powerful [enough] to assume [it] for himself, except that he considered\textsuperscript{750} that it was more honorable to make kings than to reign.\textsuperscript{751} But immoderate power rarely is perpetual, as indeed Edward [showed], when he had been away two years (with the Queen meanwhile giving {birth} to the Prince in the aforementioned sanctuary), [and], with a company [of soldiers] by no {means whatsoever} equal to [that of] Warwick, fought [him] at Barnet, ten miles from London, with [the result that] Henry was captured again, and the Earl and a great [number of men] in both parties were killed in the slaughter. In {this way}, he established the kingship on his own house so [strongly] that it was not able to be shaken except by domestic dissension and internal fraud.

[448.17] Perhaps these narratives are too wordy, [but] it would absolutely not be proper [for them] thus to be omitted, lest one be ignorant that the Protector, [when] he was about to charge to Edward's sons a natal fault, could discover nothing that would impinge on [Edward's] marriage except a long-past and antiquated false {accusation}. Yet that fiction, however feeble, satisfied that [man], for whom it was enough only to say something, [since] indisputably, securely, and certainly, proofs of it would not be demanded. Therefore, after that it was decided that the beginning of insinuating the matter to the people [would be] for Shaw. [After going] so far that Edward and his brother Clarence and all Edward's offspring were declared bastards, he would display the Protector's right to the kingship, [and] would be silent [about] his wish [for it].

\textsuperscript{745} \textit{famae}, not \textit{rumor} as just above
\textsuperscript{746} \textit{fidem datam}
\textsuperscript{747} \textit{eluto}; or “washed away, purified”
\textsuperscript{748} \textit{ducit}
\textsuperscript{749} This is the plural form of same word, \textit{ops}, that means “help” just before.
\textsuperscript{750} \textit{duxisset}
\textsuperscript{751} a pun: \textit{reges facere quam regnare}
From the podium [450] on the next Lord's Day, at the Temple of Paul, with a very numerous audience that the fame of that man assembled, he commenced his discourse with this theme: “Bastard shoots do not produce deep roots.” Then he opened [by saying that] a certain special and peculiar grace is always infused [into] and inspired in a legally contracted marriage, which is diverted into sacredly conceived offspring, and which those who are born from promiscuous or adulterous intercourse lack for the most part; they attest to the crime of their parents by their depravity and they chastise [them] by their misfortune, even so far that if someone, with the fault of his origin concealed by maternal fraud [and] the true heirs supplanted, invades the property\textsuperscript{752} of another's father and occupies [it] for a time, nevertheless the matter is arranged in \{such a way\} by God that shortly, with the truth bursting \{out\} through some crack, the legitimate successors are restored and the genuine shoots\textsuperscript{753} are returned to their earth, with the bastard shoot\textsuperscript{754} discovered and plucked \{out\} before it produces deep roots. When he had confirmed these [words] with several ancient examples, he immediately turned \{aside\} to praises of Richard, the late Duke of York, often in passing calling him the father of the Protector. Then, with the people reminded that perpetual succession to the kingship had been decreed for his descendants alone by an ordinance of the Senate and a statute of the Commons, he next declared\textsuperscript{755} that Edward was joined to the Queen against law and right, [since] Lucy, his true and indubitable spouse, was [still] surviving, [and] since indeed [after] he had contracted marriage with that virgin, [and] then even confirmed [it] by their begotten offspring, he was led \{astray\} by the beauty of a widow coming \{upon\} [him] to hold fidelity after pleasure. Thus none of his offspring were eligible \{by inheritance\}\textsuperscript{756} for the kingship. He pushed this topic with great straining,\textsuperscript{757} not only with signs and suspicions but even with falsely named witnesses. He added that he was not ignorant of the amount of danger with which he spoke, but for those speaking from that place in which [452] he himself stood, the truth should be held more important than even life itself; for himself, John the Baptist was the exemplar\textsuperscript{758} for despising death while he repudiated the illicit marriages of kings. Nevertheless, he was not very astonished that Edward put no weight as to whether he left proper or bastard [children], since neither he himself nor likewise his brother, the Duke of Clarence, held certain enough paternity, as they resembled certain notorious and noted men from the household of the Duke of York more than the Duke himself. He likewise said Edward had degenerated a long [way] from his noble nature.\textsuperscript{759} Yet the Protector, the most illustrious of all men who sustain [themselves] from the earth, recalled his father not only in his life but even in his face itself. “Here is,” he said, “the one and only true and indubitable son of the Duke of York; here is the noted face of that man; here is the certain form and the very image of that dearest Duke still hovering in your breasts.”

