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This issue of the Review is dedicated to Dr. Robert Sasseen, in his final year as President of the University of Dallas, with deep gratitude for his vision and years of devoted service to the university community, and with sincerest wishes for his continued success in the future.

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Roman Ivory is Most Valuable

Flory Tomutsa

In Virgil’s revision of Odysseus’ homecoming and Aeneas’ arrival in Carthage, Virgil creates a new vision of the masculine and feminine. He portrays this vision as one encompassing, not merely roles to be automatically filled by one sex or the other, but as representations of the two views of life, the balance between the two visions necessary for any individual or institution to be completely whole. Juno and Jove personify the constant struggle between the masculine and feminine perspectives. Throughout the Aeneid, Rome’s balance of views is in question because, on one hand, Anchises’ ghost specifically paints a picture of an absolutely universal, patriarchal Rome, while on the other, Aeneas portrays certain traits of the feminine, such as his initial acceptance of Dido’s love and his final destruction of Turnus, that irreversibly affect the history of Rome. The destiny of Aeneas’ wife to stay behind in Troy while he and his son embark to found an empire presents the family to be a primarily masculine venture, pursued for the sake of propagating an empire. This vision of the family goes against the nature of the mutual exchange between the masculine and feminine which lends itself to the necessary balance in human nature. The gods dehabilitate the natural and necessary growth of that balance in life by deliberately misleading Aeneas. They cause him to believe that he is duty-bound to his destiny and protected in his pursuit of the masculine empire, yet in the last fight between Aeneas and Turnus, Aeneas’ victory is not guaranteed by his destiny: “Jupiter held the two pans of a scale in balance and placed in each a destiny—doom for him whose weight would bring death down” (Virgil 12.983-985). So, although Rome is founded, it is not the Rome that the gods promise Aeneas it will be. For this reason Anchises tells Aeneas to leave the underworld through the ivory gate of false dreams instead of the horn gate of true shades: “. . . the other all white ivory agleam without a flaw, and yet false dreams are sent through this one by the ghosts to the upper world” (4.1213-1215).

For the purpose of this essay, I will focus on the masculine traits of order and justice and the feminine traits of generativity and passion, including both the procreative passion of eros and the destructive passion of vengeance. These Virgilian manifestations of the masculine and feminine are rooted in the more concrete Greek mythological heritage in which the woman is linked to the land while the man is linked to the sky. The woman remains at home while the man travels and wanders; the woman’s ties are local while those of the man are more universal. Virgil portrays Juno and Jove as the extreme aspects of the masculine and feminine. Jove, the masculine view, is the distant, omnipresent proprietor of fate and justice. He is swayed little by emotion and always looks to the common good. Juno is the personification of twisted femininity. As seen in Juno’s actions, in addition to those of many mortal characters in the Aeneid, the generative nature of the feminine passion becomes destructive if it is denied. She refuses to recognize her own unique potential for influence by constantly attempting to usurp Jove’s power. Her vengeful attempts to thwart Aeneas, and all that he represents, continue until Jove tells her during the last battle, “Let yourself no longer be consumed without relief by all that inward burning; let care and trouble not forever come to me from your sweet lips” (12.1085-1088).

Amidst the power struggle of the masculine and feminine perspectives, the gods cause Aeneas, the epic hero, to believe that he has a divine mission to found a city, Rome, which is completely masculine in view; thus, this necessitates personal abandonment of all feminine traits. Yet, the account of Dido and Aeneas’ relations, the Virgilian revision of Odysseus’ homecoming to Penelope, shows the traits of both masculine and feminine to be manifested in man and woman alike, although to differing degrees since the manifestation of both perspectives is necessary within human nature. Virgil’s portrayal of this need creates a tension within Aeneas’ divine mission. This tension is confronted upon Aeneas’ arrival at Carthage. Aeneas’ inconsistency due to the opposing wills within him, that of his own nature and that of the gods’, is marked by his prolonged interlude with Dido, followed by his
abrupt departure. To appreciate the implications of these scenes, it is necessary to compare and contrast them with the corresponding Homeric scene of Odysseus’ homecoming.

Odysseus and Aeneas arrive in Ithaka and Carthage in much the same conditions: they both are greeted by goddesses who prepare them for their upcoming adventures; they both appear as weary travellers in need of refuge; they both are welcomed with due hospitality by Penelope and Dido; and they both move each of the women with the stories they tell. Yet here the principle similarities end. Penelope is hospitable to, and emotionally touched by the story of the traveller, Odysseus in disguise, because she is reminded of her husband’s trials and because his physical appearance is similar to that of her husband (Homer 19.358-360; 20.204-207); Dido is hospitable to, and emotionally touched by, the story of Aeneas because she herself has experienced many of the same troubles (Virgil 1.856-862). Penelope is the greatest of all Homeric women in mind and good sense (Homer 19.325-327); her fame extends far, like that of a king (Homer 19.107-114). Homer’s version of a female king is not a queen, but a good housewife. Yet even in her unparalleled status, Penelope is unable to control the household completely; with mutinous servants and unbridled suitors, the house is stagnating without Odysseus’ guidance (Homer 17.537-540). Telemachos leaves no question that even she, “shining among women,” is not the head of the household, even in Odysseus’ absence, when he says, “The men shall have the bow in their keeping, all men, but I most of all. For mine is the power in this household” (21.352-353).

Dido, on the other hand, the Virgilian version of a female king, is a queen, a great and famous queen. She is an interesting combination which Aeneas does not quite know how to handle: she has the beauty of a goddess and the rule of a just king (Virgil 1.676-692). She has a balance of power and compassion that allows her to offer, with no apparent difficulty, to give the Trojans refuge if Aeneas has been killed, or to share the rule of her city with Aeneas, a stranger, if he is still alive. Later, when she gives herself to passion, it is a complete passion that does not contradict her status as ruler. Only initially is her ability to rule paralyzed; by the time Mercury appears to Aeneas the first time, he is laying bricks for Dido’s kingdom.

Yet even Dido feels incomplete; even with all her glory, she has no children and laments, at one point, about the barren state in which her dead husband left her (Virgil 4.24). The gods employ Dido’s single vulnerability by using Aeneas’ son to awaken her desire for Aeneas. Her welcome of Iulus stems from a desire to create life, a desire that cannot be filled even by the founding of a new city. This is a revision of the Homeric theme in which Odysseus’ masculine desire for generativity causes him to realize Kalypso’s sterile immortality in a depression that causes even the water to look barren (Homer 5.84). While Odysseus returns to Penelope and the fertile relationship unifying the masculine and feminine, Aeneas accepts the sterile paternity of the Roman city, rejecting the feminine and balanced role Dido plays. In fact, when Aeneas tells her he must leave her (because he thinks he can fulfill his generative desire by founding a city), Dido once again bemoans the sterility of their relationship, finalized through his abandonment, that leaves her so totally bereft (Virgil 4.449-454).

The location of the consummation of Penelope and Odysseus’ desire contrasts starkly with that of Dido and Aeneas. Odysseus’ famous bed is the center of Ithaka, while the site of Dido and Aeneas’ union is a cave that is outside the city; Penelope and Odysseus are married, while Dido and Aeneas are driven together by Juno during a hunting party. The situation adds a primal element to our Roman couple’s sex life, indicating Juno’s view that man’s most generative act ought be separate from society and may be even in opposition to it. Because she has rejected the generative nature of femininity, Juno is consumed with the destructive element of passion and is bent on seeking her revenge against Aeneas.

Despite her just and fair rule as queen, Dido is full of unbridled passion, demonstrated not only by the scene in the cave, but through Dido’s love sickness for Aeneas which causes her to “burning, in her madness roam through all the city, like a doe hit by an arrow shot from far away” (Virgil 4.95-97) as well as through her despair when he leaves and she traverses “the whole city, all aflame with rage, like a Bacchante driven wild” (Virgil 4.410-411). With both Amata and Dido’s Bacchic revelries in times of distress, the reader is faced with the enthralling dichotomy of the women’s ability to exist simultaneously in the political world of masculine order and in the primal
world of feminine passion. This could be seen as the feminine equivalent of the masculine ability to exist simultaneously in the political world of order and in the destructive world of war and death. Yet, the male figures, most specifically Aeneas, in the epic seem to be limited in their ability to express this duality of passion. At times, Aeneas does not even seem to have a will of his own; he simply does whatever the gods tell him to do.

Aeneas is quite the dolt in his affair with the queen. As might be expected from his previous relations with women, as well as the culture’s typical relations with women, he has never before dealt with a powerful woman, who is filling the "role" of a male. Because of her position, he underestimates the depth of Dido’s passion; although he recognizes her as "the impassioned queen" (Virgil 4.386), he does not realize that she will commit suicide if he leaves. Even in the tragedy of the situation, there is something almost humorous about his oblivion, a delusion that is so obvious when he sees Dido in the underworld and speaks to her:

Dido, so forlorn,
The story then that came to me was true,
That you were out of life, had met your end
By your own hand. Was I, was I the cause?
I could not believe that I would hurt you
so terribly by going. (6.613-616; 6.624-625)

When Aeneas abandons Dido, he rejects what she represents: the balance of the masculine and feminine, justice and procreative passion, a procreative passion which can become a destructive force. In doing so, he disturbs the natural order of internal and external psychological relations (much as Juno has done), analogous to the disturbance of the household for which the Trojan War of the Iliad is fought. As a result of such a disturbance, he must fight in a bloody civil war before he can gain the hand of Lavania in marriage. How antithetical is war to the gentlest of communions, the beginnings of a new family.

Anchises tells Aeneas in the underworld that he is to establish the arts of Rome: "To pacify, to impose the rule of law, to spare the conquered, battled down the proud" (Virgil 6.1152-1154). Like Achilleus, Aeneas’ final end for killing his opponent in battle is to revenge the death of his companion, Pallas. Yet unlike Achilleus, who is driven by blind passion, Aeneas is initially motivated by an imperial sense of justice, and in the spirit of that justice, is about to have mercy on conquered Turnus, when he remembers the death of Pallas. Aeneas’ destructive passion betrays his ultimate inability, as a human, to hold merely the masculine vision to the complete exclusion of the feminine. He tries to simulate the familial fertility, that can only be realized between man and woman, through the exclusively male father-son-grandson relationship that he, his father, and his son share. The description Anchises provides for Aeneas of their male descendants in the underworld demonstrates the divine effort to define the propagation of the polis of Rome as the sole purpose of family. Aeneas’ lesson in the patriarchal lineage of the future provides an interesting contrast with Odysseus’ exchange with the women of Hades, the women who are the matriarchal lineage of the past. With this attitude, Aeneas’ generativity is denied, his passion resurfaces as a destructive force, and he recognizes that the concept of a complete patriarchy is a dream that cannot be realized through human nature.

Aeneas fails to see the implications of his "divinely inspired" dream to found a masculine world empire. The incomplete nature of his dream and mission, as spoken by the gods, is most directly indicated in the symbolic act of Aeneas’ departure from the underworld through the ivory gate of false dreams. When Penelope speaks with Odysseus, disguised as a traveller, in the Odyssey, she tells him that she fears that the dream of her husband’s homecoming and their reunion, is a dream that comes through the false gates, a message of the gods that will never come true (Homer 19.560-569). Her prophecy is not realized in Odysseus, but in Aeneas, whom the gods tell time and time again that the feminine aspect of reality is not welcome in his mission to found the worldly empire of Rome. Mercury comes to Aeneas a second time while he is sleeping the night before his departure from Carthage, to encourage his departure and, as a parting message says, "Ha! Come, break the spell! Woman’s a thing forever
fitful and forever changing" (Virgil 4.791-792). Considering the circumstances, the message of the god plainly misrepresents Dido and does so purposely in order to persuade Aeneas to follow his mission. The reason it is so imperative that Aeneas leaves immediately does not lie in the temporal nature of his opportunity, but rather in Jove's insecurity about Dido's strength, an insecurity strong enough to cause a god to lie to his hero. Dido can hardly be called a fitful and changing thing. Only after her sister speaks encouragement does Dido even consider forsaking her vow of chastity to follow her passionate feelings (instilled by not one goddess, but two) towards Aeneas. Even at that point, she prays about it, pouring libations at the alters of Ceres, the law-giver and Juno, the goddess of marriage, emphasizing once again the balance of her character. She is the one in control of her kingdom so, unlike Penelope, she does not "need a man around the house" for the pragmatic aspects of life. This makes her desire for Aeneas much more poignant and fresh.