\textsuperscript{752} fortunas
\textsuperscript{753} surculos
\textsuperscript{754} vitulamine
\textsuperscript{755} ostendit
\textsuperscript{756} capacem
\textsuperscript{757} a pun; also “with a greatly labored, formal, speech”
\textsuperscript{758} authorem; elsewhere “author”
\textsuperscript{759} indoles; or “genius, natural quality”
But it had already been agreed beforehand that while these words were being said the Protector would show himself. In {that way}, with such a speech coinciding with his arrival, it would be thought that the preacher was inspired to proclaim [that speech] not by a human plan, but by some divine nod {of approval}. Then the people would be moved by that [thought] so that they would acclaim Richard as king instantly; thus it would appear to posterity that he was chosen for the kingship by {divine} providence and almost by a miracle. In truth, that plan turned [out] ridiculously spoiled, whether by the negligence of the Protector or the excessive diligence of the preacher. For while both feared that his arrival would precede those words, with which it was supposed to {unexpectedly} coincide, the former contrived delays along the way, [while] the latter had so hastened in speaking that with that topic totally concluded, he had descended into other things neither similar nor related when the Protector came in at last. But the preacher, when he noticed [the Protector's] entrance, abandoned that matter [454] which he then held in his hands, [and] suddenly, as if stunned, with no connection or order but [rather] in a most inept return, he repeated those words again: “Here is the one and only true and indubitable son of the Duke of York” and what follows, in {the midst} of which words the Protector, with the Duke of Buckingham accompanying [him], marched through the middle of the people to a place in which he could hear the rest of the discourse. But they were so far {away} from acclaiming that [man] as king that they appeared almost turned into stones by their amazement at so shameful of a sermon. Afterwards, when its author had asked a certain friend what men were thinking and saying about him, although he knew [well] enough from his own conscience they were not good [things], nevertheless when he learned they were all bad, he was so upset that after a few days he wasted {away} from sorrow.

But since what had been begun so openly now appeared urgent,761 with only one day interposed after that discourse, the Duke of Buckingham, with no scanty escort of nobles and knights (more perhaps than knew what they were bringing) came into the forum in London, a place both elegant and spacious762 [enough] for a great crowd. Then, with the people convoked in the Senate-house,763 the Duke, from a higher place, surrounded by the nobles and Senate of London, advancing a little, as he was not utterly illiterate and [was] eloquent by his own nature, is reported to have used764 words of this {sort}:

“Love of you, men of London, makes [it] so {that} we (for you recognize of what {sort} [of men] we are) come here {intending} to report to you about a matter of first importance, [and] neither more important than advantageous for the public, nor more advantageous for anyone than for you. Indeed, the matter is [something] which you have continually desired most greatly with your prayers, which you would seek far {off} and pay greatly for [456], [and] now we bring it to you of {our own accord}, with

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760 Lit. “thing”
761 Lit. “to be urged”
762 capacem
763 curiam
764 habuisse
no risk for you, no labor, nor any expense whatsoever. Do you ask what it could be? Certainly the security of your bodies, the unassailed chastity of your wives and daughters, and your goods [made] certain for you and safe from treachery. Of all those things, what has there been for a long {while} now which anyone was able to certainly call his own, with so {many} threatening snares and pitfalls constructed, with so many and such large taxes besides exacted every year, of which there was then indeed no end, even when there was no need? What [need] there was came more from luxury and squandering than from any good and honorable cause. Thus it was stolen day {by day} from good [men] so that it could be wasted on the reprobate. This calamity had proceeded from there [so much] that already not even the customary forms of taxation sufficed, but the gentle and calm name “benevolences” was stretched {to cover} pure robbery. For the tax-collectors carried {away} from someone not the amount he willingly had given, but the amount that pleased themselves, as if the people, in assenting to the tax, had referred the designation “benevolences” to the will of the King himself, not to each [person's] good [will]. But [the King], never content with a moderate [amount], increased every pretext for scraping {together} [money] to the very utmost {extent}. Therefore crimes were assessed, not by their violence, but by the wealth of the transgressor. Thus the maximum fines were imposed for all minimal offenses. Indeed, sometimes a slip of the tongue was compensated for by the whole fortunes of rich [men], or, so that the [punishment] might appear to have been given out of anger [rather] than out of greed, [458] it was atoned for by death, when the vicious name of lèse majesté was alleged for a deed by {no means} death-bringing in itself.

[458.3] There is not {one} of you, I suppose, who would demand examples of these deeds from me, as if the name of Burdet had escaped you, [that] of the best man, and for one word that thoughtlessly escaped [him] between drinks, he was cruelly slaughtered by the abuse of laws for the lust of the Prince, with no less glory for Markham, who, when he was the first of the judges, resisted (with his office taken {away} precisely on {that account}), than to the eternal disgrace of those judges who remained, and, corrupted by fear or flattery, murdered an innocent man who believed in their fidelity and piety by their perverse turning of laws. Why should I tell of Thomas Cook, a knight and your citizen, but of {a kind} few cities have, who both succeeded to all the honorable offices among you by proper legal {form} and managed [them] magnificently? Which of you is either so heedless of all these things that he does not recognize [them], or so forgetful that he does not remember [them], or so harsh that he does not groan {over} this man's conviction? Why do I say conviction? [Groan] for his calamity, for the spoils [taken] and [that] it happened that [he went] from so {much} wealth to not only poverty but even to nakedness, for no other cause than that he was loved by those with whom the King was enraged.

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765 discrimen; elsewhere “peril”
766 Lit. “not not annually”
767 elsewhere “appraised”
768 Lit. “redeemed”
769 Lit. “thing”
[458.20] But what finish will there be if I were to number [them] individually, when there is nobody from this great assembly who has not experienced (either from a lawsuit\textsuperscript{770} of his [friends] or of his own) whole households brought to the ultimate peril, and mostly for no cause, sometimes for a small [one] propped up with theatrically elevated\textsuperscript{771} names? Indeed, there was no crime so great that a false accusation of it could lack an argument. For since the King anticipated [460] the legitimate time of his reign, claiming\textsuperscript{772} the scepter by war, there was an argument for treason against a rich [man] who had a blood-relative, an in-law, a [more distant] relative, a friend, a member {of his household}, or [even] someone he hardly knew, who was ever someone the King had for an enemy at {any time}, [although] at different times more than half of the populace was opposed to him. In this way, while a trap\textsuperscript{773} was laid for your goods, your bodies were dragged into danger simultaneously; and this was in peace, besides so {many} wartime hardships. Although a torrent of all evils flows {forth} from [war] as if from a wellspring, nevertheless it never overflowed more dangerously than anywhere belabored by internal sedition, nor did it ever happen with greater destruction of peoples than when it once issued {forth} into this Britain of ours, nor in [Britain] itself was [the populace] ever either so much rent by discord with unyielding [partisan] zeal, nor did [a people ever] contend more bitterly, nor was [a people ever] ruined by such a long war, nor by such frequent battles, nor was [war ever] fought so bloodily, nor did the sum of [these] things ever bring destruction almost to the end, as it did in this one [man's] principate, who, while he was beginning his kingship, then guarding\textsuperscript{774} [it], then was driven {out}, then returned and regained [it] again, [and] then took {vengeance} on his expellers, spilled as much English blood as it cost (not long {ago}) for France to be subjugated twice. Thus the people was diminished or overcome, [and] truly what part of the high nobility\textsuperscript{775} was left {behind}? And afterwards while the money of the former was sought [and] the power of the latter was feared, neither part was safe\textsuperscript{776} or at peace. And whom did he not suspect, [when] even his brother was frightening for him? Whom would he have spared, who killed his own full {brother}, or who could have loved him if not even his brother could?

Now, who could tolerate this, which nevertheless nobody is ignorant of, that Shore's wife [462], a cheap whore, was more influential with the Prince than all the nobles of his kingdom, and that one [woman] was more solicited for advancing [petitions] than all the lords? Indeed some of these [men] used the prostitute's patronage in their great affairs, more necessarily than honorably. However, that {little} woman was reported as by no means impure until the wicked lust of the Prince stole her from her husband, indisputably your [fellow] citizen, [a man] not without resources and of good {innate} talent and hope. Yet in this matter I would rather forbear to speak about it out of reverence for the deceased, except that it is pointless that something everyone knows