The exchange between Dido's balanced character, Aeneas' ambiguous one, and the gods' deceptive nature sheds a different light on the place of the feminine within the Roman culture. Although the Aeneid is known more for its focus on the polis instead of the household, and thus is assumed to overlook the importance of the feminine, Turnus' murder causes the reader to realize that the feminine is anything but overlooked. In fact, I would argue that Virgil makes a much stronger case for the necessary harmony between the masculine and feminine vision, with their inherent differences, yet ultimate equality, than Homer does throughout either of his epics. The epic's ending with Turnus' murder stands as a warning of what happens when the feminine view is suppressed, thus allowing the primary reader, Augustus, to "write" the rest of Aeneas' history through his own choice of actions in Virgil's Rome.

St. Augustine and the Problem of Evil in the Confessions

Mark Arandia

Like any artwork of the highest order, the Confessions, St. Augustine's autobiographical masterpiece, explores in considerable detail issues which in our current time continue to perplex us. One such issue, considered by many to be the centerpiece of the work, and which is the subject of this essay, is the problem of evil, its nature and origin. In the following pages I will present an analysis of Augustine's teaching on this matter, drawing in particular from his personal struggle, as documented in the Confessions, between the attractive yet unsound tenets of Manicheism, and the unerring but more demanding precepts of Christianity.

It is in the fifth book of the Confessions that Augustine begins his discourse on the problem of evil which he will spread throughout almost the entirety of the work, up until the moment of his deliverance. Let the reader recall that the Manicheism against which the mature Augustine revolted was a sect within Gnosticism, a heresy that posits a radical spirit-matter dualism whereby the transcendent and worldly realms of reality collide against one another in an antagonism of opposites. The created physical order is the product of an evil demiurge, although some part of the pleroma (or good and transcendent force) has somehow managed to penetrate that order—hence the body-soul dichotomy in man. The path to salvation, according to the Gnostics, is paved not with properly ordered wills, but rather with the gnosis or a special knowledge that members of their elitist sects acquire as a means to regain entry into the pleroma. Thus we can look back with a sympathetic eye upon the repentant theologian who in the folly of his youth:

Liked to excuse myself and to accuse some unidentifiable power which was with me and yet not I.....and, when I had done something wrong, [preferred] not to make myself confess to [God] that [He] might heal my soul; for it was sinning against [Him]. (PS.40:5; Chadwick translation 84)
Yet it would be terribly unfair to Augustine to assume that his only consideration in seeking the discipleship of Mani was the moral latitude permitted by the latter's teaching. As we discover in the pages of the Confessions, there was indeed a time when the young Augustine assented to the Manichean body of speculative doctrines as elements of a theoretically sound cosmogony. Taking the spirit-matter dualism as a first principle, for example, Augustine arrived at the conclusion that:

There are two opposed masses, both infinite, but the evil rather smaller, the good larger...[for]
I thought it better to believe that [the good God] had created no evil—which in my ignorance I thought not merely some sort of substance but even corporeal, since I did not know how to think of mind except as a subtle physical entity diffused through space—rather than to believe that the nature of evil as I understood it, came from [the good God]. (85)

Implicit in this rather crude formulation is a wholesale rejection of the Incarnation—indeed of the very principle of sacramentality, that indisputably vital component of Catholic orthodoxy—and, as it would follow, of Christianity itself: "That [Christ] could be mixed with us and not polluted I did not see, because my mental picture was what it was" (86). But Augustine soon discovers that even this crisis can be averted through a refutation of one of Gnosticism's major premises—the existence of and eternal combat between two opposing forces of light and darkness. A closer look at this inference reveals that it is one which, under logical scrutiny, dissolves from within. Indeed the very notion of a combative struggle between God and an evil entity undermines the very omnipotence of God, that is, it implies a degree of corruptibility in Him, because:

If nothing could harm [God], that removes any ground for combat, and indeed for combat under such conditions that some portion of [God]... is mingled with hostile powers and with natures not created by [God], and is corrupted by them and so changed for the worse that it is altered from beatitude to misery and needs help to deliver and purify it. (113)

The Manichees posit the tainted portion of God to be the human soul (pantheist-tending as they were), "enslaved, contaminated and corrupt, to which aid is brought by [God's] word, free, pure, and intact" (113). The contradiction here only becomes apparent when one reflects on the question: How can God's word (which, being one and the same substance as the soul, is itself corruptible) effect any degree of positive change in a human soul crippled by the selfsame paralysis from which the Agent ostensibly acting upon it suffers? As this clearly is a perversion of reason, it thus follows that the Manichean argument is self-refutatory, regardless of whether one posits God as corruptible or incorruptible (in the latter case it is even more obvious), for either way "without further discussion the very proposition is false and to be abominated" (113). From this difficulty, then, Augustine escapes with a reaffirmed conviction regarding the "divine immunity from pollution and change and the complete immutability of our God, the true God...." (113).

Augustine takes the next step in his journey toward a complete comprehension of the ontology of evil by differentiating the corruptible from the incorruptible and deducing therefrom the locus of evil, "that is, the source of corruption by which it is impossible for [God, Who is Incorruptible] to be injured" (114). The corruption of God, he affirms, is a logical impossibility, as that which by definition is both Immutable and Supremely Good can neither be sapped of its vitality nor rendered more perfect. Evil thus somehow originates in that which by nature is corruptible, or more precisely, in God's temporal creation.

Through the study of Platonic texts, we are told, Augustine arrives at the understanding that existence is a good, and therefore that even things which are liable to corruption are good. For if "there were no good in them, there would be nothing capable of being corrupted. Corruption does harm and unless it diminishes the good, no harm would be done" (124).
From this simple truism the entire doctrinal edifice of Gnosticism collapses upon itself. Evil, as the Gnostics claim, cannot be a force which spars throughout the heavens with an indestructible God, much less a positive entity, an ontologically independent reality:

Hence I saw and it was made clear to me that [God] made all things good and there are absolutely no substances which [He] did not make. As [God] did not make all things equal, all things are good in the sense that taken individually they are good, and all things taken together are very good. For God made 'all things very good' (Gen. 1:31). (125)

Having thus discarded the notion of evil as an ontologically independent entity (which, as has been mentioned, was for the young Augustine the only means of preventing the ascription of evil to God), Augustine endeavors to discover the origin and nature of evil within the created order. And, in one moment of reflection, he tells us precisely where he found it:

I inquired what wickedness is; and I did not find a substance but a perversity of will twisted away from the highest substance, you O God, towards inferior things, rejecting its own inner life (Eccles.10:10) and swelling with external matter. (126)

And again:

I was brought up into [God's] light by the fact that I knew myself both to have a will and to be alive. Therefore when I willed or did not will something, I was utterly certain that none other than myself was willing or not willing. That there lay the cause of my sin I was now coming to recognize. (114)

With this we come full circle and arrive at the uniquely Judeo-Christian conception of evil as originating in a perverted will, a will in deliberate disharmony with the Divine Will. But what of the existential status of evil? We concluded already that evil is not a positive entity, is not a res, is totally non-objectifiable. Evil, properly understood, is a privation, the negative yield of an act of willing that which is estranged from the Good. To simplify it further, evil is the privation of a good that ought to have been willed and thus acquired but, for the sake of an inferior good, was not. Again, evil, or sin, has its origin in that for which we are all of us accountable—the human will, which God, in His undying Goodness, made free. Good, as well as evil, is therefore in our hands. We can deliberately will what is repugnant to God, and thereby estrange ourselves from Him, much as Augustine did along with his hooligan friends in the pear garden, or we can choose what is consonant with the Summum Bonum, in all its alluring majesty, as did the wise Victorinus. Either way, as Augustine never tires of reminding us, we the possessors of wills are (with the aid of that Grace with which we must ourselves cooperate) responsible for their proper ordering and direction. This is a reality which all must confront, and which the Gnostics, in their blindness and ignorance, have never failed to deny. Never was a religious doctrine so attractive, and yet so deadly, as theirs.

This last point is surely the most fitting one with which to bring this essay to a close. From what has been said thus far, it should be clear that the one vital principle that emerges out of Augustine's discovery of the Christian understanding of evil is the principle regarding the existence of the free human will and the often-times painful responsibility each of us bears for setting it along its proper path. Now it is no great failing for an inquisitive yet untutored youth to find himself captivated by a body of religious dogmas which offers beatitude to a select few without requiring of them any moral endeavor, personal sacrifice or responsibility. To will oneself to be deceived, however (which inevitably becomes one of two alternatives), is an unpardonable sin. An operative intellect and a passion for Truth will lead anyone who embarks on the journey, albeit along different pathways, to the same unerrning realization made by that noble Saint so many centuries ago:
The consequence of a distorted will is passion. By servitude to passion, habit is formed, and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity. But I was responsible for the fact that habit had become so embattled against me; for it was with my consent that I came to the place in which I did not wish to be. Who has the right to object if a just penalty pursues a sinner? (140)

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**Sabrina and Grace:**

*The "Hidden Strength" of Milton’s Mask*

Karen Kraft

Upon a first reading, Milton’s *Mask at Ludlow Castle* appears obviously and overtly classical; the figures of Comus and Sabrina are clearly drawn from classical Greek myth. If one considers the allegorical character of the masque genre in general, however, and the historical fact that Milton wrote this piece specifically for a noble family of seventeenth-century Christian Wales, the classical mythological elements seem to give way to an implicit Christian meaning. Some critics maintain that the *Mask* has an underlying Platonic meaning, rather than a Christian one, and sound arguments can indeed be made for such an interpretation. Nevertheless, knowing the general character of Milton’s other writings, one must ask why this work would depart from his “poetic project” as a whole. In the context of Milton’s poetic devotion to Christianity and his views of his own literary vocation, his *Mask* seems to follow a course similar to that of his "Nativity Ode" and "Lycidas," both of which draw on classical pagan elements to emphasize (by contrast) Christianity. Aside from such "external" evidence, the "internal" evidence of the Mask itself suggests an implicit Christian meaning, which is most clearly revealed in the figure of Sabrina. Given a deceptively minor role, Sabrina is actually quite a pivotal character, becoming an allegorical figure for an instrument of Christian grace, specifically as granted through virginity. In order to explore further this idea, one must examine the incident of the Lady’s immobilization in Comus’s chair, the invocation of Sabrina, and the final words of the Attendant Spirit in the Epilogue.

The immobilization of the Lady in the enchanted chair of Comus has provoked numerous interpretations, and yet it remains somewhat of a mystery. The episode is an important one in relation to Sabrina, for it provides the reason for her invocation. What this reason is exactly is, of course, the mystery. At the beginning of Comus’s temptation of her, the Lady remarks, "Thou canst not touch the freedom of my mind"(663). It is curious (and problematic) that she apparently has this freedom during the temptation but is unable, herself, to "touch" this same freedom later, to mobilize herself, to escape the chair. Perhaps this point is precisely that which Milton is trying to make: human freedom is only powerful to a certain extent. The Lady’s freedom of mind is rooted in, as her brothers reveal, the virtue of chastity and her ability to exercise it: "a hidden strength,/Which, if heaven gave it, may be termed her own./ 'Tis chastity . . . . " (418-420). Apparently, though, this gift of chastity is insufficient to mobilize her. Here it is helpful to draw on the wisdom of A.S.P. Woodhouse; his Christian interpretation of the *Mask* distinguishes chastity from continence (or, temperance) and virginity. According to Woodhouse, continence, or temperance, belong to the "order of nature", being natural virtues, and virginity "belongs exclusively to the order of grace", which concerns the Christian idea of man’s supernatural character. Chastity falls into a sort of intermediate level between these two orders, which Woodhouse calls the two "orders of existence" in human life. The Lady’s virtue of chastity is founded in the natural virtues but is still somewhat incomplete, for it is not on the level of grace. It can be attained without the assistance of Christianity. Thus, there seems to be a hierarchy with virginity as a source of grace; this idea would seem to have a connection to the immobilization. The Lady needs the grace of the ultimate virtue, "the sage / And serious doctrine of Virginity"(785-786), which is not within the power of her own mind to grasp. As she herself suggests, a "sublime notion and high mystery/ . . . must be uttered" to grasp this virtue. The Christian mystery, which utters the grace, is symbolized in Sabrina.
An examination of the invocation of Sabrina will address this Christian interpretation, as well as address the counter, the philosophical, interpretation that rejects the latter. Sabrina is the supernatural power that frees the Lady, but one may ask if supernatural power is equivalent to grace. Accepting the argument Woodhouse makes, that virginity belongs to this order of grace, it seems only logical to see in Sabrina the function of that grace, for after all, she is a virgin goddess. The text makes this notion clear: "a virgin pure"(826) who "will be swift / To aid a virgin, such as was herself"(855-856). That the Lady does not yet have the grace that comes with this Christian virtue of virginity has been made clear by the immobilization. One of the opponents of this Christian interpretation is Sears Jayne, who states that the Mask is primarily about Platonic philosophy, thus equating Sabrina, not with grace, but with the natural power of the soul." However, the very invocation of Sabrina suggests otherwise. If, as Jayne asserts, Sabrina represents a part of the soul called the Mens which gives to the soul a memory of the divine, thus freeing it, why then must the goddess be invoked? Furthermore, why is it not the Lady who invokes her?

It is these questions that the philosophical argument fails to answer; it is these questions that point to grace. Something must be deficient in the Lady, for otherwise, it seems illogical that Sabrina exists as a separate external entity. In addition, it is the Attendant Spirit, not the Lady herself, who calls upon Sabrina "in warbled song / .. [with] the power of some adiring verse" (854-858). The Spirit acts as a mediator, so to speak, for the Lady-- grace-- is not given randomly. Perhaps the Spirit is an agent of divine Christian Providence, assisting in the administration of grace. Clearly, this is no natural power of the soul. Here the Platonic argument fails. Jayne's assertion also falters in that he suggests that the two brothers symbolize Philosophy: why then is "philosophy" not capable of freeing the Lady from the chair? Grace is vital. Further possible evidence of Sabrina's symbolizing grace may be implied in these lines: "I sprinkle on thy breast/ Drops ... from my fountain pure"(910-911). The reference to water as healing sounds almost baptismal; it could be compared to the grace bestowed at a Christian baptism. It seems clear that any other explanation of Sabrina's role is insufficient.

The final words of the Attendant Spirit, in the epilogue, seem to suggest as well that Sabrina functions in the role of grace. The epilogue, as Woodhouse argues, achieves the Mask's "exclusively religious level," which the Spirit's words exhibit. The first noteworthy line occurs within parentheses: "(list, mortals, if your ears be true)" (996). The parentheses seem to be significant, setting off the words as almost an aside, clearly made the audience (which initially was the seventeenth-century Christian nobility at Ludlow). They are words to signify that vital knowledge is to be imparted. If the audience's "ears be true," they will catch the implicit meaning. The final lines of the Spirit hearken back to this:

Mortals, that would follow me,  
Love Virtue; she alone is free  
She can teach ye how to climb,  
Higher than the sphery chime;  
Or, if Virtue feeble were,  
Heaven itself would stoop to her. (1018-1023)

This passage reveals "the level of grace alone." Heaven stoops to the Lady through the figure of Sabrina; human virtue, alone, is indeed "feeble." The lines imply, to careful ears, that something exists above and beyond "the sphery chime," which suggests the philosophic heavenly spheres. The reference to musical spheres is reminiscent of those stanzas (11-13) of Milton's "Nativity Ode," which suggests that the music of philosophic spheres supplement the music of God's angelic choirs. What exists beyond the spheres is grace, and ultimately God. Virtue, perhaps the natural virtue of chastity, can teach one how to reach this. But "teaching" is limited, and it may be that more is needed with which to endow virtue so that it may reach beyond the musical spheres. This "more" is grace. It clearly cannot be the case that, as Jayne suggests, this is "the soul's achievement, not God's." God's grace is necessary, and in this masque, it stoops to man in the figure of Sabrina.
Thus, Sabrina's role is much more pivotal than it may seem at first. The immobilization, the invocation, and the Spirit’s closing words indicate that grace is a necessary element in the Mask. This equation of Sabrina with grace substantially supports the Christian interpretation; the philosophic interpretation of this issue is simply insufficient. Milton wrote a classical masque, but his intentions seem Christian. Also, the placing of his contemporaries (the Egertons) within this classical context is obviously anachronistic, for the Egerton children retain their contemporary identities throughout the masque. Perhaps Milton is using this anachronism to draw attention to the disparity, and ultimately to suggest the Mask as a Christian allegory, one in which grace does indeed seem to be the “hidden strength” (418).

Works Cited


Poems by Lisa Marlene Strykowski

On Her Lover’s Decision to Enter the Priesthood

If we had but one more time united
Beneath the light of one fast-waning moon,
Might its image your desire have sated
As in my eyes, you glimpsed the sun’s bright noon?
If we had once more our arms entwined
Welding our two thin frames into one strength-
One created of two halves combined-
Might I have held you in my heart, at length?
Consummations devoutly to be wished
Twixt our souls alone again occurring,
In Love’s innocence all sin abolished,
Saints in holy ecstasies enduring...
Thus we might have been, had not the angels
So wrongly jealous of our pure Love been,
Nor ensnared you in Seraphic tangles,
Luring you from my Love to that within.
Alas! You are lost from my arms for’er,
And only a cold cross shall know those lips
Which once met mine in kisses never rare
In number, but in value as the drips
Of dew- the first upon the first white rose
In that first Garden on the first bright day...
But now that psalm-book of our Love must close:
We’ll only speak when before you I pray.
The Dark Lady's Lament

That time of the year thou mayst in me behold
When women soft of Spring do tease and play
And that enigma of my night and cold
Is offset by the laughing light of day,
Not change, but fixedness of winter fire
That shall not alter come a thousand Springs.
Apollo's nymphs dance endless to his lyre,
But oh! sad beauty when Philomel sings!
The love I bear burns as a high, cold star
That makes the very snow and ice catch flame.
And ev'ry pale, cold moonbeam is a scar
That pains with sweet remembrance of the name
Of her who soon away from you must go,
Permitting Spring to dissipate the snow.

On Man's Constancy

His appetite has changed a bit
-For constant men, 'tis rare-
And yet, he says he'll have no more
Of my once-craved fare,
And seeks he in the marketplace
Some random woman's ware.

He's choked with nourishment, he swears,
So much I did him feed,
That now he simply cannot eat
Another thing indeed.
(Yet, when he seeks some foreign dish, Astonishing his speed!)

Incredible how one young man
Can pack so much away,
Yet never show an outward sign
Of corpulent decay,
Remaining still handsome and hale
As once did Dorian grey.

Man's constancy is this: 'tis nought
But that which lasts an hour,
A shadow, breeze, or ray of sun
That has no staying pow'r.
When speaks he then sweet roses, think;
To death comes ev'ry flower.
Heidegger Helps Us Take A Romantic Seriously:

Heideggerian Hermeneutics Applied to Wordsworth's "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood"

Petra Weldes*

"The indefinability of Being does not dispense with the question of its meaning, but compels the question."
(Heidegger, "Introduction to Being and Time," 44)

Wordsworth's project, throughout his poetry and poetics, is to reveal the nature of "Being". His "worthy purpose," as he puts it in "The Preface to the Lyric Ballads" (125), is to instruct others in the way in which the human mind, through memory and imagination, reconnects with Being in a way that it becomes an actual presence in lived experience. The "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood" seems emblematic of Wordsworth's preoccupation with this question of Being, and thereby provides a significant entrance through which to explore his project. I will begin by discussing pertinent aspects of his poetics, and then explore his project through an analysis of the poem.

Tahir Jamil points out, in Transcendentalism in English Romantic Poetry, that Wordsworth's philosophical depth and value has been subject to continual debate, in which "the tendency seems to be to treat the philosophical attitude of [Wordsworth] either as secondary in importance or as a pose and 'superficiality'" (1). His philosophical and/or religious attitude is usually labeled as either "pantheist-mysticism" or "sensationalist-naturalism" (Alvis 15).

Yet, in "The Preface to the Lyric Ballads" (1850), Wordsworth asserts that poetry is "the most philosophical of all writings, ... whose object is truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative ... carried alive into the heart by passion" (139). It is this assertion in Wordsworth's poetics which I argue should be taken very seriously, indeed. I will link Heideggerian concepts with Wordsworthian poetics. Rather than focusing on narrative time [Zeit], as James Kee does in Narrative Time and Participating Consciousness; A Heideggerian Supplement to McGann's The Romantic Ideology, I will focus on Being [Sein].

Martin Heidegger claims in "The Origin of the of the Work of Art" that "[a]rt, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry" (199. italics added), and that "[p]oetry is the saying of the unconcealment of beings" through "language [which] is the house of Being" (Letter on Humanism 237). The "pleasure which [Wordsworth] hopes to give" ("Preface" 137) through language, through the rhyme and meter of poetry, is the vehicle which allows this concealment. The pleasure of poetry, its form and music, slips notions and images of "indefinable" Being between the vigilance of our analytic intellect, and carries them "alive into the heart of passion."

Even though Wordsworth repeatedly asserts that the language of good poetry "can in no respect differ from the language of good Prose" ("Preface" 135), he also asserts that "of two descriptions, either of passions, manners or characters, each of them equally executed, the one in prose and the other in verse, the verse will be read a hundred times where the prose is read once. ("Preface" 151) Thus, he concludes, "it is possible for poetry to give other enjoyments, of a purer, more lasting, and more exquisite nature" ("Preface" 157). These enjoyments are the experience of the mystery of Being as an actual lived reality.

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But these enjoyments are not to be mistaken for unauthentic language or unauthentic modes of being. Here we see Wordsworth's poetics converging with Heidegger's phenomenological emphasis on "everydayness." It is within the normal lived experience, in and against the natural world, that we uncover Being. Thus, Wordsworth dismisses "poetic diction" (an example of unauthentic language) as "a mechanical adoption of ... figures of speech... applied to feelings and thoughts with which they have no natural connection whatsoever" (Appendix to "Preface 1850," 160). We are to imaginatively turn to our recollections of childhood, as Wordsworth does in the "Ode," The Prelude, or "Tintern Abbey," and to the everyday experiences of "humble and rustic life... because in that condition of life our elementary feelings co-exist in a state of greater simplicity, and consequently may be more accurately contemplated, and more forcibly communicated" ('Preface' 125). There is nothing Arcadian or nostalgic in this view. It is a recognition of the complexities of the human condition, that we are "enjoying and suffering beings" ('Preface' 141) who are continually seeking to make sense of and relate to the complex and paradoxical life in which we find ourselves seeking, that is, to find the meaning of our Being.

The "Ode," itself, is seen as broken into two sections, with a subdivision in the second section, while criticism usually falls into two camps as to the meaning of the poem. I use this same structural approach, while offering a different analysis than generally provided. I propose that the first section of the "Ode," raises this question: Why has the "celestial light" of Being become dim? The second section offers a diagnoses of the loss of Being as the inevitable result of an individual's maturation, and the third suggests a prescription for recovering the light of Being as an actual lived experience, through the mature imagination.

One camp of critics, such as Fry, sees this poem as an "evening ode...about a poet no longer gifted with unmeditated vision" (59) who laments about the decline of his poetic gift and seeks consolation elsewhere. The first section of the "Ode," stanzas 1-4, poses the fundamental question: What has happened to the "celestial light?" It closes with the poignant lament: "Whither is fled the visionary gleam? / Where is it now, the glory and the dream?" (56-57). But I contend that Wordsworth is seeking to understand that ability to see, feel, and be one with the mystery of Being that is so indicative of childhood.

Wordsworth begins with the recollection of a time when "every common sight, / to [him] did seem! Apparelled in celestial light" (1-4). He goes on to define this "celestial light" as "the glory and the freshness of a dream" (5) that he equates with the experience of a perfect unity with nature. He describes this unity as "The fullness of your bliss, I feel-I feel it all" (40). "Your" refers to the creatures of nature, and "bliss" is a blissful state of unity in which everything is drenched in celestial light. This state is the mystery of Being revealed through the eyes of childhood which he so beautifully describes in "Tintern Abbey":

For nature then

..............................
To me was all in all.-I cannot paint
What then I was. The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their forms, were then to me
An appetite; a feeling and a love,
That had no need of a remoter charm,
By that thought supplied, nor any interest
Unborrowed from the eye. (72-83)

For a child, nature is "all in all". The child feels immersed in and undifferentiated from the "haunting passion" of the cataract. There is no need for intellectualization, which is the "remoter charm, / by thought supplies," between the child's "appetite, feeling and love" and the nature that calls it forth. This is a pure sensation and experience of oneness.
This is the Edenic Paradise in which the mystery of Being is a perfect unity - until it is broken. Perhaps, building on Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, it is broken by "a Tree, of many, one" (51), referring to the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. Despite his lament, Wordsworth seems to rest on the notion of a fortunate fall. As long as the child identifies totally with Being, living in that blissful, glorious union, beings can never show themselves as themselves, thus making it impossible for Being to be unconcealed. The child must mature into "Dasein," a being-there standing over and against Being, for only then can "Dasein" ask the right questions. Heidegger writes:

[B]eings themselves turn out to be what is interrogated in the question of Being. Beings, are, so to speak, interrogated with regard to their Being. But if they are to exhibit the characteristics of their Being without falsification they must for their part have become accessible in advance as they are in themselves. (Introduction 47)

Thus, it is the maturing of the self or other dichotomy which is necessary for beings to become accessible "as they are in themselves." However, as Kee writes, "when the context of the whole is forgotten - when, for example, immanence and transcendence become names for two worlds, or when human beings become subjects who stand primordially against an external, objectively given world" (59), the so-called subject/object split in the Western tradition begins.