\textsuperscript{770} periculo; “trial, danger, suit at law”
\textsuperscript{771} Lit. “buskined”
\textsuperscript{772} vendicaret
\textsuperscript{773} insidias; elsewhere “{treacherous} plot”
\textsuperscript{774} tuetur
\textsuperscript{775} nobilium procerum
\textsuperscript{776} tuto
remain unsaid: There was such an insatiable ardor in [him] that no part of his morals appeared less bearable. For there was not ever any [woman], no {matter} how lowly or how powerful—a virgin, a wife, [or] a widow—towards whom he had [even] once cast his eye, who had pleased him by her manner, shape, face, voice, posture, or, in sum, any [feminine] quality, that he would not immediately pursue, solicit, [and] rape; restrained by no fear of God [and] by no disgrace, with irreparable injury to many women and with no less grief and sorrow for their husbands, parents, and any of their friends who remained, who, [along] with herself, are honorable. They hold the chastity of their wives and the honor of their household so dear that they would willingly consent to settle\(^{777}\) that any [amount] of their fortunes be thrown away so that such a reproach would not be brought in.

\(^{462.22}\) But [though] it was allowed that the kingdom was astonishingly oppressed by these and other such [things] everywhere, nevertheless you, the citizens of this town, were always especially [oppressed], both since [464] there was no other [place] which abounded so copiously in occasions for injustices and because you were so much closer. For, [during] the greatest part of the year he was not far separated from the town. And nevertheless there are excellent underlying reasons that you are the [men] whom he should especially cherish, not only because from this city—the most renowned in the whole kingdom—much illustrious fame comes to the Prince among all foreigners (although because {of that}, too), but [also] because with great expense and danger to yourselves, in all his affairs, in prosperity and adversity, you always offered [him] the friendliest minds, extraordinary fidelity, [and] singular effort.

\(^{464.10}\) Although he who ought to hold t he most gratitude to you for your very pious affection toward the house of York [holds] the least, there now remains someone, at least (with those above nodding assent), who will act more diligently. That you would not be ignorant of this [man] is, finally, the cause of all this business of ours with you. While we explain it, I politely {request} that you pay attention, as you have begun [to do]. I know [well] enough there is no need that I review the same [matter] anew that Dr. Shaw so recently explained to you from the pulpit, a man far more eloquent than I am, and thus certainly a far weightier authority. For I do not arrogate so much to myself that I would claim that my words were of equal influence with those of a man who preaches the Word of God itself to the people, particularly [one] of such prudence that no one understands better what should be said [and] furthermore [one] so religious that he would certainly advocate nothing contrary to what he thought, particularly from that place to which no good [man] ever ascends intending to lie. Therefore, from such a man, you have learned by such preaching\(^{778}\) that the right of administering this kingdom is owed to

\(^{777}\) *decidere*; a legal term, “to compromise, put an end to a legal dispute”

\(^{778}\) Daniel Kinney's amends the clause at 464.23 to more closely reflect 1557’s “which honorable preacher.” He prints: *Igitur ab hoc tali viro vos tanto predicatore didicistis*, which he translates, “And so from this fine man and great preacher you have learned ... .” However, his version is not supported by any Group Three text. Kinney's version is closest to *A*: *Igitur ab hoc tali viro vos tanto predicacione didicistis*, but there is a clear difference. Kinney and 1557 refer to the preacher, while *A* refers to preaching. In addition, both *tali* and *tanto* are more ambiguous than Kinney makes them. Lewis & Short define the former as “of such an especial kind or nature (both in a good and a bad sense),” and note that the latter “conveys only the idea of relative greatness.” Thus, *A* should be translated: “Therefore, from such a man as this, you have
Richard, Duke of Gloucester, most powerful and most abounding in every kind of virtue, since indeed he now remains the [only] one who legally is able to succeed his father, the most renowned Duke, on whose blood, by a {formally} proposed law, [466] the kingship was confirmed, both because of Edward's illegitimate wedding, from which he was able to beget no offspring except a bastard, and for another reason which [Dr. Shaw] signified rather than {plainly} stated, [and] thus will not be spoken by me, since [the reason] is one which nobody avoids except glad, out of shame and reverence for the Protector, so pious toward his mother, even such [as she is], retaining affection such that he unwillingly tolerates anything unfavorable against her, even when it is said for his own good.