Thus, at the end of section one, Wordsworth is asking the question Heidegger has postulated as the essence of "Dasein". The Dasein is the one being for whom the question of the meaning of Being is possible (Introduction 84). Throughout his poetry Wordsworth is attempting to inspire us to refocus on the natural, objective world, as infused and drenched with the mystery of the Being and thus to bridge the abyss between subject and object. Wordsworth has anticipated Heidegger’s argument that Being has been, since Plato, forgotten (Introduction 89).

Manning (1990), as an example of the second main camp of criticism, sees this as a poem about growing up and growing old, "sublimating childish ways" to mature, adult consolations (89). I assert, rather, that the second section, stanzas 5-8, provide a diagnoses of the forgetting, the loss, of Being.

Wordsworth begins by declaring that "our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting" (58), and in this he might easily be echoing the Platonic notion of anamnesis. But his claim seems stronger than a notion of recollection, when he asserts that "trailing clouds of glory do we come / From God, who is our home" (64-65). Humans, like all beings, come from Being, and in infancy and youth we "behold the light, and whence it flows" (69). However, as the child matures, Being is forgotten, and the celestial light fades. Wordsworth diagnoses this as the process of each individual becoming more earth-bound, more of a 'self' than an 'other.' This process is facilitated by the imagination being primarily used to look into, and create, the future. The child becomes an actor, "as if his whole vocation / Were endless imitation" (106-107). Trying on the roles of adulthood, the child learns to see and be in the world through these imitations. Wordsworth laments:

Thou little Child, ......................
Why with such earnest pains dost thou provoke
The years to bring the inevitable yoke.
........................
Full soon thy Soul will have earthly freight,
And custom lie upon thee with a weight,
Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life! (121-128)

1 It is appropriate to reflect on the Introduction to the "Ode," which Wordsworth added later. In it, Wordsworth suggests that the intimations of immortality and reincarnation are simply poetic devices. This seems to be entirely against the title of the "Ode" itself. In the same way, Wordsworth’s 1805 *Prelude* is more intriguing and audacious than his 1850 version; I believe the "Ode" should be read that way as well.
Heidegger calls this process "ensnaring":  

Dasein not only has the inclination to be ensnared in the world in which it is and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light; at the same time Dasein is also ensnared in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps. (65)

Thus, the child "imitates" the adult world, learns through the "wedding" and "funeral" the traditions of human existence, and takes on the "yoke" of an existence which is purely focussed on the experience as ensnared by the world. It is the weight of being-in-this-world that dims the celestial light and causes us to forget Being.

Wordsworth, then, is not a pantheist, despite the way his claims to be "Nature's priest" and the "chosen son" are usually read. He is a "pantheist," meaning that he understands Being to be both immanent and transcendent. Heidegger writes that "Being is the transcendence pure and simple" (85) and that "Being is the being of beings"(82). When a human being focuses exclusively on the object as object, and on life striving toward the future, both the object and the future are dead, and this "earthly freight," this ensnaring tradition, dims the light of Being. It is the ability to see the object as subject, by "endeavor[ing] at all times to look steadily at [the] subject" ("Preface" 133), that allows the mystery of Being to be revealed. Thus, Wordsworth's intense love and "worship" of nature, found in most of his poetry, is his celebration of the immanence of being, which thereby reveals its transcendence. We might, here, be reminded of the first part of Dante's Beatific Vision when:

In the depths, [he] saw contained, bound with love  
in one volume, what is scattered  
on leaves throughout the world. (Par. XXXIII:85-87)

Thus, we are brought to the final section of the "Ode," stanza's 9-11. It seems most often argued that the final stanzas offer a consolation over the loss of poetic strength or youthful vision. H.W. Garrod states that it is "an attempt to vindicate a life from which vision has fled ... actually worn out by over-use" (115;119). Geoffrey Durrant sees this poem as one that confirms that "a loss of joy [is] compensated for[by] asserting this world is beautiful" (121), whereas C.M. Bowra claims that Wordsworth "exchanged the consolation of Nature for the consolation of a more orthodox faith" (99). I agree, however, with Lionel Trilling, who, in the Liberal Imagination  

sees the final section of the "Ode" as a promise of new and heightened powers, rather than merely a consolation (126-127).

I argue that here Wordsworth offers a prescription for renewing the "glory and visionary gleam", the actual lived experience of the mystery of Being, through memory and imagination. There is "something that doth live, / that nature remembers" (130-131) within every person, but it is not the simple sweetness of childhood; rather, it is a memory of "obstinate questionings / Of sense and outward things, Failings from us, vanishings; ... / Moving about in worlds not realized" (141-145). These "high instincts" (146), according to Wordsworth:

Are yet to master light of all our seeing;  
Uphold us, cherish,and have power to make,  
Our noisy years seem moments in the being  
Of the eternal Silence; truths that wake,  
To perish never. (152-156)

Wordsworth claims that human beings are filled with a "master light" that illumines "truths that never perish." These truths make our lives "moments" of silent being. These moments might very well be "spots of time" (Prelude 11.257) in which we seem to enter an eternal and timeless place, which is, nevertheless, inhabitable with and shareable by others, through imagination. Heidegger states: "es gibt Sein ... it gives Being ... [this] self-giving into the open, along with the open region itself, is Being itself" (Letter 238). In these "spots of time," we live in the presence of Being, and we celebrate the unconcealment of Being.
Wordsworth goes on to claim that nothing "can utterly abolish or destroy" (160) these memories of truth, but that "our souls have sight if that immortal sea / which brought us hither, / Can in a moment travel thither" (163-165). But how? Wordsworth answers "in thought" (171). Thus, Wordsworth writes in the "Preface" that "poetry is the image of a man and nature" (1850, 148). Thought and imagination combine to look back upon memories and arrange them through the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger seems to argue for this same kind of process when he states that "Dasein has proven to be what, before all other beings, is ontologically the primary being to be interrogated" (Introduction 56). He goes on to say that "thinking that thinks into the truth of Being is, as thinking, historical" (Letter 239). Wordsworth expounds in the "Preface":

For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings; but through this be true...our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our thoughts, what are indeed representations of all our past feelings; and as by contemplating the relation of these general representations to each other, we discover what is really important. (126)

The imaginative act, "the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings...recollected in tranquility" ("Preface" 149), reveals, through this rearranging, the truth and light of Being brought forward, from memory, into the mature eyes of the present. We must find our way through the "earthly-freight" back to Being, using imagination as our tool and the memory of the "celestial light" as our guide. What we discover, through this "directed and modified" imaginative view of nature and our childhood memories, is that humans and nature operate according to the same laws, the truth of Being.

Wordsworth concludes in the "Preface" that "the poet, singing a song in which all human beings join with him [sic], rejoices in the presence of truth as our visible friend and hourly companion" (141). The "Ode" teaches the imagination how the vision of Being can be regained when the poet writes:

We will grieve not, rather find
Strength in what remains behind;
In the primal sympathy
Which having been, ever must be. (180-184)

Wordsworth’s prescription is not to "grieve" over the loss of the blissful unity of childhood, but to follow that memory as a beacon lighting the trail which we are to follow. What "remains behind" is the fact that we have become "Dasein," being-there, such that now, as beings aware of beings, we can ask the question of the meaning of Being. This "primal sympathy" is the reality that Being is the being of beings, and although it may be forgotten, it "ever must be." This mode of questioning and uncovering is what brings the "philosophic mind" (86) out of human suffering; / In the faith that looks through death" (84-85).

The "Ode" models Wordsworth’s understanding of the redemptive act of the mature imaginative memory. Once we are willing to see the many layers of perception through which we look at our world, that "primal sympathy," what Engel calls "the sympathetic power of imagination" (269), is still available to us, albeit in a new way. Thus, it is our original unity with Being that allows us to recapture the mystery of Being. By "relinquishing [the] habitual sway" (191) of nature, meaning and Edenic, blissful unity, we come to love nature, and therefore all life, "even more than when [we] tripped lightly as" (194) children, because now we come to love, reveal, and unconceal Being. Wordsworth sings in celebration of the "dignity and beauty" ("Preface" 129) of the human being as the place where meaning of Being is revealed:

Thanks to the human heart by which we live,
Thanks to the tenderness, its joys, and fears,
To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears. (200-4)
The "Ode" is a lament, an instruction, and a model for the imaginative act of melding memory with nature's instruction, such that the reality of the mystery of Being is re-established as a lived experience. "[T]he Poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the Being thus produced, as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man" ("Preface" 141). Wordsworth reminds us of the forgottenness of Being by asking the question which only Dasein can ask, and answering it in the language of the creative imagination, which any human being can speak. The Poet, with his comprehensive soul, is "nothing different in kind from other men [sic], but only in degree" ("Preface" 150). Thus, Wordsworth, through his poetry and his poetics, encourages all people to become poets, to speak Being into being and recapture the mystery as an authentic, lived experience:

... we have traced the stream
From darkness, and the very place of birth
In its blind cavern, whence is faintly heard
The sound of waters; followed it to light
And open day, accompanied its course
Among the ways of Nature; afterwards
Lost sight of it bewildered and engulfed,
Then given it greeting as it rose once more
With strength, reflecting in its solemn breast
The works of men, and face of human life;
And lastly, from its progress have we drawn
The feeling of life endless, the one thought
By which we live, infinity and God. (Prelude 13: 174-184)

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Abigail realized with a start that the voices she heard were not part of her dream. There were actual people downstairs. She slung her hand across the bed and felt that the other side was empty but still warm. Her mother must be talking to... Was that a man's voice? Abby jumped down from the bed, and for a split second inwardly rejoiced because her father had come home again, but then with a force so powerful that she had to catch her breath, she remembered that her father would never come back, and that this war that killed him might never end.

Abby quickly shook herself out of her dreamy daze, and scampered across the room, shoved her arms into her robe, and eased into the hallway.

When she reached the banister, she peered through its slits down into the dimly lit foyer. Her mother stood in the doorway, her back was to Abby, and she was talking to a tall, distinguished man on the porch. Suddenly, the man shifted to his left, and Abby caught a fleeting glimpse of his uniform. With a gasp, she leaned back against the wall, hidden in the shadows, and covered her mouth with her hand to keep from crying out aloud. The man on her porch was a Yankee.

... get through the night

"Abigail, you listen to me, ya hear? That man and his regiment are gonna use our barn tonight whether we like it or not. So we might as well just grit our teeth and get through the night, you hear me?"

Abby just stared sullenly at her mother. Her mother gripped Abby’s slight shoulders sternly. Betsy inwardly winced at the thinness of her daughter, once again reminded of the shortages brought on by the war. If
Tom were only here to help her through this... But he wasn’t and she was the only one left to deal with this problem, and so no matter how difficult it was going to be, she had to put up a strong front for her daughter, and anyone else that might be watching.

"Abigail, listen to me! That man has promised not to hurt us. He gave me his word of honor, and right now we’ve no choice but to believe him, ya hear? So now get yourself up into your room, and try to get at least a little sleep, alright?" With a slight push, Betsey propelled her daughter toward the bedroom.

Abby whirled around and faced her mother.

"That man killed my father. Mamma, don’t you see, he killed him."

"Abigail Creighton, I don’t ever want to hear you say that again," Betsey exclaimed. With a heavy sigh, she motioned once more toward the bedroom. "You’re just tired, sweetie," she said weakly, "now go on, get in bed, things won’t seem this bad tomorrow." She realized as she said the words that she was silently praying that what she had just spoken was true.

The First Meeting

Soft and lazy sunlight poured through Abby’s window, and she rolled onto her side, wishing for a few extra minutes of sleep. She was still so tired after last night. Last night. Did it really happen? Was it just another confusing and complicated dream, or did Yankee soldiers really sleep in her barn, not a hundred yards away from where she now rested? For that matter, they could still be there.

Quickly, she put on her work dress, ran a brush through her thick hair, splashed some cold water on her face, and slid down the staircase. She maneuvered her way around the kitchen, successfully avoiding her mother, and crept out the back door.

Her heart skipped a beat as she turned the corner of the house and faced the barn. She took a deep breath, and hoped that her father would be proud of her. She would defend this little bit of land the same way her father had defended his state and country. Deep down, though, she hoped she wouldn’t have to die for her land. With an intense frown, she scolded herself for her selfishness.

The barn loomed ahead, and for the first time in a while, Abby viewed it with different eyes. It used to be one of the grandest barns in the county, but now all the paint was peeling or faded, and the shutters hung limp. She was embarrassed at the sight. Her father would be so upset if he could see it now. He had constantly worked so hard to keep things looking good. He had always told her, "Just because we aren’t the richest people in the world, Abby, doesn’t mean we can’t have high standards." His words echoed through her mind and soul, and she started to turn and run back to the safety of the house.

Suddenly, the thundering of horses stopped her dead in her tracks. A dozen Yankee soldiers on horse-back rode by, passing her small figure with a curse and a cloud of dust. They were far down the road in a dusty haze as quickly as they had come, and Abby stood trembling and pale.

"I’m terribly sorry about that, Miss. We didn’t realize anyone would be standing in the middle of the yard this early in the morning."

Abby whirled around to see who had spoken, and before her stood the tall man she had seen in the doorway the night before. Without warning, she turned on her heels, and ran toward the barn.
The misty heat of the animal's breath comforted her as she slid the milk pail off its hook and kicked the three-legged stool under Tarah's udder. She knew the soldier would follow her in here, and she desperately wanted to appear calm and collected when he came.

What a fool she had been, Abby mentally chided herself. She was twelve years old, and fully capable of carrying on a decent conversation, even if it was with a Yankee. She had acted like a complete baby, running away like that. The shame of her actions stung her, and her cheeks burned with the thoughts.

What were they doing here, anyway, and why had all the regiment left except that soldier? Were they coming back for him, and if so, how long would he be here? Abigail prayed for all the soldiers to leave soon, and
she must have been praying with such force that she hurt Tarah, because suddenly her back hoof shot through the
distance and knocked Abby off the stool.

"We seem to meet in rather awkward circumstances, Miss...?" he paused, waiting for Abby to enter the
correct information into his silence.

Instead, she jumped to her feet with as much grace as she could muster, and brushed the bits of hay from
her apron. The silence hung heavy on the air, and Abby knew that her face would be flushed with embarrassment.
"Well, it looks as if you have yourself quite a job here. This is a pretty big farm for two people. Farming is a
lot of work, even during times of peace. Yes, you sure have a lot of work to do around here," he paused, "I'm sorry, miss, I don't believe that we've been properly introduced. My name is Colonel Tate, Samuel Tate. And I don't believe I caught your name."
"That would be because I haven't told you yet." Abby blurted. She hadn't meant to speak a single word
to this soldier, this Colonel, but suddenly she was smarting off to him. Oh, her mother would kill her if she ever
found out about this.

A low chuckle reached her from across the room.
"No, I guess you haven't yet, now have you. But this conversation is going to be much more difficult if
you don't tell me. I mean, it is a little less personable to carry on a conversation with someone and you don't even
know their first name, don't you agree?"

From the corner of her eye, she saw him lean against the wall of the barn beside the open door.
"Abby, " she said, without looking up from the flowing stream of milk as it squirted the sides of the pail.
"Well, Abby, now that we are on a first-name basis with each other, is there anything I can help you with?
I have what appears to be free time on my hands right now, and I'm really not that bad of a farm hand."

Abby's grip went rigid. How dare this man offer to help her. Didn't he realize that if it weren't for the war her
father would still be here and they would not need anyone's help?

How dare he ask that question. How dare he. How dare he. The words echoed through her brain and tears
swam in her eyes.
"Miss," he said, "is there any--"
Abby turned on the stool, almost knocking the bucket of milk over with her foot.
"I don't need your help," she said in a low voice. She prayed that he did not notice the tears glistening
in her eyes.
"We don't need your help," she said again. In one swift motion, she stood up, grabbed the milk pail, and
brushed past him toward the house.

"Mamma! Mamma!"

"Mamma, that man, he's in the barn, and he won't leave me alone. Mamma! Mamma!" Abby pushed
through the doorway, sloshing milk onto the floor, and frantically looked through the kitchen for her mother.

Betsey stepped around the corner, her arms loaded with jars of honey and other cans of fruit.
"What are you saying?" she looked at the panic written into her daughter's face. "Abigail, what is it? What
happened?"

"Oh, mamma, the soldier, the Colonel. He's in the barn, and he was talking to me."

"Yes, and what was he saying?" Betsey watched her daughter closely. "Abigail, calm down and tell me
what this soldier said."

"Mamma, he... he asked to help me with the chores."

Betsey waited for the remainder of the story. Abby stood there, looking at the milk splashed across the
table. Slowly, she raised her eyes to meet her mother's.
"Is that all?" Betsey asked.
Abby nodded.
"You mean to tell me that you came running in here like he was chasing you all over this farm, and all
he did was to see if he could *help* you?*

Abby nodded again, then lowered her eyes to the table once more.

"Abigail, he is not going to hurt you. He is here because a member of his regiment is injured very badly, and he is waiting until help comes for this soldier. He is not going to hurt you, ya hear me?"

Abby looked blankly at her mother.

"But don't you see, mamma, he already has."
Laundry Day

The mid-day sun beat heavily upon them as they knelt over the tub of laundry. Abby fought the stiff handle of the wringer while her mother pushed the clothes across the washing board. Neither spoke, but the silence was not uncomfortable in the heavy atmosphere.

In the distance, the sound of horse hooves trotting along the dusty road reached them. Betsey stopped working and wiped her chapped hands on her apron. It was the Colonel.

"Afternoon, ma'am," he nodded in Abby's direction, "You too, miss."

Abby stared straight at the clothes wringer, not batting an eyelash.

The Colonel directed his next statement to Betsey.

"I'm going to run into the town. I need to check on any word about the doctor. I would be much obliged if you would kindly look in on the soldier for me. He was resting well enough when I stepped out, but I'm not sure how long I will be detained."

His eyes searched Betsey's face for a reaction.

"Of course," she said, "He'll be just fine, I'm sure."

A slight shadow crossed over the Colonel's face, but it disappeared as quickly as it had come.

"Thank you once again. Is there anything I can pick up for you while I'm there?" Betsey shook her head.

"Alright, then, I'll return just as soon as possible."

Abby turned in time to see him touch the brim of his hat, nod his head, and urge his horse down the road.

The dust quickly enveloped his straight and staunch figure.

Both figures quickly bent down to their work again, and the silence was not nearly as comfortable now as it had been earlier. Betsey was the first to break the stillness.

"Abby, don't hold a grudge against that man. He means well, and he is doing the same thing hundreds of other men are doing right now. He just happens to be on the other side. Do you understand what I'm sayin'?"

"No, Mamma, I guess I just don't."

Life with the Enemy

The days flowed by in a slow, blurry pattern. Abby grew more accustomed to the presence of the Colonel at the farm, but she still prided herself on her intolerance of his presence. "Papa would want me to hate him," she thought to herself, grasping to that small shred of loyalty to his memory.

Colonel Tate was still here because the injured soldier was not any better. A doctor had come after he returned from the town that day, but no one knew what was happening with him. Abby didn't understand why the Colonel wouldn't just take him on to the army hospital; it couldn't be that far since the Yankees were always so close now, but he didn't, and for Abby, each morning brought the knowledge that one more day would be spent in awkward existence with the enemy.

Abby was never allowed in the room with the injured soldier, although her mother had slowly taken over the daily care for him, and the Colonel stayed with him at night. The Colonel had also eased a little of the work load for Abby, although she didn't ask him to. But, even so, it was nice to have a little more time each day just to herself. She loved to sit by the corral and watch the Colonel's roan graze and exercise. He had the most beautiful horse she had ever seen, even if it was technically a Yankee horse.

Then, suddenly, the uneasy calm was disrupted.

"Things don't always work out."

"Mamma, what's the Colonel doin'?"

Betsey stood at the basin in the kitchen, scrubbing her hands harshly. She spoke without looking up from her activity.

"He's buildin' a coffin."

Abby stared out the window, stunned. Empty, hollow noise filled the air as the sound of nails driven into
thick wood rose on the summer day.

"Wha-, who? The soldier? The one he was waiting to get well? But he said he would live. Mamma, I don’t understand. He was gonna get well."

"Things don’t always work out like they are ‘spose to, Abigail," Betsey snapped. Abby looked surprised, then hurt. Betsey’s shoulders sagged.

"He was never gonna get well. I could tell that the minute I set my eyes on him. His injuries were so bad. But the Colonel, he just knew he was gonna live. I almost started to believe it myself.” Betsey glanced out the window toward the barn. When she realized Abby was still standing at the door, she looked surprised.

She forgot I was here, Abby thought.

The even, rhythmic sounds continued to drift from the barn, and Abby dejectedly walked toward the corral. Dusk was approaching, and the evenings were beginning to have a chill to them.

Abby leaned on the fence and gazed at the docile horse as she ate her evening dinner. Abby’s thoughts swirled around her, encompassing her in an haze of confusion and melancholy.

"Beautiful, isn’t she?” The Colonel stood next to her on the fence.

Abby had been so absorbed in her thoughts that she had not heard him approach the corral. She said nothing, just stood staring out at the sunset.

The Colonel was not affected by her silence.

"The way I see it,” he continued, "this puts us on some sense of common ground."

"What do you mean?” Abby asked.

"Well, when someone you loved dies, that gives you a small bit of something that you can share with others that have lost someone they loved also."

Abby turned to look at him, straight in the eyes, for the first time since he had galloped into her life.

The Colonel was touched by the intensity of her questioning gaze, and so he continued, "That man wasn’t just another Yankee soldier, Abby, that man was my brother."

Abby’s astonishment could not have greater.

"He was you brother?” she asked softly.

"Yes."

"But. . . but how can you stand there and tell me about this? I was his enemy. He died fighting the side that I. . . You should hate me. You should hate all Southerners, we killed your brother!” The horror of her realization struck her with such force that her breath caught in her throat.

The Colonel gripped her shoulders tightly, forcing her to gain control of her emotions. In a slow, even voice, he said, "But Abby, you didn’t kill my brother any more than I killed your father. The war killed them. And while people caused the war, people can also work together to end this terrible conflict."

Abby turned back toward the corral. The sun slid toward the edge of the horizon, with a splash of brilliant color. As she stood watching the spectacular display, she realized that she did not have to hate Colonel Tate. In fact, she did not even want to.

Morning

The next morning, Abby sat at Betsey’s feet, snapping the last of the summer peas to be stored for winter. Each sat in contented silence, wrapped in her own thoughts.

Suddenly, the sound of a horse’s hooves on the hardened ground approached, and Colonel Tate appeared, bedecked in full uniform atop his roan.

Abby silently gazed at the Colonel, seeing for the first time the tattered uniform, the worn brim of his hat, and the dull the shine of his boots.

Abruptly, the Colonel raised his hand in a slight salute to the brim of his hat then turned toward the road. The dusty haze enveloped him. He traveled away with the image of mother and daughter forever imprinted upon his memory.
William A. Edwards

*Paradise Lost* is a poem that can be read as the history of a marriage. Milton traces the relationship between Adam and Eve from God’s creation of a helpmate for Adam through the pure conversation of their married life, to the point of rupture induced by disobedience. This results in the mutual torment of their fallen marriage, but also makes possible reconciliation through divine grace and allows Eve to prove her fitness for Adam. If she has been the instrument of his Fall, she is also the "help" for his fallen state. God’s institution of matrimony foresaw the full implication of the term “help for him” (Halkett 99). When Adam asks God for “fellowship... fit to participate? All rational delight” (8.389-391), he explains his need for an equal partner, not being satisfied with the companionship of man with beast:

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Among unequals what society  
Can sort, what harmony or true delight? 
Which must be mutual, in proportion due  
Giv’n and receiv’d. (8.383-386)
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This relationship, it turns out, will not provide equality in the sense of sameness. However, even though Adam and Eve have different talents and their sex is “not equal” (4.296), they do complete one another harmoniously. Adam’s wrestling with the problem of Eve’s “inferiority” and his own admiration for her is a problem for Adam even before the Fall. Milton chooses to emphasize the delight and de-emphasize the “inferiority”: “Not equal, as their sex not equal seem’d;... Hee for God only, shee for God in him” (4.296, 299). The moment when Adam and Eve are introduced as “Lords of all,” is such a difficulty for Allen Chambers, that he suggests Adam’s angry denunciation of Eve after the Fall is a “fair defect / Of Nature” to be Milton’s own opinion of her from the start (Chambers 88). Considering the biblical account of creation, we may ascend the steps to understanding of what was really a revolutionary idea: that Eve was made not just for Adam, but for “God in him” (4.299).