[466.9] Therefore, when the nobles and the people (in good part) had {carefully} weighed these matters and had simultaneously considered [that] not only the warlike virtues, but all appropriate arts for governing a dominion besides, coincided by divine {providence} in this one man in such {a way} that he alone could appear born for the kingship, [and] not tolerating to be ruled any longer by a bastard seedling, nor [that] such bitter evils become longer established, voted with great consensus to approach the Protector with their supplications and to implore his mercy lest he reject their prayers and lest he refuse to take upon himself the burden of administering the kingdom, which he would be doing no more by his own right than for the public good. But without doubt he will not willingly accept this [benefit].

[467.9] [Since] he is adept on {account of} his wisdom, he would easily weigh how much more care than advantage dominion carries with it, particularly for one who has thus resolved to govern in the way I know enough he is going to govern, if he takes it. I proclaim to you that that duty is not child's-play, and certainly that very {thing} [is what] that wise [man] perceived who said, “Woe to that kingdom whose king is a child.” And [thus] there is more reason both for rejoicing in your fortune and for giving thanks to those above, by whose benevolence it has been provided that he whom they have destined for this kingship not only is of mature age, [but] indeed even has joined admirable prudence [468] with great experience of affairs and the highest glory at home and abroad, acquired by his virtue.

[468.3] Even if, as I said, he would reluctantly assume such a burden upon himself, nevertheless we hope it appears that he will oppose it not a little less if you, also, the most honorable citizens of by far the most illustrious city in this kingdom, would decide to join your prayers to our supplications in this matter. Although [it is granted]
that you would act as we have conceived no little hope [you would act], on account of
your wisdom, nevertheless we still beg [you] vehemently, and [we] certainly [do] that
more confidently, because, besides these our prayers, which themselves we believe will
also have some influence on account of our affection toward you, by selecting such a
prince not only would you have benefited the entire kingdom for the public, but also you
will especially procure advantages separately for yourselves, for whose favors he would
always carry a debt, not otherwise than if you had given [him] dominion.”

[468.15] When the Duke had said this, he expected he would immediately be
applauded with hands and feet, and that Richard would be unanimously acclaimed as
king; so [much] he had hoped that the mayor had formed the people {beforehand}. But
counter to his great hope, when he considered the deep silence everywhere, whispering
nearer to the mayor, he asked, “What does this manner {of acting} mean to you?”
“I suppose,” he said, “[that] your speech was not heard by them {clearly}

That, indeed,” said the Duke, “is easily corrected,” and at once he repeated the
same [things] somewhat more audibly than before, with other words, turned in a different
order, truly so distinctly and ornately, with such a suitable voice, face, and posture, that
anyone [who] was present would easily grant that he had never before heard such a bad
cause declaimed so well. Yet, whether they were stunned from wonder or {470} from
fear, or because each [man] preferred to follow another leader in speaking than go
{ahead} himself, all {remained} equally silent. The mayor, therefore, also somewhat
perturbed by this matter, gathering into a circle with the Duke and some confidants, said
that {it was not} the custom for anything to be proposed to the citizens by any other than
the Recorder's voice; perhaps the silence was born from there, lest they should appear to
change their traditions. (The Londoners address as “Recorder” a man there who is the
assistant of the mayor, learned in the laws of his country, so that he would not err through
inexperience in returning judgments.) A certain Fitzwilliam had entered that office
recently, an honorable and grave man, [and], since he had not yet ever addressed the
people, such an inauspicious beginning badly annoyed him. Yet, ordered to speak [and]
fearing harm to himself if he refused, he proposed the same things yet again, but he
moderated his discourse in such {a way} that everything he said would be taken as the
Duke's words, not his own. But the state of the people remained the same, no different
[than before], not otherwise than to be as silent as usually prevails in deepest night, and
with such an unmoved expression that by no sign at all did they manifest any sentiment of
their minds.

[470.18] But the Duke, somewhat offended that they had received his speech with
such adverse ears and minds, turned to the mayor [and] said, “Let them seek for someone
[else] who could bear such obstinate silence,” and immediately he turned to the crowd.

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784 *confidentius*; elsewhere *confido* is “trust”
785 Lit. “by one voice of all”
786 Lit. “duke”
787 Lit. “evil”
788 Lit. “in the sleeping part of night”
789 elsewhere “face”
“Men of London,” he said, “we came to report about this matter to you, a matter in which we needed neither your help nor [your] counsel at all. For we nobles [and] the remaining people of the kingdom could have sufficed for choosing a prince, except that our love towards you had persuaded us that we not remove you from the handling of this matter, into which you were received as partners, so that it would repay [you] so exceedingly that, of [all] your advantages, none [could] equally [repay you]. You appear either to insufficiently discern this mind of ours or to regard [it] as of little [importance], [since] indeed you have not [472] supposed it to be worthy of a response. Just respond with one word, at least, whether or not you want the most powerful Duke of Gloucester to be approved for the kingship, whom all the other nobles and people are going to select anyway. For once a response has been given either way, we will depart, and are going to trouble you no further about this matter.”