Milton held with passionate conviction that the Bible was a record of divinely inspired truth, and that it was the Christian’s duty to interpret and follow, not to contradict or ignore: “What in me is dark / Illumine, what is low raise and support: / That to the hight of this great Argument / I may assert Eternal Providence, / And justify the ways of God to men” (1.22-26). Milton utilizes the windows of opportunity presented to him through the general accounts of the creation and fall of Adam and Eve, to present his personal interpretation of the relationship between men and women. Milton was compelled to work with, and around, previous interpretations of the Bible in his treatment of *Paradise Lost* (Ferry 113).

Considering the account in Genesis, the opening three chapters narrate several events to be taken into account in Milton’s presentation of Eve. She was not only created after Adam, but was made for him, because God said: “It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him an help meet for him” (Genesis 2:18). Again, Eve was made for Adam: “And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man” (Genesis 2:21-2). From this origin, the bond of marriage was established:

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... She shall be called woman,  
because she was taken out of Man.  
Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother,  
and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh. (Genesis 2:23-4)
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Milton assumes this order of events and incorporates them into his poem. His presentation of the creation is also dictated by the fact that this history, recounted in Genesis, was interpreted in the epistles of St. Peter and St. Paul. "To Puritans, the Apostle to the Gentiles provided the crucial model of a Christian reading of the letter of the Old Testament in the light of the spirit" (Lim 117). For this reason, the Apostle's sayings were included in many writings about marriage and were quoted in the English service during matrimonial oaths:

... saith unto them that are married: Yee husbands,
dwell with your wives according to knowledge,
giving honour unto the wife, as unto the weaker vessell. (Lim 118)

Next in the wedding service, St. Paul's words are called to the attention of women:

Yee women, submit you selves unto your owne husbands,
as unto the Lord: For the husband is the wives head,
even as Christ is the head of the Church. (Lim 118)

The events in Genesis are the necessary materials for Milton's story: these texts from the New Testament are their most authoritative interpretation. Consequently, Milton poetically utilizes the facts of Eve's creation to define her place as distinct from Adam's in the opening description of Adam and Eve:

Two of far nobler shape erect and tall,
Godlike erect, with native Honor clad
In naked Majesty seem'd Lords of all,

Not equal, as their sex not equal seem'd:
For contemplation hee and valor form'd,
For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace,
Hee for God only, shee for God in him:

As the Vine curls her tendrils, which impli'd
Subjection, but requir'd with gentle sway,
And by her yielded, by him best receiv'd,
Yielded with coy submission, modest pride. (4.288-310)

Although Milton's details above echo the New Testament interpretation of the Genesis account, there are clearly modifications which foreshadow his more radical treatment of Biblical materials.

Working as a skilled artisan and not a theologian, Milton begins by painting Adam and Eve on equal terms. Both display "The image of their glorious Maker," whereas St. Paul says that the man "is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man" (I Cor 11:7). Milton dims the distinction between the two further: "Hee for God only, shee for God in him" (4.299). This rewording brings Eve closer to the divine creator than the Biblical account openly expresses. Again, Milton adjusts the effects of St. Paul's words: "Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands" (Eph 5:22). In comparison, Milton says that Eve's vine-like ringlets "impli'd / Subjection, but requir'd with gentle sway, / And by her yielded, by him best received" (4.307-309). Eve's subjection bears with it the implicit requirement of gentleness from Adam (Sammons 120). The balance of the phrase in "by her yielded, by him best received" also suggests an exchange, wherein Eve is granted a choice. According to Milton, this type of mutual exchange can only occur between coequal partners: "Among unequals what society / Can sort, what harmony or true Delight?" (8.383-384).
In fact, Milton's Eve is first introduced as a regal figure, sharing with Adam in "Majesty," signifying their joint positions as "Lords of all." With the purpose of de-emphasizing her inferiority, Milton reinforces his concept of marriage as cheerful conversation. Milton uses the occasion of naming the animals to allow Adam an opportunity to express what sort of mate he seeks and what he expects of marriage: "Of fellowship I speak / Such as I seek, fit to participate? All rational delight, wherein the brute / Cannot be human consort" (8.389-392). Adam desires "conversation with his like to help, / Or solace [for] his defects" (8.418-419). God not only gives divine approval by concurring with Adam's assessment of his need, but reveals that it was His intention all along to create a mate for Adam:

... I, ere thou spak'st,
Knew it not good for Man to be alone,
And no such company as then thou saw'st
Intended thee, for trial only brought,
To see how thou couldst judge of fit and meet:
What next I bring shall please thee, be assur'd,
Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self,
Thy wish, exactly to thy heart's desire. (8.444-51)

Milton firmly places the initiative on God as the planner of equal marriage.

Here again, Milton reshapes, or works around, the New Testament, which provides the primary seventeenth-century interpretation of Eve's place in Genesis. Milton uses the naming of the creatures and the making of Eve to put into the mouths of God and Adam a view of woman different from the Apostles (Lim 130). Eve's place is elevated from a position of simple procreation or sanctification of fleshly desire, to a position of completion which results from mutual conversation.

The power of influence which Eve possesses upon Adam's ability to reason is evident in the following interchange he has with Raphael:

... here passion first I felt,
Commotion strange, in all enjoyments else
Superior and unmov'd, here only weak
Against the charm of Beauty's powerful glance.
Or Nature fail'd in mee, and left some part
Not proof enough such Object to sustain,
Or from my side subducting, took perhaps
More than enough: at least on her bestow'd
Too much of Ornament, in outward show
Elaborate, of inward less exact.
For well I understand in the prime end
Of Nature her th'inferior, in the mind
And inward Faculties, which most excel. (8.530-542)

Up to this point, Adam's opinion is unanimous with St. Paul's admonition, but he goes on to admit the turmoil he feels for Eve:

... yet when I approach
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems
And in herself complete, so well to know
Her own, that what she wills to do or say,
Seems wisest, virtuœst, discreetest, best;
All higher knowledge in her presence falls
Degraded, Wisdom in discourse with her
Loses discount'nanct, and like folly shows;
Authority andReason on her wait. (8.546-554)

Milton tries to point out that Adam struggles with his assessment of Eve’s submissive position. He should not admire her “As one intended first, not after made,” because that view contradicts the history recounted in Genesis.

There is a strange stiffness when the listening Angel rebukes Adam for allowing his passion to cloud his reason. Raphael preaches the New Testament view of woman’s relationship to man:

Accuse not Nature, she hath done her part;
Do thou but thine, and be not diffident
Of Wisdom, she deserts thee not, if thou
Dismiss not her, when most thou need’st her nigh,
By attributing overmuch to things
Less excellent, as thou thyself perceiv’st. (8.561-566)

If the dialogue between Adam and Raphael were to cease here, it would simply confirm the traditional thought. Adam’s open airing of his true feelings foreshadows his fall, which is based on the subjection of his reason to passion (Reichert 95). Raphael then follows with a timely reminder of Eve’s place by recalling Biblical events.

Yet, Milton does not end the intercourse here. Adam replies to the Angel, not with an apology or excuse, but with a startling correction of the Angel’s view of human marriage:

From all her words and actions, mixt with Love
And sweet compliance, which declare unfeign’d
Union of Mind, or in us both one Soul;
Harmony to beyond in wedded pair
More grateful than harmonious sound to the ear.
Yet these subject not; I to thee disclose
What inward thence I feel not therefore foil’d,
Who meet with various objects, from the sense
Variously representing; yet still free. (8.602-610)

Adam’s reply is a lesson in marriage. Adam rephrases his feelings for Eve to make clear that they “subject not.” What he wants the Angel to understand is that his marriage is a “Union of Mind, or in us both one Soul” (Reichert 97). The conversation which Milton refers to is an instrument of harmony by which Adam and Eve together reflect the completeness of the Image of God: “Thou in thyself art perfect, and in thee is no deficiency found; not so is Man, / But in degree, the cause of his desire / By conversation with his like to help” (8.416-418). This adjustment allows Milton to present his own ideal of marriage as the pinnacle of human experience; its near destruction is an image of human damnation.

Ferry emphasizes, at the point of the fall, that Milton’s balanced presentation of Adam and Eve is surprisingly disrupted (127). According to the episode in the third chapter of Genesis, when God questions the guilty pair after having eaten of the apple, emphasis is placed on both human replies: Adam blames Eve, and Eve blames the serpent. In Milton’s version of the episode, when God asks Adam whether he has eaten the forbidden fruit, Adam responds with a long speech accusing both God and Eve: “To whom thus Adam sore beset repli’d . . . ” (10.124). In contrast with Adam’s self-exonerating speech, the description of Eve is truly repentant: “To whom sad Eve with shame nigh overwhelm’d, / Confessing soon, yet not before her Judge / Bold or loquacious, thus abasht repli’d: / The Serpent me beguil’d and I did eate.” (10.159-62). Milton’s view is clearly not so balanced
as the Genesis account. He exaggerates Adam's devious excuses to the point of ridiculing him, while he elevates Eve's accusation of the serpent to a form of truly penitent confession. The unbalanced judgment and sympathy might be explained by the perspective that Adam's sin was more serious, because man was created the guide and head of woman.

However, Milton continues to present Eve as Adam's spiritual superior in his treatment of the reconciliation between the fallen pair. In the later part of Paradise Lost, Adam delivers a long and bitter complaint for his lost innocence, which is overheard by Eve. He goes on, railing absurdly about the misery inevitably brought to man in marriage. In response, Eve confesses to have sinned more gravely than Adam. "Finally she offers to sacrifice herself for Adam in words which directly reverse Adam's earlier excuse for blaming Eve to God" (Ferry 128):

And to the place of judgment will return,  
There with my cries importune Heaven, that all  
The sentence from thy head remov'd may light  
on me, sole cause to thee of all this woe,  
Mee onely just object of his ire. (10.932-936)

These words powerfully echo Christ's sacrificial offering. Milton's sympathetic attitudes grow strongest at the point in the story most appropriate for a severe judgment (Ferry 124).

Milton steadily suggests that the relation of Eve to Adam, though human and subject to change, is potentially and increasingly the image of the Son's relation to the Father within the Godhead. For both Eve and the Son, obedience is a response to goodness. When the Son rides forth to banish the rebel angels, "Heav'n his wonted face renew'd, / And with fresh Flow'rets Hill and Valley smil'd" (6.781-784). When Eve goes forth "among her Fruits and Flours," which the Son has created, "they at her coming sprung / And toucht by her fair tendance gladier grew" (8.44-47). Twice in addressing Eve, once at the beginning and once at the end of their un-fallen life, Adam calls her "Daughter of God and Man, accomplisht Eve" (4.660) and "Daughter of God and Man, immortal Eve" (9.291). In one way, the designation is a gentle reminder of her subordination; he is a creature of God only, she of God and him. In another and more important way, however, it is a bold comparison. It echoes the names "son of God" and "Son of Man," which are the names of the incarnate Christ.

The crucial act that defines the purpose and process of Eve's submissive love, is the Son's voluntary offering of Himself in propitiation for man's foreseen demise. That His sacrifice is voluntary is indicated by the dramatic moment when God the Father asks, "Where shall we find such love?" (3.212-213), and then waits while "all the Heavn'ly Quire [stand] mute, / And silence [is] in Heav'n" (3.217-218). Mankind might have been lost at this point. Yet, not from necessity but from love, the Son replies: "Account me man; I for his sake will leave / Thy bosom, and his glorie next to thee / Freely put off, and for him lastly die" (3.238-340). The Son's personal offering is made in trust that only good can come of obeying God. He "attends the willi Of his great Father" (3.270-371) and is, in return, exalted through His humility and, with Him, those he descends to save:

Nor shalt thou by descending to assume  
Mans Nature, less'n or degrade thine owne.  
.................................................................  
. . . because in thee  
Love hath abounded more than Glory abounds,  
Therefore thy Humiliation shall exalt  
With thee thy Manhood also to this Throne. (3.303-304, 311-314)

Likewise, Eve's subordination is not demeaning, but a means of promotion by obedience. After she awakens from a dream, Eve volunteers her allegiance to Adam. The renewal of her loving submission is Eve's response to a divine revelation that she is to be an indispensable part of the salvation process; she will bear the "Prome'sd Seed":

30
Wearied I fell asleep: but now lead on;
In mee is no delay; with thee to go,
Is to stay here; without thee here to stay,
Is to go hence unwilling; thou to mee
Art all things under Heav’n, all places thou,
Who for my wilful crime art banisht hence.
This further consolation yet secure
I carry hence; though all by mee is lost,
Such favor I unworthy am voutsaf’t,
By mee the Promis’d Seed shall all restore. (12.614-623)

Eve’s unreserved submission to Adam is her expression of obedience to God which results in the reconciliation of Adam’s progeny. Her obedience is not composed of following a set of instructions, but is rather a response to the divine will, made in her own unique way. The truth that Milton sets forth is that such loving obedience as exemplified in the Son and observed in Eve, empowers, frees, ennobles, and opens the way to opportunity: “To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess / A paradise within thee, happier far” (12.586-87). For Milton, the perfection of the soul is not static, but a process.

In Paradise Lost, all things are moving toward perfection: “Thou in thyself art perfect, and in thee I no deficiencie found; not so is Man, / But in degree, the cause of his desire / By conversation with his like to help” (8.416-418). Eve proves to be the catalyst by which spiritual perfection through conversation is achieved. Adam and Eve’s spiritual perfection is pursued within a divinely inspired system of authority and subordination, but in it, the “higher” serves the “lower.” Just as Raphael is sent to teach Adam, and the Son voluntarily offers Himself in service to the reconciliation of Man, Eve willingly and lovingly submits to the guidance of Adam. By emphasizing the importance of servitude and de-emphasizing the “inferiority” which results from physical distinctions manifest in creation, Milton skillfully illuminates Eve’s position as indispensable in the salvation process while staunchly maintaining Biblical accuracy. One of the innovations of Milton’s poetic world is that Adam can be preeminent without Eve’s subjection. Neither one depends for promotion on the demotion of the other. Milton’s creation of meet help for Adam was, despite its biblical adherence to the subjection of wives, a step in the liberalization of attitudes toward women because it increased their responsibilities as promoters of godly living. Milton successfully demonstrates that matrimonial conversation is the divinely ordained instrument of harmony by which Adam and Eve together reflect the completeness of the Image of God: “Union of Mind . . . both one Soul.”

Works Cited


Mary and the Church: 
Matthew and the Church

Angela Franz

"The Mother of Jesus in the glory which she possesses in body and soul in heaven is the image and beginning of the Church as it is to be perfected in the world to come."

(Lumen Gentium 68)

The Second Vatican Council included an article on Mary in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium, instead of writing a separate document on Mary. This move puzzled many, who wondered what the Blessed Virgin had to do with ecclesiology. Yet this very bewilderment indicates the problem that the Council Fathers were trying to combat: namely, the theological neglect of Mary's role as the image and beginning of the Church.

The connection between Our Lady and the Church was the foremost Marian theme for the Church Fathers, yet this theme was largely undeveloped after the Reformation, when theologians were more concerned with an apologetic stance regarding Mary's privileges as opposed to a deepening theological reflection on her relation to the Church. The Second Vatican Council, however, renewed interest in this aspect of Mary's role in the Church. A few decades earlier, the renewal of the study of the Church Fathers revived the investigation of the role of Mary as the Church's model (since patristic Mariology was primarily ecclesiastical in focus) and provided the theological background necessary for the work done by the Council.

This paper will explore the relation between Mary and the Church in light of Lumen Gentium, in the hope of regaining a sense of Our Lady's role in guiding her sons and daughters towards their final goal of union with God.

Mary's Relation to the Church: Grace and Faith

In the Introduction to the section on the Blessed Virgin, the Council notes that Mary is "hailed as pre-eminent and as a wholly unique member of the Church, and as its type and outstanding model in faith and charity" (LG 53). She is not above the Church, therefore, but part of it, a member of the Mystical Body of Christ, although holding a pre-eminent place. In this respect, she is a model follower of Christ, a Christian to whom all can look in their struggles to live the Christian life. But is she not the Immaculate Conception? How can the rest of humanity not so blessed at their connection find Mary a model in faith?

The answer is found in Mary's total dependence on grace. The encyclical Redemptoris Mater by Pope John Paul II highlights the role played by grace when it notes that the angel's greeting at the Annunciation reveals Mary's identity as "full of grace" (RM 8). Our Lady's dignity does not depend on anything other than the freely-bestowed grace of God, given in foreknowledge of the Resurrection. In this sense, all Christians can find her example one that is not so distant from their everyday lives, in that all people are called to live with total abandonment to divine grace. Mary's words in the Magnificat reveal her awareness of her complete dependence on God: "... for he who is mighty has done great things for me, and holy is his name" (Luke 1:49). All the greatness in Mary's life is a result of the mighty Lord's grace. Mary is a type of the Church, then, in that the latter is called also to be completely filled with grace and to recognize in this dependence the gift of God.
Mary is also our model in faith and in the charity that flows from faith. John Paul II states that her faith is "the essential Mariological truth . . . she has become really present in the mystery of Christ precisely because she 'has believed'" (RM 12). From her entrance into salvation history in the Annunciation, to her own passion under the cross, and finally to her participation of the Church's beginning at Pentecost, Mary never ceased to have complete faith in God, even when God's will was unfathomable or hidden, as in the losing and finding of the twelve-year-old Jesus in the Temple.

The Church has its model in Mary's faith, and it shares her faith in a powerful communion of believers. Mary believes in and through the Church; she is both a model of faith and a fellow believer. She presents the archetypal model of a follower of Jesus Christ in her continued faith in him and, through him, in the Father. Mary is the beginning of the Church's faith (RM 20).

**Mary as Virgin and Mother**

Mary's virginity is another model for the Church. The Holy Spirit descended on Mary at the Annunciation; she accepted him totally by her *fiat* and lived in total fidelity to God, remaining a pure virgin vessel for him, both physically and spiritually. Likewise, the Church is called to be reserved for her Spouse alone. Some in the Church imitate Mary's virginity by taking a vow of celibacy; all are called to imitate Our Lady's total dedication to God, regardless of one's state of life.

Mary is also the mother of God, or *theotokos*, as defined by the Council of Ephesus. Jesus' conception is the fruit of love, the fruit of the union between Mary and the Holy Spirit. The fact that Jesus is truly man, as expressed by the Council of Chalcedon, is highlighted by Mary's physical motherhood, for how could a human person be a mother if her child were not also human? In this way, the truth of Mary as the mother of Jesus reveals as much about her Son as it does about her. Here Mary is a model for women who are called to motherhood, which brings forth new members into the Body of Christ.

The more important aspect of motherhood, however, is stressed in the New Testament when Jesus refers to a kind of spiritual motherhood in the Church: "But he said to them, 'My mother and my brothers are those who hear the word of God and do it'" (Luke 8:21). *Redemptoris Mater* calls this kind of motherhood more important, in that it indicates a true follower of Christ (RM 20). Yet here also Mary shows herself to be the perfect disciple of Jesus, in that she demonstrates spiritual motherhood as well as physical. No one has heard the word of God and kept it better than this virgin from Nazareth, who heard the angel's word and said *Fiat* more faithfully and completely than any other person.

This spiritual motherhood indicates that Mary's motherhood was more than the physical motherhood of a woman. The Council of Ephesus, condemned the Nestorian heresy which held that Mary was the mother only of the humanity, not the divinity, of Jesus Christ. By insisting on Mary's motherhood of God, the Church has set her up as a model here also. But how can the Church (and through her, each Christian) bear Christ? Certainly only Mary could bear Christ physically, but by a spiritual motherhood, each Christian is called to bear Christ within his soul, to conceive him in union with the Holy Spirit and to bring him to birth in the world. As member of Christ's Mystical Body, we are united to him and to his mother, and thus share in Mary's role: the Church (and every Christian) is called to be mother and sister and brother to Christ. Likewise, the Church's purpose and goal is to conceive Christ in intimate union with the Holy Spirit and to bring him to birth in the world through the activity of his Mystical Body.

Mary's motherhood embraces a third aspect, the motherhood of the faithful. As members of the Mystical Body, all Christians are children of Christ's Father and of his mother as well. Just as Paul notes that Abraham is father in faith of all believers, so Mary is our mother in faith, she who "believed that there would be a fulfillment of what was spoken to her from the Lord" (Luke 1:45). This motherhood could be said to have been conceived at Christ's conception, inasmuch as her motherhood of Christ began her involvement in salvation history. Yet as
Raniero Cantalamessa points out in *Mary: Mirror of the Church*, this motherhood is only fully realized at the Cross, that moment of "glorification" according to the Gospel of John when Jesus gives the Church in the person of the beloved disciple to Mary (119). At the time of Christ’s glorification, the redemption of mankind is "accomplished" (John 19:30), enabling us to be adopted sons and daughters of God through the redemptive action of the Son of God, thereby gaining entrance into the Mystical Body of Christ; Mary is our mother inasmuch as we are Christ’s brothers and sisters. In the language of John Paul II’s personalism, motherhood is concerned with the whole person, and in this way Mary’s motherhood reaches the heart of every person. Our Lady’s motherhood is a "gift which Christ himself makes personally to every individual" (RM 45). In this sense, Christians can glorify the Father for providing us with Our Blessed Mother’s maternal protection in his plan of salvation.

**Mary United with her Son in the Work of Salvation**

*Lumen Gentium* devotes three paragraphs to exploring Mary’s union with her Son in the work of Salvation (LG 57-59). In his hidden life, her great faith is revealed (RM 17). After the angel’s extraordinary words and Simeon’s foreboding prophecy, the quiet happy years before Jesus’s public ministry must have seemed incongruous. Yet Mary always believed that the Lord’s words to her would be fulfilled (Luke 1:45). The hidden life established her in grace for the time of the Passion, called "perhaps the deepest 'kenosis' of faith in human history" (RM 18). The Church on earth is also called to be united to Christ’s Passion when she experiences her own passions of persecution, scandal and schism; she must bear her own cross, in imitation of Christ, following Mary’s model.

Like Mary, however, the Church is drawn into the mystery of Resurrection and Pentecost, in which the new life of Christ is poured out and when the Mystical Body is formed. Mary is present both at the birth of Christ and at the birth of his Body the Church, under the Cross and at Pentecost, and she remains the "prototype of the praying Church, in that she has a constant desire for the Holy Spirit" (Cantalamessa 146). The Church’s vocation is to call down the Holy Spirit on every age and to dispense the new life of the Spirit through her sacraments.

**Mary as Mediatrix and Model**

The pilgrim Church’s purpose in her salvific activity is to attain eternal communion with the Triune God in heaven. Mary’s role as Mediatrix and model serves this purpose (LG 60, 65). The Church has always emphasized that Mary’s mediation does not diminish Christ’s primary and wholly unique mediation as Son and High Priest (Hebrews 4:14-16); rather, Mary’s mediation originates in grace and always fosters union with Jesus (RM 38). As she said at the wedding of Cana, "Do whatever he tells you" (John 2:5), always pointing to Jesus and never to herself. Her mediation began with her motherhood as fruit of her intimate union with her Son and the will of his Father (RM 39), as seen at the wedding of Cana. It continues from heaven, as she continues to intercede for the Church. Her mediation is imaged at the Eucharist, when the Church offers up the perfect sacrifice of the Son to the Father for the salvation of souls.

**Mary as the Revelation of the Church in Glory**

Mary’s Assumption reunited her with her Son and continued her intercession. It also reveals what the Church will be in glory, when all the faithful are united with God in heaven. The chapter title in *Lumen Gentium* on this point calls Our Lady the "sign of true hope and comfort for the pilgrim people of God." These themes of comfort in sorrow and hope for glory highlight the eschatological hope of the Church that is both participating in part in the Kingdom of God while working and hoping for that Kingdom’s completion.