[472.6] Somewhat stirred at this discourse, the people muttered among themselves and more a sound was heard than words, of the kind rendered by bees departing from their hive, until from the farthest part of the Senate-house, in which the servants of a certain Nashfield, participants in the plot, had crowded together, a shout was unexpectedly raised from the back repeating: “King Richard!” The astonished citizens turned their necks back. But (as {usually} happens in a crowd) certain slaves with no concern for Richard joined themselves with those shouting, and boys elated by any alteration of things whatsoever also presently threw their hats and caps upwards in a sign of their joy.

[472.15] But the Duke, although he was displeased that no honorable citizen appeared in that party, nevertheless deftly turned the deed in favor of himself: having called for silence again, he said that shouting was a most pleasant [deed] of so happy a mind in electing the king and in consenting as one, that not even one [voice] was heard which spoke against [it]. “When it will be opportune, we will make [it] so that he hears [about] your very extraordinary affection, as he will no doubt turn [it] sometime to your great good. But meanwhile we beg you that tomorrow all of us approach his majesty together to ask that what you have offered to him with such a consensus, he will make valid by his consent.” With these words, he descended; the others departed, part openly sad [and] many with pretended joy; nor were those lacking from the Duke's attendants who, when they were not able to suppress their grief (which they did not [474] dare to display), were compelled to turn their face toward the wall while the anguish of their heart burst forth through their eyes.

[474.3] Therefore, on the {next} day the nobles and citizens in a great throng approached the Protector, who was lodging there in London. The messenger sent inside affirmed that all the nobles [and] the Senate and people of London were at the gate, who were desiring and expecting a discussion. But he at first hesitated to go {forth}, uncertain what that crowd endeavored [to do], which came {upon} [him] so

790 elsewhere “counsel”
791 See Sallust, *Conspiracy of Catiline* 39.3, where this phrase means “political revolution.”
792 elsewhere “consensus.” The word is in the same case and only four words apart from the one before.
793 a pun in Latin: *expetant expectent*
794 Lit. “doubted”
unexpectedly. The Duke, when it was reported to him, displayed this hesitation of the
Protector to the others, so that they would know how far away the Protector still was
from this proposed thought. As for the rest, having sent back the messenger, they
implored with great prayers to be admitted, reporting that, except in his presence, they
would not reveal the things that they were going to reveal. Finally, therefore, he came
out. Nevertheless, he still did not completely entrust himself [to them], but indeed
received and responded to [their] discourse looking down\textsuperscript{795} from a walkway above.
Then, [once] all [of them] were quiet, the Duke, in an equally distinguished \{manner\},
first begged that it be permitted to them to speak freely the things they wanted, without
any offense to him, for although they had contemplated nothing from there that would not
result in both honor for him and advantage for the kingdom, nevertheless, since they were
uncertain how his serenity on [his] part would accept [it], they would speak nothing
themselves unless they obtained his pardon. To this, the Protector, as he was in such a
matter extremely benevolent and affable, \{and\} there was an amazing burning \{desire\} in
him then for knowing \{476\} what they wanted, nodded \{assent\}, and encouraged [them],
lest they hesitate\textsuperscript{796} to declare anything they had decided, \{as\} truly, his consciousness of
his own mind towards them persuaded [him] that there was nothing anyone thought about
him which was not more worthy of thanks than pardon.

\[476.5\] Therefore the Duke, finally secured by that speech of the Protector, dared
to explain the matter with its causes and eventually to implore his immense mercy, lest he
neglect a kingdom so continually afflicted by so many intolerable evils, \{and\} that he
might regard the nobles and the people (prostrated at his feet) with his accustomed
benevolence, subject his shoulders to a country fallen upon him alone, lift up a republic
\{which was\} almost destroyed and trampled upon, \{and\} finally, that he might lay hands
on\textsuperscript{797} the scepter as if on the beam of a ship continually drifting without a skilled
steersman,\textsuperscript{798} and that he would suffer that worshipful head to be burdened with a
diadem, and neither fear the storms of dominion nor be seduced by immoderate
moderation so much that, for the sake of his [own] peace \{but\} with that of the public
neglected, he would flee\textsuperscript{799} the kingship owed to him by human custom, the British
republic\textsuperscript{800} destined [for him] by the presiding heavenly ones, from which \{kingship\} he
would get so much more honor and less worry because no king ever commanded a people
as willing as his \{people\}, which of itself was burning \{with desire\} for the auspices for
the king.\textsuperscript{801}