The text of Revelations 12 provides the images of both the Sorrowful Mother and the Queen, both of which can be applied to Mary and to the Church "journeying and at journey’s end" (Rahner 105). The Church Fathers interpreted these images originally as representing the Church, and only in the fourth century did a Marian interpretation originate (Rahner 105). The Sorrowful Mother motif is expressed through the labor of childbirth and
the image of the moon which waxes and wanes. The Queen image expresses Our Lady's glorious Assumption and foreshadows the glory of the whole Church at eschaton, both promised for the future and already realized now through the sacraments (Rahner 116-117). As the victorious Woman, both Mary and the Church rejoice in the eternal joy of heaven, praising the Father who gives them both the grace to be spotless Virgins, fruitful in their maternal love and united to their Spouse through the Holy Spirit.

Thus, Mary is present at both the beginning and the end of the Christian drama. She appears at the beginning as "full of grace," a model of faith. Her life as virgin and mother show the Church what total dedication to the Father and total union with the Spirit bring about: the birth of the Son into human history. Her faithful presence in the events of salvation history, and her continuing work of love as Mediator and model, guide the Church to imitate Our Lady's example, until the Church also, after laboring to give birth, can rejoice with its children in the glory of heaven. In this way, Mary stands at the beginning of faith and at the end of history as the image of the faithful Church, to which the suffering, pilgrim Church can cleave.

The Man's Role as a Provider and a Co-Educator in the Christian Family

Peter Fletcher

In Familiaris Consortio, Pope John Paul II elucidates his understanding of the man’s role in the family as a husband and as a father. He first argues forcefully for a family structure in which the man is very present and active; he is not, however, oppressive to the point of undermining the natural dignity of the woman’s role in the household. He then defines man’s most essential role in the family: "to ensure the harmonious and united development of all the members of the family" (FC 25). The Holy Father finally defines more precisely how this role is carried out within the realms of the education of the children and the ordering of work as a means to the end of the family.

First, the Pope argues for man to accept a "more solicitous commitment to education, a task he [man] shares with his wife..." (FC 25). The word "shares" here emphasizes his unique and complementary role in the education of the children. The Pope speaks further of the role of education, not only as a "right," but as a "duty": "it is irreplaceable and inalienable... incapable of being usurped by others" (Fe 36).

What, though, do we mean when we speak of this vague and undefined word "education"? In one place the Pope puts it simply as "the vocation to growth and development" (FC 36). More precisely, it should be understood as the development of social skills, intellectual understanding, and most importantly, as spiritual growth within the truths of the Church. Pope John Paul II offers a concise list of truths which children must learn to actualize their humanity:

...1) a correct attitude of freedom with regard to material goods, being convinced that 'man is more precious for what he is than for what he has'. ...2) a sense of true justice, which alone leads to respect for the personal dignity of each individual ...3) and more powerfully by a sense of true love... understood as sincere solicitude and disinterested service with regard to others. (FC 37)
These truths give substance and greater meaning to "education" and lend a framework with which to consider man's role in it. These three basic truths (and many others) can be taught by both word and action. More concretely, understanding these truths and the need to convey them offers the father and husband three corresponding tasks: he must begin with himself by living out an attitude of the poor; he must mete and dole the laws of the household always with justice and compassion; and he must show love selflessly with total self-giving, first to his wife and then to his children. The Pope brings out this last point when he explains how "the self-giving of husband and wife for each other is the model and the norm for the self-giving that must be practiced in the relationships between brothers and sisters" (FC 37).

Finally, all these are given still more concrete meaning through the over-arching framework for the family's moral life: the Catholic Church. As members of the Church, the parents have a special mission to raise their children within the faith, and for men, this mission requires an active spiritual involvement in the aggregate life of the church and in participation of the sacraments. The Holy Father explains, "...by means of the witness he gives of an adult Christian life...[the man] effectively introduces the children into the living experience of Christ and the Church" (FC 25). Thus, through his own practice of the faith, the father teaches his children to follow in his footsteps and in this, he fully becomes a father, for he is begetting "...not only...bodily life but also the life that through the Spirit's renewal flows from the Cross and Resurrection of Christ" (FC 39).

Having expounded some of the specific aspects of the role that a man plays as co-educator in the family, it remains to be considered the greater picture of how the man's other responsibility as provider for the family relates to this other task. Pope John Paul II speaks of the family man's work as something which should "never be a cause of division in the family but promotes its unity and stability" (FC 25). This phrase is one loaded with implications and must be carefully considered.

First, we must consider the general idea: in order to view the ultimate effectiveness of a man's work, it must be laid up against the standard of its effectiveness in promoting "unity and stability." In light of man's over-arching task to "ensure the harmonious and united development of all the members of the family," the deepest meaning of "unity and stability" can only be attained if the members of the family are continually growing and thriving in Christian truth. Thus, if a man's work promotes only superficial unity and material stability, he will have failed to fulfill his role in the family. What, though, does this mean, practically, for the Christian husband and father? First of all, it excludes the common understanding that a family's strength lies in its material success. It excludes the possibility of men's thinking that the goal is merely to work as hard as possible to provide as much money as possible. Thus, the "workaholic" is not making great sacrifices but rather is abandoning his wife and family. The family must always be the standard by which to measure success.

Another way to explain this idea is to say that, by making the real effectiveness of a man's work dependent on its impact on the family, the work and family become related as a means to an end. First, a distinction should be made here between the primary end and other secondary ends: without prior fulfillment of the primary end, the secondary ends can never be fully actualized. Thus, while work may be pursued as an end in itself, offering much fulfillment to the worker, it must first be seen as a means to the primary end of the family. Simply put, work is to provide for the family first and to offer the satisfaction of work well done only in a secondary way. In no way does this idea degrade the true value of work itself, but it merely orders it to the good of the family.

Consider an example of this distinction between the primary end and other secondary ends. A doctor can, and should, feel good about his role as a servant of society. However, the fulfillment experienced in one's work can only be valid if it compliments, and is not in conflict with, the primary fulfillment which lies in the family. Thus, if that doctor's work, helping society, does not compliment his role as co-educator and help promote unity and stability in the family, his work is ultimately detrimental to society. This fact is especially true, for society is made up of families. Aristotle speaks of this in his Politics, and Pope John Paul II speaks of it when he refers to the family as "the first and vital cell of society" (FC 42). Thus, in order to find fulfillment in serving society, one must first serve that which makes up the society: the family. Here again, the family is primary and must be
considered before seeking that which is secondary. Work, however good in itself, must be considered in light of this standard: does it avoid being "a cause of division in the family," and does it "promote . . . [the family's] . . . unity and stability" (FC 25)?

In conclusion, as Pope John Paul II expounds in Familiaris Consortio, if men were to order their two main tasks, of educating and providing toward the end of "... ensur[ing] the harmonious and united development of all the members of the family," they would indeed find the fulfillment they vainly seek in their work alone. They would find that greater attentiveness to their wives and children will increase their joy in all things, because the one, crucial and primary end would be truly fulfilled. They would find that their wives might feel greater dignity as wives and mothers now that these women are not alone in the rearing of the children and the ordering of the household. They might even find, with grace and humility, that redirecting their focus from work to the family will afford them the opportunity to rediscover the fulfillment which they must have felt that first time they held their firstborn child. In fatherhood lies man's end, his dignity, and his ultimate happiness.

The Declaration of Independence vs. the Thrasymachan Political Order in Plato's Republic

Helen Lasseter

In the Republic, Glaucion puts forth a Thrasymachan political order that sets us justice and gives man rights through the social compact; the Declaration of Independence does not give rights but rather builds on a pre-existing sense of natural justice, in order to secure the rights which already exist according to nature.

Thrasymachus' view of justice is the advantage of the stronger. What is right is determined by the ability of the strong to take what they want and to do with it what they will. Taken in a political society, justice is the advantage of the ruler through others' obedience to the laws. This view of justice is that on which Glaucion builds his mock theory of the social compact.

Glaucion says that the social compact arises out of a fear of suffering injustice. It is the weak, who suffer injustice, that form this compact which creates a mean between suffering and committing injustice. The compact is profitable to those who can't escape the suffering of injustice. If he could, man would always pursue his own advantage over that of everyone else, but most men are not capable of being in this stronger position for very long. Out of fear, the weaker men make a compact, agreeing not to commit injustice. It is the set laws which say what is lawful and just.

The Declaration says that governments are instituted to secure the natural rights of men which exist according to nature but are not secured in nature. The social contract is there for the security and happiness of those within it and is instituted by the consent of the governed. It has as its end the guarantee of the natural rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. With or without government, these natural rights are still a part of man's being, but it is a just government which properly secures these rights according to the designs of the governed.
In Glaucon's theory, justice is set out in the compact as obedience to the laws which are the mean between committing and suffering injustice. Justice and rights come from the laws within the compact. It is the government which creates and then secures the rights which its members were too weak to secure outside of the compact. There is a right to nothing outside the compact except, as the Thrasymachan view says, whatever man has the power to take and keep. Thus, outside this compact, man has the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness if he is the stronger man. Glaucon's theory does not indicate that all men are equally endowed with natural rights. The American idea of justice, the proper enjoyment of man's natural rights, is not contained in Glaucon's theory of the state of nature, because man has no rights by nature. Glaucon states that the compact "is the genesis and being of justice," and so without that compact which states what is just and what is not, there are no rights, and there is no natural justice. Outside the compact, man has a right to whatever he can get. Within the compact, the laws give men rights, and justice is the obedience to those laws. The sense of justice which arises within the context of government and does not lay at the root of the formation of government.

The Declaration arises from the need for man to protect himself from the stronger, but the Declaration's view of the social compact arises out of a natural sense of justice. It upholds justice outside of the compact by stating that all men equally have the natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The laws do not give rights but are rather instituted to preserve those rights of man which already exist. The compact is formed to secure these natural rights. Injustice is seen as the infringing upon these rights, and unjust governments are those which do not secure but violate these rights. Within the context of the Declaration, obedience to the law does not necessarily constitute justice, as in Glaucon's theory. Law and government do not always equal justice, because it is not law which dictates what is just and right. Law, in the Declaration, centers around the natural sense of justice that upholds man's inherent rights. In the Declaration, justice is the preservation of these rights first and foremost within the compact, and from this it follows that it is just to obey those laws agreed upon which do secure these rights. The Declaration's sense of justice does not come from the laws which make up the compact, but the compact is rather built to preserve the justice in nature of man's rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The law builds from these rights, and the natural sense of justice within the political order comes in preserving these rights.

To Sin

Trang Truong

Charles Baudelaire expresses the sentiment of futility for pardon in "Le Rebelle." Through his diction and his poetry structure the poet suggests that one who has succumbed to Darkness will not wish to return to his initial state of innocence, even though the great love and forgiveness of God is presented to him.

Baudelaire's portrayal of the angel is unorthodox. The diction he employs describes the divine creature as a wrathful "eagle" fetching for a sinful prey with his "firm fist." It might not be the angel's intent; however, out of despair he reacts like an aggressor who "tortures" the damned one. By such a depiction, the poet implies that the frustration of the angel has been building up, and that the answer of the transgressor only reinforces what the angel dreads.
Also, Baudelaire uses poetic devices to help him convey an orderly structure that emphasizes the need of righteousness in the poem. This is illustrated through a conscientious rhythmic scheme. Furthermore, the composer utilizes alliteration with the consonants "p", "t", and "v". These hard letters serve to amplify the harshness and the drama of the words of the angel. To conclude the technical analysis of the poem, the structure needs careful attention. Of the fourteen lines, eleven are monopolized by the angel and one is granted to the sinner. This imbalance accentuates the hopelessness in attempting to convert the damned man. It illustrates that the angel has used his power of persuasion to its fullest. However, it is vain.

Since the sinner only articulates four words, they must be of importance. Robert Dupree, in attempting to preserve the rhythmic scheme, translates "je ne veus pas!" into "I will not!". However, the literal sense of these words is "I do not want to!". This has some significance in that the rebel willfully refuses to cleanse himself of his sins. These words he utters seem to convey a sense of pain, fear, and cowardice. Indeed assuming that this man of woman has fallen from grace and recognizes it, it is not simple to ask for repentance. On the other hand, it is easier to sink into sin.

Baudelaire expresses the anger and frustration of the angel as well as the fear and cowardice of the sinner in "Le Rebelle." Through his diction and poetic structure, he emphasizes the harshness and futility of the angel's action. "Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin" (John 8:34).
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