\textsuperscript{795} or “despising.”
\textsuperscript{796} Lit. “doubt”
\textsuperscript{797} In Latin, \textit{manus ... ad moveret} can mean both “put one's hand to something” (here to the scepter) for the
purpose of work, and to “violently seize” it.
\textsuperscript{798} In Latin, the same word, “\textit{gubernator}” means both our cognate “governor” (of a country) and
“steersman” (of a ship).
\textsuperscript{799} In Laint, “\textit{refugio}” is especially to run away to a place of refuge, such as a sanctuary.
\textsuperscript{800} Lit. “the British thing.” The Latin has only “\textit{rem ... Britannicam}” here. I understand \textit{publicam} based on
\textit{publiciae} just above (476.15-6).
\textsuperscript{801} This can mean either that they eagerly await the beginning of Richard's reign, or that they eagerly await the
divine omens which will tell whether or not it will be a good beginning. Also, Richard is not king yet,
Edward V is, and has not yet had his auspices.
When the Protector heard the Duke's words, with his face by no means whatsoever nodding assent, he responded that he himself was not ignorant that the things were true that the Duke had reported; nevertheless he had such affection for his brother and such affection for his children, moreover he had so much regard for his own honor that he would prefer to even three crowns, that he was not able to lead his mind to comply with their petition. Indeed foreign nations, for whom the way by which it was managed would have been less ascertained, would appraise him, also, by others' greed, and thus his reputation would come into danger, if he did not reject those things concerning the kingship which the Duke offered of his own accord. He was able to cede his right not at all reluctantly because he had seen that it always brings more gall than honey to him who intended to rule in such a manner that it ought not to be permitted for someone to rule who did not want to rule in that manner; but nevertheless he not only forgave their request, truly he even had gratitude and would have gratitude for their extraordinarily well-disposed wills toward him. Yet he pleaded that even for his sake, whatever mind they bore towards himself, they should avow it totally to the Prince, whom he would prefer to obey than to rule. Nevertheless, to whatever extent it might please the King, his labor and counsel would not ever be lacking for the republic, which he had assisted some small amount even in the time of his administration (the credit for which he referred to God, not to himself), especially on account of some vile endeavors which had disturbed the republic before and were agitating so that they might damage it anew, which he had suppressed partly by his own industry, but mostly by divine providence.

Then the Duke, having briefly held a conversation with his men, indicated again that the affair was the sort which they should have begun, so that even if it were to be approached anew, nevertheless they would want to begin it, with abundant reasons; as it was now, truly, they had gone forward too far for coming back. Besides, it was determined by the fathers and the people that they would not tolerate any longer to be ruled by Edward's bastard children. Therefore, if he would not spurn the dominion offered to him on their own accord, he was the one desired as prince by all their prayers; but if he entirely and positively responded that he would not be accepting, they would easily find somebody for whom the republic would be of concern.

These words alone bent Richard's mind (so strongly abhorring the kingship), considering that if he would himself refuse, nevertheless his nephew was going to rule no more. Therefore he said, "While I lament your decision, with your mind so steadfast not to tolerate this king any longer, I neither see it to be possible nor perceive it to be right that unwilling men be ruled by anyone. Certainly, it belongs to me; although I know there is no other to whom the kingship is owed by right of inheritance, nevertheless I consider these your wills of more import than all laws, the whole force of

802 Lit. "accepted."
803 Lit. "reason"
804 Lit. "thing"
805 Lit. "They had progressed farther than could be returned from."
806 From 1565. Perhaps, though, it should be "the dominion."
which depends on you. Since I {clearly} see your consensus toward me is so solid, lest I appear either insufficient of courage in zealously {administering} the republic,\textsuperscript{807} or not to recognize your goodwill toward me, behold! Here on this day, I take upon myself the government of the two kingdoms of England and France, the one so that I might guard\textsuperscript{808} and enlarge it, and the other that I might subject it to [the first] and restore it to obeying your sovereignty, to which it ought to submit. Indeed I consider merely the administration of them mine, truly the right and profit and ownership of each of them totally yours, not at all doubtfully public. The day on which I shall have ceased to have that mind is the day I pray that those above take away from me, not only this kingdom of yours, which I would have wickedly tried to steal, but even my life itself, which would be unworthy to be retained.”

This speech of his received a shout of joy, repeating: “King Richard!!” The nobles, with the king (for so he was called from that [482] hour), withdrew inside; the people departed for home variously affected, and they were discussing among themselves many things about this affair. But most in their mouth was this shameless pretense of acting and speaking as if the Protector had never before either heard or thought about what had been done, when meanwhile they themselves indeed did not doubt that nobody was so stupid as to have doubt that this great affair was conducted by agreement. But others argued [in favor of] custom and received convention in human affairs, which requires all great affairs to be accomplished with some legitimate ceremonies. Indeed, some [things] are rustically managed if those who conduct [them] do not pretend to some extent, and the spectators [do not] dissemble\textsuperscript{809}. For also one who is created a bishop is asked twice whether he wants to, and twice denies it, exceedingly devoutly, [and] the third {time} he is barely able to be induced to want it, as if he speaks unwillingly. If, however, he pays nothing to the prince, nevertheless, the bulls purchased from the Pope utterly declare his ambition. Indeed, are the people ignorant that one who plays an emperor in a tragedy is perhaps a craftsman? Nevertheless it is such lack of knowledge to know that which you know, that if someone calls him what he truly is, not who he falsely is pretended to be, he comes into danger; indeed he is given a good beating for a bad joke by the simulated henchmen, even as he deserved, who undertook to disorder the whole play with an untimely truth. In the same way, the tragedies they had watched were kings' games; the people had been called into it only to watch, and one who is wise would only {intend} to watch. Some who, by an impulse, appeared on stage and intermingled themselves with the theatrical company disordered the play through their inexperience [and] thrust themselves into great danger.

On the following day, with a large escort, he came into the forum (not that of London, but a larger and more majestic [one] which is near the palace adjoining West[minster] abbey), where {legal} causes are pled from all parts of the kingdom indiscriminately. There, when he had placed himself in the seat which is called kingly [King's Bench], because judgments are reported in that court as if [484] they were pronounced from the mouth of the king himself, {turning} back before the assembly, he

\textsuperscript{807} or “zealously engaging in public affairs.” Lit. “eagerly snatching the republic.”

\textsuperscript{808} [tuear]

\textsuperscript{809} Lit. “if those who conduct [them] do not simulate ... and the spectators do not dissimulate”
declared that he was to take possession of the kingship from that place especially, from where {judicial} decisions are announced to the people by the mouth of the king, because he had supposed that it {must be} done when he thus perceived that to be king was precisely to execute the laws and to act as their servant. Then, with a speech as flattering as possible, he [tried to] win {over} the nobles, the merchants, the artisans, and in sum every kind of man, but particularly the colleges which study British laws. Finally, lest fear make him hated by anyone, at the {same time} as he appeared benevolent, he spoke {beforehand} with treacherous mercy [about] the evils of dissensions and the goods of concord. He decreed that all enmities were erased from his mind, [and] he publicly forgave all [men] of all offenses against himself. As an example by which to proclaim this deed, he ordered [one] Fogg to be summoned to him, whom he mortally hated. Having led him out of the adjacent sanctuary (for he had {taken} refuge there out of his fear), he gave [Fogg] his hand in the sight of the people. [This] deed, accepted and scattered with praises by the commoners, the prudent held as empty. While returning, he [always fawned upon810] whomever he had met on the way, [for] a mind conscious of having become guilty always prostrates [itself] to a nearly servile flattery. Indeed, he was not secure even so, nor did he trust those upon whom he fawned; he did not withdraw his hand from his sword-hilt, and he looked {around} in all directions just like he was {about to strike} back.

With this staged election, he had begun to reign on the [26th] of June. He was crowned the ___ day811 of the same month, and that celebration was carried {through} for the most part with the same paraphernalia which had been destined812 for his nephew's crowning.

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810 Cf. 1557 “whom so euer he met he saluted.” Daniel Kinney suspects semper adhlandiri nam has been omitted through haplography. See CW 15, pp. cxxxix-cxl and note 234 in Chapter Two above.
811 See note 273 in Chapter Two above.
812 The last word of the work in P is destinatus.
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